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Foreword
The challenges faced by market competition have been more widely recognized in 
the Latin American region over the last few years. There has been renewed interest 
in antitrust policies, in modernizing various regulations and achieving greater trans-
parency in the way firms operate. The relevance this topic has acquired has grown 
precisely at a time when the concentration of wealth has deepened regionally and 
globally. The lack of appropriate pro-competition legal and institutional frame-
works during the privatization process of large public enterprises in the 1980s and 
1990s and a great number of ensuing mergers and acquisitions have made possible 
frequent anti-competitive practices, adversely affecting consumers and the competi-
tiveness of producers.
In a number of public utility services essential to the economy, large privatized 
firms, formerly under public ownership, often act as monopolies. These practices 
have spread internationally. Economic liberalization and digitalization have made 
it easier to invest capital in foreign markets, but little has been done to curb abuse 
of market power in many developing countries where they operate.
This book addresses competition policies in Central America and Mexico, 
particularly in the banking and telecommunications sectors, in which market distor-
tions have led to low levels of efficiency and competitiveness. In the cases of both 
of these sectors, access to credit and a modern telecommunications system is vital 
for the constant innovation and efficiency of their services. On the other hand, 
access to these services has become part of the population’s basic well-being. The 
arrival of foreign direct investment (both regional and international) in the banking 
system and in the telecommunications sector has not produced improvement in 
quality or more competitive prices of these services in most of the countries studied. 
An effectively enforced competition policy can go a long way towards strengthening 
these sectors, among others, especially in small economies where this policy faces 
many obstacles set up by strong economic and political interests.
The experiences of the seven countries studied in this volume are a valuable 
point of reference for competition policy officials, who are either adapting their 
laws in order to strengthen and adjust them to their own realities, or else are enforcing 
newly enacted competition laws for the first time. The studies included in this book 
also provide a wide range of experiences in the difficult relationship that usually 
v
exists between competition policy officials and sector regulators and suggest ways 
of improving their cooperation.
This volume contains the most important results of the project “Strengthening 
Competition in the Central American Isthmus: National Policies and Institutions, 
Regional Coordination and Participation in International Negotiations”, funded by 
International Development Research Center (IDRC) and implemented by Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). Within this project 18 
national studies were carried out: three in each country of the Central American 
Isthmus covering general competition conditions, competition and regulation policy 
in the banking sector, and competition and regulation policy in the telecommunications 
sector. These documents, together with three similar studies on Mexico, nurtured 
three chapters of comparative analysis in this book. Another two chapters show a 
country case study of competition policy application (Costa Rica) and a sector case 
study – competition within the banking system – in Mexico. Finally, the conclusions 
of the book are presented in an international perspective, where the experiences of 
third developing countries are brought up and enrich the findings of the book.
The efforts to improve competition conditions in the region have increased, but 
there is a long way to go. We can expect knowledge and experience to develop 
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Claudia Schatan and Eugenio Rivera
The need for an efficient functioning of markets has been gaining progressive 
recognition in the developing countries as a mechanism to supply goods and services 
at reasonable prices for consumers, inputs at competitive prices for producers and 
for levelling the playing field for potential competing companies, including small 
and medium-sized ones.
Between the 1950s and the 1980s, the control of prices, interest rates and 
imports in Latin America guaranteed the development of the national industry, as 
well as the access of population and producers to essential services and to banking 
credits at preferential rates. This situation became impossible to sustain after the 
mid-1980s. The over-indebtedness, the enormous fiscal deficits and a growing lag 
in the competitiveness of the productive sector, among other factors, ended the 
aforementioned policies. Therefore, an effort to promote the good functioning of 
markets was, and continues to be, one of the routes that can help these developing 
economies to ensure a suitable behaviour of economic actors. However, that has not 
happened in a spontaneous way despite the macroeconomic policies of opening and 
deregulation. That is why the competition policy becomes indispensable to eliminate 
distortions in the markets.
This book focuses on the development and the challenges that the competition 
policy faces in Latin American countries, with a special interest in the small economies 
of Central America. Most of the latter countries have incorporated competition 
policies with a considerable lag in their governmental agendas. Thus, the main aim 
of this book is to analyse the market distortions in that region, the legal and institutional 
competition instruments governments rely on and those that could be developed to 
face such distortions.
The competition policy – understanding by that, mainly, the antitrust law and 
the competition agency in charge of applying it – has faced serious difficulties in 
the Central American Isthmus. There is a fertile land for anti-competitive practices 
in this region given its numerous national markets of reduced size and its concentrated 
productive structure, especially in the non-traded product areas. These markets 
often shelter horizontal monopolistic practices (e.g. agreements among producers of 
goods or similar services to fix prices, to fragment markets geographically), as well 
as vertical practices (e.g. conditioning of input purchasing or input sales; establishing 
contracts of exclusivity in the distribution and sale of goods). It is particularly 
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important for the competition agencies to distinguish concentrations that respond to 
a necessity of a greater firm size required by a technological innovation which will 
improve industry efficiency from the practices that search the increase in profit 
margins through monopolistic power.1
The scarce resources of competition agencies in countries with little human and 
financial capital call for a special effort to adapt the competition policies commonly 
used in developed countries to their own realities. Social conditions lagging behind, 
the great number of small and medium-sized firms and the exposure of competition 
authorities to be “captured” by groups of interest demand a careful design of 
competition policies in those countries (see Schatan and Avalos, 2006).2
Besides making a comparative and critical analysis of the Central American 
countries’ experience (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua 
and Panama), additional reference points are taken into account in this book, especially 
from Mexico. Among the Latin American countries, Mexico is the closest to 
Central America, not only geographically but also in competition policy subjects. 
In fact, Mexico has had a strong influence on the laws of this region, so that it is a 
forced reference when studying the countries of the Isthmus. Although the latter 
nation differs in size from the former ones, they share a similar cultural, legal and 
institutional background. The competition authorities in Mexico have had to find 
ingenious solutions, not always successfully, to solve difficult cases in a relatively 
weak institutional framework. A helpful aspect of the Mexican competition policy is 
the cumulative experience regarding the notification to the competition authority 
obligation prior to the merger.
It is important to point out that the combination of supports and resistances faced 
in order to engender the competition policy explains the degree of speed upon 
which such policies were introduced in the studied countries. Between 2004 and 
2006, progress has been fast, since three countries enacted their competition law for 
the first time and two others revised them. The sequence of law enactment in the 
seven countries under study is the following: Mexico (1992, and amended in 2006), 
Costa Rica (1995), Panama (1996, and amended in 2006), El Salvador (2004), 
Honduras (February 2006) and Nicaragua (October 2006).3 Guatemala was still in 
the process of discussing a law project at the end of 2006. The experience gathered 
by the first countries that enacted competition laws has been very useful for the rest 
of the countries.
This book also analyses the specific conditions and policies of competition in 
two strategic sectors – telecommunications and banking – in six Central American 
countries and Mexico. These two sectors are crucial as much for the possibilities of 
1 For greater details on restrictive competition practices, see UNCTAD (2004).
2 On the economic groups formation and the role played by them in Central America, see Segovia 
(2006).
3 The studies contained in this book were concluded in September 2006, i.e. before the Nicaraguan 
competition law enactment (October 2006); hence, this legal change is not taken into account in 
the chapters of this book.
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advancing economies more quickly in the technological innovation and competitiveness 
as for increasing population’s well-being. This is important since inter communication 
has become a basic need for society, as has the access to credit and banking services. 
The Central American region, to a greater or lesser degree, still suffers from a lag in 
the access to these services. This situation is, partly, a consequence of an incapacity of 
oligopolies and monopolies (until recently public) to respond to the increasing 
demand of population and companies to these services. These two strategic sectors 
have also been highly regulated. However, this regulation has neglected the conse-
quences of maintaining a highly concentrated market and has not demanded a 
competitive behaviour from companies.
In the telephony sector, the countries under study show different trajectories in 
privatization and liberalization, as well as in their market performance. In all of 
these countries, however, this service has improved substantially since the incorpo-
ration of the mobile telephony. This technology has allowed the expansion of 
telephone connections at an accelerated rate and has been able to respond to a long-time 
dissatisfied demand. Meanwhile, in spite of its expansion, the fixed telephony 
shows that it is still lagging behind. As will be seen in this book, the behaviour of 
agents in the market has shown different results in different market segments 
(mobile telephony and fixed telephony). Private monopolies that emerged from the 
privatization have had comparatively a much greater capacity to remain as the only 
company in the fixed telephony market (specially those companies to which the 
government gave an exclusive concession for several years) as compared to the 
mobile telephony sector, where there has been more space for the entrance of new 
companies. In any case, the companies that managed to hold on as monopolies at a 
national level have tended to dominate not only national markets but also regional 
and international ones. From this reinforced position, and helped by the convergence 
of networks and services, these monopolies also have progressively been positioning 
themselves in the market of mobile telephony, while increasing the competition in 
this market. Nevertheless, the increasing presence of regional duopolies in tele-
communications and the competition policy’s institutional weakness may frustrate 
the possibility to improve competition further. In a context of high barriers to the 
entrance and weak competition policies, the strong and generalized dominion of 
companies such as Telefónica and Telmex-América Móvil may encourage large 
companies to distribute markets among themselves and hence dominate most of 
them in the telecommunication sector.
Like in other countries and regions, the banking sector is one of the most State-
regulated markets. This is because its inadequate operation can cause potential 
economic imbalances. In fact, this sector’s lack of solidness led to diverse insolvency 
crises, especially during the first half of the 1990s. Since then, the countries of the 
region have subscribed the Basel Protocol, which has led to the introduction of 
international norms of financial supervision and to other mechanisms in order to 
guarantee the sector’s stability. These measures have had the aim of improving the 
capitalization and financial soundness of the banking system. On the other hand, 
this has led to a greater market concentration. Nevertheless, the mere concentration 
in the market structure is not an indicator of abuse of market power. In fact, the 
4 C. Schatan, E. Rivera
information technology, the offshore operations and the greater facility for the free 
flow of international capitals have introduced a greater contestability in the banking 
system of Central America and Mexico. But important anti-competitive practices 
persist in this sector, and the Mexican case, studied in this book, is quite illustrative 
of this behaviour.
Costa Rica has been the country that accounts for the richest experience in the 
field of competition policy in Central America. This country not only was one of 
the first countries in signing an antitrust law and in creating a competition authority 
(Comisión de la Promoción de la Competencia, CPC), but its legal and institutional 
design also made the processing of hundreds of cases possible throughout ten years 
or more. This experience contrasts with the case of Panama, which has been limited 
by its unavoidable bond with the judicial system. The study on Costa Rica provides 
a detailed analysis of the most important cases taken by the CPC, from its creation, 
obstacles, the useful instruments available for their solution, to the learned lessons 
and the best international practices.
Although it goes beyond the objective of this book, it is important to point out 
that the obstacles faced by small economies to have an effective legal and institu-
tional competition framework could be lessened through regional and international 
cooperation. Such cooperation has already begun to take place in trade agreements 
both among Latin American countries and with third countries. Nevertheless, a 
solid competition policy is needed at a national level. The competition clauses can 
include a wide spectrum, from cooperation involving consultations between com-
petition authorities to the joint resolution of anti-competitive practices affecting 
countries in the region. On these lines, an important case is the agreement reached 
by the Andean Community, which has a Competition Commission with supranational 
powers. Countries in the region lacking an antitrust law of their own can use such 
an agreement.4 Nevertheless, the latter regional administrative entity has not 
reached the expected results, which has led to a reform in the agreement in 2005. 
Among the most influential changes carried out by the Andean Community are the 
greater competencies given to national agencies of competition. Therefore, strong 
national institutions are needed to support the growing mutual support in competition 
issues in a context of economic integration (Silva and Alvarez, 2006). Likewise, 
cooperation between developed and developing countries – key to approach 
anti-competitive practices of multinational companies – requires a greater institu-
tional soundness from the latter countries. Otherwise, the competition policy insti-
tutions in the developed countries would prevent developing countries from the 
access to their information because they would fear that this could be handled in an 
inadequate way (Stewart, 2005).
The three following chapters have been elaborated based on seven national 
studies (six in Central America and Mexico). Chapter 2 analyses the competition 
policy laws in these seven countries. Chapter 3 presents a comparative analysis in 
the telecommunications sector for the same group of nations. There is also a 
4 Bolivia and Ecuador.
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regional comparative analysis for the banking sector in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 
reviews the main case studies in Costa Rica, the country with the richest experience 
in competition policies in Central America. It emphasizes the obstacles faced as 
well as the lessons learned by the competition agency in that country. Chapter 6 
contains a study on competition policy in the Mexican banking system which, 
notwithstanding its greater openness to foreign investment over the last years, is 
still considerably inefficient. This is a valuable point of reference for the Central 
American region where foreign capital is quickly starting to make its way into the 
financial market. Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes and interprets the main findings for 
Central America and for Mexico of the research conducted for this volume and 
relates those findings to the experiences of nascent competition agencies in other 
developing countries.
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Chapter 2
Markets in Central America and Mexico: 
What Is Happening with Competition?
Eugenio Rivera and Claudia Schatan
Introduction1
Given their lack of competition, market functioning in Central America2 has 
become a topic of growing importance and attention. In recent years competition 
policy has evolved rapidly throughout Latin America, and has been included in the 
policy agenda of governments throughout the region.3 The purpose of this text is to 
evaluate the means by which some Central American countries have ratified com-
petition laws, to analyse the characteristics of those laws or of the bills that are 
currently the subject of congressional debate and to identify the principal problems 
they experience while exploring possible solutions. Some existing laws or bills in 
Central America were influenced by those of Mexico, a country that has been 
applying such legislation for more than a decade (since 1992). That precedent justi-
fies the inclusion of an analysis of that country as a reference point for much of the 
research carried out in this book.
This work assesses the reasons why those countries that have had such laws in 
place for a decade or more (Costa Rica, Panama and Mexico) have had to make 
changes to their competition laws in order to strengthen competition agencies. In 
the case of those nations that have only recently approved this legal and institu-
tional framework, which is to say El Salvador (2004) and Honduras (2006), this 
study depicts the challenges they have faced in overcoming deep-seated opposition 
to approving such laws, as well as the extent to which they contain advances 
compared to their predecessors. Lastly, we point out the obstacles to approving 
such legislation in the two countries that have yet to adopt a competition law, 
Guatemala and Nicaragua. As was the case in El Salvador and Honduras, the 
1 This chapter was concluded in September 2006. Nicaraguan competition law was enacted in 
October, 2006, so it is only considered as a law project in the analysis of this chapter.
2 For the purpose of this book, the Central American Isthumus includes the following countries: 
Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama. Belize is not included 
because not enough information on competition was available in that country.
3 Competition law is a legal instrument for broad application that is aimed at promoting and pro-
tecting market competition.
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resistance in these last two countries emerged from an optimistic view of the market’s 
self-regulating capabilities as well as a deep-seated opposition from within the 
business world. With the exception of Guatemala, however, a conviction developed 
throughout the region that the lack of a competition policy constitutes an insur-
mountable obstacle to achieving proper resource allocation and efficiency at the 
level of production. Within this analytical context, this chapter reflects on the expe-
rience and the most adequate competition framework for small economies and 
developing ones such as those of Central America. This reflection also seeks 
mechanisms for strengthening legal bodies that attend to competition problems, as 
well as the forms that help to politically value the issue of competition in a way that 
allows it to become a true priority in governmental agendas.
In synthesis, competition has recently assumed great importance and become the 
subject of considerable activity in the countries under study. Whether at a swift or 
plodding pace, countries have elaborated proposals, approved laws or sought to 
present their legislatures with major reform bills in an effort to improve competition 
conditions. This process has taken place at a time when considerable progress has 
been achieved on the level of competition policy worldwide. By 2006, there were 
14 countries in the Americas with competition laws and a competition authority,4 
approximately half of which had been adopted sometime around the middle of the 
1990s. All other developing countries have since made progress on this front. 
Nevertheless, this remains a controversial subject for such economies as was appar-
ent in 2001, when it proved impossible to include the Singapore issues, including 
that of competition, in the Doha Round of the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
Although Doha took up the question of competition (in response to a proposal from 
the European Union), it did so in the specific hope of keeping the benefits of trade 
opening from falling under the control of major corporations that might ally in 
cartels or adopt other anti-competitive practices to assure themselves of monopoly-
scale profit margins. Many developing countries have expressed the need to expand 
their ability to implement competition policies by assuming multilateral commit-
ments under which they could apply trade sanctions whenever competition rules are 
not respected.
There exists an undeniable need for competition policy in Central American 
countries.5 As with most developing countries, during the decade of the 1980s the 
region experienced a foreign-debt crisis and a dramatic upswing in oil prices that 
led to a scaling back of the economic intervention capabilities of governments, 
while leaving the market to assume a much larger role in the resource allocation 
within the economy. The deep distortions markets experienced following the 
privatization of large-scale publicly owned companies and the deregulation of 
prices and trade, to name a couple of key developments that got under way in the 
4 International Competition Network (ICN) web site [online] (www.international competitionnet-
work.org/).
5 While many types of economic policies affect the conditions of competition, such as trade policy, 
we will not focus on such matters because they are beyond the scope of this study.
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mid-1980s, show that such markets have failed to spontaneously operate in a 
healthy manner, thereby making it necessary to regulate the behaviour of industry 
protagonists. Owing to a series of conflicts of interest between various groups within 
each country, several governments failed to intervene as needed.
The circumstances described above, their impact on economic growth, as well 
as their adverse effect on distribution and competitiveness dispelled optimism as to 
markets’ self-regulating capabilities. The result was to make competition policy an 
indispensable aspect of a successful economic reform.
In what follows, Section I develops a conceptual framework for facilitating the 
analysis of competition policy in small developing economies (SDC). Section II 
studies the processes that led to ratification of competition law in Costa Rica, 
El Salvador, Honduras and Panama, as well as the obstacles to approving such leg-
islation in the remaining countries in the region, including those that only recently 
managed to get such laws passed. We also analyse the factors that are weighing 
either in favour of, or against approval of, such bills that are currently under discus-
sion. Section III offers a detailed analysis of the characteristics of the legal frameworks 
that are already in place or which are currently being considered. This section 
also takes up the institutional characteristics of the defence of competition in 
Mexico, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras and Panama as well as the institutional 
environment envisioned in bills that are pending approval by some countries in the 
region. Section IV considers the role of the judicial system in applying such laws 
while exploring the reasons underpinning the grave problems encountered in trying 
to achieve an effective defence of competition. In Section V, we explore competi-
tion conditions prevailing in some markets in the region, as well as some pertinent 
cases that have been resolved in Costa Rica and Panama. This chapter ends with a 
series of conclusions in Section VI.
I.  Competition Policy: A Necessity in Small 
and Developing Economies?
1. General Context
Two decades after most countries in the region introduced a series of economic reforms, 
several of which were directed towards improving market functioning in order to opti-
mize allocated and productive efficiency, the results have generally proven to be frus-
trating on the level of competition conditions, although some signs are encouraging. 
The persistence of barriers to entry, especially those related to the ability of firms and 
business associations to influence public policy, leads to a variety of distortions that 
affect the development of market competition and which have proven impervious to 
change despite trade openings and other pro-free trade economic reforms.
At the outset of the economic reform, doubts emerged as to the need for, or 
usefulness of, including competition laws as part of the reform. Powerfully influenced 
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by analytical focuses such as unrestricted market access theory (Baumol et al., 
1982), some analysts maintained that to the extent that tariff and non-tariff trade 
barriers, as well as legal entry barriers to various industries, could be swept away 
by an active deregulation process, markets would function better and even opti-
mally. Some writers holding a different perspective questioned the convenience 
or possibility of applying a competition policy in a context marked by incompe-
tent governmental institutions or, worse yet, that could be dominated by private 
interests. From these analysts’ perspective, a maximalist application of competi-
tion law could inhibit corporate freedom and restrict the rewards that firms should 
otherwise derive from the functioning of markets (Khemani and Dutz, 1996).
International experience has been categorical in showing that even when the 
liberalization of international trade introduces important competitive pressures 
to domestic markets, it offers no direct guarantee that these will function properly. 
In fact, while products more easily enter markets, there is nothing to keep 
importers and distributors from taking unfair advantage of their market power 
when marketing their products. In this way trade liberalization in and of itself 
does nothing to eliminate the propensity of firms to adopt anti-competitive 
practices. Similarly, privatization in no way assures that companies will behave 
better than their public sector predecessors as they are capable of erecting 
private anti-competitive barriers in the place of state ones (Cernat and Holmes, 
2004; Schatan and Avalos, 2006).
It is worth noting that even when large and developed countries enjoy conditions 
propitious for market competition, some argue the existence of innate imperfections 
derived, for example, from the existence of change costs, especially for non-standardized 
products or commodities such as sugar, flour or other goods with characteristics that 
are difficult to differentiate. As Klemperer (1995) has pointed out, the cost of 
change arises out of the need for compatibility between newly acquired items and 
existing equipment in order to avoid the transaction costs that arise from having to 
change the supplier. Other costs that derive from change are learning how to use 
new brands, those related to uncertainties as to the quality of unfamiliar brands, the 
loss of discount coupons and similar mechanisms and, lastly, the psychological 
costs that accompany change or the abandoning of brand loyalty for non-economic 
reasons. All of these costs tend to raise prices and to provoke oligopoly-related 
deadweight losses, thereby discouraging the entry of new companies and reducing 
market competition.6
6 From a different perspective, some analysts substantiate the need for competition legislation on 
the basis of three factors. First, there is no proper controversy resolution mechanism owing to a 
lack of the litigation legislation needed to assure a perfect adjudication. Second, the costs for 
obtaining information or the transaction costs that may be incurred by those affected by a monop-
oly practice prove to be greater than the costs of those who engage in such practices and, third, it 
is less costly to adjudicate through a specialized body than by a regular civil court (Sánchez 
Ugarte, 2004).
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The anomalies described above tend to occur in economies that enjoy 
competition-conducive conditions, which is to say large and developed countries, 
but the irregularities are much greater in the markets of developing economies 
and, even more so, in those which are small.
2. Small Economies: An Elusive Concept
Proposals that tend to formulate and win approval for competition promotion 
legislation have sparked a series of questions and debates among SDC. These 
include: (i) whether such economies need competition legislation or, in contrast, 
whether trade liberalization and deregulation suffice to generate a self-regulating 
market economy; (ii) what SDC means when speaking of market competition; 
(iii) whether the specific characteristics of such countries demand particular 
types of competition laws and policies or require an adaptation of the existing 
ones in the way in which they should be applied; and (iv) in light of the charac-
teristics of such nations should competition policy add to its list of goals helping 
to achieve social objectives?
This study focuses primarily on Central American countries, which are small and 
developing economies. There is a limited body of literature analysing small 
economies and competition, and even less dealing with the topic in relation to SDC. 
Further complicating matters, the authors of such literature employ different con-
cepts of what constitutes a small economy, and some even regard this as an unnecessary 
analytical category. In our view, the Central American economies are characterized 
by specific features that demand that the competition policies applied in large devel-
oped economies – which are by no means homogeneous – undergo a certain degree 
of adaptation.
In practice there is no specific view of competition for SDC. An initial focus for 
dealing with small economies that tend to be better developed was provided by Gal 
(2001), who defines a small economy as one that in the case of most industries is 
capable of sustaining only a reduced number of competitors in the face of limited 
domestic demand. The factors that help determine the scope of the market include 
the size of the population, how it is distributed and trade openness. According to 
this logic, a reduced market affects the three principal indicators of social well-
being: efficiency in resource allocation, efficiency in production and dynamic effi-
ciency. According to this outlook, three characteristics of small economies make 
competition in their markets more complicated: high degrees of concentration, 
diverse entry barriers and suboptimum production levels, which is to say below the 
minimum efficient scale (MES) that imposes upon them elevated production costs 
(Gal, 2003). The principal consequence of these considerations for competition 
policy in small economies is that they must make economic efficiency their principal 
objective because they are in no position to sacrifice it in favour of achieving 
broader objectives such as social goals. In this regard, Gal proposes that small 
economies, unlike the large ones, approve concentrations that expand the size of 
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corporations so as to broaden dynamic efficiency, even as such transactions tend to 
curb competition. In this regard, De León (2006) points out how difficult it is for a 
competition agency in a small developing country to determine up to which point 
the actions of companies that expand their size favour dynamic efficiency, an issue 
tightly linked to technological innovation and to what extent actions such as mergers 
and acquisitions undermine competitors.
Gal has her critics, including Simon Evenett (n.d.), who believe that Gal’s 
concept of small economy fails to offer characteristics that truly distinguish them 
from the largest economies. The alleged peculiarity that these countries display on 
the level of firm size (MES) applies to very specific cases in which imposing barriers 
to entry exist. From our point of view, Gal’s analysis is mainly based on the situation 
of countries that are highly protected and to a certain extent isolated from the inter-
national economy in ways many countries experienced before the economic 
reforms that began in the 1980s became generalized. Nevertheless, her analysis 
remains pertinent for markets of non-tradable services.
On the other hand, Gal’s concept of small economies (2001) is too skewed if we 
recall that this category extends to include Australia, Canada, Israel and New 
Zealand. In such a context it is difficult to analyse through the prism of competition 
conditions the sort of SDC that exist in Central America, especially the smallest of 
these such as the Caribbean nations studied by Stewart (2006).
It is interesting to note the opposite side of small economies from the one that 
Gal contemplates, which is to say those of Caribbean countries that Stewart (2006) 
studies. In reality each of these two groups suffers very distinct market problems. 
Stewart argues that for many countries of the Caribbean Community (Caricom), the 
problem resides in the extent to which such small economies make it difficult for 
competitive firms to exist, thereby limiting their capacity for technological progress. 
Rather than generate their own technology, countries on these islands import it, so 
they invest practically nothing in their own research and development, thereby 
limiting their ability to generate dynamic efficiency. She adds that there are “sub-optimal 
levels of production, since a considerably large fraction of all output is produced in 
sub-optimal volumes and sub-optimal plants, leading firms to be inefficient and 
internationally uncompetitive”7 (Stewart, 2006).
Furthermore, Stewart holds that the insertion of small economies into the global 
economy and international trade exposes them to competition from multinational 
corporations, which are capable of displacing local companies and, in the process, 
gravely undermining employment and the provisioning of food in such economies. 
According to the author, in such instances it would be totally justifiable if the 
objectives of competition policy were to be subordinated to social concerns.
We may deduce from this that the problem that the tiny countries of the 
Caribbean encounter from trade opening is the substitution of the domestic produc-
tion of basic goods by international sources and its grave impact on employment 
7 Quoted from the author’s original text in English (unpublished in such language), p. 5.
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with no possibility of generating additional economic activities, thus Stewart’s 
conclusion on the need to subordinate competition policy to social objectives.
Central American nations stand somewhere between the two extremes studied by 
Gal (2001, 2003) and Stewart (2006). Trade liberalization has not produced a dis-
placement of local production in these countries on the scale that Stewart describes. 
Within such nations there exists a wide range of products that can be produced by 
companies in the category of medium-sized enterprises (MSE), or the same effect 
can be achieved through exports to the rest of the region or countries beyond.
For SDC on the scale of Central American countries, the elimination of entry 
barriers to new products may expand economic activity. There are greater similarities 
between Central American and Caribbean countries in the extent to which economic 
and political power is concentrated into a few hands, a consolidation which facilitates 
collusion and other anti-competitive practices. In relation to such features, Gal (2004) 
emphasizes these societies’ lack of a competitive culture, the political influences 
exerted on competition authorities and the interests of groups linked to major corpora-
tions among others characteristics8 that greatly limit the possibility of applying an 
effective competition policy. In such a panorama, Gal suggests making a priority of 
competition promotion and competition advocacy9 as a means for discouraging anti-
competitive practices and postponing the formal establishment of legal and institu-
tional competition channels. From another perspective, however, she advises that a 
competition authority that monitors and acts in cases of anti-competitive practices may 
also serve as a means of competition advocacy combined with significant effects 
designed to dissuade such behaviour.
In practice, economic reforms in developing countries have been – or are in the 
process of being – accompanied by the creation of indispensable regulatory and 
competition institutions. Nevertheless, these bodies at first tend to be characterized 
as congenitally weak and are suspected of tending towards an incorrigible tendency 
towards arbitrariness. These bodies’ weakness is accentuated when they are 
dependent on judicial-deficient mechanisms to review their rulings, frequently neu-
tralizing their effectiveness.10 In regulatory spheres, this situation has frequently 
translated into excessively generous tariff policies that at least partially explain the 
possibility for incumbents to expand their companies more than they would have 
been able to under genuine competition conditions, for example by means of an 
8 It is noteworthy that the author points out that in developing countries the intention of achieving 
economic efficiency and competitiveness cannot be isolated goals and that competition must at 
times be subordinated to certain social objectives, especially those which concern distributive 
matters. These contrasts with the outlook this writer expressed in earlier works: ‘Therefore, social 
objectives should have little or no weight in the formulation of competition policies in small 
economies’ (Gal, 2001, p. 1452).
9 Competition advocacy generally refers to two types of activity: those that consist of promoting 
competition culture and the issuing of opinions on the impact of competition laws and norms.
10 This situation contrasts with that of developed countries. In England, for example, jurisdictional 
authorities generally assume that the regulatory authority serves the public interest and, as a con-
sequence, firms are reluctant to carry their disputes before such judicial authorities.
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aggressive policy of takeovers.11 In the specific field of competition, the panorama 
described above has contributed to undercutting the effectiveness of competition 
policy that in some countries has led to a sense of generalized impunity in this field. 
A case in point is the extent to which such violators excessively recur to an amparo 
(in the region’s legal systems, an amparo is a frequently used appeal alleging a vio-
lation of constitutional rights that can act as a stay or injunction against government 
decisions, in both regulatory and judicial proceedings). In this way institutional 
deficiencies, particularly on the level of competition, can obstruct the development 
process by deterring economic agents from adopting salutary practices. 
Notwithstanding these problems, as we shall see further in this text, the countries 
under study have made progress towards overcoming such problems. But while the 
Central American countries, as well as Mexico, remain far from achieving a truly 
effective competition policy, it is encouraging to see the extent to which they have 
strengthened the process both as they have managed to draw on the experience 
accumulated over at least a decade into greater efficiency and in the extent to which 
the judicial system has grown more skilful (Costa Rica is a good example of this).
3.  Some Additional Peculiarities of Small 
Developing Economies
Small and developing economies are highly susceptible to anti-competitive practices 
due to a series of issues that we dealt with in Section I of this chapter. Under these 
circumstances, some policy instruments assume particular importance, especially 
regulation. In effect, whenever several markets traditionally characterized by the 
presence of natural monopolies have been progressively undercut by competition 
the possibility has been posed of eliminating that sector’s regulatory authorities and 
leaving supervision of such industries exclusively in the hands of competition agencies. 
New Zealand is the paradigmatic example in this regard. Nevertheless, it has 
become clear that over an extended period of time aspects peculiar to natural 
monopolies coexist with those of a competitive environment, thereby assuring the 
need to maintain regulatory policies. In effect, it is necessary to sustain tariffication 
in many of these industries and anti-competitive behaviour acquires forms that 
demand the intervention of agencies that specialize in the sector. Such situations 
assume even greater significance in the countries that we analysed and which face 
international operators in these types of sectors.12
In addition, developing countries and, even more so, the small ones in this 
category are in need of regulations that afford foreign investors security. In the case 
11 For the case of telecommunications, see Mariscal and Rivera (2005a, b, 2007).
12 In this regard see the chapters of this book that analyse competition in banking and 
telecommunications.
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of the countries we deal with in this study, Levy and Spiller (1996) offer an analysis 
of the advisability of defending investors against the risk of expropriation that should 
be taken into account. The regulatory framework should stimulate private investors, 
especially those from abroad, by employing two complementary mechanisms to 
restrict arbitrary administrative actions: first, by imposing substantial restrictions on 
discretional administrative action and, second, by putting into place formal and 
informal restrictions on making changes to regulatory systems and institutions that 
are designed to reinforce such restrictions. In the countries under study, the job of 
guaranteeing the rights of foreign investors is further backed by investment accords 
between countries. Such agreements are designed to provide foreign investors pro-
tection and non-discriminatory treatment, as well as to establish clear rules on earn-
ings repatriation, controversy resolution mechanisms and the rules under which 
compensation is to be determined in the case of an expropriation, to list a few. While 
these concerns may appear reasonable in principle, a doubt emerges as to whether 
one is exaggerating the importance of investor protections to the detriment of con-
sumers, which can explain the excessively high rates charged by major, privatized 
corporations for publicly necessary services (e.g. telephony services in some of the 
countries under study). A similar risk involving competition is to be found in some 
sectors. in an effort to attract greater investment, policies on competition and con-
centrations are left lax. It would appear indispensable to understand that only strict 
policy can assure the desired benefits from foreign investment.
A very important feature of competition conditions in Central America is the 
influence exerted by international concentration processes on the level of produc-
tion (telecommunications and banks, among others). This phenomenon has 
emerged out of the massive wave of mergers and takeovers that got under way in 
the 1990s and continues unabated. The technological advances that allows various 
sectors to achieve greater flexibility in production should help open the market to a 
greater number of competitors, but while that has been the case to a certain extent 
(wireless phone service and electric power distribution, to cite two examples among 
others), it has failed to adequately offset the aforementioned concentration process, 
and frequently it is the same major corporations that take advantage of such 
technologies to diversify production and in this way further strengthen their 
conglomerates. While this is by no means an exclusively SDC phenomenon, and is 
more of a generalized process, such countries require a special effort as they lack 
the sufficiently powerful competition-policy instruments needed to limit market 
power abuses by major corporations within their countries. Singh (2004), for 
example, suggests that the defence of competition in developing countries would 
best be conducted on a regional level in order to counteract the power of the afore-
mentioned multinational firms, and argues that national authorities are too weak to 
apply competition principles inside each country in an independent manner. Singh 
proposes the need for a supranational body to regulate the behaviour of this type of 
firms and limit their ability to expand through mergers and acquisitions, the effects 
of which are predominantly anti-competitive. In this sense, he coincides to a certain 
extent with Adhikari and Knight (2004), who propose regional rather than national 
competition policies. Both positions deserve greater study.
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In synthesis, the characteristics of SDC such as those of Central America that 
demand special attention in the formulation or reformulation of competition policies 
are as follows:
• The public’s lack of competition culture and the heavy weight of the corporate 
organization of production on consumer mentality.
• Concentration of economic and political power in a few families, thereby com-
plicating the independence of competition authorities and facilitating the capture 
of public entities by powerful economic interests. This is a characteristic closely 
associated with a precarious rule of law.
• Scarcity of financial and human resources for the creation of institutional struc-
tures strong enough to combat anti-competitive practices.
• An abundance of small and medium-sized firms and their lack of national and 
global competitiveness. They may achieve a more viable entry into the interna-
tional market by forming alliances among themselves – export cartels – in which 
case competition law would have to be applied only to the anti-competitive 
practices of truly large-scale firms.
• Given the small scale of these markets, regulation is especially important for 
achieving a more proper behaviour on the part of the companies that operate 
within them. This is especially valid in the case of markets for non-tradable 
public utility services.
• The judicial system of the countries under study is extremely precarious and 
lacks the capacity necessary for efficiently managing cases that competition 
authorities might tackle.
• Each country’s abilities to combat anti-competitive practices are weak in the 
face of the growing international trend towards a concentration of production (in 
telecommunications, banking and others), so regional cooperation is indispensable 
in this regard.
II.  Economic Reform and the Rise of Competition 
Law in Central American Countries
Central American countries, as in the case of many others, promoted broad 
programmes of economic reform as far back as the 1980s, and with particular vigour 
beginning in the 1990s. The reform programmes in some of these nations lagged 
owing to serious problems arising out of acute political crises, which in various 
instances escalated into civil wars. Nevertheless, things began to regain a sense of 
normalcy beginning early in the 1990s and significant efforts to achieve economic 
reform got under way. During an initial phase, these policies came in response to the 
problems that the traditional model of development began to experience in recent 
decades, the onset of a new intellectual mood both locally and internationally and the 
pressures exerted by international financial bodies amid the foreign-debt crisis that 
erupted at the beginning of the 1980s. Such developments prompted countries in the 
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region to try and find a new way to insert themselves into the international economy. 
Some of the reforms from this period were conducted in the absence of the sort of 
legal and institutional framework essential to their success. Those that were aimed at 
leaving resource allocation in the hands of the market and relieving the state of that 
burden did so without creating conditions that would have allowed these markets to 
function properly once the deregulations, privatizations and trade and financial open-
ings occurred. Such weaknesses have heightened concern within all of the countries 
under study for the need to establish new measures for overcoming the limitations of 
the initial economic reforms. One such measure was the introduction of competition 
policies in the 1990s or in the middle of the current decade, which is to say less than 
ten years since the first wave of reforms were implemented.
As the current decade began, the countries of the region were at varying stages of 
progress on competition matters and offered a rich amalgam of situations (Table 2.1). 
In 2005, some of them (Costa Rica, Panama and Mexico) were already revising laws 
that had been put into place roughly ten years earlier, others (El Salvador and 
Honduras) had just adopted a law that drew on some of the accumulated experience 
of the first group of countries, and the last two countries, Guatemala and Nicaragua, 
were continuing to debate either a draft of a law or a final bill, respectively. Most of 
the laws and drafts of competition law built on Mexico’s experience and legislation.
A series of elements, such as the insistence and support of international bodies, 
served as an impetus to competition policies in the region (see Schatan and 
Avalos, 2006). The heterogeneous response to the stimuli and/or demand from such 
international agencies depended on specific circumstances in each country includ-
ing the power wielded by major corporations and the extent to which governments 
could function independently of power groups. Even in the countries that have 
competition laws and authorities, their characteristics (their strengths and weak-
nesses) depend on the degree of resistance exerted nationally by various sectors 
when the draft laws were being negotiated with the various groups. We can describe 
at least three situations in this regard within Central America:
• Countries that have implemented extremely broad economic reforms, including 
massive privatizations, and which have adopted competition laws and regulatory 
bodies. Panama has been in this situation since 1994, while El Salvador and 
Honduras joined this group in 2006. Honduras’ privatizations have not been as 
extensive as in other countries, owing to difficulties encountered in passing con-
trol of some companies to the private sector, but the country remains firmly 
committed to that goal (Tábora, 2007). Panama’s law was revised in 2006.
• Countries with privatization and trade liberalization, with weak regulations and 
lacking a competition law, such as Guatemala and Nicaragua. These countries 
are considering a draft of a law or a final competition law bill, respectively, with 
Nicaragua closer to adopting it than Guatemala as it is already before Congress 
(since July 2005) and lawmakers have already established some points of con-
sensus on the proposal.
• Countries that have introduced economic reforms that are more limited on the 
level of privatizations, but which have adopted a competition law and agency. 
This is clearly the case of Costa Rica, which has a competition law, and where the 
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state maintains a considerable presence on the level of banking, infrastructure, 
electric power and telecommunications, among other public utility enterprises. Its 
competition law, however, exempts public sector firms from its enforcement.
Costa Rica is the country that maintains the strongest public sector industry in 
Central America, one that includes a series of natural monopolies. Despite that, very 
early on the country embarked on an effort to reorient its growth model towards 
exports by introducing a programme for deregulating prices and the financial sector. 
Beginning in 1994, Costa Rica began to emphasize the search for free trade agree-
ments.13 Approval of the country’s competition law was motivated in part by interest 
in achieving the Free Trade Agreement with Mexico, which contained a clause on 
competition, and by the need to negotiate the Third Structural Adjustment Program 
(SAM III), whose conditions included having a competition law. When Costa Rica 
drew up its law, it patterned it after that of Mexico (Yong, 2005; Sittenfeld, 2006 and 
her chapter in this book). The extent to which the government enjoyed a greater 
degree of independence from the private sector compared to those of other countries 
in the region explains the relative ease with which the law was approved. However, 
the problem with Costa Rica’s competition policy is that it contains numerous excep-
tions aimed at protecting public sector monopolies.
Different factors led to Panama adopting a competition law and establishing a 
Commission on Free Competition and Consumer Affairs (CLICAC). One of the 
principal motives underpinning this initiative was to achieve the institutionalism 
needed to support its joining the WTO in 1997. The Competition law (Law N° 29) 
enacted in 199614 contains the instruments for combating unfair trade practices 




Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua Panama
Competition 
 Law
× × × × ×
Competition
 Commission
× × × × ×
Regulation by 
 industry
× × × × ×
Unified regula
 tion from a
 single body
× × ×
13 In 1994, after joining the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), tariffs were lowered 
to no greater than 55%, except on dairy products, poultry and their derivatives. Costa Rica adopted 
trade and reciprocal investment agreements with Mexico in 1994, Dominican Republic in 1998, 
Chile in 1999 and Canada in April 2001, the Caricom in March 2004 and is currently discussing 
a free trade agreement with the USA (DR-CAFTA). Costa Rica sustains reciprocal investment 
promotion and protection accords with more than 20 countries (Yong, 2005).
14 The Competition Law was enacted the same year as the Law on Industrial Property (Law 35), 
both of which are complementary.
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internationally such as dumping as well as undertaking consumer protection. The 
law contains rules on four issues: monopolies, consumer protection, unfair trade 
practices and safeguard measures. The law emphasizes the effect of anti-competitive 
conduct on consumer well-being. In fact, the function of the CLICAC is frequently 
confused with that of setting prices favourable to consumers. The Panamanian gov-
ernment received considerable support from international financial bodies in prepar-
ing to deal with competition policies. This support came from the US Agency for 
International Development (USAID), which financed the initial studies for the 
draft of the competition law, and later the World Bank conducted a broad training 
effort. The new institutional arrangement that is expressed in a series of laws and the 
establishment of new bodies includes the 1996 establishment of the Public Services 
Regulatory Body (Ente Regulador), whose tasks include setting rates on public serv-
ices that are in the process of being privatized (Fernández, 2005). Significant changes 
were made in 2006 to the competition law and the CLICAC was dissolved by decree 
to be replaced by the National Authority for Consumer Protection and Defense of 
Competition (ANPCDC). The changes made to the law included extending its appli-
cation to all entities and types of economic activity with the sole exception of 
those that are of the unique purview of the state, and a major restructuring of the 
competition agency, which changed its character to a certain extent, as we shall see 
later in this text.
The case of El Salvador is different from the other countries we have mentioned. 
While proposed versions of a competition law were produced even before they first 
emerged in Costa Rica and Panama – such as a draft bill drawn up by the Salvadoran 
Foundation for Economic and Social Development (Fusades) in 1993 – opposition 
from business groups and political parties in the Legislative Assembly assured that 
such bills would end up being filed away in the stacks of the Economic Commission. 
Interest in competition law revived in 1996, when the Center for the Defense of 
the Consumer and the Foundation for National Development (Funde) presented the 
Legislative Assembly with a second bill, and when in 1997, El Salvador took out a 
World Bank loan for implementing its National Competitiveness Program (PNC), 
which stipulated a strengthening of the institutional framework for the promotion 
of competition defence and consumer protection. USAID and the European Union 
were among the other bodies that worked with academic institutions in bolstering 
local capabilities in designing and analysing competition policies.15 However, not 
until evidence emerged that the economic model was stagnating did a possibility 
emerge for approving a competition law. In the wake of the major setback the governing 
15 In 1998, USAID financed a project run by the Programa Académico de la Fundación Doctor 
Guillermo Manuel Ungo (Fundaungo) on strengthening competition conditions and the consumer 
protection system in El Salvador which identified good international practices in the design and 
application of competition policies as well as generating consensuses among key protagonists on 
the need for a competition law. In 2000 the European Union provided funding for the Friedrich 
Ebert Foundation to execute a programme for strengthening Salvadoran democracy that included 
training and technical assistance to the Legislative Assembly’s Commission on Free Competition 
in an effort to assist in the process of designing and discussing a competition law.
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Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA) Party suffered in the 2003 presiden-
tial, municipal and legislative elections, internal and external pressure began to 
build in favour of a recomposition of government economic strategy, and they ulti-
mately achieved the necessary consensus on the content of the competition legisla-
tion,16 which was approved in late 2004 (Molina, 2007).
In Honduras, the task of introducing competition policy and, more specifically, 
a competition law has been made more difficult than in the other three mentioned 
countries owing, above all, to that country’s significant degree of economic concen-
tration and the intimate working relationship that exists between the government 
and the business sector, which rests on a web of deep personal and family ties that 
criss-cross sectors with economic and political power and ultimately influence 
many political and economic decisions (Tábora, 2007). Nevertheless, the country 
needed to make progress on a number of fronts before it would be capable of apply-
ing a competition law, especially in administering justice. For example, Honduras 
lacked a public prosecutor until 1993 when the Law on Public Prosecutors was 
enacted. It was impossible to effectively implement the Consumer Protection Law 
approved in 1989 until the 1997 establishment of the Special Consumers’ 
Prosecutor’s Office (attached to the Public Prosecutor) for prosecuting cases. 
Another series of laws necessary for applying competition law was recently enacted 
in Honduras, including an investment promotion law, the Law for the Promotion 
and Development of Infrastructure and Public Works (1998), a revised version of 
the Law on Industrial Property (2000), among others (Hernández and Schatan, 
2006). Each of these measures helped to establish the principles under which agents 
could exercise their economic freedom in the broadest possible sense. But major 
resistance to the competition law remained, and the consensus necessary for 
approval failed to emerge despite the first efforts to draw up a version of the law, 
dating back to 1994 when the Office of the Presidency prepared a discussion 
 document (Guidelines for formulating and implementing a law for promoting 
 economic competition), and in 1996 when the first draft was published.
Renewed support for the idea emerged when the idea was listed as one of the 
commitments in a Poverty Reduction Strategy accord signed with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), and again among the 2004 political goals assumed under the 
Poverty Reduction Strategy for Honduras. In 2002, the National Competitiveness 
Commission was formed, whose functions included furthering the development of 
the PNC. The latter’s tasks included improving competition and lowering adminis-
trative barriers, thereby giving added impetus to approval of a Law for Promoting 
the Defense of Competition. These endeavours enjoyed special funding from the 
World Bank. The competition law was finally enacted in February 2006 and 
the agency was established in August 2006.
16 The main points of consensus that emerged included the need for an independent competition 
agency and on sanctions that would discourage anti-competitive conduct, but which would not be 
confiscatory for firms.
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In Nicaragua, the government remained wedded to promoting a strong public 
sector economy until 1989. When we add to this hurdle the economic crisis and the 
worsening social conditions with which the country entered the 1990s, we can 
appreciate just how much more of an effort would be needed to generate conditions 
favourable for achieving conditions of effective competition than in other 
countries in the region. A number of key reforms were enacted once the country 
emerged from a period of hyperinflation by 1991 and growth resumed in 1994. 
Cooperation programmes were resumed in 1992 with a series of donors – the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP), German Technical Cooperation 
(GTZ, for its German-language initial abbreviation), the UK’s Department for 
International Development (DFID), among others – when a support and advisory 
programme was created to assist with the competitive transformation of the coun-
try. In addition to macroeconomic issues, the programme anticipated a moderniza-
tion of the legal framework governing the private sector as well as the institutional 
support upon which it could draw. Significantly, in Nicaragua it has been the 
forums for negotiating international trade agreements that have pushed the country 
to commit to, and enforce, competition laws and norms. Added urgency to approve 
a competition law has arisen from membership in Dominican Republic – Central 
America Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA), which contains no explicit clauses 
in this regard but indirectly takes up competition in the case of the banking and tel-
ecommunications industries (Ansorena, 2007). The Nicaraguan Congress was 
debating the law in mid-2006 and the small and medium-size enterprises were 
actively supporting the law project.
Guatemala has expressed the least interest in enacting a competition law of any 
country in the region. The need for constitutional and legal norms in defence of 
competition has not been a topic of significant debate in forums within civil society 
or business circles; nor has it become an important item in the agendas of either 
political currents or the government (Romero and González, 2006). Since the sec-
ond half of 2001 a draft version of a law has languished in the Economy Ministry’s 
Department for the Promotion of Competition, but it took years to emerge as a bill. 
That lack of progress apparently reflects the extent to which the individuals who 
alternated as ministers of the economy from 2000 to 2004 were unconvinced that 
the proposal might win the necessary support either in the executive branch or in 
Congress (Romero and González, 2006). Furthermore, some leading government 
officials were also businessmen with direct interest in some of the most protected 
segments of the economy, another factor that further inhibited officials at the 
Economy Ministry from more enthusiastically promoting the draft law. One major 
source of resistance to even discussing competition law in Guatemala, as in the rest 
of the countries under study, is the extent to which monopolies or oligopolies con-
trol domestic markets for a number of strategic goods and services.
In synthesis, a long list of factors have led to a protracted process in approving 
competition law (El Salvador and Honduras) or kept such legislation from yet being 
approved by mid-2006 (Guatemala and Nicaragua). Those obstacles include resist-
ance on the part of business interests that have long been protected or which have 
enjoyed exclusive concessions or acquired state-owned companies at very favourable 
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terms; the influence such sectors wield within government; the very marginal extent 
to which this matter has been incorporated into the economic agendas of govern-
ments; a lack of local technical capacity to seriously and thoroughly explore the 
issue; and a paucity of competition culture in these countries. Even those nations 
that enacted competition law and established competition authorities in the mid-
1990s and which have managed to implement reforms that restrict market power 
abuses continue to face hurdles. They continue to run up against the resistance 
posed by the most reticent power groups to effective competition policy; they feel 
pressured to draft their laws with too great a haste or pattern their legislation after 
those of other countries while failing to account for the peculiarities of Central 
American nations; or they lack the human capital and necessary funding to carry 
through on this task, or any combination of the above factors.
III.  Competition Norms and Institutions 
in the Laws and Draft Bills Under Discussion 
in Central America and Mexico: A Critical Evaluation
1.  Characteristics of the Competition Laws in Central
America and Mexico
Concern regarding the eventual negative effects from monopolies can be found in all 
national constitutions in the region and, while they vary in form, all of them prohibit 
monopoly and anti-competitive practices. However, for an extended period of time they 
lacked corresponding regulatory laws, meaning that such constitutional principles were 
dead letter in practice. However, the existence of such nominal rules aided governments 
or other interested parties in promoting a legal and institutional competition frame-
work. As we have already indicated, most Central American countries already have 
competition laws and regulatory bodies, and those that do not have drawn up competi-
tion bills and created offices in charge of promoting their adoption and implementation. 
After Honduras approved its law in early 2006, the formation of a Competition 
Authority was promoted by the PNC, which in turn formed part of the Foundation of 
Export Research and Development (FIDE, for its Spanish-language initial abbrevia-
tion). In Nicaragua, the Ministry of Promotion of Industry and Commerce (MIFIC) has 
a General Department of Competition that directly oversees market regulatory issues, 
especially those related to competition. Guatemala’s Economy Ministry has a Deputy 
Ministry for Investment and Competition (which includes a department on competi-
tion), which is drawing up the law and norms designed to favour free competition and 
the elimination of protectionist practices (Romero and González, 2006). Nevertheless, 
the agencies in Guatemala and Nicaragua that have been assigned the task of promoting 
competition law lack the decision-making power needed to define market rights. As a 
result, they are limited to generating information and lack the ability to embark on an 
active policy of competition supervision.
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In the following analysis, we compare the existing laws and bills under discussion. 
We seek to identify the various national perspectives and both the similarities and 
differences between countries on the level of competition. In addition to the six 
countries of Central America, we take up the case of Mexico, whose laws inspired 
those of several countries in the region.
An initial, general overview appears in Table 2.2, which lists the dates on which 
competition laws were approved, the name of the law, the name and date on which 
the respective government agency began operations, and whether the law is or is not 
under review.
Most of the existing laws or proposed competition laws in Central America 
define their main purpose as promoting competition as a means to improve eco-
nomic efficiency, and in this way to raise consumer well-being. Something different 
happened in Guatemala and Mexico; in the former country the argument is that 
efficiency will benefit both producers and consumers, while Mexican laws make no 
explicit reference to benefits for either producers or consumers. Countries in the 
region tended to adopt the European model of establishing norms for the anti-
 competitive conduct of economic agents more than impeding the emergence of 
monopolies or oligopolies in domestic markets. This perspective calls for a legal 
framework along with a body of norms that are universally applicable to all who 
participate in the market for goods and services.
The classification of anti-competitive practices in competition laws differs from 
country to country, but the concepts are quite similar. Following the example of 
Mexico, Panama and Costa Rica distinguish between absolute monopolistic prac-
tices, relative monopoly practices, concentrations and unfair competition. In El 
Salvador, the law lists competitors, agreements between competitors, agreements between 
non-competitors and concentrations. However, the concept of agreements between 
competitors is fully applicable to absolute monopolistic practices, while agree-
ments between non-competitors are typified as relative monopolistic practices. 
Guatemala’s typification identifies prohibited behaviour, abuse of a dominant posi-
tion and concentrations. An interesting concept in the Guatemalan draft law is that 
of functional competition, which refers to the difference between real competition, 
conditionally restricted practices and concentrations. The Honduran law distin-
guishes between practices restricted by their nature and those that are prohibited 
due to their effects. Although the terminology differs, this is another instance in 
which the law is speaking of absolute and relative monopolistic practices. In 
Nicaragua, the typification is that of monopolistic practices (concerted practices 
and anti-competitive agreements) and abuse of a dominant position as well as 
unfair competition. Concerted practices and anti-competitive practices refer 
to absolute monopolistic practices while abuse of a dominant position refers to 
relative ones.
Three countries under study – El Salvador, Honduras and Mexico – have defined 
specific antitrust thresholds beyond which competition is harmed and at which 
point official notification is required before any mergers or takeovers are entered 
into. The other countries lack any such notification rules but companies may vol-
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concentrations and order a break-up of the firms in question ex post when they 
deem such measures are needed (see Table 2.3).
There are significant differences between the laws in terms of the areas that each 
addresses and of the responsibilities and functions assigned to competition authori-
ties. The Panamanian law and the Nicaraguan draft, for example, list numerous 
tasks in addition to the defence of competition. Consumer protection, unfair prac-
tices in international trade and, therefore, antidumping and import safeguards are 
also included in the Panamanian law.17 Under the Nicaraguan bill, the competition 
authority must deal with market competition, consumer protection, intellectual 
property, simplifying filing and application processes and unfair competition (in the 
sense of misleading or deceiving consumers). In the other countries competition 
laws and draft versions exclusively focus on competition, except in Costa Rica, 
where consumer protection is also mentioned, but two separate entities were 
 created for each subject: the Competition Promotion Commission and the National 
Consumer Commission.
Both existing laws and pending legislation generally extend competition law to 
all economic agents whether public or private. However, exceptions abound. 
In Mexico, Costa Rica and Panama, the laws do not apply to monopolies that were 
legally created for industries that are constitutionally reserved for the state. Many 
of the exceptions that were once contained in the Panamanian law were eliminated 
during the 2006 revision, leaving only providers of public utilities (electricity, 
water, etc.) under the scrutiny of the Competition Authority. Guatemala’s draft law 
and Nicaragua’s bill, as well as existing law in Costa Rica and Mexico, allow for 
export cartels with some conditions: that they neither reduce the value of exports 
nor exclude other agents involved in the same type of economic activity. Costa 
Rica’s competition law also does not apply to service providers whose activities are 
regulated by concession contracts. The pending Guatemalan and Nicaraguan laws 
would exempt their application to intellectual property rights. In Mexico, Honduras, 
Nicaragua and Panama, competition law does not apply to collective bargaining 
agreements. The Costa Rican law contains the greatest number of exceptions, but 
the recently designed laws or draft versions of such laws in other countries tend to 
be much more broadly applicable. Practically no exceptions are to be found in the 
laws of El Salvador and Honduras, for example, and in the latter of these two coun-
tries the law extends even to economic sectors regulated by special sector laws. The 
Honduran law is the only one in the region that even applies to foreign-based 
 professional and business associations whose actions may impact the local market; 
not even Mexican law contains such clauses.
Some limits on spontaneous market functioning arise out of the government’s 
authority to set some prices. Mexico’s law leaves open the possibility of setting 
prices of products that are regarded as essential or basic consumer items. In Costa 
17 The 2006 revised version of Panama’s competition law also created separate offices for 
 consumer and competition protection.
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El Salvador Article 33. When a merger is planned whose total assets surpass 50,000 urban 
minimum wages in effect in the industry or when the merged company’s 
combined revenues would exceed 60,000 urban minimum wages in effect in 
the industry in question, the parties to the merger must request prior 
authorization from the superintendency
Guatemala Article 21. Scope of application
Whenever any corporate merger affects or has the potential to affect the 
Guatemalan market and leads to an absolute dominant industry position, 
the Economy Ministry may call for the Superior Council for the Defense of 
Competition to report on:
(a) When the merged firm would expand its market share by 25% or more of the 
domestic market, or a substantial percentage of said market for any 
specific good or service or
(b) When for the most recent year the combined sales volume within Guatemala 
of the merger participants surpasses $30 million
Honduras The commission will decide which concentrations are subject to regulatory 
approval
Mexico Article 20. The commission must be notified before the concentration takes 
place if:
 I.  The transaction involves a sum greater than 12 million times the daily, 
general minimum wage in effect in the Federal District (Mexico City)
 II. The transaction implies the accumulation of 35% or more of the assets or 
shares of an economic agent whose assets or sales are greater than 12 
million times the daily, general minimum wage in effect in the Federal 
District; or …
III. If the parties to a proposed merger have separate or combined assets or 
annual sales totaling more than 48 million times the daily, general 
minimum wage in effect in the Federal District, and the merger would imply 
an additional accumulation of assets or shareholder equity greater than the 
equivalent of 4.8 million times the general minimum wage in effect in the 
Federal District
Nicaragua Whenever the merger implies an acquisition of or an expansion in market share 
of 25% or more, or when the combined gross revenues of the economic 
agents that are to merge surpasses an average of 200,000 times the annual 
minimum wage
Panama The commission is to decide which concentrations have to be verified. The 
Guide for Control of Economic Concentration (2001) lays out critical values 
for some concentration indicators (Herfindhal-Hirschman and Dominance), 
and whenever a case surpasses those reference points it merits greater 
scrutiny
Rica the law allows for regulation of rates on public utilities that are still provided 
by state-owned companies, as well as to ration import and export licences for some 
products on behalf of public interest, but this mechanism can be employed only on 
a temporary basis and the arguments cited in its application are subject to review 
every six months. The Guatemalan draft law states that it does not take precedence 
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over other laws or their accompanying rules and regulations (Article 5) that are 
aimed at objectives such as adjusting supply, promoting exports and dealing with 
idle capacity or social issues.
One of the most difficult tasks facing competition authorities is that of market 
definition for antitrust purposes. Five out of the seven countries in our study use the 
same criteria for defining a “relevant market” (Panama uses the term “pertinent 
market”). The relevant market normally refers to the product market and the geo-
graphical market. The former refers to the market for goods that respond to a cer-
tain specific demand that can be satisfied with similar, interchangeable and 
comparably priced products, while the second market refers to the area in which 
these goods may be obtained on favourable terms (e.g. at a distance that would not 
imply an additional charge for transportation costs). When it comes to sanctions, 
the statutory maximum fine in Mexico for absolute monopolistic practices can be 
as high as $1.55 million and the one for relative monopolistic practices as great as 
$935,000.18 In 2006, the highest potential fines in Central America were in Panama, 
at $1 million, followed by El Salvador, where they can reach $800,000, depending 
on the seriousness of the infraction. The other countries contemplate fines that are 
much smaller in absolute terms. Fines defined as a percentage of earnings or capital 
might prove severe, but these practically have never been imposed. This type of fine 
is contained in the laws of Costa Rica and Mexico. In this last country, such sanc-
tions can be particularly severe as they can be as great as 10% of the annual reve-
nues the guilty company took in during the preceding fiscal year or up to 10% of 
its asset value, whichever is higher. The draft law in Guatemala would impose fines 
of up to 100% of sales from the preceding year in extreme cases. The recently 
approved competition law in Honduras also leaves open the possibility that compa-
nies can appeal such rulings by filing a writ of amparo.
There are many obstacles to imposing the penalties contemplated in competition 
laws. In Mexico, companies accused of monopolistic practices or abuse of market 
power can easily appeal such rulings, thereby postponing the levying of fines or 
other penalties for a long period of time (Avalos, 2006). In a similar vein, there are 
a number of means in Panama for avoiding fines (only 10% are paid) or other pun-
ishment, at least under the law as it read prior to the revision of 2006.
As for non-monetary penalties, all of the laws or proposed laws in this study 
contemplate the possibility that competition authorities may order that the prohib-
ited activity be ceased or corrected, including the partial or total break up of a 
 business that has been improperly merged. Except in Nicaragua, all such laws 
allow for the possibility of filing criminal charges whenever the authority has 
exhausted all administrative recourse or such action is warranted by the seriousness 
of the accused party’s conduct. Nicaragua would only impose fines and those are 
to be calculated based on what is deemed necessary to compensate for, or repay, 
the  damages suffered by the affected parties. While El Salvador imposes sanctions 
18 These would be greatly increased under the revised version of the competition law that the 
Mexican Congress was considering in mid-2006.
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for procedures that contravene the law or regulations, the penalty may be lifted if 
the company cooperates in correcting the problem under a procedure we can 
generically refer to as a leniency resource. This option provides authorities with 
means for obtaining essential information on anti-competitive practices that they 
might otherwise have a hard or impossible time obtaining. The proposal to reform 
Mexico’s competition law also introduces this concept, which is already widely 
used in many other countries including the USA, where companies that self-report 
violations or offer early cooperation with criminal or regulatory investigations may 
avoid criminal prosecution and fines.
Competition advocacy is a crucial issue. It is conducted in various ways in 
a number of countries. In Mexico, advocacy extends both to the promotion of a 
 competition culture and the issuing of opinions – either on request from the 
federal government or by the authority’s own initiative – regarding new laws or 
norms, and if the revised version of the law is approved such opinions would be 
binding on such rules. Costa Rica also allows the competition commission to 
consider whether application processes, requirements and regulations on economic 
activity obstruct, impede or distort either domestic or international market 
transactions. The Nicaraguan draft law contains a section on competition cul-
ture and refers to the simplification of filing procedures, reviews of judicial 
rulings and the treatment of government assistance. This is the only group of 
countries covered in this study that textually confers on the competition com-
mission the power to specifically engage in competition advocacy. The laws of 
El Salvador and Honduras and the draft  competition law in Guatemala make no 
mention of this subject.
2. Competition Agencies
Although there are substantial differences between the competition authorities of 
the countries covered by this study, something of an international consensus has 
formed as to the characteristics a competition agency needs in order to function 
efficiently and effectively. The most significant of these features include the need 
for autonomy from the executive branch of government; stable funding; that 
 commissioners meet certain ideal standards (that they be competition specialists, 
that their nominations be widely accepted, that they serve a clearly defined term of 
office and that they be subject to removal for reasons that are clearly spelt out in the 
law). It is also recommended that the process of choosing and replacing commis-
sioners be staggered so as to better assure the possibility of consistent rulings and 
an independent outlook.
As Table 2.4 shows, under the laws of Costa Rica and Mexico, the competition 
authority is attached to the Economy Ministry, which draws up its budget. The 
competition agencies of El Salvador, Honduras and Panama send either to Congress 
or to the executive branch their own budget proposals, which are delivered by a 
ministry, usually the Finance Ministry.
Table 2.4 Institutional characteristics of competition authorities in Central America and Mexico (Competition laws and law projects of Central American 
countries)
Characteristic/
Country Mexico Costa Rica El Salvador Honduras Guatemala Nicaragua Panama
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In the countries under study most laws or bills initially opted for a commission 
rather than a single commissioner except El Salvador, where the authority is a 
superintendency presided over by a single director. In Panama’s 2006 reform of 
Law 29, the three-member CLICAC commission was replaced by the National 
Authority for Consumer Protection and the Defense of Competition presided over 
by a single administrator.19
The commission formula offers the advantage that decisions are not made by a 
single individual but instead are the product of collective deliberations among 
various commissioners. A multi-member body may also prove less vulnerable to 
control by private economic agents. Nonetheless, the commission may be at a 
 disadvantage in some respects compared to a single director, who might handle 
cases more expeditiously, for example.
The manner in which commissioners are chosen is another factor that determines 
the commission’s degree of autonomy. A selection process, in which both the 
Presidency and Congress are involved, for example, may bolster a competition agen-
cy’s autonomy and legitimacy by limiting the chances that commissioners could be 
arbitrarily removed. Panama’s Law on Competition, Guatemala’s draft law and 
Nicaragua’s bill all contemplate such a selection process. In any event, commission 
autonomy must be accompanied by a proper mechanism for rendering accounts.
Due to the predominance of political systems that concentrate power in the 
Presidency, some countries have preferred to leave the faculty for designating com-
petition authorities strictly with the president: Mexico, El Salvador and also Costa 
Rica, which added the step of having the Ministry of the Economy, propose a group 
of candidates from which the president chooses. In other countries, proposals by the 
president or a commission to designate candidates must be ratified by the Congress 
or Legislative Assembly (Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama). In almost 
all countries the designation of competition authorities is staggered (when there are 
appointments) or does not coincide with presidential periods, in order to isolate 
them from political pressures. Finally, in some countries these authorities may be 
re-elected and in others they may not (see Table 2.4).
Some legislation establishes norms aimed at ensuring that the individuals 
appointed to competition commissions have specialized knowledge (see Table 2.4). 
Although the small size of most of the countries considered in this study makes it 
difficult, at present, to demand professional preparation and experience in the field 
of economic competition, the laws require that the commissions include people 
with a background in economics together with professional lawyers. This is true of 
the recently approved Salvadoran law and the proposal under study in Guatemala. 
The case of Mexico is, without a doubt, the most advanced in this field, requiring 
19 The new agency has two departments: the National Department on Free Competition and the 
National Consumer Protection Department. The administrator maintains a close working relation-
ship with the five-member Council of Advisors, which is made up of the Minister of Trade and 
Industry, who presides over the council; the Economy and Finance Minister; the Minister of 
Health; a representative of the consultative council of the consumer associations; and a representa-
tive from the associations of business owners, retailers and/or industrialists.
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that the professionals participating in the commission have experience in the area 
covered by the law.
In all the countries studied it has been made very difficult to remove competition 
authorities from office in order to prevent political interest groups from influencing 
the competition body. In Mexico, members of the commission can be removed only 
for well-founded causes, and other countries go one step further by specifying the 
only acceptable causes for removal (see Table 2.4).
Despite the multiple mechanisms that contribute to greater independence of 
competition authorities, budget limitations, political regimes and other factors in 
developing countries make it difficult to achieve total independence for the com-
missions and their members.
Last, it is important to note that competition legislation has been changing, or is 
in the process thereof, in the countries that pioneered competition policy in the 
region (Costa Rica, Mexico and Panama). These revisions respond largely, but not 
exclusively, to the difficulties encountered during the first decade of existence of 
the legislation.
Panama’s Law on Competition was modified in February 2006. This new vision 
expands the law’s reach to include companies that provide publicly useful services, 
as well as substantially altering the commission’s internal structure in order to 
expedite case resolution, and raising fines and facilitating their collection. The new 
law also offers greater protection for competition authorities, who previously could 
face prosecution as a result of litigation from existing anti-competition cases. The 
new law, however, has become a source of controversy as the agency administrator 
has lost some of the autonomy previously enjoyed by CLICAC commissioners.
Costa Rica, for its part, was in the process of revising its competition law in 
2006, but by mid-year a proposal for an alternative law was yet to emerge. The 
changes being debated were: improved typification of anti-competitive practices; 
possible requirement of prior notification of concentrations, with adequate 
establishment of limits; the incorporation of “clemency appeals;” the elimination 
of various exceptions to the application of the law; and the strengthening of institu-
tions linked to competition policy, among others.
In Mexico, the latest version of the law (approved by Congress in mid-2006, but 
yet to be signed by the president as of this writing) grants greater powers to the 
Federal Competition Commission (FCC) to break up companies, including those in 
the telecommunications, media and financial services sectors, that engage in anti-
competitive practices and fail to abide by earlier commission rulings. The new law 
imposes considerably higher fines than those imposed under previous rules in an 
effort to more seriously dissuade potential violators of the competition law. For 
example, the fine for instances of absolute monopoly practices would reach as high 
as 1.5 million times the daily minimum wage in effect at the time in Mexico City. 
Additionally, the “appeal for pardon” would be introduced to help the FCC bring 
together evidence to identify any anti-competitive practices by companies. 
Collection of the fines, which had been minimal (approximately 14% of the total 
levied), would be carried out by the Tax Administration System, which would be 
likely to increase the effectiveness of collections.
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Within Central America, Costa Rica and Panama are the countries that have the 
most experience in resolving cases filed before competition authorities, given that 
in the other countries the competition commissions are very new (El Salvador) or 
do not yet exist. In Costa Rica, between 1995 and 2004, the competition authority 
resolved 537 cases, or 89% of those brought before the commission. Among the 
cases resolved during this period, there were 145 general consultations, 203 suits, 
92 formal investigations, 47 consultations to the Technical Unit, 9 rulings on 
licences, 37 opinions, 2 instances of price setting and 2 mergers. Fines have tended 
to increase from around $2,400 in 1998 and to surpassing $400,000 in 2002. 
Nonetheless, the overall amount of fines applied is still quite limited. Through 
mid-2006, no penalty had yet been issued and paid that was equivalent to 10% of 
the value of annual sales or 10% of the value of a firm’s assets (Yong, 2005; 
Sittenfeld, 2006, and her chapter in this book).
In Panama, CLICAC (whose name was changed at the outset of 2006) handled 
few cases of anti-competitive practices. In fact, between 1998 and 2004, approxi-
mately 30 cases of monopolistic practices were fully processed including both 
those brought by private companies or CLICAC.20 As was discussed earlier, the 
competition authority only has the faculty to investigate the existence of indica-
tions of anti-competitive practices, and if they appear to exist, the authority must 
file suit in the courts and wait for them to resolve the case. Since the CLICAC was 
created, 14 cases were settled (through 2005) without the need to file suit in the 
courts, either because it was decided to handle the case through competition advo-
cacy or because evidence of wrongdoing was not sufficient to file suit. The rest of 
the cases were taken to court and by mid-2006 decisions had been issued at the 
initial and appeals levels; these cases involved meat, flour and medical oxygen, 
among other products. It should be noted that once a case is taken before the 
courts, and the judge rules in favour of the competition authority, the accused may 
appeal before the Superior Court and other courts, such that a case may be pro-
longed significantly (this has changed somewhat since the Competition Law was 
changed in 2006). It is interesting to note that in cases of absolute monopolistic 
practices brought by CLICAC that have been resolved, the courts have generally 
supported the position of CLICAC.
The majority of the 1,450 cases processed between 1993 and 2004 by Mexico’s 
FCC (Avalos, 2006) were related to mergers or acquisitions, which can be explained 
by the requirement that the companies provide advance notification of these opera-
tions. This suggests that from the time this prior notification was required, the 
competition commission has had to devote considerable resources to resolving 
these cases. It should also be noted that the majority of the cases of monopolistic 
practices processed in Mexico have been of the “vertical” type (Avalos, 2006), in 
contrast to those handled in Costa Rica which have been principally “horizontal,” 
partly because it has been harder to prove “vertical” practices.
20 Some cases are investigated confidentially and the number of such cases is unknown.
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IV. The Competition Law and the Judicial System
International experience shows that in various developing countries, two principal 
mechanisms have served to debilitate the institutionalism of competition defence: 
the creation of weak competition bodies, and the establishment of weak or non-
functioning judicial mechanisms that instead of assisting the commissions in apply-
ing competition law effectively neutralizes and weakens the law even more.
Application of competition policy obligates the state to intervene in transactions 
between private parties (or between private parties and the public sector) to pre-
serve the competitive conditions of markets. Although diverse institutional models 
exist, the application of competition law, including the application of monetary 
sanctions, generally has been, or is to be undertaken by, an administrative body, 
either within the executive branch or in the form of an autonomous agency. In 
Central America, the exception is Panama, where the competition authority 
(ANDCC) may not apply sanctions until there is a court ruling. Other countries 
resolve cases through administrative channels, or they will once the law is passed. 
However, it will be possible to continue in this mode only if the parties found in 
violation of the law comply with their penalties. If not, the competition authority 
will resort to judicial channels once administrative options have been exhausted. 
Furthermore, if the sanctioned company feels that the penalty it has received is 
unfair, it may appeal or seek an injunction before the judicial system in Mexico and 
Honduras, thus overlapping the administrative and judicial systems. In some coun-
tries, once the competition authority makes its ruling, it may be appealed exclu-
sively within the administrative system. At that point there are no more 
administrative channels and any successive litigation is handled by the court for 
administrative disputes. When the competition authority conducts its investigation, 
it may solicit information from the companies involved, and the majority of com-
petition laws, or proposals for laws, grant the commission the power to demand this 
information; some even give the competition authority the power to carry out 
inspections in situ. Information provided by the companies is expected to be trust-
worthy, and if a company is found to falsify or omit any requested information, it 
may be subject to fines according to the laws of some countries. If these fines are 
not paid, competition authorities may seek redress through the judicial system. El 
Salvador imposes the lightest fines for this type of infraction, but it does impose 
them. In Mexico the provision of information is voluntary, but as the law is revised 
this will probably change, and in Panama, as discussed, the judicial branch inter-
venes from the start, issuing the instructions to provide information.
To the degree that competition authorities depend on judicial tribunals to carry 
out their functions, they face various obstacles to the effective resolution of their 
cases. Noteworthy among these are the following: (i) generally, judges are not 
prepared to handle cases of great technical complexity; (ii) the existence of admin-
istrative bodies that can issue legal rulings creates different options for the resolu-
tion of cases. In international practice at least three methods may be identified.
(i) Perhaps the most common one holds that the administrative authority is just one 
party on an equal footing with the private party in the case, and in which the object 
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of the dispute receives no special treatment. In consequence, cases are presented 
by the administrative body and are subject to all ruling bodies to which other legal 
cases would be subject. (ii) A second method recognizes the administrative 
authority’s faculty to issue rulings, and in its capacity as a representative of the 
public interest, on certain differences with respect to the private party involved in 
the case. In this context, the role of the judicial system’s review is reduced to a 
review of the due process carried out by the high court. (iii) A third method dis-
tinguishes between the administrative faculties of government bodies and autono-
mous agencies and the courts’ faculties for issuing rulings, but recognizes the 
special characteristics of competition cases, and in consequence, creates special 
tribunals for them. The basis for this method is that the judges can become special-
ized in the issues relevant to competition cases, allowing them to manage the 
technical complexities involved. At the same time, this guarantees greater coher-
ency and consistency in decisions and presumably allows for swifter resolution of 
cases. The countries in the study group with competition legislation and authori-
ties use various methods. In Costa Rica, El Salvador and Honduras, cases brought 
before the competition authority are resolved by that same body, which has the 
faculty to apply penalties. As previously noted, parties have recourse to an appeal 
or reversal of the authority’s final resolution. As such, once administrative chan-
nels are exhausted, the legality of the final resolutions may be disputed directly 
before the courts of administrative disputes.
In Panama, the National Authority for Consumer Protection and the Promotion 
of Competition (previously CLICAC) has the characteristic of being an investiga-
tive body that does not issue binding rulings. This agency only reports on evidence 
of any anti-competitive practices; if an investigation leads it to conclude that there 
are grounds for proving anti-competitive practices, it has the option of presenting 
its case before the courts. For this purpose, Panama created the Civil Circuit 
Courts,21 which are responsible for resolving cases resulting from the application or 
interpretation of the law regarding monopolies, consumer protection and bad-faith 
business practices. These courts were intended to overcome the difficulties faced by 
the ordinary courts in resolving highly technical cases and, at the same time, to 
ensure swift resolution. Few cases have been brought before these courts, however, 
and resolution of these cases has been extremely slow.22
21 In the 1970s, once new laws for business were defined, Panama debated whether these laws 
should be interpreted and ruled upon within the administrative system, in the traditional courts or 
in specialized courts. International organizations and the executive branch preferred that these 
issues be resolved administratively, as was taking place in the commercial arbitration tribunals of 
the Chamber of Commerce. In 1978, however, a decision by the Supreme Court regarding com-
mercial exclusivity contracts determined that commercial issues should be taken up by the ordi-
nary courts and should not be resolved through administrative channels. Following passage of the 
Industrial Property Law and the Competition Law, the volume of business justified the creation of 
the Specialized Commercial Courts (Fernández, 2005).
22 In part, this situation can be explained by the fact that during the period 1998–2002, these 
courts received 2,511 cases, of which 93% were suits regarding intellectual property rights 
(Fernández, 2005).
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The Third Superior Court of Justice of the First Judicial District was also created 
and made specifically responsible for handling appeals of rulings handed down by 
the circuit courts.23 In practice, the authority brings a suit before the court either 
based on a complaint by third parties or ex officio in a summary oral hearing. The 
case is brought before the respective Commercial Court, which sets a preliminary 
hearing. Subsequently, an in-depth hearing is set for the oral presentation of 
evidence by any of the parties. Once the judge issues a decision, the decision may 
be appealed to the Third Superior Court. In the case of rulings above 750,000 
balboas, the affected parties may seek a higher appeal before the First Hall of the 
Supreme Court of Justice, but when penalties are below this amount, no appeal is 
allowed (Fernández, 2005).
In Mexico, the Federal Competition Law allows for an appeal for reconsideration 
before the competition commission (Article 39). This appeal suspends execution of 
the resolution while the commission considers the appeal request (within 60 days). 
This first phase extends the period of action taken by the commission, leading to a 
second stage that begins once fines are issued. The competition law establishes fines 
that appear to be sufficiently significant to dissuade or punish parties engaged in 
anti-competitive practices, but the fines ultimately are practically unenforceable due 
to the many defence mechanisms available to companies. The principal problem 
results from the use of the writ of amparo, originally designed to protect individual 
guarantees as a means of resolving disputes within administrative law. Through 
April 2004, which marked the tenth year of the Federal Competition Commission, 
6,666 cases were resolved, against which 636 amparos and 90 rulings of fiscal 
nullification were applied. Among these, as of the date indicated, 375 amparos had 
been resolved, with 260 still pending. Of these injunctions that were resolved, 35% 
was decided within one year; 76.5% was in less than two years and the remaining 
23.5% in a period of three to five years. Of all the amparo filings, 284 were sought 
against procedural movements to protect companies from requests for information 
or allegations of responsibility for anti-competitive practices (Sánchez Ugarte, 2004).
The amparo presents various problems when applied to companies. It does not 
seem reasonable for a legal recourse aimed at protecting the life and safety of indi-
viduals to be used in commercial suits. Even more so when the accused in question 
are alleged by the Commission to be engaged in prohibited practices that gravely 
affect smaller companies, as is very frequently the case. Furthermore, the suit of 
amparo does not explicitly take into account the protection of the public interest. 
A second problem arises because of the very nature of the amparo, because the case 
becomes focused on the protection of guarantees with little attention paid to resolving 
the original dispute. We can cite a series of additional complications: the possibility 
that each and every subsidiary of the company obtaining the amparo also seek protection, 
23 Panama also has municipal courts that handle only cases involving claims of 3,000 balboas or 
less on the part of the consumer. In the provinces or districts that do not have one of these courts, 
cases involving free competition and consumer issues are handled by the civil or mixed circuit and 
municipal courts.
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and given that such processes are not cumulative, each of the subsidiaries’ cases may 
be brought before different judges and courts and result in different and even contra-
dictory rulings. Such complications are further magnified by the absence of any time 
limits for courts to issue decisions on such cases (Sánchez Ugarte, 2004).
How can these problems be addressed given that they severely limit the possi-
bilities for effectively defending competition? In Mexico various measures have 
been proposed that tend to restrict the use of the amparo. These include combining 
all the cases brought over the same issue; the introduction of greater requirements 
for the granting of such an injunction24; that ruling on amparo requests take into 
account all the presumed misdeeds and issues of both form and substance25; requir-
ing the courts to rule on such cases within a specific period of time; and assuring 
that the sentence be applicable to all economic entities. Several of these aspects 
have been incorporated into the proposal for revision of the competition law 
approved by Congress (mid-2006) but pending approval by the president.
During the discussion surrounding the elaboration and approval of the competi-
tion law in Honduras, one bill proposed that once administrative channels are 
exhausted, a case may proceed to the courts on the condition that the accused must 
already have paid the fines levied. The logic behind this proposal was to counteract 
actions meant to prolong the process, thereby undermining the effectiveness of the 
law. Nonetheless, this element was removed from the latest version of the proposal. 
The bill now stipulates in its Article 48 that once administrative appeals against the 
decisions of the commission have been exhausted, the only further recourse will be 
to seek an amparo before the Supreme Court of Justice, which could generate prob-
lems of the type mentioned in the case of Mexico.
The case of Chile is illustrative. Based on experience accumulated by the tradi-
tional system,26 Chile created the Court of Defense of Free Competition as a special 
and independent ruling body, the function of which is to prevent, correct and sanc-
tion actions deemed prejudicial to free competition. The Supreme Court is in 
charge of the directive, correctional and economic superintendency of this court. In 
this way, the court assures the existence of personnel who have been trained to 
24 On this point it has been proposed that judges not grant an amparo when the ruling in question 
is against a monopolistic practice that substantially affects the public interest, and that in cases 
where an amparo might be issued, such a ruling could only come after the party seeking the 
injunction assures future payment of damages to the harmed party through a bond or other 
adequate guarantee (Sánchez Ugarte, 2004).
25 If this proposal was to be approved, as reasonable as it seems, it would definitively transform 
the entire concept of an amparo.
26 Until the reform of November 2003, the Chilean anti-monopoly system consisted of the National 
Competitiveness Enforcement Department (Fiscalía Nacional Económica), an administrative body 
and both prevention and resolution commissions. The system recognized the need for specialized 
personnel (in this regard, it was not constituted by judges but rather included economics profes-
sionals and government officials) but even as the Resolution Commission was presided over by a 
Supreme Court judge, its rulings were only subject to review by the country’s high court, ensuring 
agile dispatch of cases. The Court of Defense of Free Competition recently replaced the two 
commissions mentioned.
2 Markets in Central America and Mexico: What Is Happening with Competition? 39
tackle the difficult technical problems of competition legislation, consistency in 
rulings and, at the same time, swift resolution of cases, given that decisions may be 
appealed only before the Supreme Court. A formal complaint may be filed in the 
case of definitive rulings on measures included in Article 17 K,27 and such a request 
can be made either by the National Competitiveness Enforcement Department 
(Fiscalía Nacional Económica) or by any of the parties involved within a period of 
ten working days from the time of notification. In order to ensure swift processing, 
the law establishes that this claim be given preference over other issues. Furthermore, 
to assure termination of the anti-competitive conduct, the law establishes that the 
filing of a formal complaint will not suspend compliance with the decision except 
for the payment of fines.28 However, at the specific request of one of the parties and 
via a well-founded resolution, the court in which the claim is filed may totally or 
partially suspend the effects of the sentence.
V.  Market Distortions and Cases Resolved 
by Competition Agencies
The objective of this section is to use examples to illustrate market distortions that 
occur throughout Central America and Mexico. National studies carried out as part 
of the project “Reinforcing Competition in Central America” by the International 
Development Research Centre (IDRC) and Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean (ECLAC) reveal that in certain markets, similar anti-competitive 
practices repeatedly occur. Some of these practices are part of regional or even inter-
national business strategies, and others are exclusively domestic in scope.
Setting aside the telecommunications and banking sectors, which are developed 
in other chapters of this volume, sectors such as cement, rice, milling, beer and 
other alcoholic beverages, air transport, the poultry industry, slaughterhouses 
and beef are particularly anti-competitive, although some of these have recently undergone 
a positive evolution. In the following section we will analyse three markets: the milling 
industry, in which market distortions occur at the national level; the abuse of market 
27 The measures included in the Article are the following: (i) to modify or put an end to the acts, 
contracts, pacts, systems or agreements that are contrary to the dispositions of the present law; 
(ii) to order the modification or dissolution of associations, corporations and other private corporate 
entities that may have intervened in the acts, contracts, pacts, systems or agreements referred to 
under the previous letter; (iii) to apply fines payable to the public fund of a sum equivalent to up 
to 20,000 annual tax units. The fines may be imposed upon the corresponding corporate entity, or 
its directors, administrators and anyone who may have participated in the conduct of the respective 
act. In the case of fines applied to corporate entities, their directors, administrators and anyone else who 
has benefited from the respective acts must be responsible for payment, as long as they have 
participated in the conduct of these acts’ (own translation; Republic of Chile, 2005).
28 To file a formal complaint in cases in which a fine is imposed, the guilty party is required to post 
a sum equivalent to 10% of the fine.
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power by the airlines at the regional level; and anti-competitive practices in the soft 
drink industry in which global companies are involved.
1. The Wheat Flour Market
The flour market is of great concern to governments for its wide-ranging social 
impact on the economy (representing 7% of the basic food basket in Panama; 
Fernández, 2005).
This sector has been analysed in the cases of El Salvador (Molina, 2007), 
Nicaragua (Ansorena, 2007) and Panama (Fernández, 2005), but the problem also 
exists in countries such as Costa Rica and probably in the rest of the region. In the 
first half of the decade of the 2000s, the problem of collusion among flour millers 
became more evident and severe as the price of wheat rose on international markets, 
affecting the price of flour and subsequently of bread at the national level. In 
Nicaragua, for example, between 2001 and 2004 the price of flour rose 55% (in 
fact, there was a bread “crisis” in 2001 in this country).
Generally, the flour market has a monopolistic or oligopolistic structure in which 
the key players also often retain control over flour imports and distribution (creat-
ing distortions such as market segmentation). Some countries even depend on 
imported wheat for domestic flour milling.
In El Salvador the milling industry is duopolistic: Molinos de El Salvador 
(MOLSA) and Harinas de El Salvador (HARISA) control the three phases dis-
cussed. In Nicaragua there are only three flour millers, and they maintain very close 
ties to the two flour importers Proharina and Fhacasa.
In Panama, the problem of the millers became one of the first cases to be inves-
tigated and prosecuted by the competition authority (CLICAC) in the mid-1990s. 
The authority brought suit before the courts against four companies in the country 
for collusion in fixing the price of wheat flour and in maintaining their respective 
market shares for wheat flour sales, for which they exchanged relevant information 
between November 1996 and September 1997. The case was recently decided in 
favour of CLICAC.29
Additionally, some countries erect entry barriers on flour imports by requiring 
compliance with specific regulations or norms. Such is the case of Resolution 
94-2002 approved by the Council of Ministers for Economic Integration (COMIECO) 
in October 2002 for El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, which 
accepted the technical norm for fortified wheat flour, Decree No. 30809, published 
29 The sentence determined that on March 8, 1994 the millers had signed an agreement to set wheat 
prices and divide up the market estimated at that time at 120,000 quintales (1 quintal = 46 kg) per 
month. The defendants presented a high court appeal before the Supreme Court of Justice which 
was rejected as inadmissible; they have subsequently presented a second appeal which is awaiting 
disposition by the court (Fernández, 2005).
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in Gazette No. 216 on November 8, 2002. This counteracted to a certain extent the 
effects of the liberalization of trade in wheat flour decreed by the Executive 
Committee of Economic Integration (CEIE) in October of the same year. Regardless, 
this latter measure represented an advance in the regional free trade of wheat flour 
reflected in expanded trading volumes for this product in Central America. 
Nicaragua, the country that most protected its milling industry with a 35% tariff until 
2004, was one of the most favoured by this agreement. Nonetheless, there is a certain 
degree of differentiation in this product area, and even if imported flour is cheaper 
in Nicaragua, it is also of inferior quality, which has segmented the market. A sig-
nificant price drop was by no means felt in all countries (Molina, 2007).
Given that the largest consumers of flour are the bread bakers, and the relatively 
high price of this input raises the price of this basic foodstuff in the region, some 
governments have removed import tariffs on flour from third-party countries such as 
Mexico. This has provided producers with a source of flour at competitive prices. 
Nicaragua’s MIFIC agreed to liberalize flour imports by bakers and even extended 
to them a preferential line of credit for such imports. Nonetheless, in El Salvador as 
well as Nicaragua, it is difficult for bakers to import their inputs directly due to their 
small size and the lack of an established custom of taking advantage of external supply 
sources. As a result, the majority of their bakers continue to source flour in their 
domestic markets at monopolistic prices. One promising sign is that in July 2006 a 
new association of bakers in Nicaragua made its first direct import of flour.
2. The Air Transportation Market in Central America30
There has been little competition for passengers in the market for intra-Central 
American air transportation due to the extent to which the market is concentrated 
in the hands of Transportes Aéreos del Continente Americano (Air Transport of the 
American Continent; TACA) airlines since the early 1980s. This Salvadoran-owned 
company formed Grupo TACA, a business alliance that includes the participation 
of various Central America airlines, including Líneas Aéreas Costarricenses, S.A. 
(LACSA); Taca International Airlines, S.A.; Taca de Honduras, S.A. de C.V.; 
Aviateca, S.A.; and Nicaragüense de Aviación, S.A. (NICA). As such, practically 
all the region’s national airlines belong to this conglomerate except Panama’s 
Compania Panamena de Aviacion (COPA).
Midway through 2006, TACA was operating flights to 19 cities in Central 
America and the USA via its operations hub in San Salvador. TACA’s principal 
route is North America–Central America, but its profit margins are particularly 
high on intra-regional flights. Outside of the region, the competition is greater and 
the company is not able to apply the same strategy.
30 This section is partly based on Molina (2007).
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Central American airspace is protected through an intra-regional “open skies” 
agreement, but operators from outside the region are not accorded the same treat-
ment. As a result, US and South American airlines are not permitted to operate 
flights between points within the region. Put another way, no airline other than 
TACA can pick up passengers in a Central American country and take them to 
another destination within Central America. In contrast, the market for North 
America–Central America routes is highly competitive.
Beginning in 1998, the regional market became somewhat more competitive due 
to an open-skies agreement signed between some Central American countries and 
the USA, allowing for the entry of new competitors into the market. Nonetheless, 
Grupo TACA continues to engage in monopolistic practices. For example, Panama’s 
COPA airline requested and was granted, in December 2004, permission to operate 
additional flights on its routes from Central American countries to destinations in 
South America, Panama and the Caribbean. TACA filed several legal challenges to 
COPA operating a second daily flight on these routes, and on several occasions has 
succeeded in denying the Panamanian airline permission to land in El Salvador.31 
Such anti-competitive conduct has had adverse effects across the region for 
consumers and airlines alike.
3. The Market for Carbonated Soft Drinks
Anti-competitive practices occur frequently in this market and have been challenged 
before competition commissions in Costa Rica and Mexico. However, these are 
practices that some multinational corporations, principally Coca Cola, engage in 
throughout many countries, including within the European Union.32 Such conduct 
consists of requiring both large and small-scale retailers, and even stadiums, amusement 
parks and other types of businesses agree to sell only Coca Cola brand beverages. 
This barrier also leads to the brand being sold at prices higher than those of alternative 
brands of carbonated soft drinks, as was the case when Big Cola began to compete with 
Coca Cola in Mexico.
In order to supply their product to retail resellers, Coca Cola frequently demands 
the exclusivity described above. This requirement may be applied in direct or indi-
rect forms. For example, the Coca Cola Company or an affiliated bottler may pro-
vide the retailer with a small refrigerator in exchange for the commitment to stock 
it only with Coca Cola products. If the retail location is small enough that no other 
refrigerator of this type can fit, this guarantees that no other brand of cold beverages 
will be sold there. It is important to note that the small family stores that face these 
monopolistic practices are the channel for 75% of Coca Cola sales in Mexico, while 
31 [online] skyscrapercity.com/archive/index.php/t-295767.html
32 Ibid.
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restaurants, schools, clubs, hotels and entertainment facilities represent 24% of 
sales, and supermarkets only 1%.33
Consumption of this type of beverage in Mexico is enormous. By the end of the 
1990s, 10% of the Coca Cola Company’s global earnings was being generated in 
Mexico and, in 2004, this country was the sales location for 11% of the 19,800 
million unit cases of soft drinks sold by the company. In addition, the Coca Cola 
Company regularly enters markets for related products seeking to replace domestic 
brands through large investments in advertising and promotions. This is the situa-
tion faced by firms producing fruit drinks, juices and nectars in Mexico. Coca Cola 
will use its Minute Maid brand to challenge Jumex, Jugos del Valle and the work-
er’s co-operative Pascual Boing for control of this market.34 Special attention is 
needed to assure that the practices that shaped the carbonated soft drink market do 
not extend worldwide to that of juice, fruit drinks and nectars.35
Charges of monopoly practices in the sale of certain products were filed before 
competition officials in Costa Rica in 2001,36 and Mexico’s FCC received several 
such complaints between 2000 and 2003. In both instances heavy fines were levied 
on the company accused of conducting these practices.
VI. Conclusions
There were no instruments for promoting market competition in Central American 
countries at the time when governments in the region carried out most of the eco-
nomic deregulation process and privatizations of large public companies, which in 
many cases began to operate as private monopolies. Such monopolies and other 
market distortions that accumulated since the economic reforms posed a major chal-
lenge for the competition agencies once they were formed (in five of the seven 
countries studied, including Mexico, by the end of 2006), especially in the smaller 
economies. The countries that still need to create the legal and institutional framework 
for competition will face these problems perhaps to an even greater degree, but they 
also will be able to learn from the mistakes and successes of their neighbours.
Competition is now on the agenda of governments of most countries in the 
region. Competition policy has greatly expanded in recent years and between 2004 




36 The suit in Costa Rica was against Coca Cola and Embotelladora Panamco Tica S.A. on the 
grounds that these companies engaged in relative monopolistic practices. In June 2001, the com-
pany Embotelladora Centroamericana S.A. brought suit against Embotelladora Panamco Tica S.A. 
for the same reasons. The latter company, one of the largest in Latin America, commonly imposes 
prices on the businesses that sell the products they distribute (Sittenfeld, 2006 and her chapter in 
this book).
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but the pioneers in competition policy (Costa Rica, Panama and Mexico) have 
reformed or are in the process of reforming their laws, as we have previously noted. 
The trend is towards expanding the coverage or applicability of competition law by 
reducing the number of exceptions, incorporating the “clemency appeal” in order 
to have more channels for access to information on monopolistic practices and 
increasing fines to give them more dissuasive influence over potential transgres-
sors. In addition to modifying the laws, these countries have also made efforts to 
improve training for judges and seek closer relationships and collaboration between 
competition agencies and the judicial systems. The countries that have recently 
passed their laws – El Salvador and Honduras –have already incorporated some of 
these improvements.
After at least ten years of experience in competition policy in three of the coun-
tries under study, we can see that the legislative model based on that of the USA, in 
which the courts play a major role in case resolution, does not appear to be the most 
adequate for countries such as those of Central America which lack expertise on 
both the judicial and competition-policy arenas. This is the situation in Panama, 
which even created special courts for cases that are often handled in a very pro-
tracted and unsatisfactory manner. It seems that a European-style system, in which 
cases could be handled through administrative channels, would be much more effec-
tive. Furthermore, there are numerous ways companies engaging in anti-competitive 
practices may avoid or delay the payment of fines, and such loopholes for legal 
manoeuvering must be eliminated to make competition laws more effective.
The lack of culture of competition is a prominent problem in Central American 
countries and a concerted effort to address this issue is indispensable. An effective 
application of competition law to anti-competitive practices, however, is an impor-
tant means of legitimizing and promoting the knowledge and respect for the insti-
tutional framework needed for guaranteeing the healthy functioning of markets.
The relationship between regulation and competition is very important in this 
type of economy, and they should complement each other so that goods and serv-
ices, especially of types previously provided by the state and now dominated by 
large corporations, can be provided in a technically adequate manner.
In small economies, the competition agency faces a special challenge in the case 
of market concentrations, given that these may be necessary in order to achieve 
important technological innovations and increased efficiency. A major challenge 
for the countries under study is how to distinguish such objectives from that of 
increasing profit margins through monopolistic practices. In this regard the compe-
tition agencies of Mexico, on the one hand, and Costa Rica and Panama, on the 
other, vary in their capacity to deal with this issue. In Mexico, the majority of cases 
are related to corporate mergers and takeovers, transactions for which participating 
companies must give regulatory officials prior notification. In the other two countries, 
where notification of merger or acquisition plans is voluntary, competition agency 
efforts are focused largely on other types of practices (generally horizontal monop-
olistic practices). El Salvador is the first SDC in Central America to require prior 
notification of mergers, and its competition commission will face challenges in 
carrying out its work, considering the scarce resources available to it.
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As we have seen, competition policy has advanced considerably in recent years 
in the countries under study, but at the same time the further advances have been 
registered in competition policy at the international level, thereby posing new 
challenges for the region. For example, the local trend has been to apply the “rule 
of reason” instead of prohibiting certain practices per se, even when the practices 
are horizontal in nature. Even if this way of treating cases is undoubtedly more 
reflexive and probably leads to fairer resolutions, it poses the need to provide SDC 
with greater resources. It is also important to maintain a broad view of the changes 
experienced by these countries as a result of their insertion into global markets. 
They all have strengthened commercial ties through free trade agreements (FTAs) 
between each other or with third-party countries and this can open the door for 
large multinational corporations to take advantage by exerting their market power 
in these countries, or for other types of distortions to occur although improvements 
in competition also may take place in some markets as a result of these agreements. 
Hence, many FTAs include competition clauses.
In this context, regional and international cooperation on competition is crucial 
within Central America, and between the region and those countries with which it has 
strong economic ties such as the USA and Mexico. The possibility of collaborating 
on information sharing and coordinating actions to avoid anti-competitive practices 
that simultaneously affect various markets of the region (e.g. the cement, beverage, 
air transportation and banking industries, among others) would be of great help. This 
becomes even more significant when considering the limited resources available to 
all of the regions’ competition agencies. It would also be very useful to make a great 
effort to harmonize competition rules at the regional level, create similar criteria for 
confidentiality and transparency of information and pursue cases of trans-border 
monopolistic practices. A seed has been sown for taking up this effort in the 
Guatemala Protocol of the General Treaty of Central American Economic Integration 
(1993), which includes the following stipulation: “In the trade sector, the states party 
to this agreement agree to adopt common dispositions to avoid monopolistic activities 
and to promote free competition in the countries of the region.”
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Chapter 3
Models of Privatization and Development 
of Competition in Telecommunications 
in Central America and Mexico
Eugenio Rivera
Introduction
Telecommunications in Central America and Mexico have undergone unprecedented 
changes. The coverage attained in fixed telephony, and particularly in mobile 
telephony, was unimaginable just a few years ago. Despite this general trend, the 
countries of the region have taken varied paths in the privatization and liberalization 
of telecommunications, which have resulted in different levels of competition and 
performance in the industry.
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse, based on national studies on competition 
and regulation in telecommunications, how the different forms of privatization and 
liberalization of this industry or, conversely, the preservation of public enterprise 
have affected the intensity of competition in the industry, the coverage and the quality 
and price of services.
For this purpose, first we analyse the different forms of privatization and 
liberalization of telecommunications or their rejection, seeking to identify the 
causes leading to the application of the various models. Three courses of development 
can be pieced together in the region.
The first concerns the case of Costa Rica, in which the citizens rejected privatization 
and opted for keeping the Costa Rican Electricty Institute (ICE), also in charge of 
telecommunications, as a public enterprise. Honduras shows significant similarities 
with this course of development. The second involves the cases of Mexico, Nicaragua 
and Panama, where the strategy was to privatize and provide the enterprise with a 
period of exclusivity. This policy aimed at strengthening the enterprise prior to the 
liberalization of the market. The third approach was that adopted by El Salvador and 
Guatemala which was characterized by the simultaneous privatization and liberali-
zation of the industry and also by the privatization of radio spectrum management.
Among the major options mentioned, privatization is considered by the literature 
an important factor for the sector’s performance.1 Whether the monopolistic public 
enterprise was privatized as a vertically and/or horizontally integrated monopoly, or 
1 On this subject see Rivera, 2006.
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whether measures were taken so as to limit its monopolistic power through restruc-
turing, or if certain precautionary steps were taken to limit its dominant position 
seems to have been crucial for the enterprise’s behaviour and this will be looked into 
in this chapter. These different paths are the result of specific political configurations 
and coalitions and diverse types of historical performance by the public enterprise. 
The international context in which the different processes took place also had a 
strong influence. Thus, the Mexican reform can only be understood within the context 
of approval by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the final 
destiny of ICE in Costa Rica will probably be determined by the Dominican 
Republic – Central America Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA).
Together with the forms of privatization and liberalization, the industry’s per-
formance is associated with the existence of a legal framework favouring competition 
and effective conditions for its application. This latter aspect refers to the institutional 
capacity of both the sector regulator and the competition agency to effectively perform 
regulatory tasks and supervise competition, and their respective capabilities for coor-
dination. It also refers to the ways in which the overall institutional framework 
operates, and particularly the administration of justice. The regulatory and competition 
agencies, in addition to undertaking tasks incumbent upon the Executive Branch such 
as administration of the radio spectrum and formulation of telecommunications and 
competition policies, also operate as administrative entities assisting in the administra-
tion of justice.2 Paradoxically, the Judiciary sometimes stands as a significant obstacle 
to the application of those policies, thus affecting competition and market efficiency.
In this context, Section I compares the different privatization and liberalization 
processes as well as their main determining factors. Section II analyses the main 
features of the regulatory and competition institutions, as well as their legal framework. 
The general business climate and its impact on a competitive atmosphere are also 
studied in this section. Section III studies the processes of opening up to competition, 
a crucial time for assessing the consistency of the regulatory framework and its appli-
cation. Section IV focuses on the characteristics of the sector’s industrial organization 
and the performance and development of competition in the industry’s different 
segments. Section V analyses the evolution of rates in the countries of the region. 
Section VI identifies the trends influencing the future of telecommunications in the 
region and sets forth the main conclusions together with policy recommendations.
I.  Privatization and Liberalization of Telecommunications 
in Central America and Mexico: The Diversity of Experiences
With the exception of Costa Rica, the seven countries covered by this study have 
furthered forms of privatization and deregulation of telecommunications. However, 
these forms of privatization and liberalization of the sector have varied.
2 We wish to thank Gustavo Paredes, while being a Commissioner of CLICAC, for having called 
our attention to this link.
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1. The Case of Costa Rica
Costa Rica has a long experience in open trade practices and in the establishment 
of free trade agreements. Recently it took part in the negotiations leading to the 
signing of DR-CAFTA, although it is yet to be ratified by the Legislative Assembly. 
Even though the main political forces have expressed their support for this agreement, 
citizens’ rejection persuaded the President of the Republic to postpone seeking its 
ratification by the said Assembly. The chief reason for this rejection is the commitments 
assumed by Costa Rica in telecommunications in Annex I.
In DR-CAFTA, Costa Rica pledges to promote the opening up of telecommuni-
cations services gradually and selectively, and strictly in accordance with the social 
objectives of universality and solidarity in the provision of such services. To that 
end, Costa Rica would have had to enact, by December 31, 2004, at the latest, a 
legal framework that would allow the strengthening and modernization of ICE.3 
Likewise, by virtue of the Agreement it would have to allow other providers to supply 
telecommunications services under no less favourable terms and conditions than 
those established by, or granted in accordance with, its legislation in force to 
January 27, 2003. Costa Rica would not have permitted other telecommunications 
services providers (including international) on a non-discriminatory basis to compete 
in order to supply directly to the client, with the technology of its choice, the 
following telecommunications services: (i) private network services, at the latest 
by January 1, 2006; (ii) Internet services, at the latest by January1, 2006; and 
(iii) mobile wireless services, at the latest by January 1, 2007. Finally, the country 
would have to apply the new regulatory framework for telecommunications services 
as of January 1, 2006, in accordance with the following provisions: universal service, 
independence of the regulatory authority, transparency, allocation and utilization of 
scarce resources, regulated interconnection, access to, and use of, information 
services supply networks, competition, undersea cables systems and flexibility in 
technology options.
The DR-CAFTA negotiations were accompanied by intense public debate and 
social conflict. The debate continued after its signing in January 2004. The situation 
was further complicated when proceedings were instituted against two ex-presidents 
involved in cases of corruption in connection with the Social Security Fund and 
ICE, probably the two leading institutions of the so-called Costa Rican model. 
These cases appeared to confirm all citizens suspicious who viewed the different 
initiatives for modernization of the public electricity and telecommunications 
enterprise only as attempts by privileged groups to appropriate, at a low price, the 
national wealth.4 The early start of the campaign to elect a new president in 
3 In February 2006 presidential election, the candidate of the Citizen’s Action Party actively 
opposed this Free Trade Agreement. Nevertheless, the winning candidate, Oscar Arias, supported 
such agreement all along.
4 For an analysis of the different proposals for reform of ICE, see Rivera (2006).
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February 2006 led the authorities to postpone the parliamentary debate on the 
Agreement until after the elections.
Costa Rica is the only country among those studied5 that has rejected the priva-
tization and liberalization of telecommunications. The main reasons for this stance 
are as follows. (i) The public electricity and telecommunications enterprise has 
been associated with the most positive aspects of the Costa Rican model, which 
enabled a relatively poor Central American country to emerge as the most developed 
in the region. (ii) Associated with the above, ICE took electricity and telecommuni-
cations services to every corner of the country and achieved higher levels of coverage 
than most Latin American countries. While in the rest of the region users had to 
wait years for access to a telephone, Costa Ricans were able to gain access so much 
more quickly. (iii) ICE has also played a crucial role in helping the country reach 
levels of competitiveness that have enabled it to participate favourably in the most 
modern international chains of production. National Telecommunications Institute’s 
(INTEL) investments are one of the main examples of this situation. (iv) After the 
privatization and liberalization of telecommunications in the rest of Central 
America and Mexico, fixed telephony in Costa Rica remained at the head of the 
industry in terms of coverage, and was placed second in Latin America.6
2.  Privatization with Exclusivity: The Cases of Mexico, 
Nicaragua and Panama
In the cases of Mexico, Nicaragua and Panama, the privatization process was 
accompanied by the right of an exclusivity period for the telecommunications 
enterprise, prior to the opening up of the market to competition. The similarities 
among these experiences, however, conceal significant differences in telecommuni-
cations public policy.
Mexico’s case is undoubtedly a paradigmatic example of nationalism in the process 
of privatization and opening up of telecommunications. The enterprise was privatized 
as a national, vertically integrated monopoly and was granted a six-year exclusivity 
period. The new General Law of Telecommunications (LGT) was passed more than five 
years after privatization and the regulatory body was established shortly before the end 
of the exclusivity period. The privatization of telecommunications in Mexico formed 
part of a broader process of reform begun in 1986 with the accession to General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the government’s decision to establish a 
free trade agreement with the USA and Canada. Despite opposition from large social 
groups, the hope that this policy would contribute to reactivating the economy and to its 
5 The group of countries includes Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, 
Nicaragua and Panama.
6 The only other country in Latin America that has rejected privatization of its telecommunications 
enterprise has been Uruguay.
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long-term growth succeeded in rallying majority support in society. The poor 
performance of the public telecommunications enterprise constituted a forceful 
argument in favour of the reform and, at the same time, privatization became a funda-
mental component of the modernization of the economy (Mariscal and Rivera, 2005a).
Telecommunications policy in Mexico cannot be understood unless it is inserted 
into the context defined by the decision of the administration of Salinas de Gortari 
(1988–1994) to reorient Mexico’s development from the import substitution model 
towards an export model based mainly on close association with the USA and 
Canada. Betting on NAFTA led the Mexican government to use the privatization of 
Teléfonos de México (TELMEX) as evidence of its commitment to approval of the 
Agreement. With the privatization of the enterprise the Salinas administration 
wanted to show its split with the national revolutionary tradition and its willingness 
to further private sector-driven capitalism. Government policy was also determined 
to privatize because of its fear that the telecommunications enterprise would suffer 
a rapid process of denationalization or become a victim of competition from major 
foreign operators, particularly from the USA. In this context, the enterprise was 
strengthened financially as much as possible so as to become attractive to domestic 
investors (Mariscal and Rivera, 2007). The decision was taken, moreover, to privatize 
the enterprise as a vertically and horizontally integrated monopoly and it was 
decided that the dominant share among the investors should be Mexican.7 The 
exclusivity period paved the way for an important set of conditions for the moder-
nization of the enterprise, digitalization of its networks and financial strengthening 
which stood it in good stead to face the generalized opening up of the industry to 
competition as of 1997. Together with tax benefits, the tariff policy set in the 
Concession License was highly favourable to the enterprise, allowing high rates of 
return, which meant that in 1999 Mexico registered the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) highest prices for telecommunications 
services (OECD, 1999). This policy enabled the company to begin its international 
expansion in 1998 and since then it has become, together with Telefónica España, 
one of the two dominant companies in the region.
If in Mexico’s case the exclusivity period and other policies applied in favour of 
TELMEX can be explained by the aim of contributing to shape a national champion 
capable of vying with US companies for the position of privilege within Mexican 
borders, in the cases of Panama and Nicaragua this policy is harder to understand.
In Panama, on July 14, 1992, the Legislative Assembly, controlled at the time by 
the Christian Democrat Party, succeeded in passing a law “whereby the privatization 
process for state enterprises and services is established and regulated.” However, 
the opposition introduced an Article which indicated that the law would not be 
applicable to the privatization of public utility enterprises, INTEL, Institute of 
Water Resources and Electrification (IRHE) and National Aqueducts and Sewerage 
7 The concession licence obliges TELMEX to maintain its capital structure and Board of Directors, 
so that the power to determine the company’s administrative control and management should fall 
chiefly on the Mexican partners (Mariscal and Rivera, 2007).
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Systems Institute (IDAAN), or to the services they provide, and that a special law 
to approve their privatization would be required. Paradoxically, one of the parties 
that authored the above-mentioned Article took office in government in 1994 and 
proposed a bill, passed in 1995, paving the way for the privatization of INTEL.8 The 
immediate causes of privatization appear to have been problems of supply in fixed 
telephony, the non-existence of mobile services and the fiscal problems of the 
Panamanian State, which made it difficult for the state to carry out the necessary 
investments in this sector. (González, 2007).
The opening of envelopes containing the companies’ offers took place on May 20, 
1997. The company Cable & Wireless won the bid for the enterprise by offering $652 
million as against General Telephone and Electronics’ (GTE) $451 million. The 
benchmark price had been established at $500 million, so $152 million above that 
price was obtained. With regard to mobile telephony, in 1996 an invitation for tenders 
was issued for Band A for the provision of mobile services throughout the country. 
The winning bid was from Bellsouth, in alliance with Multiholding,9 which paid 
$72.6 million. Motorola, for its part, offered only $42 million. Band B was assigned 
to the winner of the bid for INTEL (which was Cable & Wireless, as mentioned), 
which would have to pay the same amount paid for Band A (González, 2007).
What are the reasons behind the Panamanian government’s decision to grant an 
exclusivity period in fixed telephony, award a mobile licence as part of the sale of the 
fixed telephony enterprise and limit mobile telephony service to two operators? Three 
explanations have been put forward in the debate on the matter: (i) the presence of 
natural monopoly in fixed telephony; (ii) the government’s objective of maximizing 
its revenues as owner of 49% of the shares led it to turn over the sector in exclusivity 
– The present value of cash flows is greater under that system; (iii) radio spectrum 
restrictions did not make the entry of more operators viable (González, 2007).
The first argument may be convincing to justify the sale of the enterprise as a 
monopolistic operator. It is not, however, the grounds for a period of exclusivity. 
Exclusivity is justified precisely as a period in which the enterprise renews itself 
and reaches a critical threshold that makes it possible for it to face the competition. 
But the characteristics of a natural monopoly rule out any attempt at entry of new 
firms, and therefore additional barriers seem unnecessary. The second argument is 
undoubtedly the relevant one. The concession of exclusive rights allowed the 
government to maximize its revenues at the time of sale and, as owners of 49% of 
the shares, profit from a greater flow of dividends. The fiscal reasons do not, however, 
seem sufficient to explain the continued public presence in the ownership of the 
enterprise. In this regard, the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD), the dominant 
group in the coalition that assumed the Presidency of the Republic in 1994 and was 
characterized by strong nationalistic tendencies, saw in public participation in the 
8 Ernesto Pérez Balladares, of the United People Alliance, headed by the PRD, obtained 355,307 
votes of a total of 1,066,844 valid votes. The PRD is the party founded by the revolutionary 
national leader Torrijos.
9 The shareholding was Bellsouth USA 43.7% and Multiholding Corporation 56.3%.
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company INTEL a mechanism to ensure consistency between economic growth 
objectives and modernization of the enterprise and national interests. The 
Panamanian government’s interest is reflected by the fact that eight years after 51% 
of the enterprise’s shares were privatized, the Panamanian State continued to hold 
49% of the shares. A further expression of this situation is the existence of ongoing 
negotiations between the government and the enterprise to obtain lower prices for 
public institutions than those paid by other users of telecommunications services 
(González, 2007). In this regard, Panamanian policy in privatization and liberalization 
of telecommunications may be interpreted as a version of the policy of national 
champions in the case of small countries.
Nicaragua’s case also has its peculiarities. It is the region’s poorest country, with 
long-standing high external indebtedness resulting from having to finance its 
current account deficits and a substantial percentage of its fiscal deficits with inter-
national aid or concessionary loans. This situation makes the country highly 
vulnerable to international pressures in favour of privatization. Privatization of the 
public telecommunications monopoly was put forward as a solution to the problem 
of demands for indemnity on properties confiscated by the Sandinista government. 
The funds obtained would be allocated to finance the bonds issued in favour of 
persons with unfairly confiscated properties. The proposal thus succeeded in building 
political consensus on privatization of the industry (Ansorena, 2007).
The privatization process was preceded by a significant investment effort. 
Between 1992 and 1994, Nicaragua achieved the highest rate of investment and 
modernization of telecommunications in the whole of Central America, so that the 
assets of the public operator were the most modern in the region at the end of that 
period. Investments during that time span totalled $103.9 million, 72% of which 
was earmarked for the acquisition of infrastructure and equipment. As in the two 
preceding cases, a horizontally and vertically integrated monopoly was privatized, 
with an exclusivity clause for a period of three years. The exclusive concession also 
included national and international long distance (LD) and the option to acquire a 
mobile telephony licence. In its part, the winning company had to pledge to meet 
network expansion goals, improvement of service quality and creation of a techno-
logical platform (essential equipment) to allow interconnection and thus increase 
the participation of other operators once the exclusivity period was over. The priva-
tization model included the sale of 40% of the shares, with majority voting power 
equivalent to 57%; employees could have access to 11% and the remainder 49% 
would remain as property of the state for subsequent sale on the domestic or inter-
national stock market. A number of difficulties postponed the privatization until 
2001.10 Finally, on December 12, 2001, after a public bidding process, 40% of the 
10 Political difficulties and strong public opposition to the privatization of the only profitable public 
services enterprise postponed approval of the sale by the National Assembly until 1998. The first 
competitive bidding process begun in May 1999 was declared void when the two interested 
companies, TELMEX of Mexico and Telefónica of Spain, decided to withdraw. The second 
attempt, six months later, had the same outcome, when a consortium made up of MCI WorldCom, 
TELMEX and France Telecom withdrew from the process (Ansorena, 2007).
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enterprise’s shares were turned over to the Swedish-Honduran consortium Telia 
Swedtel Ab – MEGATEL EMCE for a period of 20 years. The price paid was $83 
million, far below the benchmark price of $203 million (Ansorena, 2007). In 2004, 
in contrast to the above case, the government proceeded to sell the remaining 
shares, awarding them without a bidding process to the Mexican company América 
Móvil, part of Grupo Carso. In parallel, the same company acquired MEGATEL of 
Honduras, as a result of which América Móvil became the sole shareholder of 
Empresa Nicaraguense de Telecomunicaciones, S.A. (ENITEL). Furthermore, with 
the purchase of MEGATEL, América Móvil became an operator with two cellular 
telephony licences, one from ENITEL and the other from Servicios de 
Comunicaciones Personales Inalambrica (PCS SERCOM).
If in Panama’s case the exclusivity policy expressed an interest in maintaining a 
public presence in the sector, in Nicaragua’s case it represented only a concession 
to the investor. Protecting an international telecommunications operator does not 
appear to make sense from the point of view of the public interest. On the other 
hand, the sale of the enterprise to the Mexican operator, which enabled the latter to 
strengthen its position in the fixed telephony segment and also in national and 
international LD and, at the same time, made it easier for that same company to 
have majority control of mobile telephony, significantly reducing the intensity of 
competition, is not easy to explain. The severe political problems affecting 
Nicaragua between 2003 and 2006, the consequence of which has been, among 
others, the parallel and conflictive existence of two regulatory bodies, may contribute 
to understanding that situation. We will return to this topic further ahead.
3.  Privatization without Exclusivity: The Cases 
of El Salvador and Guatemala
In the cases of Guatemala and El Salvador, privatization and opening up to 
competition took place simultaneously.
In El Salvador there appear to be two driving forces behind the privatization and 
reform of telecommunications. First, the decision of the 1989–1994 Administration 
to promote a programme of comprehensive reforms, drawn up with the support of 
a working group headed by Arnold Harberger and aimed at building a new economic 
model. This programme included initiatives to stabilize macroeconomic imbalances 
(inflation, fiscal deficit, current account, competitive exchange rate), a structural 
adjustment programme (privatization of the banks, liberalization of foreign trade 
and impetus for tax reform) and additional policies aimed at propelling an export-led 
economic growth (Argumedo, 2007). The second was the deep discontent of the 
main entrepreneurial groups with the situation of telecommunications.11
11 The export strategy was facing serious difficulties due to lack of infrastructure. Textile maquila, 
for example, needed modern telecommunications to participate in international “just in time”
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In this context, as in the case of Nicaragua, the Administration decided to 
promote a wide-ranging programme of investments and a policy expressly designed 
to raise the enterprise’s productivity. Thus, between 1990 and 1993, the enterprise 
called Administración Nacional de Telecomunicaciones (ANTEL) invested $133.1 
million, i.e. an average of 0.6% of gross domestic product (GDP) annually. The 
number of lines was increased from 2.9 per 100 inhabitants in 1989 to 5.5 in 1993; 
the number of employees was reduced from 48 per 1,000 lines to 22 in 2003; and 
the institution’s profits improved (Argumedo, 2007). The following Administration 
(1994–1999) decided to intensify the progress made, creating the Presidential 
Commission for the Modernization of the Public Sector (CPMSP) with the aim of 
decentralizing or privatizing public services such as electricity, telecommunications, 
water, public transport and ports, as well as analysing the reform of the Pensions 
System. As in other cases, the reform of telecommunications was assigned an 
exemplary role, which led to its being carefully prepared. Indeed, between 1994 
and 1995, various studies were commissioned which had to include a diagnosis of 
the problems and the requirements for creating a competitive market in telecom-
munications. In 1996, the new Law of the sector was passed and the regulatory 
body was created. In 1997, the enterprise was restructured in such a way that a fixed 
telephony company was created and another one also to take charge of mobile 
operations. Finally, in 1998 both companies were privatized. France Telecom 
acquired 51% of the shares of Commonwealth Telephone Enterprises (CTE), S.A. 
de C.V., the fixed telephony company, for $275 million (the benchmark auction 
price was $268.8 million), and Telefónica España bought INTEL, the mobile company, 
for $41.0 million (the benchmark auction price was $11.9 million; Argumedo, 2007).
In Guatemala, privatizations began in the early 1990s. In 1993, a selective process 
to sell low-utilization and low-performance state assets began with the aim of 
financing public-benefit programmes. The most distinctive feature of economic 
reform until 1996 was the sale of state assets to finance the fiscal gap and obtain 
resources for activities and programmes on the social agenda. Most of the privatizations 
carried out in this period (mainly the sale of the national airline Empresa 
Guatemalteca de Aviacion, S.A. (AVIATECA) and the concession awarded to 
Comunicaciones Celulares (COMCEL) for Band A) were severely criticized for the 
production strategies. In the early 1990s, the waiting time to obtain a new telephone line was more 
than two years, there were problems of quality in communications, the geographical coverage of 
the network was very limited, and the damage caused by the civil war was to demand resources 
to replace the infrastructure. This situation limited the State’s possibilities to attract foreign 
investment. The high rates in long distance telephony, which subsidized local calls, hindered the 
competitiveness of exporting companies. A survey on obstacles to competitiveness carried out by 
the World Bank showed that over 58% of the companies interviewed stated that they had problems 
with the service, 71% of these said they faced the problem of overloaded lines, 14.5% pointed out 
crossed lines and interruption and more than 78% stated there were not enough lines to be able to 
acquire new ones. Other indicators showed low-quality service since 75% of faults took between 
four and 20 days to repair, whereas the rest took even longer. Around 35% of calls could not be 
completed due to high congestion (Argumedo, 2007).
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procedures followed, which lacked transparency and left the population with a bad 
aftertaste regarding privatization processes. Towards 1996, after the signing of the 
Peace Accords, the political regime was becoming consolidated and although the 
growth rate was satisfactory with respect to the region, the country was facing a 
fiscal situation that threatened macroeconomic stability. In this context, a new 
government took office, headed by President Álvaro Arzú. Progress in the moderni-
zation of the state as a means to build a more efficient and competitive economy 
was the prime objective of the Government Program for the period 1996–2000. 
Special importance was placed on physical infrastructure, particularly in telecom-
munications (Urízar, 2007).
The government analysed three options: (i) keeping Empresa Guatemalteca de 
Telecomunicaciones (GUATEL) as a public enterprise and promoting initiatives 
aimed at strengthening it; (ii) selling GUATEL with a five-year period of exclusive 
concession; and (iii) selling GUATEL, thereby immediately opening up the market 
to competition and concentrating the government’s activity on its regulatory role. 
The first option was discarded, as it did not adjust to the principles of subsidiarity 
promoted by the government. The second option proved attractive, particularly 
from the standpoint of public finances. However, the five-year concession of a 
monopoly was considered a risk, since a benefit of that nature would lead the 
private investor to do everything possible not to lose it. Thus, the reform would lead to 
nothing more than the passage from a public monopoly to a private one. To avoid 
that risk, the second option was also discarded. Despite the fiscal costs involved, 
the government opted for the third possibility. It was believed that a competitive 
atmosphere would contribute to attain more quickly a modern telecommunications 
services and at low prices (Urízar, 2007).
The government rejected the possibility of dividing the enterprise and preferred 
to sell it as a vertically and horizontally integrated operator. It was considered that 
its destructuring could hinder attracting investors and further affect the sale price. 
Efforts were made to neutralize the impact of this decision on competition through 
the approval of a Telecommunications Law. Political and legal difficulties of various 
kinds made it necessary to create a new enterprise, Telecomunicaciones de 
Guatemala, S.A. (TELGUA), to which all the assets and liabilities of GUATEL 
were transferred, leaving the latter with a minimal structure to enable it to continue 
serving community telephony. TELGUA took over the provision of local and LD 
telephone service and entered the market of the Personal Communications System 
(PCS). On October 1, 1998, the sale of 95% of TELGUA’s shares to the company 
Luca, S.A. was finally concluded. The process was audited by Arthur Andersen and 
the value of the transaction was $977 million. Subsequently the owners of TELGUA 
established a partnership with TELMEX, an international operator, which acquired 
45% of the shares. Prior to the Telecommunications Law, frequencies were obtained 
by authorization from the Executive Agency by means of concessions or authoriza-
tions. Chapter II (Articles 54–56) of the Telecommunications Law created the legal 
concept of “Frequency Usufruct Titles” (TUF), giving the spectrum the nature of 
an economic good rather than a public good. Thus, the category of regulated (free) 
Bands, which are allocated as TUF and can be freely transferred and utilized, 
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within certain technical limitations, was created. TUFs detail the hours and area of 
operation, the maximum transmission power and the maximum interference 
permitted within the area of coverage (Urízar, 2007).
4. The “Honduran Way”
In the case of Honduras, with the enactment of the Law on Telecommunications (LMT) 
on October 31, 1995, Empresa Hondurena de Telecomunicaciones (HONDUTEL) 
became the responsibility of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport and later12 
this responsibility was conveyed to the President of the Republic. Subsequently, 
these tasks were entrusted to the recently founded National Telecommunications 
Commission (CONATEL). Finally, the development and operation of telecommu-
nications services were assigned to HONDUTEL and private companies. One 
 fundamental feature of the LMT was the reform of the Organic Law of HONDUTEL, 
permitting association with private investors.
In this context the “capitalization process” arose for the purpose of attracting 
foreign private capital. At the same time, the enterprise was granted a concession 
in the following terms: “[F]or 10 years following the date of entry into effect of the 
Framework Law for the Telecommunications Sector, HONDUTEL shall provide, in 
an exclusive manner, national and international telephony services and telegraphy 
services in places where there is no other means of communication in the country, 
and such exclusivity shall be incumbent upon the company or companies established 
by HONDUTEL” (quoted by Tábora, 2007). In October 1998, the National 
Congress of the Republic approved Decree 244-98 which broadened the concession 
to 25 years and extended it to the non-exclusive operation of the carrier service. To 
modernize the sector, a mechanism was promoted that consisted in capitalizing a 
new enterprise with the assets of HONDUTEL. The new company, Compania 
Hondurena de Telefonos, S.A. (HONDUCOM), would be capitalized by means of 
a public bidding process in which 47% of the shares would be transferred to a tech-
nical partner who would take over the management of the enterprise, 2% would be 
sold to the workers and the state would keep 51% through HONDUTEL.
On signing a letter of intent with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 
1997, a new distribution of shares was agreed upon, by which the state would keep 
47% of the shares, 2% would be sold to the workers and 51% would be assigned to 
the strategic partner. A number of problems, among them Hurricane Mitch, delayed 
the process.
Finally, in 2000, seven companies showed an interest in acquiring the above-
mentioned block of shares. However, only one of them, TELMEX, made an offer. 
The offer was only just over one third of the benchmark price ($300 million), as a 
result of which on October 16, 2000, the bid was declared void and in May 2001 it 
12 On October 25, 1977, by virtue of Decree 118–97.
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was decided to suspend the process until another arrangement could be found 
(Tábora, 2007).
The difficulties in capitalizing the enterprise led to the design of the programme 
“Telefonía para todos” (Telephony for all – TpT) with the aim of benefiting users 
and the national economy by addressing unsatisfied demand for telephone service 
and improving service quality and attention to customers, thus laying the founda-
tions for the opening of the market as of 2005. To that end, competition would be 
introduced in fixed voice services, private participation in the sector and the supply 
of new services would be encouraged, thus stepping up the growth and moderniza-
tion of the sector.13
The TpT programme envisaged broad access to the telecommunications market. 
In fact, all interested parties could sign a contract and receive equal treatment from 
HONDUTEL. Specifically, HONDUTEL should sign a contract with any party 
interested in establishing itself as a marketer of sub-operator type that complied with 
the following requirements: (i) being legally incorporated as a business enterprise in 
accordance with the country’s laws; (ii) in the case of natural persons, having the 
legal capacity to contract and in the case of foreign companies, being authorized to 
carry out business transactions in Honduras; and (iii) submitting a sworn statement 
to the effect that neither the applicant nor any of the partners holding more than 10% 
of the capital stock are included in the cases provided for in Article 92 (Sections e 
to k of the General Regulations of the Framework Law for the Telecommunications 
Sector). Having complied with the above requirements, the interested parties would 
proceed to sign the Marketing Contract, after which they would obtain their registration 
and the licences for use of the radio spectrum (if necessary). Likewise, they would 
be assigned blocks of numbers and would have to pay the established rates.
The TpT programme introduced two important innovations. The first stems from 
the creation of the concept marketeer sub-operator, who is defined as “the one that 
receives from HONDUTEL an extension of the rights granted by Law, to enable it 
to directly provide the public telecommunications services authorized to 
HONDUTEL. To provide the services the sub-operators may make investments in 
infrastructure in order to expand the public telecommunications network, contribut-
ing both facilities and value-added services.” Even more important is the implicit 
annulment of HONDUTEL’s exclusivity (Tábora, 2007).14 Finally, the TpT decree 
13 The programme “Telephony for All – Modernity for Honduras” (TpT) was approved by means 
of Executive Decree No. PCM 018–2003 dated September 23, 2003, and ratified by Legislative 
Decree No. 159–2003, published in the Official Gazette on October 24, 2003 (Tábora, 2007).
14 In this regard, Tábora points out that “On the other hand, the same TpT Decree, with the aim of 
permitting anyone wishing to invest in telecommunications to do so, eliminated all kinds of 
restrictions for those wanting to enter the market. This situation, due to the principle of egalitarian 
treatment and non-discrimination established by the LMT, left in contradiction and legal inconsistency 
all the constraints included in this matter in the concession contract of the mobile operator, 
CONATEL being obliged to amend the Concession Contract in these aspects, a situation which 
gave rise to dissent among the members of CONATEL, and which was interpreted by some as an 
example of inconsistency in sectoral policy on the part of the government, and as an irregular 
situation by others, even though the amendment was executed by a motion of the National 
Congress and was duly approved by Congress once it was made effective.” (Tábora 2007).
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ended segmentation in the provision of telecommunications services, since the 
sub-operator can use the same infrastructure to provide the different services, 
which also promotes technological convergence.
The impact of the “Honduran way” toward the liberalization and modernization 
of telecommunications seems promising. By September 2005, 40 companies had 
obtained registration as sub-operator15 of which 17 had started commercial operations 
and installed 63,000 telephone lines,16 two thirds of which belong to MULTIFON 
(Tábora, 2007).
II.  Regulation and Competition in Telecommunications: 
Institutional Problems
1. Introductory Considerations
In the region’s experience, with the exception of Costa Rica, public telecommuni-
cations enterprises traditionally have been unable to provide adequate services. 
Hence, privatization emerged as the possibility to overcome these problems by 
incorporating private management capacity into service provision.
However, the fact that telecommunications companies were natural monopolies 
made it necessary to create a regulatory agency to ensure consistency between private 
operation and public interests. International evidence was conclusive to the effect 
that a good law was not sufficient and that a regulatory agency was needed with the 
necessary resources to effectively apply the regulatory framework.
The problem is that the regulatory agencies created in the region began to operate 
either long after the privatization process (Mexico’s case) or simultaneously with 
the privatization and the opening up to competition. Thus, these agencies are weak 
and face serious problems associated with asymmetry of information. Moreover, 
the regulatory agencies of small countries have to face transnational corporations 
which have major financial and technical backing. The technical capture is, there-
fore, a permanent possibility that prevents, or at least seriously hinders, effective 
regulation. The difficulties regulators face to obtain the required information 
seriously hinder their task and hence the need to promote competition as the main 
mechanism that can assure the industry of an efficient performance. However, the 
types of privatization and opening up to competition in the region have not been so 
favourable to the development of competition. Although the situation varies from 
one segment and from one country to another, the fact is that companies other than 
the incumbent effectively operating in the market are not sufficient in number or 
15 The TpT Decree establishes that once HONDUTEL’s exclusivity period is over, sub-operators 
may continue offering the services, whether under the same scheme of sub-operator or directly 
requesting their empowering title accrediting them as operators (Tábora, 2007).
16 Equivalent to one sixth of the total lines installed (Tábora, 2007).
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in size to create the necessary competitive climate for the telecommunications 
market to operate efficiently.
In this context, the competition agency should play a crucial role in eliminating 
obstacles to entry and preventing anti-competitive conduct. Despite the progress 
made,17 the existing competition agencies in the region show serious difficulties in 
efficiently protecting competition in the telecommunications sector. In some cases 
the general law on telecommunications assigns the regulatory agency tasks 
designed to protect competition in the sector, but these are very general standards 
that are frequently almost inoperative and that definitely do not represent an 
effective means of promoting a competitive market.
In this context, the aim of this section is to identify the main problems regarding 
design of the regulatory framework for telecommunications and the institutional 
system for regulation and promotion of competition in this market.
2. Institutional Design and Competition18
Academic reflection and analysis of international experience regarding privatizations 
and the transition towards a competitive market in telecommunications tend to agree 
that the success of the process is associated with it being effectively planned; being 
preceded by the enactment of a Telecommunications Law that defines the rules of the 
game; and with the creation of a regulatory agency with the necessary authority and 
resources to efficiently apply the regulations. This institutional framework should be 
complemented with the prior establishment of the competition agency (Rivera, 2006). 
As we shall see, the experiences in the region are still far from this model.19
Although on different dates, Panama, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Honduras and El 
Salvador approved new Telecommunications Laws and created specialized regula-
tory bodies prior to the privatizations process. Up to the end of 2005 only three 
countries of the region had competition authorities: Costa Rica, Mexico and 
Panama. In Costa Rica’s case, however, the issue is not important in view of the 
existence of the public monopoly in telecommunications. Furthermore, the 
Competition Law explicitly denies the Commission on Promotion of Competition 
(COPROCOM) any power regarding the sector. Further ahead we will return to the 
cases of Mexico and Panama after dealing with the cases of the countries that have 
lacked a competition authority.
17 The Superintendence of Competition of El Salvador began its operations on January 1, 2006, 
and Honduras was due to set up its agency six months after the Law was passed (early 2006).
18 For a detailed analysis of the Central American telecommunications regulatory framework, see 
Rivera (2006).
19 Costa Rica is once again an exception, since it lacks a specialized regulatory body. The state 
telecommunications and electric power enterprise still maintains important regulatory powers, 
particularly as regards spectrum management.
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In El Salvador the Law creating the General Superintendence of Electricity and 
Telecommunications (SIGET) was passed by Legislative Decree No. 808 of 
September 12, 1996. The competition-related problems that could be faced by a 
telecommunications industry, particularly in a small country, led different sectors, 
as of the early 1990s, to put forward legal proposals to punish abuse of market 
power by one company to the detriment of its competitors. These proposals, however, 
were rejected, and therefore Article 111 of the Telecommunications Law granted 
SIGET the authority to prohibit anti-competitive practices. Unfortunately the law 
does not establish mechanisms for their study and sanction (Argumedo, 2007).
SIGET’s highest authority is the board of directors, which is made up of one 
director appointed by the President of the Republic, who performs the duties of 
superintendent, one director elected by private sector trade associations legally 
established in the country (through the National Private Enterprise Association – 
ANEP) and one director appointed by the Supreme Court of Justice (CSJ). The 
directors are designated for a period of seven years in office and may be nominated 
again.20 However, in the first nine years of operation SIGET had four superintendents 
(average tenure two years and one quarter), which reflects the strong tensions to 
which the entity has been subject. The case of El Salvador is also noteworthy due 
to the presence, in SIGET, of a director elected by private sector trade associations, 
in particular the above-mentioned ANEP.
In general, in Latin America, there is much discussion regarding the possibility 
of the governments exerting pressure on the telecommunications regulatory body to 
favour short-term interests. Instead, in the Salvadoran case concern arises over the 
regulatory body being subject to the influence of the private sector. One would 
think that SIGET’s director could represent the interests of the companies using 
telecommunications services and therefore that conflicts of interest do not exist. 
However, the public interest represented by SIGET could at times be inconsistent 
with the interests of business chambers.
The Competition Law was passed in late 2004 and entered into force on January 1, 
2006, with the creation of the Competition Superintendence. One of the main 
 challenges would be its coordination with SIGET.
In Guatemala’s case, regulation of telecommunications is the responsibility of 
the Superintendence of Telecommunications (SIT). When the law creating the 
agency was under discussion, the possibility of granting the entity full autonomy 
was suggested. However, the support of two thirds of Congress could not be 
garnered for that purpose. It was therefore decided to make SIT dependent on the 
Ministry of Communications, Infrastructure and Housing (MICIVI), which, in turn, 
was to appoint and could remove the superintendent. This official’s authority 
depends on the minister of MICIVI (Urízar, 2007). Subsequent amendments to the 
Law further undermined the authority of the Superintendent of Telecommunications, 
20 A reform approved in December 1997, established the director from the private sector and the 
one from the CSJ could remain in office for five and three years, respectively.
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first (by virtue of Decree 47–2002 Articles 13 and 15 were amended and 14 was 
eliminated), through a reduction in his financial resources and by conditioning his 
budget to a government decision; and second, by stripping him of the power to pro-
ceed judicially and administratively against transgressors of the law (modifications 
of Decree 15–2003 which amended numerals 2 and 3 of Article 81, relative to 
infringements and fines; Urízar, 2007).
In Honduras, the LMT Sector, enacted through Decree No. 185–95 of October 
31, 1995, created CONATEL to regulate and oversee the development and operation 
of telecommunications. CONATEL has the authority, among others, to collaborate 
with the President of the Republic to formulate telecommunications policies and 
ensure their effective execution by means of regulation and coordination actions. 
It therefore assumes the duties entrusted in other countries to the Ministry of 
Communications. CONATEL’s Commissioners are appointed by the President of the 
Republic, may remain in their posts for up to four years, and may be nominated for 
additional periods. Their terms of office coincide with that of the President of the 
Republic and they may be removed whenever the authority deems it appropriate.
The LMT establishes that it is the responsibility of CONATEL to promote 
competition in the telecommunications services. In this regard CONATEL must 
ensure that operators of telecommunications networks provide access, on equal 
conditions, to other operators and users in the same or similar circumstances. 
Nevertheless, despite the fact that these duties were entrusted to CONATEL, the 
LMT, on establishing the breaches to be sanctioned as serious, makes no reference 
to infractions against free competition (Tábora, 2007). The type of privatization 
process in Honduras, already described, which maintains the incumbent enterprise 
as public, has so far minimized the problems that this legal and institutional design 
could pose to the industry’s development.
In 2005, the debate ended and the Competition Law was passed. The new legis-
lation has pre-eminence over sector legislation, but promotes coordination with the 
sectoral regulatory body, especially when the markets are reasonably open to com-
petition as in the case of telecommunications. The reasons that led to demanding 
coordination are the following: (i) the need to have technical knowledge of subjects 
related to the sector during the transition to, and consolidation of, the new competi-
tion agency; (ii) the need to define the setting of competition in advance and not be 
limited to applying sanctions retrospectively for conduct contrary to competition or 
to restructuring the sector; and (iii) the need to apply policies unrelated to competition 
but which the government considers important, for example, on universal service, 
national security and protection of users.
Finally, as in the other countries without a competition authority, in Nicaragua 
the Telecommunications Law provides for a competitive mechanism in the provision 
of services. However, Article 24 of that Law envisages the possibility of granting 
concessions with exclusivity for a period to an operator. The Law prohibits anti-
competitive practices and establishes that operators are obliged to provide satisfactory 
access at competitive rates to the telephone network of service providers whose 
licences have been authorized by Instituto Nicaragüense de Telecomunicaciones y 
Correos (TELCOR). However, TELCOR’s powers are limited to demanding 
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information and adopting pertinent corrective measures, which are not specified 
(Ansorena, 2007). The agency is headed by a Director General appointed by the 
President of the Republic.
The weakness of the regulatory body was accentuated by the serious conflict 
between the President of the Republic (2001–2006) and the alliance of Sandinistas 
and Liberals.21 The latter used their parliamentary majority to introduce important 
reforms that affected the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE), the CSJ and the Office 
of the General Comptroller of the Republic. In this context, and with the opposition 
of the President of the Republic, the above-mentioned political alliance succeeded 
in passing the Law creating the Superintendence of Public Services (SISEP) on 
November 23, 2004, in the Legislative Assembly. This new entity had to bring 
together in one single government structure the regulatory bodies of the sectors 
providing basic services (water, electric power and telecommunications). This 
approach to the institutional regulatory framework could be positively assessed in 
the context of the international discussion, bearing in mind the shortage of human 
resources in the country. However, the fact that at least during 2006 both TELCOR, 
supported by the President of the Republic, and SISEP, supported by the National 
Assembly, were operating gave rise to an unsustainable situation that made promo-
tion of competition in the telecommunications sector even more difficult.
The above analysis makes it clear that the countries of the region that have no 
competition authority suffer from an institutional weakness in their regulatory 
framework, which, in turn, is an obstacle to create favourable conditions for 
competition.
What has happened with Mexico and Panama, which faced the opening up of the 
industry to competition when they already had a competition authority?
From the point of view of the sequence, Mexico operated in a very different 
manner from that usually recommended. It privatized in 1990, organized the 
Federal Commission on Competition (CFC) in 1994, passed the LGT in 1995, 
created the Federal Telecommunications Commission (COFETEL) by means of a 
presidential decree in August 1996 and opened the market to competition in 1997.
If analysed in general terms, the LGT proves adequate. It defines a regulatory 
framework and includes standards that assume a competitive structure in the industry. 
Nonetheless, if analysed in greater detail important difficulties appear. First of all, 
the sequence followed by the process was wrong. The concession licence granted 
to TELMEX in 1990, which regulated the performance of the enterprise until the 
approval of the general law, was likely to collude with the latter and with the 
Competition Law. Indeed, the LGT provides that licencees could freely set the rates 
for telecommunications services, which should be non-discriminatory. Only if a 
company has substantial power in the relevant market according to the Federal Law 
on Economic Competition (LFCE) can the Ministry of Communications and 
21 Enrique Bolaños formed part of the Liberal Party headed by ex-president Arnoldo Alemán 
(1996–2001). However, both representatives drifted apart when Bolaños’s government joined the 
accusations of corruption against Alemán (who was imprisoned for that reason).
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Transportation (SCT) establish specific obligations related to rates, service quality 
and information (Article 63). In 1997, the CFC declared that TELMEX had 
substantial power in five markets (local telephony, access, inter-urban transport, 
national LD and international LD) and consequently requested from COFETEL the 
establishment of specific obligations regarding rates. TELMEX complained and 
held that such statement violated its concession licence.
A second difficulty was that the LGT assigns the SCT the basic regulatory 
authority. In spite of this, in August 1996, President Ernesto Zedillo created 
COFETEL by presidential decree, which basically plays an advisory role to the 
SCT, to which the law assigns the regulatory functions. Thus, a highly ambiguous 
situation arises. Formally, the regulatory body is COFETEL, but due to its weak 
legal base, companies question the legitimacy of any decision adverse to them. In 
fact, on crucial issues the SCT, particularly the Under Ministry of Telecommunications, 
is the regulatory body. Like many Executive Branch agencies, the under ministry 
tends to privilege short-term growth of investment and coverage, even at the cost of 
the development of competition (Mariscal and Rivera, 2007).
A third difficulty was that even though the Telecommunications Law includes 
among its objectives fostering healthy competition among the different providers of 
this service, no institution is assigned this generic function. Indeed, among the 
functions of the SCT, no specific mention appears in this regard; nor does the 
Federal Law on Competition appear among the laws that should be applied if no 
express provision on competition appears in the Telecommunications Law. Only in 
the case of tenders does it indicate that the bases should include a favourable 
opinion from the CFC. It is the decree creating COFETEL that said agency is obliged 
to register the rates for telecommunications services and establish specific obli-
gations with regard to rates, service quality and information for licences of public 
telecommunications networks that have substantial power in the relevant market. 
Naturally, an Executive Branch decree is a weak legal instrument to assign powers 
of such importance to an administrative agency.
The above difficulties are compounded by the non-existence of a fixed term of 
office for COFETEL commissioners and of the specific causes of removal from 
their posts. Particularly important is the generalized use of the remedy of amparo 
which allows the regulatory action to be suspended when those affected consider 
that the norm applied violates their constitutional rights. In a context in which justice 
operates slowly, these remedies can remain in process for as long as three years, 
which naturally leads to ineffective regulation (Mariscal and Rivera, 2007).
In Panama’s case, even though nominations for commissioners take place in the 
manner indicated by the Law, it seems it has not been altogether possible to prevent 
them being carried out on the basis of short-term political interests. In fact, the pre-
dominance of the party in government can be accompanied also by its prevalence 
in the Legislative Branch and, in this context, make politically based nominations, 
not in line with the capability required by the post (González, 2007). A similar 
problem has been put forth in the case of Nicaragua (see Ansorena, 2007).
In Panama, the fact that the state retained 49% of INTEL’s shares gives rise to a 
conflict of interests since the government expects high earnings for the operator 
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who can provide higher public revenues, but this can hinder the regulator’s mission 
of applying an appropriate tariff policy (González, 2007).
III.  From Exclusivity to Competition: Models 
and Main Lessons
As we have seen throughout this chapter, the countries of the region that privatized 
and opened up the telecommunications industry to competition show dissimilar 
processes. The sphere of design of the institutional economic framework also differs 
among countries.
However, all the countries studied, whether or not they went through a period of 
exclusivity, have opened their doors to a competitive model. The aim of this section 
is, first, to analyse the principal characteristics of the opening up to competition, 
identify the positive aspects and problems of each experience and subsequently, in 
the fourth section, evaluate the industry’s performance in each of the countries and 
telecommunications segments.
As we saw above, three countries, Nicaragua, Mexico and Panama opted for 
granting a period of exclusivity to the new owners of the privatized enterprises. These 
periods varied in length (six years in Mexico and three years in Nicaragua and Panama) 
but in all of them, exclusivity included fixed and LD telephony and gave the company 
that acquired the public enterprise the right to operate a mobile telephony licence.
Another two countries, Guatemala and El Salvador, opted for immediately opening 
up the industry to competition after the privatization without offering exclusivity. 
Before carrying out this operation, El Salvador separated fixed telephony from 
mobile telephony and sold them to different operators, whereas Guatemala trans-
ferred a single enterprise to the private sector in an integrated manner.
1.  Exclusivity and Opening Up to Competition: The Cases 
of Mexico, Nicaragua and Panama
The literature has confirmed that privatization with exclusivity represents signifi-
cant costs for society as regards both coverage and service prices. Scott Waltsten 
(2000) empirically demonstrates that a monopoly is more valuable to its owners 
than a company operating in a competitive market and concludes that a government 
can practically double the revenues obtained from privatization by guaranteeing 
exclusivity rights. Coinciding with some of the findings in this chapter, Waltsten’s 
study also shows that the greater revenues are accompanied by a reduction in the 
growth of the telecommunications network of up to 40%.22
22 A similar conclusion is reached by Estache et al. (2002, p. 157) who, on evaluating the progress 
of telecommunications in Latin America, maintain that “high prices continue to be perceived as
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In Mexico’s case, the opening up to competition shows distinct characteristics in 
each of the segments. In 1987, when the mobile market took off, the country was 
divided into nine regions, with two licences granted in each one. TELMEX, through 
its subsidiary Telcel, received a licence in each of the regions, the only proviso 
being that the company could not be the sole provider in any of those regions. In 
TELMEX’s concession licence, the SCT reserved the right to grant another, or 
other concessions, in favour of third parties in order to develop, in equal circum-
stances, fixed telephony and national and international LD services, within 
the same geographical area or in a different one, identical or similar to those that 
were the subject matter of the concession. However, during the six years following 
the date in which the concession licence was signed, the SCT pledged to grant other 
concessions for national and international LD basic telephony public service networks, 
only if the company had not fulfilled the conditions of expansion and efficiency set 
forth in the concession licence, which contradicts the above. Chapter V of the said 
licence defined the general conditions for interconnection and the company’s inter-
connection obligations with other LD public networks when the sector was opened 
to competition as of January 1, 1997 (Mariscal and Rivera, 2007).
Between 1988 and 1990, Telcel – TELMEX’s mobile affiliate – expanded its 
cellular network in the 800 MHz (Band B) radio frequency, covering the cities of 
Tijuana, Cuernavaca, Toluca, Guadalajara, Monterrey and the Mexico City metro-
politan area. In 1990, the company began to offer cellular telephony in the nine 
regions into which mobile telephony service was divided in Mexico. In 1998, the 
1,900 MHz (Band D) radio frequency for PCS in the nine regions was awarded to 
Telcel. Subsequently, in 2004, a wide-ranging auction was carried out that would 
make it possible to meet the country’s enormous demand for mobile telephony. 
Towards the end of the last decade, the segment’s main operators, together with 
Telcel, were Iusacell, operating since the end of 1980s, Pegaso which entered in 
1999 and Unefon which began operations at the beginning of the year 2000. The 
entry of Movistar, of Telefónica España, in 2002, contributed dynamism to the 
market. Nevertheless, up to 2004 the share of companies other than Telcel reached 
only 22.8% (Mariscal and Rivera, 2007).
By 1994 applications to enter local telephony had already been presented. 
Iusacell, a joint venture between Alejo Peralta and Bell Atlantic, proposed providing 
the service by means of fixed wireless technology, but it was not until October 1997 
that the rules for the development of competition in local telephony were 
published. The objectives of the said standards were to promote competition, 
an issue in the region. To a large extent this is a result of the limited competition in the sector. For 
most countries, the exclusivity periods granted to get the privatization deals done, resulted in lasting 
high connection and usage tariffs. … Indeed, residential connection rates continue to be high when 
compared to the US even if they have gone down significantly. These exclusivity periods are now 
coming to an end as in Argentina or Venezuela and this should lead to a reduction in tariffs driven 
by the market. However, most countries have not yet defined the rules of the game to ensure 
competition in a sector where costing the access to bottleneck facilities continues to be at the core 
of the regulatory debate.”
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facilitate interconnection and interoperability of public networks, ensure the 
continuity of the service and avoid the application of discriminatory rates. In 2003, 
eight companies were authorized to provide local wired service (Ramírez, 2005). 
The results, however, are not encouraging. In 2004, seven years after the segment 
was opened up to competition, TELMEX maintained a share equivalent to 95% in 
local telephony, although the companies that entered the market did increase their 
share in a sustained manner (Mariscal and Rivera, 2007).
In June 1994, the SCT issued the “Resolution on the Plan for Interconnection 
with Public Long-Distance Networks” which, among other things, obliged 
TELMEX to interconnect its networks with all the interested parties. It was 
expected that by early 1997, 60 interconnection points would be in operation and 
that they would increase to 200 in the year 2000. With the prospects of the opening 
up of LD to competition, several companies began to apply for concession licences 
to operate in this segment.23 In January 1996, the first negotiations among the oper-
ators took place, without agreement being reached on interconnection rates, which 
led them to request the intervention of the SCT. Both TELMEX and the new LD 
operators questioned the SCT’s resolution by means of formal claims. Whereas for 
TELMEX the charges were insufficient to cover the costs it had incurred to provide 
the service, for the entrants there were no reasons to justify them. Following a year 
of analysis, the recently established COFETEL upheld the above-mentioned rate, 
although according to different international standards it was extraordinarily high.24
In January 1997, seven companies entered the LD market, users being able to 
pre-select the operators in 60 cities. Among the licencees were Mexican industrial 
and financial groups associated with US telecommunications operators. Three 
major operators dominated the market: TELMEX, which established a joint venture 
with US Sprint to provide international services between Mexico and the USA, 
Avantel (Banamex and MCI) and Alestra (Alfa and AT&T), which merged with 
Unicom (Bancomer, GTE and Telefónica). Despite the problems mentioned above 
with the opening of the market, the companies that entered quickly gained shares 
in national LD, attaining 30% in 1999. Since 2001, this process has gradually 
reverted, dropping to 23.2% in 2004.
Seventeen years after opening up to competition in mobile telephony and almost 
nine years in local and LD telephony, the results from the point of view of operators 
other than the incumbent were not encouraging. Compared to other Latin American 
23 Together with TELMEX, which had a licence since December 1990, Avantel obtained it on 
October 6, 1995; IUSATEL on February 12, 1996; MARCATEL on February 26, 1996; 
INVESTCOM on April 4; BESTEL on April 10; MIDITEL on April 26; ALESTRA on April 30 
and TELINOR on July 23.
24 A rate was established for cities with Interurban Traffic Centre (CTI; US$0.0257 in 1997 and 
US$0.0231 in 1998) and another for cities with Routing Capacity Centers but without CTI 
(US$0.0240 in 1997 and US$0.0219 in 1998). Furthermore, the SCT determined that the companies 
should pay an additional 58% for traffic termination, which raised the effective rate in 1997 to 
US$0.0536 and US$0.0513, respectively. By contrast, a World Bank study of the Mexican market 
suggested an average weighted rate of US$0.019 cents.
70 E. Rivera
countries, Grupo Carso’s share of the three segments analysed in Mexico far 
exceeded the incumbents’ share in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and even Peru. It should 
be pointed out that this situation has occurred despite the fact that it was the 
companies from the USA, Mexico’s great neighbour, which tried to become 
consolidated in the Mexican market, but without success.
One important specific element has to do with the modalities provided for in the 
Law for the establishment of interconnection and access charges. As in other 
countries, the LGT assigns the operators themselves the task of agreeing on those 
charges. What can be a reasonable, efficient mechanism in a context in which 
the companies are of a relatively equivalent size is not when companies not only of 
different sizes but also having strictly contradictory interests come together in the 
negotiation process. Indeed, as soon as the exclusivity period is over, the entrants 
face the urgency to begin operations. The incumbent, on the other hand, is interested 
in hindering the entry of its competitors as much as possible, and, furthermore, 
every day that the negotiation process is lengthened is another day that it continues 
to have exclusivity. The more the negotiation period is prolonged, the longer the 
time during which the entrant has to face its fixed costs and its financial costs 
without beginning to receive income, which clearly stands as a barrier to the entry 
of competitors. The delay in the start of operations significantly raises costs for 
competitors, reducing their competitive possibilities.
Representatives linked to TELMEX and to COFETEL maintain that the entrants’ 
difficulties stemmed from their low levels of investment, from the limited knowledge 
of US companies and other foreign operators of the characteristics of telecommu-
nications markets in developing countries and from errors on the part of the 
executive bodies (Mariscal and Rivera, 2007). Nonetheless, the characteristics of 
the privatization process with a long period of exclusivity that consolidated a single 
operator and the weakness of the institutional regulatory framework certainly 
played a central role. It can be said that the institutional framework did not work 
properly. The various complaints filed by the different competitors both before the 
CFC and COFETEL took a long time to be resolved, losing all effectiveness. The 
declaration of dominant enterprise that the LFT provided for as an instrument to 
avoid anti-competitive conduct by the incumbent company had no effect due to the 
said way in which the declaration was written and the remedy of amparo which 
neutralized any administrative measure by the regulatory body and the competition 
supervisor. Everything points to problems with the legal framework which go far 
beyond the sphere of regulatory policy and protection of competition (Mariscal and 
Rivera, 2005a, b).
In the Panamanian model of transition to competition, the opening up was due 
to be implemented in two phases: the first, corresponding to basic telephony, on 
January 2, 2003; and mobile telephony in January 2008. The regulatory framework 
included the following model for opening: the point of departure was acknowledgement 
that the entrants would face serious difficulties resulting from the consolidation of 
the incumbent enterprise. In this regard, the new companies were assured inter-
connection provided by the incumbent in an (apparently) peremptory period and 
total freedom to choose the services to be provided, as well as the customers. It was 
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believed that by choosing the most profitable markets, entry would be made feasible. 
The unbundling of networks was also provided for, i.e. the possibility for entrants 
of leasing segments of the network from the incumbent to provide their services and 
number portability (González, 2007).
The opening was prepared well in advance. As of early 2002, numerous com-
panies applied for concessions. Up to February 2005, there were 28 concessions for 
local telephony, 33 for national LD, 59 for international LD, 20 for public tele-
phones and 13 for the hiring of dedicated voice circuits. The basic idea was for the 
entering operators to have their installations ready to enter into operation on the 
appointed date. Bellsouth, a company that controlled 45% of subscribers, requested 
concessions for all the services. Cable Onda, S.A., the dominant cable television 
operator, did much the same. It was therefore a question of operators with a significant 
market share and a solid foundation in the new telecommunications technologies.
Despite the existence of a regulatory framework favourable to the entrants, the 
liberalization of the sector has encountered obstacles that in the best of cases 
have substantially delayed implementation. There are four fundamental aspects. 
(i) The interconnection mechanism, in which the regulator only intervened if the 
parties could not reach agreement, contained incentives for both parties to await the 
regulator’s intervention, which substantially delayed the processes. Even having 
defined the conditions and the interconnection rate, the problems did not end, for 
numerous technical difficulties have further delayed the process.25 (ii) With regard 
to competition in LD, problems arose both in the use of access codes and in 
automatic routing. The changes demanded by the use of various access codes by 
users were subject to the speed at which the incumbent implemented them. 
Regarding the second mechanism, it was assumed that its operation gave rise to 
change costs, basically derived from the programming the incumbent had to 
assume. If these costs were to be covered by the user, the change of provider would 
be discouraged. Alternatively, if these costs were to be assumed by the entrant, its 
competitiveness would be reduced. (iii) Related to the above, the survey had to be 
carried out among users so that they choose their LD services provider, even though 
done as scheduled, mainly because the cost of the calls could not be determined 
before the negotiations on interconnection charges had concluded. (iv) Finally, 
number portability had still not been put into operation and judicial proceedings 
halted efforts regarding unbundling of the network. With regard to the latter aspect, 
the non-existence of an explicit standard in this respect, within the legal framework, 
led this policy to be questioned before the courts (González, 2007).
25 The most significant problems that arose were the expansion of routes and new interconnection 
points. In the case of the expansion of the E1 for POI in the city of Colón and in the provinces, as 
requested by the entrants, this had still not been achieved until June 2004. Thus, to that date, 
competition in national LD had not yet begun, despite the fact that, as we saw, there were a significant 
number of entrants according to the regulatory framework; it had begun a year and a half earlier. 
For a detailed description of the perverse incentives of the regulatory framework and the “techni-
cal competitive” problems encountered, see González (2007).
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Panamanian legislation does not encourage the incumbent to allow interconnec-
tion, as it would threaten its monopolistic position; nor does the entrant have 
incentives to reach agreement with the incumbent, since, having analysed the 
incumbent’s negotiating capacity, it is unlikely that the latter would be prepared to 
grant a lower access charge than the regulatory body would define, and it is therefore 
in its interest to await the regulator’s arbitration. Finally, the regulator has strong 
incentives to “split the child in half” since according to Article 216, interconnection 
charges should reflect “at least the long-term incremental costs” (González, 2007). 
Having added the practical problems,26 the consequence of the above was that in 
mid-2004, i.e. a year and a half after the opening up, important cities such as Agua 
Dulce, David, Chorrera, Santiago and Chitré did not have interconnection points.
Despite the above, opening up to competition in LD has meant a substantial drop 
in prices due to both the impact of the threat of competition and the lessening of 
difficulties in implementing the required investments. According to estimates the 
average minute of national LD was to drop from $0.15 in 2002 to $0.07 in 2007. 
In the case of local telephony the progress has been negligible.
This situation raises a more general debate. Whereas some placed emphasis on 
the unbundling of networks as an important mechanism for introducing competition 
in fixed telephony, others maintain that it is an unworkable policy (the owner of the 
network cannot be compelled to lend their network and even less below its cost) 
which discourages investment (the entrant, if it can use the incumbent’s network, 
will not want to invest). The Panamanian experience appears to show three basic 
problems: (i) the difficulties in moving from a system of exclusivity to one of 
competition are usually underestimated; (ii) the capabilities of network unbundling 
as a basic instrument for introducing competition in fixed telephony are overestimated; 
and (iii) the postponement of full liberalization of mobile telephony until 2008 
hinders the most effective means of introducing competition throughout the sector 
– mobile telephony.
As we saw, the third country that granted a period of exclusivity to the former 
public enterprise when it was privatized was Nicaragua. The privatization process 
culminated in December, 2001, and therefore the opening up to competition was to 
begin towards the end of 2004. However, the process was postponed until April 
2005, by means of a parliamentary resolution.27 Subsequently, the conflict between 
the two regulatory bodies, TELCOR and SISEP, had translated into hard bargaining 
regarding whether the telecommunications should be opening up or not. Whereas 
26 The most important problems were those of expansion of routes and new interconnection points. 
In the case of the expansion of the E1 for the POI in the city of Colón, this had not been achieved 
in June, which hindered competition in national LD. The ensuing interconnection problems 
translated into problems of congestion, which were a serious disincentive for consumers to change 
provider (González, 2007).
27 The National Assembly established that the opening did not have to be on December 18, 2004, 
three years after the signing of the privatization contract, but had to be three years after ENITEL’s 
concession contract was published in the Gazette, which was in April 2005.
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the first entity declared the total opening up of this sector in April 2005, the recently 
created SISEP disregarded such measure and proposed an extension of ENITEL’s 
private monopoly and a freeze on telephone rates after the start-up of the new 
regulatory body (Ansorena, 2007). This situation resulted in serious disorder. 
Towards the end of 2005, ENITEL’s monopoly in basic telephony continued, 
SISEP was engaged in preparing a new project for opening in consultation with the 
operators and the mobile telephony company had entered the international LD 
telephony segment, refusing to recognize ENITEL’s exclusivity (Ansorena, 2007).
As to mobile telephony, Bellsouth operated in conditions of exclusivity between 
1997 and the end of 2002. In 2001, TELCOR decided to open the segment to the 
participation of other operators by initiating the bidding process for the second 
mobile telephony licence. Thirteen companies took part in the bidding. The operating 
licence was finally28 awarded to PCS SERCOM, an affiliate of the Mexican company 
América Móvil, which began operations in December, 2002, simultaneously with 
ENITEL, which had the right to a mobile telephony licence in accordance with the 
privatization contract. Competition in the segment suffered a grave setback when the 
above-mentioned Mexican company acquired ENITEL in 2004, and thus held two 
mobile telephony licences. The non-existence of a competition agency that could 
have established as a condition for the purchase of ENITEL that América Móvil 
should get rid of one of the mobile licences represents a serious problem for the 
development of competition in the sector. Bearing in mind that mobile companies 
are central to the development of overall competition in telecommunications,29 the 
prospects for competition in Nicaragua are not at all promising. Despite the foregoing, 
it should be pointed out that the number of mobile subscribers rose from 200,000 in 
2002 at the end of the exclusivity period to 686,000 in 2004.
2.  Privatization and Opening Up to Competition: The Cases 
of El Salvador and Guatemala
In contrast with the countries analysed in the preceding section, both El Salvador 
and Guatemala rejected the possibility of granting a period of exclusivity to the 
companies that acquired the former public enterprise and opted instead for imme-
diately opening up the industry to competition.
In El Salvador’s case, the decision to sell the assets of the fixed company 
separately from those of the mobile company is also noteworthy. Thus, the presence 
of at least two telecommunications operators was assured. The option for a 
28 In fact, the bidding was won by another operator linked to president Alemán, the owner of which 
was later accused of corruption. The licence was transferred to the second bidder, PCS 
SERCOM.
29 On the importance of mobile companies in overall competition in telecommunications, see 
Mariscal and Rivera (2005a, b).
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competitive market in mobile telephony has translated into the fact that despite the 
country’s small size, there are four companies operating: CTE-Telecom (since 
1999), Telefónica (since 1998), Telemóvil (since 1992) and Digicel (since 2002). 
Three companies have national coverage and one of them has centred on the urban 
area (Digicel).30 After having only one operator in 1998, by 2004 the mobile market 
was distributed fairly equitably among the four operators.31
As Argumedo (2007) points out, there is another situation in fixed telephony, 
where CTE maintains its dominant position. In 1998, the company had 386,600 
lines; by 2002, the total number of lines had risen to 709,400, of which CTE had 
90%; and by the end of 2004, the lines had continued to grow, although at a slower 
rate, reaching 887,800. CTE’s share continued to be high and was equivalent to 
88.7%. According to SIGET, there are another nine companies in fixed telephony, 
but the concentration is greater than in mobile telephony. CTE continues to be 
practically the only company that offers fixed telephony services to the residential 
segment, and it faces more competition in the segment of service to businesses.
In Guatemala the process of interconnection between the incumbent operator 
and the new operators began in mid-1999, and conflicts arose from the start. In the 
mobile segment, when the “caller pays” mechanism was introduced in October 1999, 
there were differences of opinion and legal disputes over this system. There were 
three cases of arbitration for interconnection charges in mobile networks. In inter-
national LD there were also tensions due to the fact that, among other things, the 
earnings from incoming international traffic included subsidies to local telephony. 
There have been many conflicts over interconnection charges for incoming inter-
national traffic, two of which went to arbitration, but those regarding international 
termination charges continue to be in conflict. The need to gradually eliminate 
this situation in the context of the interconnection contracts signed has also given rise to 
other disputes between operators, caused by: (i) blockage of calls to operators who 
have filed complaints before the SIT; (ii) lack of renewal of interconnection contracts 
with the incumbent, which has led to three complaints before the SIT; (iii) discrimina-
tory rates for calls to competitors, giving rise to complaints in ordinary proceedings; 
and (iv) double charges to users of international LD, among others (Urízar, 2007).
The LGT does not establish any restrictions on the entry or exit of competitors, 
but most operators,32 some international analysts33 and SIT officials, believe that in 
practice the barriers to entry come from discriminatory treatment and the difficulty 
30 According to Argumedo (2007) the competition is intense. The companies offer varied plans to 
attract different segments of the contract market (individual, family, friends, corporate) and prepaid 
cards for different amounts. They also offer a wide variety of complementary services such as 
roaming, text messages, sending of photos and sending of emails. The companies have been very 
aggressive in expanding the network of points of sale and charges for products and services.
31 Even though Telemóvil keeps a greater participation (28%), CTE, Digicel and Telefónica, follow 
closely, with 28%, 22% and 21%, respectively (Argumedo, 2007).
32 Interview with Mr. Baldir Garrido, President of the Union of Telecommunications Operators, 
March, 2005 (Urízar, 2007).
33 Ibid (p. 11).
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that the incumbent imposes on other operators to access and interconnect to public 
networks. This difficulty is generally reflected in: (i) delays in interconnection 
negotiations; (ii) rates for termination of international calls traffic being higher than 
those of the market; (iii) difficulty in making payments in cascade between the 
different service providers, since the latter have agreed that to make telecommuni-
cations transfers between companies that do not have direct interconnection, the 
operator who carries out the function of traffic only will transfer the traffic if there 
is an interconnection contract between them. (iv) Another reason many operators 
experience difficulty in interconnection and access to essential resources is that the 
list set forth in Article 27 does not include key elements for the development of 
effective competition in the sector, such as the unbundling of infrastructure, joint 
location of equipment, rights of way and sole invoice service, among others. Thus, 
for example, operators have come up against difficulties in obtaining rights for the 
placement of posts or ducts, which are governed by the regulations of the different 
municipalities and are therefore subject to the discretionary authority of the mayor. 
(v) Another aspect that has hampered interconnection is that the incumbent operator 
offers only two interconnection points in the municipality of Guatemala, making 
entry difficult, since the entering operator must pay for transport of telecommunica-
tions to those points, even if it possesses the infrastructure to transport the commu-
nications by its own means (Urízar, 2007).
The de facto opening up to competition in Honduras promoted by the TpT has not 
responded to expectations, despite the progress made. In fact, when the project was 
launched, it was expected that towards the end of 2005, 200,000 lines would have 
been installed. By September only one third of these had been installed. Among the 
main reasons for this situation were: (i) initial interconnection problems that obliged 
sub-operators to wait approximately seven months after the programme was launched 
before the first of them went out on the market; (ii) lack of definition and selection of 
the technology to be used by sub-operators, and many of those that obtained registra-
tion as sub-operators acted more as a result of the momentum generated by the 
project or of false expectations of the telecommunications business than a thorough 
knowledge of the business (Tábora, 2007). An interesting aspect of the Honduran 
experience has been the technological variety applied by the different companies.34
IV.  Industrial Organization and Competition 
in Telecommunications in Central America and Mexico
In the preceding section the paths followed by the opening up to competition in the 
different countries were compared. It was shown how the countries that accompanied 
privatization with the granting of a period of exclusivity have had more difficulties 
than the other countries in creating a competitive market. However, the non-existence 
34 At the beginning of the programme, most of the interested parties focused on the use of wireless 
systems; however, due to the limited spectrum availability many rejected this system. It is worth
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of institutions for the defence of competition and the inexperience and limitations 
of regulatory bodies have made the transition to competition difficult even in the 
countries that did not grant a period of exclusivity. The purpose of this section is to 
evaluate the forms acquired by the industrial organization of the sector and compare 
the different models and their results in terms of number of operators per segment 
and the dynamism of the different markets.
As in the rest of Latin America, the telecommunications market in Central 
America has become the object of dispute between the two dominant operators in 
the region, Telefónica España and the Mexican group TELMEX – América Móvil, 
part of the huge Grupo Carso.
Since the early 1990s, Telefónica España has been developing an aggressive 
policy of expansion in the telecommunications market in Latin America. This policy, 
which began in South America, has been progressively expanded to the north of the 
continent.35
In fact, Telefónica began mobile operations in El Salvador and Guatemala. 
Despite its interest in participating in the bid for INTEL of Panama, it was unable to 
do so, since that country’s legislation prohibited the participation of companies in 
which foreign governments had a majority share.36 Subsequently, after Telefónica 
reached an agreement with Bellsouth in March 2004, to acquire all of its operations 
in Latin America, Telefónica took control of Bellsouth’s operations in Guatemala, 
Nicaragua and Panama. In parallel, the company began operating in Mexico in 2002 
by means of various acquisitions until it became the second operator in that country 
after Telcel. Thus, the company began to have an increasing presence in the territory 
of its major competitor at regional level: the TELMEX – América Móvil group.
This latter group, which originated in the privatization of TELMEX in 1990, had 
concentrated almost exclusively on its operations in Mexico until 1997. The back-
ward state of telecommunications in that country, its enormous size and the threat 
posed by US companies, particularly in the context of NAFTA, justified the exclusive 
attention that the company gave to its country of origin. This policy began to 
change drastically at end of the 1990s.
1. Competition in Fixed Telephony
The problems of competition in this segment are evidenced by the incumbent’s high 
share in these countries. Those which provided an exclusivity period have experienced 
greater difficulties in moving towards competition.
highlighting the variety of technologies used by sub-operators to undertake their projects: satellite 
and wireless access such as Teléfonos de Honduras; wireless access such as MULTIFON, 
UNITEL, CELTEL and Community Telephony, among others; copper networks such as 
INTELDATA; cable subscription television networks such as SULATEL, AMNET and Cable 
Color, among others; data transmission and switching networks such as METRORED; Informatics 
Access Networks (Internet) such as ITTSA, to mention a few cases (Tábora, 2007).
35 For a detailed analysis of this process, see Mariscal and Rivera (2005a, b).
36 As is known, Telefónica from Spain was completely privatized.
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Up to 2004, TELMEX of Mexico had a 95% share of fixed telephony. 
Unfortunately, cable television operators had not developed the so-called Triple 
Play and hence, there has been practically no competition in broadband.
In Panama’s case, entry to the fixed telephony segment has been very difficult. 
Even though by February 2005, 28 concessions for local telephony had been turned 
over, competition has concentrated on national and international LD and the business 
segment of local telephony. The difficulties encountered by the interconnection 
process have delayed the effective entry of competing companies, and therefore 
their presence is still minimal.
In Nicaragua, the control package was acquired by the consortium Telia Swedtel 
Ab – MEGATEL EMCE in 2001, while the state pledged to sell the remaining 49% 
it owned in a period of three years. In 2004, the privatization process was finally 
completed with the sale of the shares to the Mexican company América Móvil. That 
same year, seeking to expand its position in the regional telecommunications 
market, América Móvil took over the operator MEGATEL of Honduras, thus 
becoming the only shareholder of the Nicaraguan operator ENITEL. As mentioned 
above, the exclusivity period was expected to finish towards the end of 2004, 
despite a number of problems, among them the “competition” between the two 
telecommunications regulators, which was a sign of the country’s serious political 
conflict. Yet, in 2006, ENITEL continued to be the monopolistic provider in fixed 
telephony (Ansorena, 2007).
In the case of Honduras, the end of the exclusivity period was scheduled for 
the end of 2005. The TpT programme, with the introduction of the concept of 
sub-operator, made it possible to move this process forward. By August 2005, 
according to CONATEL data, 40 companies had been registered as sub-operators. Of 
these 40 companies that complied with the requirements established in the process, 17 
have begun commercial operations and it is estimated that to date they are operating 
approximately37 63,000 telephone lines commercially, around one third of which 
belong to only one sub-operator.38 Taking this information as a reference, to 
December, 2003, 100% of the fixed telephony market was in the hands of 
HONDUTEL. By December, 2004, with the entry of sub-operators this percentage 
dropped to 93.69%, the remaining 6.31% being in the hands of sub-operators. 
In August 2005, sub-operators had 13.83% of the total telephony market, whereas 
HONDUTEL maintained dominance with 86.17%. Three aspects should be under-
scored in this context. First, the great success achieved by the entrants, which 
contrasts with the cases mentioned before. Despite this progress, 98% of the lines 
installed were located in the country’s three most important cities, deepening the 
coverage inequity between urban areas and rural areas, thus leaving the government 
to attend the social problems of access to telecommunications services (Tábora, 2007). 
37 Even though the regulations issued by CONATEL for the programme “Telephony for All – 
Modernity for Honduras” establish compulsoriness in delivery of information on each operator’s 
new subscribers, no evidence was found that this requirement was being complied with, and there-
fore the data on subscribers are estimated, based on the Tabora’s own research.
38 MULTIFON, S.A. de C.V.
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This situation confirms the incumbents’ repeated claims about the policy of “cream 
skimming” developed by the entrants. Finally, the presence of a public operator 
who shares the government’s interest in promoting the entry of other operators may 
have been a contributing factor in reducing conflicts with regard to interconnec-
tions. Furthermore, it should be taken into account that at least until 2006, sub-
operators had not had to pay charges for the use of HONDUTEL’s network. This 
regime was transitory and concluded on December 25, 2005. As of December 26, 
2005, the regime of payment of access charges established in the Regulations for 
Interconnection was enforced (Tábora, 2007).
What happens in the case of countries which, together with privatizing the enter-
prise, opened up fixed telephony to competition?
In El Salvador ten companies participated, among which the most important were 
CTE-Telecom, Telefónica, Emetel, GCA Telecom, El Salvador Telecom, El Salvador 
Network, Telemóvil and Newcom. However, as we saw in the previous section, 
CTE’s share continued being large (88.7% of the market). In spite of this, the 
immediate opening up to competition has allowed greater participation by entrants.
An analysis of the different national cases shows that over and above the 
differences displayed by the privatization processes, the transition to competition 
in fixed telephony has proved more complicated than expected. Indeed, beyond the 
intentions what the processes in the region show is that a public monopoly has 
become a private one.
If we analyse the fixed telephony industry from a regional point of view, the 
situation is even more complicated. As we can see in Table 3.1, in four of the five 
countries that have privatized the public telecommunications enterprise, the TELMEX 
– América Móvil group appears as the owner of the dominant enterprise in fixed 
telephony. Only in Panama is the dominant company owned by another group. The 
above-mentioned table also makes it clear that there is no other fixed operator with 
any capacity to generate competition in this segment. In this sense, as the regional 
telecommunications market consolidates, it is difficult to expect a competitive 
market to be generated by the countries’ dominant companies. On the contrary, 
only the consolidation of the dominant position of Grupo TELMEX – América 
Table 3.1 Central America and Mexico: fixed operators and market shares, 2004 (percentages) 
(Own preparation)
 Grupo TELMEX – 
Country América Móvil Telefónica España Third operator Fourth operator
Costa Rica   ICE (100) 
El Salvador CTE (88.7) 9.7  
Guatemala TELGUA   
Honduras   HONDUTEL (86) Several sub-
     operators 
     (14)
Mexico TELMEX (95)  Avantel Alestra
Nicaragua ENITEL (100)   
Panama   Cable & Wireless 
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Móvil would seem possible. We will return to this topic in the following section on 
analysing the situation of mobile telephony.
In this context, it is likely that if HONDUTEL is privatized, Grupo TELMEX – 
América Móvil will have very strong incentives to seek to win the bid. Similarly, 
should telecommunications be opened up in Costa Rica, the possibility of ICE 
becoming a regional operator, taking advantage of its capabilities and the synergies 
created by the fact that it is also an electric power enterprise, is not very feasible.
Table 3.2 shows the evolution of the rate of penetration of fixed telephones in 
the seven countries included in our study. The excellent performance of fixed 
telephony in Costa Rica, the only country that has flatly rejected privatization of the 
enterprise, is one of the outstanding phenomena. Compared to Mexico, in 1990 
Costa Rica had a penetration 1.55 times that of Mexico; in 2004, the difference 
widened to 1.84 times. A second interesting aspect is that the growth of coverage in 
fixed telephony in Costa Rica is very dynamic, between 1998 and 2004 it rose from 
19.33 to 31.62.39
Mexico, in contrast with Costa Rica, shows an historical low penetration of fixed 
telephony (6.48 in 1990) and a very slow expansion of its coverage. It was only in 
1998 that it reached 10.36. Interestingly, it was as of that year, one year after the 
opening up to competition, that the growth of teledensity accelerated. As in Costa 
Rica’s case, although at lower levels, the growth of fixed telephony continues 
coming close to the South American countries, whose teledensities have a tendency 
towards stagnation. Nevertheless, compared to the level reached by per capita GDP, 
Mexico’s penetration rate is low (see Fig. 3.1).
Table 3.2 Mexico and Central America: fixed telephone lines per 100 inhabitants, 1990–2004 
(International Telecommunication Union (ITU) Online)
 Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras México Nicaragua Panamá
1990 10.05 2.42 2.13 1.72 6.48 1.26 9.27
1991 10.62 2.51 2.21 1.80 6.86 1.27 9.40
1992 10.89 3.22 2.29 1.93 7.54 1.37 9.75
1993 11.61 3.22 2.42 2.10 8.36 1.62 10.30
1994 13.15 4.26 2.51 2.27 9.18 1.99 11.11
1995 14.38 5.03 2.87 2.70 9.39 2.22 11.56
1996 15.47 5.61 3.30 3.10 9.28 2.63 12.16
1997 18.92 6.08 4.08 3.77 9.69 2.75 13.44
1998 19.33 6.41 4.79 3.99 10.36 3.01 15.13
1999 20.41 8.05 5.51 4.42 11.22 3.04 16.43
2000 22.34 9.96 5.94 4.61 12.47 3.12 15.11
2001 22.97 10.15 6.47 4.74 13.72 2.94 12.99
2002 25.05 10.34 7.05 4.80 14.67 3.20 12.20
2003 27.77 11.34 7.05 4.87 15.97 3.74 12.20
2004 31.62 13.42 8.94 5.31 17.22 3.83 11.85
39 As is known, there is a generalized tendency in Latin America, despite the low teledensity, for 
fixed telephony to stagnate, and even to deteriorate in recent years.
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The cases of El Salvador and Panama are particularly interesting due to the 
contrasts shown. Whereas in 1990 teledensity in El Salvador barely reached 2.42, 
in Panama it stood at 9.27, just behind Costa Rica. In 1997, when Panama’s public 
enterprise was privatized, the penetration rate was 13.44; in 1999, this rate reached 
a maximum level of 16.43; and the following year it began a continuous decline 
until in 2004 it reached a teledensity of only 11.85. In stark contrast to this, in El 
Salvador teledensity grew continuously until it surpassed Panama in 2004, when it 
reached a figure of 13.42. These different paths cannot be explained by uneven 
growth in mobile telephony. In fact, as we shall see further on, the number of 
subscribers per 100 inhabitants was, to 2004, fairly similar in both countries, 
although El Salvador slightly surpasses Panama. The differences suggest, rather, 
that the competitive atmosphere favourably affects rates and this has a positive 
impact on teledensity.40 The performance of the other three countries has been very 
modest. In 2004, the level of penetration in Guatemala was marginally over 8%. 
Honduras was barely approaching 6 points. In Nicaragua, the benefits of privatization 
had simply not become apparent.
Table 3.3 shows a synthesis of what has been discussed in this section and helps 
to evaluate the development of fixed telephony over the last 15 years. The countries 
which have liberalized the telecommunications sector, after an exclusiveness period, 
are characterized by a greater participation of the incumbent than the one it has in 
those countries which simultaneously liberalized and privatized this sector. Mexico 
is, in this sense, a paradigmatic case because the main operator had 95% participation 
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Fig. 3.1 Central America and Mexico: penetration in fixed telephony (International 
Telecommunication Union, 2005)
40 The next section shows that whereas rates stood at an average of US$0.06 for 3 min in El 
Salvador, in Panama they reached 12 cents.
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even eight years after the market opening up. In contrast, in El Salvador and 
Guatemala the participation of the main operator reaches around 15%.
If the coverage is considered, Mexico appears with a low one, at least in compari-
son with Costa Rica. In fact, its higher income per capita does not show in its teleden-
sity. The setback experienced by Panama was already mentioned. As to prices, these 
are higher for the 3 min call in those countries which have carried out privatization 
with an exclusiveness period. Table 3.3, illustrates that the average growth rate during 
the first three years of privatization are substantially higher in those countries that 
went through a simultaneous privatization and liberalization process.
The Costa Rican experience is unique: the price of local calls is the lowest of the 
region, has the highest penetration rate and shows a significant coverage increase 
rate. Even though greater efficiency is not the main reason for this situation,41 Costa 
Rica certainly gives a different perspective regarding privatization policies and 
underlines the need for competition regulatory framework that guarantees a 
competitive post-privatization market.
2. Competition in Mobile Telephony
As in the case of fixed telephony, mobile telecommunications show different forms 
of development.
In Mexico, the strong presence of the TELMEX – América Móvil group is also 
registered in mobile telephony. As we can see in Table 3.4, Telcel’s share reached more 
than 77% in 2004. This telecommunications segment, as we saw above, was conceived 
Table 3.3 Central America and Mexico: privatization, liberalization and performance trajectories, 
1990–2004 (percentages) (Author, on the basis of official figures)
 Openness  Coverage Incumbent 3 min local call Coverage
 mode 2004 participation price, 2001 growth
Mexico 1990 Exclusivity 17.22 95.0 0.16 2.42
Panama 1996 Exclusivity 11.85 100.0 0.12 −3.28
Nicaragua  Exclusivity 3.83 100.0 0.10 0.91 (three
2000          years)
El Salvador  No Exclusivity 13.42 88.7 0.07 7.01
 1998
Guatemala  No Exclusivity 8.94 83.6 0.08 4.20
 1998
Costa Rica Public  31.62 100.0 0.03 12.29
  Monopoly         (1998–
          2004)
Honduras Public Monopoly  5.31 86.0 0.07 1.32 
 2003  (2003)        (1998–
          2004)
41 We will come back to this point in the following section.
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from the start by public policy as a competitive sector. Nevertheless, in contrast to the 
majority of countries, in which there has been a relatively balanced market distribution, 
in Mexico the dominant company has tended to strengthen its presence. In 1997, 
Telcel’s share was 63.7%, Iusacell’s 23% and other competitors 13%. In the following 
years, Iusacell began to lose market share. An important factor was not including 
prepayment among its products. The company was acquired by the consortium made 
up of Vodafone, one of the world’s main mobile companies with operations in more 
than 25 countries, and Verizon. In 2003, however, these companies abandoned their 
operation in Mexico after experiencing significant losses. The entry of Telefónica 
Móviles has revitalized competition in the market. The stagnation in entrants’ share 
continued despite the sharp increase in mobile teledensity in Mexico in recent years.
In Guatemala the influence of the dominant fixed company has also been felt in the 
industrial structure of the mobile segment. Thus, Grupo TELMEX – América Móvil 
has attained a share of almost 53% of total subscribers. Nevertheless, the presence of 
important international companies such as Telefónica and Millicom (see Table 3.4) 
makes it possible to foresee competitive development towards the future.
El Salvador is undoubtedly the country that shows the promising development 
of competition in mobile telephony. Indeed, as can be seen in Table 3.4, four operators 
share the mobile market in a fairly balanced manner.
In Honduras, the original strategy at the time the LMT was approved was to have 
three operators in the short term: (i) Telefónica Celular, S.A. (CELTEL); (ii) the win-
ner of the capitalization process of HONDUTEL; and (iii) the winner of the bidding 
for Band B, on 800 MHz (Tábora, 2007). However, the consequences were the diffi-
culties encountered to incorporate a private investor in HONDUTEL and the failure 
of the bidding for Band B until 2002. On January 6, 1994, the concession for 
development of Cellular Mobile Telephony Services in Honduras was awarded to the 
companies Motorola, Inc., Millicom International Cellular, S.A. (MIC) and Proempres, 
S.A., represented by the company CELTEL. This agreement was signed by both par-
ties on August 7, 1995. The concession granted CELTEL the right to develop mobile 
telephony services within Honduran territory, using frequency Band “A,” as of June 
1996. The company officially began its services on September 15, 1996. In 2006, 
CELTEL offered its services in 13 departments and in the country’s ten main cities. 
Until 2003, the number of subscribers grew slowly until it reached 5.5% coverage.
Table 3.4 Central America and Mexico: mobile operators and market shares (Author)
Country América Móvil Telefónica Móviles Millicom Fourth operator
Costa Rica    ICE (100)
El Salvador CTE Telecom  21.0 Telemóvil (29) Digicel (22)
  (28.0)
Guatemala 52.8 22.4 COMCEL (24.4) 
Honduras 32.0  CELTEL 
Mexico 77.2 15.1  Unefon – 
     Iusacell (7.7)
Nicaragua 51.0 49.0  
Panama  37.5  
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In 2002, CONATEL successfully carried out an international bidding process for 
Frequency Band “B.” Eighteen companies expressed an interest in taking part. In 
April 2003, three companies were pre-qualified, Empresa Nacional de 
Telecomunicaciones (ENTEL) of Chile, Bellsouth Honduras and the local consor-
tium, MEGATEL EMCE, which had been jointly awarded with Telia Swedtel the 
Nicaraguan enterprise ENITEL. However, the first two declined and consequently 
the company was awarded to the consortium Telia Swedtel – MEGATEL EMCE for 
a price of $7.1 million.42 The impact of competition on the growth of the number of 
subscribers has been significant. Mobile teledensity stood at 10.15% in December 
2004, reaching a penetration of 14.82% in August 2005 (Tábora, 2007). The per-
formance of competition has been successful. Having begun operations in November 
2003, in August 2005, MEGATEL had a share of 31.8% (Tábora, 2007). This may 
reflect the fact that there are no relations between the incumbent enterprise in fixed 
telephony and the company that operated the first concession in mobile telephony.
In contrast to fixed telephony, mobile telephony looks more promising from a 
competition point of view at the regional level. Indeed, three operators have a pres-
ence in more than one market, specifically, Telefónica Móviles, América Móvil and 
Millicom. In addition, other companies such as Cable & Wireless in Panama and 
Digicel in El Salvador are in operation. Hence, there is an entrepreneurial base that 
can significantly stimulate competition in this sector.
The presence of several operators largely explains the more dynamic development 
of this sector. If we look at Table 3.5, it is evident that as of 1998–1999, teledensity 
began to grow at very high rates. Crucial features of this process are the introduction 
of the “caller pays” system and prepayment, which made it possible to broaden the 
services to groups that were not eligible for post-payment programmes. The two 
countries with the most dynamic growth are undoubtedly El Salvador and Mexico 
which rose from a penetration rate of 0.68 and 1.82 in 1997 to 27.61 and 36.64 in 
2004, respectively.
Costa Rica, in contrast, despite being the country in 1997 with the broadest 
coverage (except Mexico), in 2004, only surpassed Nicaragua and Honduras. As we 
shall see further ahead, this appears to be associated with cross-subsidies from 
mobile to fixed telephony.
V. Telecommunications Rates in Central America and Mexico
For an analysis of prices of telecommunications services in the region a distinction 
should be made between the fixed segment, subject to more or less strict regulations, 
and the segments of national and international LD and mobile telephony, under 
42 Representatives immediately pointed out that the process should be annulled as only one bidder 







Table 3.5 Mexico and Central America: subscribers to cellular telephony per 100 inhabitants 1990–2004 (International Telecommunication Union, 2005)
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Costa Rica 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.14 0.21 0.56 1.37 1.78 2.83 3.51 5.10 7.57 11.10 18.12 21.73
El Salvador 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.09 0.24 0.40 0.68 2.27 8.31 11.85 13.40 13.76 17.32 27.71
Guatemala 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.11 0.30 0.42 0.61 1.03 3.05 7.53 9.81 13.15 13.15 25.02
Honduras 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.23 0.56 1.24 2.39 3.64 4.86 5.53 10.10
Mexico 0.08 0.18 0.35 0.42 0.62 0.73 1.07 1.82 3.50 7.94 14.24 21.68 25.45 29.47 36.64
Nicaragua 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.12 0.17 0.39 0.90 1.78 2.96 4.47 8.51 13.20
Panama 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.68 3.10 8.27 14.45 16.40 18.95 26.76 26.98
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systems both regulated and subject to competition. In these latter cases, one situation 
or the other is associated with the existence or absence of exclusive concessions.
For a comprehensive analysis of rate regulation for fixed telephony in the region 
it is essential to analyse the mechanism for initial setting of rates at the time of 
privatization, the procedure defined for their establishment as a system and finally, 
the effective path followed by rates and prices throughout the period.
In the case of mobile telephony, its competitive nature, the existence of two 
separate markets, the prepayment and post-payment markets, the multiplicity of 
rate plans and diverse variations within each one and constant innovations in 
promotions make it difficult to follow-up on price policy. Despite the foregoing, 
this section gives a general overview of prices and rates, seeking to highlight the 
main characteristics of their evolution in recent years.
1.  Rate Regulation and Evolution in Fixed Telephony 
and Long Distance
In the case of TELMEX in Mexico, the concession licence determines a form of 
“authorized rate control,” i.e. the SCT authorizes the rates set by the companies in 
line with the following criteria: (i) the rate structure will seek to favour efficient 
expansion of the public telephone network and lay the foundations for healthy 
competition in the provision of services; and (ii) the rates applicable to each service 
should make it possible to recover at least the incremental long-term cost,43 in such 
a way that cross-subsidies between services are eliminated.44 This is so that there is 
the necessary incentive to expand each service and establish fair grounds for 
equitable competition. The rate structure should lead TELMEX to achieve continuous 
improvement in productivity to enable it to increase its profitability, which in turn 
should translate into lower rates for users.45
If the tariff rate of growth of a basket of controlled services is compared with the 
inflation in 1997, the year of the opening up to competition, the former exceeds the 
latter considerably. Up to 1998, inflation was higher than fixed phone rates, which 
meant a fall in real rates. This trend continued strongly up to 2002 and 2003, when 
the nominal rates finally decreased.
43 Average long-term incremental cost means the sum of all the costs TELMEX has to incur to 
provide a unit of additional capacity of the corresponding service. Incremental costs should be 
comparable to those of an efficient company, in such a way that regulated rates are internationally 
competitive.
44 It is understood that there is a cross-subsidy when a company provides a service with an insuffi-
cient rate to cover average long-term incremental costs and simultaneously provides another service 
with a rate higher than its average long-term incremental costs. The above condition will be 
applied as long as the difference is substantial.
45 For details of the manner in which the concession licence sets forth the price cap system, see 
Chapter 4.
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According to information from COFETEL, the above has translated into 
significant reductions in the prices of services. Indeed, in June 2004 in the residen-
tial sector, the rate for installation had dropped from 1,393 pesos in 1998 to 1,130 
pesos in June 2004, representing a reduction equivalent to 18.9%. Basic rent, for 
its part, had gone from 182.56 pesos to 156.55 pesos, a reduction of 14.2% in the 
same period. Finally, measured local service dropped from 1.72 pesos to 1.48 
pesos, a reduction of 14%. In the business sector, installation costs dropped from 
4,991.85 pesos to 3,500 pesos, a 29% reduction; basic rent from 251 pesos to 191 
pesos, a 21.1% reduction; and finally, measured local service from 1.72 pesos to 
1.48 pesos, a 14% drop, all in the above-mentioned period (Mariscal and Rivera, 
2007). In this context, it is noteworthy that the distinction between residential and 
business service has been maintained, but perhaps what is most important is that the 
price reductions of these services are not what could have been expected if the more 
pronounced drops in the cost of equipment and the reduction of unit costs are 
considered. Additionally the significant increase in the number of users should 
have helped to further price cuts.
The above appears to be confirmed in Table 3.6, which shows that Mexican 
local rates exceed those of all the other countries considered in this study. The 
same occurs when we compare rates in Mexico with those of the other OECD 
countries. According to a OECD study, up to August 2004, on comparing the costs 
of a basket of telecommunications services which includes local calls, national and 
international LD and calls to mobile phones, it is evident that according to the 
purchasing power parity in US dollars (USD PPP), the cost of the Mexican basket 
was 611.74, surpassed only by Czech Republic (707.03) and Poland (699.53). The 
lowest costs were those of Iceland (259.30), Denmark (259.99), Canada (298.29) 
and Switzerland (306.19).46 The average cost of the basket in the OECD was 
428.62 (OECD, 2007).
In El Salvador, maximum rates for public telephone service are determined and 
approved by SIGET, without detriment to the provisions of Article 108.47 The overall 
rate for telephone service is subdivided into: (i) access charge, which is the payment 
Table 3.6 Mexico and Central America: average cost of local call (dollars per 3 min) (World 
Bank)
Country 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Costa Rica 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02
El Salvador 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 n/a n/a
Guatemala 0.11 0.1 0.09 0.09 0.08 n/a n/a
Honduras 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 n/a
Mexico  0.14 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 n/a n/a
Nicaragua 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.11 0.1 0.08 0.08
Panama 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 n/a n/a
46 It should be pointed out that the small OECD countries have even lower costs for the basket.
47 Article 108 permitted an increase in the rate for fixed telephony based on the operator’s 
investments.
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the user makes for being connected to the network; (ii) charge for call traffic (time 
of use) or services (alarm call, directory enquiries, etc.); and (iii) interconnection 
charges, plus charges for finishing the call in another network.
Before privatization the rates were set by ANTEL, an institution that between 
1980 and 1994 did not adjust the prices charged for traffic in minutes, nor the 
charges for residential and business access, nor the network installation (FUSADES, 
1998), despite the fact that during that period inflation increased by more than 
1,000%. The deficits generated were compensated, as was usual at the time, by the 
income from the high rates charged for international communications. In 1995, the 
first increase in fixed telephony was registered, increasing the cost per minute of a 
local call by 200%. The access charge for residential and business telephony rose 
by 400%, and the installation charge increased by 33.3%. A new rebalancing was 
applied a year before the privatization, with the rate for a local call experiencing an 
increase of 200% and the adjustment for the residential charge and installation 
being lower. International calls made to the USA (the main country of destination) 
were reduced by 50% in comparison to those of 1994; it should be pointed out that 
the participation of Americatel was approved in international LD as of the early 
1990s (Argumedo, 2007).
The Law established the following mechanism for adjustment of rates: (i) for 
access charges, a collection base was established which would be adjusted annually 
in line with inflation; (ii) in the case of interconnection charges, a collection base was 
determined by type of terminal, which would be adjusted on a quarterly basis accord-
ing to the inflation rate and devaluation with regard to the USA48; and (iii) in regard 
to the charge for traffic, a clause was established to allow the rate to be increased as 
the operator invested more in extending coverage and expanding the network.49 Thus, 
rate increases were generated despite the fact that they were falling at international 
level. The continuous increase in rates contributed to the disillusionment of the popu-
lation with regard to the privatization, since during its planning it had been main-
tained that competition would make the rates go down (Argumedo, 2007).
If only the inflation rates had been applied, the charge for 1 min access would 
have reached $0.0185; if, on the other hand, the provisions of the investment con-
tract had been complied with and the maximum increases had been applied, the 
price would have risen to $0.041/min in 2002 (an increase of 95% over the 1998 
price). What actually happened with the rate was that at first the goals for expansion 
of lines were not met, and therefore the increase authorized was proportional to the 
effective growth of lines. In June 2002, SIGET and the operator agreed that the 
increases to which the company had a right were not viable, and they would seek 
to introduce them in a period of seven years (Argumedo, 2007).
48 In practice the adjustment was only for inflation, since the colon-dollar exchange rate was fixed 
since 1993 and in 2001 the country implemented dollarization.
49 Based on the existence of 340,000 lines in service in 1997, the investment contract provided for 
the following rate increases: in 1998 15% on installing 50,000 lines; in 1999 20% on installing 
65,000 lines and an annual increase of 20% between 2000 and 2002 as long as 75,000 lines were 
installed in each of those years.
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That is how the rates for fixed telephony have experienced rises, showing the lack 
of competition and the problems stemming from the investment contract. In the period 
1998–2004, there were annual average increases of 4% and 2.5% in basic residential 
and business charges, respectively. The cost per minute of local calls and national LD, 
for their part, increased over the past seven years by 5.2% and 4.7%, respectively. The 
cost of national LD calls reached a figure of $0.04/min, i.e. 40% of the cost of calls to 
the USA, which could be a sign of market power abuse (Argumedo, 2007).
In the case of Guatemala, the General Telecommunications Law establishes that 
the rate for consumer, as well as those charged among telecommunications opera-
tors, should be freely agreed upon. Government Accord 394–200150 put an end to 
the actions under Administrative Law Nos. 185–2000 and 186–2000 promoted by 
the Government against the privatization process. Article 2 establishes that the rates 
for residential and business services for fixed lines until 2003 should be as follows 
(using the exchange rate Q. 7.84/dollar): local telephony Q. 0.2036/min ($0.02597/
min) and LD telephony Q. 0.3564/min ($0.04546/min).
In 1995, LD rate for calls to the USA, the most important destination for 
Guatemalan communications, was around $1.50/min, with poor quality and high 
saturation of calls. In mid-2005, some operators offered rates of $0.10/min.
The rate policy guidelines for Telecommunications Services in Honduras are 
established in Title Three, Chapter II (Article 31) of the LMT. The latter determines 
that the rates charged by telecommunications services operators, except broadcast-
ing services, shall be regulated by CONATEL, as long as such services are provided 
in adequate competition conditions.
Although there was no rate rebalancing in the country,51 the government that 
took office in 2002 decided, together with CONATEL, to reduce LD rates. The rates 
effecting place in 2002 for communications to the USA (which represent 91% of 
all international calls) stood at $1.24/min. That year the rate was reduced to $1.04 
and in 2003 it was reduced once again, this time to $0.84.52
50 Diario de Centro América. October 5, 2001 – Number 62 – Publication of Government Accord 
394–2001 of October 1, 2001, Guatemala.
51 Since April 6, 1999, the date on which CONATEL approved HONDUTEL’s List of Rates, there 
has been no rate rebalancing whatsoever. Article 19 of the Regulations on Costs and Rates for 
Telecommunications Services establishes that there is a period for carrying out the rate rebalancing, 
which closes on December 31, 2005. The idea of this period was to comply with the contractual 
conditions that had been established in the capitalization process of HONDUTEL, in order to 
guarantee the new operator a rate structure that would allow it to recover its investment and, 
periodically reduce the cross-subsidy between international LD service and the other services. 
However, since the process failed, these contractual conditions never went into effect, and this 
provision was not applied (Tábora, 2007).
52 The idea of this plan was for the full rate to the USA to be US$0.42/min by the end of 2004, so 
that at the time of the opening up the rate should be US$0.28/min, thus making the impact on the 
market of the opening up less than it would have been at the time. It was not possible to obtain an 
official explanation for the reason why this plan was not continued, but it may be understood that the 
failure to apply the plan was influenced by the lack of a clear vision of the future of HONDUTEL, 
the entry into the market of sub-operators under the TpT programme and above all because of the 
difficulties of a fiscal nature being experienced by the current government (Tábora, 2007).
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The high international LD rates undoubtedly contrast with local rates. As can be 
seen in Table 3.6, the cost of a 3 min call was $0.06, the lowest in the region after Costa 
Rica. It should be pointed out that the above data constitute an average, since in 
Honduras a distinction continued to be made between residential and business rates.53
HONDUTEL has introduced the system of prepayment in fixed telephony. In 
2003, it launched Telecard on the market, which may be used in public telephones 
and in any terminal of its network. Telecard comes in denominations of 20, 60, 125 
and 250 lempiras and may be used for local calls, national and international LD and 
communications to mobile telephones.
As we saw in previous sections, together with the privatization of INTEL, S.A. 
Panama granted the telecommunications company a period of exclusivity that was 
to last until January 1, 2003. Unfortunately the bidding process did not include 
definitions defining the rates each of them would charge. As González (2007) 
points out, it would have been logical, once the benchmark price for 49% of the 
shares had been set for the auction, for the process to favour the bidder who offered 
to charge the lowest prices, with precise quality requirements for the services to be 
offered.
However, the rates were negotiated after the concession contract had been 
concluded. Prior to the privatization, the cost of basic local telephony was a 
fixed charge of $10.50 with no additional variable cost. After privatization a 
fixed charge of $6.27 was established for the basic plan and a variable charge of 
$0.03/min. Table 3.6 shows the average costs of a local call. As can be seen, the 
prices in Panama were the highest in the region, with the sole exception of 
Mexico.54
Privatization with exclusivity also had as a consequence high prices in LD 
telephony. Between 1997 and 2002, a national LD call had a cost of $0.15/min. 
The opening up to competition reduced the price to $0.13/min in 2003, to $0.09/
min in 2004 and was expected to fall in 2005 and 2006 to $0.07/min and $0.05/
min, respectively (González, 2007). The costs of exclusivity are also reflected in 
international LD. The average prices of international calls excluding those to the 
USA reached a price of $1.86/min in 1998, $1.69/min in 1999 and 2000, and 
$1.57/min in 2001 and 2002. The opening up to competition evidenced how unjus-
tified such high rates are. In fact, in 2003 the rates fell to an average of $0.40, in 
2004 to an average of $0.25 and they were expected to fall to $0.12 in 2005. 
International calls to the USA cost $0.98 in 1998, $0.89 in 1999 and 2000 and 
53 For details of the evolution of fixed rates in the period 2000–2004, see Tábora (2007).
54 The figures presented by González (2007) differ from those of the ITU and the World Bank. 
According to the aforementioned institutions, in 1997, the monthly charge for residential teleph-
ony was US$10.00 and in 2001 it was US$3.00. According to the World Bank, before and after 
the privatization the average cost of a local call remained at US$0.12 for 3 min, i.e. US$0.04/min. 
The difference may lie in the fact that the ITU figures for the monthly charge in residential 
telephony do not include business telephony, whereas the World Bank figures show an average of 
residential and business telephony.
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$0.85 in the two years prior to the opening up. In 2003, the first year of competi-
tion, the rate dropped to $0.18, to $0.15 in 2004 and it was expected to reach $0.07 
in 2005 (González, 2007).
As we saw before, in Costa Rica telecommunications are in the charge of ICE, 
a public enterprise that also provides electric power generation and distribution 
services. It is the responsibility of the Regulatory Authority for Public Services 
(ARESEP) to define the rates for services and supervise their quality. The legisla-
tion establishes that the services should be provided in accordance with their cost. 
Rates for telecommunications services are set under the rate system of the rate of 
return. In Costa Rica, this system translates into a rate that covers costs and the rate 
of return on capital (or development rate), understood as the income necessary for 
ICE to be able to replace or increase the assets it needs to provide its services. In 
operative terms, ARESEP applies the system of “price caps” to adjust ICE’s rates. 
In order to guarantee that service quality is maintained, an adjustment factor for 
quality is included that affects only the component of surplus or return for the 
application of the formula, so that the resources to cover the costs of providing the 
service are guaranteed.
ARESEP has approved rate increases lower than those requested by ICE, with 
the purpose of inducing the firm to lower costs and increase productivity. The out-
come of this policy during the period 1997–2005 has been a reduction in the basic 
residential rate equivalent to 27% (Vargas and Hernández, 2007). Moreover, as can 
be seen in Table 3.6, the average cost of a 3 min local call was $0.03 until 2002, 
dropping to $0.02 in 2003, thus making it the lowest average rate at that time 
among the countries considered in this study.
There is wide-ranging debate as to the causes of the Costa Rican peculiarities. 
A first argument maintains that as a public enterprise, ICE faces lower differential 
costs than a hypothetical private operator because they do not include the earnings 
or normal profitability of all economic activities (also known as retribution for the 
entrepreneurial factor or opportunity cost) because this kind of enterprise cannot 
generate profits. Also contributing to this situation would be the fact that its nature 
as a public enterprise exempts it from payment of income tax, other municipal 
taxes, as well as the right of way on public highways and use of the radio spectrum. 
As the only operator in the market it also enjoys significant economies of scale. 
Another feature that contributes to explaining the low rates stems from the syner-
gies the enterprise has by also operating the electric power distribution networks, 
such as those derived from posts for stringing electrical, telephone and optical fibre 
cables. Cross-subsidies also play a role. As in the past in the majority of countries, 
residential telephony was subsidized by the higher rates for fixed telephony service 
to companies (business) and international telephony. The considerable reduction in 
rates for international telephony at world level, together with technological progress 
– which has made possible various forms of contracting this service from the coun-
try with companies other than ICE – has obliged the enterprise to seek alternative 
sources to finance cross-subsidies. Thus, at present mobile telephony has become 
the source of financial resources to subsidize less-profitable telecommunications 
services (Vargas and Hernández, 2007).
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2. Evolution of Mobile Telephony Rates
An analysis of mobile telephony rates is substantially more difficult than in fixed 
telephony. What is involved, in general, is a market open to competition and there-
fore, normally, without the obligation to report rates. It is also a telecommunica-
tions service segmented between the post-payment and prepayment markets, often 
with sharply differentiated rates. Also, since there is considerable competition in 
this market, each one presents a wide variety of plans with many differences in 
nature, making it difficult for users to choose among them.
In the prepayment market, competition can take place in relation to prices per 
minute of airtime, as well as in connection with other variables such as: denomina-
tion of the card, duration of such denomination, grace period to recover available 
balances when its duration expires, and promotions and services offered by the 
prepayment system. Furthermore, the strategy followed by the licences has been to 
differentiate themselves to avoid open competition in the majority of the above 
variables (González, 2007).
In his analysis on competition in telecommunications in El Salvador, Argumedo 
(2007) draws four conclusions: (i) calling the USA is cheaper than communications 
between cellular phones in the country; (ii) a call from a cellular phone to a fixed 
line is more expensive than from cellular to cellular; (iii) calls between cellular 
phones of the same company are cheaper than between different companies; and 
(iv) calls from post-payment cellular phones are lower than those made by 
prepayment.
In Guatemala, the existence of greater competition among the operators has 
given consumer prices an interesting dynamic. In October 1999, Telefónica entered 
the market and immediately introduced the “caller pays” system and a 70% reduction 
in the price of outgoing calls. The entry of Telefónica also contributed to altering 
the characteristics of competition by diversifying rate plans, introducing post-
payment or prepayment systems and offering individual and business (corporate) 
plans. By January 2005, 88% of mobile telephony was in the form of prepayment 
and only 12% in post-payment (Urízar, 2007).
In Honduras, the concession contracts of the two mobile operators CELTEL and 
MEGATEL established rate ceilings for mobile telephony services. Three charges 
were identified: the basic monthly rate which was set at the equivalent of $30, the 
charge at full rate set at $0.25/min and the charge at reduced rate set at $0.18/min. 
These rates set first for CELTEL were to last ten years (until 2006). Operators had 
the freedom to determine the duration of the different rates and even the possibility 
of introducing a super-low rate. Even though nominal rates have remained fairly 
stable in an analysis of consumption per subscriber, in real terms rates went down 
31% in 2003–2005. Additionally, on average, during the latter period users used 
this service approximately 44% more than the time they talked in 2002 and for the 
same amount of money (Tábora, 2007).
In the prepayment market, CELTEL offered cards in seven denominations, 
between 25 ($1.31) and 450 ($23.68) lempiras, which are differentiated by the 
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number of minutes and the duration but have the same cost per minute – $0.2632. 
In the post-payment market, CELTEL offered five plans that include between 60 
and 400 min. The prices per minute varied from $0.25 55 (Plan Móvil 15 – 60 min 
for a total price of $15) to $0.19 (Plan Móvil 75 – 400 min for a total price of $75). 
MEGATEL, Honduras’s other mobile telephony operator, had six post-payment 
plans and their prices per minute ranged between $0.27 (Plan Alo 12 – 44 min for 
a total cost of $12) and $0.19 (Plan Alo – 525 min for a total cost of $100).56
In Panama’s case the companies compete first, in the card denominations. 
Whereas Movistar has cards worth US$2, 5, 10, 20 and 40, Cable & Wireless has 
US$5, 10, 15, 30 and 50.57 The price per minute also varies. In Movistar’s case, the 
company had only two rates. For the US$2 card, the price per minute was $0.49. 
For the rest of the cards the price was $0.43/min. Cable & Wireless, for its part, has 
a greater variety of rates per minute: US$0.40, 0.34 and 0.32 for the US$5, 10 and 
15 cards, respectively, and US$0.25 for the US$30 and 50 cards. Naturally, in the 
card denominations in which the two companies coincide, users receive a different 
amount of minutes.
In the case of the US$5 and 10 cards, the licencees do not compete with regard 
to the duration, as both of them last between ten and 30 days, respectively; nor do 
they compete with regard to the number of grace days for recovering the balance: 
their cards offer 15 days to recover balances. Market promotions have adopted the 
means to double, triple, etc. the value in minutes of each card denomination. 
According to González (2007), this is the most visible way in which both licencees 
compete in Panama.
In Costa Rica, as we saw in the preceding section, mobile telephony has replaced 
national and international LD telephony as a source to finance for other telecom-
munications segments, particularly residential fixed telephony. Mobile telephony, 
despite its lesser coverage, contributes more than half of ICE’s total revenues for 
telecommunications services. These circumstances may of course explain the 
relatively low coverage of mobile telephony in Costa Rica compared both with 
the levels attained by other countries and with the coverage of fixed telephony (see 
Section IV).
55 An interesting detail in the prepayment form is that the cards already include 12% sales tax 
(ISV), and therefore the real nominal rate is US$0.235, an amount lower than the reference rates 
for the post-payment plans Móvil 15 and Móvil 20, which do not include ISV. This analysis shows 
that the prepayment rate (US$0.235/min) is less than the post-payment rate of the Móvil 15 
(US$0.28/min) and Móvil 20 (US$0.2635/min) plans (Tábora, 2007).
56 In addition to the traditional plans, MEGATEL offers the “Control ALO” Plan, whereby a credit 
limit on consumption during the month is established (Basic Set Rate) and once the assigned credit 
limit is reached, the user has the option of entering an Alo Card to continue using the service. With 
this mechanism subscribers can ensure that their monthly bill will always be for the same amount, 
with the proviso that any excess will have to be paid in cash by means of prepayment. One of the 
main advantages offered by this plan is that it accumulates any unconsumed minutes for the fol-
lowing month, including both the minutes assigned and the minutes entered with an Alo card 
(Tábora, 2007).
57 The information corresponds to April 18, 2005 (González, 2007).
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VI. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
Privatizations and openness of fixed telecommunications promised a world of many 
operators, a substantive increase in quality and coverage of telecommunications 
services, as well as a drop in prices. The coverage and quality of these services have 
improved, but their expansion has been slower than expected, and even Costa 
Rica – a country which has persevered in keeping these services under the public 
ownership – has better coverage and prices than the rest of the nations included in 
this study.
Two central elements help understanding this situation. First, private monopolies 
have shown a remarkable strength to resist competition. Second, the usual short-
comings of sectoral regulation are greater in smaller economies, particularly in 
developing ones where two basic institutions – law enforcement and the markets – 
are weak.
In this context, to discipline the incumbent is quite difficult and high prices limit 
the population’s possibilities to use this service. This is specially so for low-income 
sectors. Together with the privatization and openness path followed, the fixed 
telephony problems are associated with an institutional underdevelopment.
The different paths taken by the privatization and liberalization process of fixed 
telecommunications were a promise of a world with many operators, a much 
greater coverage and better quality of the service, as well as lower tariffs, especially 
as regards the granting or not of exclusivity periods, which seem to translate into 
significant differences when the intensity of competition and the prices of telecom-
munications services are analysed. The case of El Salvador shows that the opening 
up to competition in fixed telephony, without a period of exclusivity, has translated 
into a much higher participation of companies other than the incumbent. By con-
trast, the exclusivity period allows the consolidation of a non-competitive model 
which tends to become more pronounced due to institutional weaknesses that allow 
anti-competitive behaviour by the incumbent, especially during the period of open-
ing up to competition.
Separate privatization of the fixed company and the mobile company appears to 
constitute a measure of singular importance in promoting competition. In fact, the 
application of this policy in El Salvador has resulted, despite the country’s small 
size, in the presence of four mobile operators with well-balanced market shares.
The formal presence or absence of a competition agency is not sufficient to make 
a difference. In fact, in countries which have a competition agency with a history 
close to, or greater than, ten years (Mexico and Panama), the predominance of the 
incumbent company does not differ substantially from what happens in countries 
without a competition authority. This seems to be associated with the weakness of 
the competition agency.
The mobile telephony represents a very different situation. Its technological 
characteristics and an active public competition policy made the participation of 
many operators possible. The intense competition in this industry had an impact on 
prices and promoted innovative commercialization techniques, allowing very 
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low-income customers to participate in this market. Prepayment reduced the access 
cost to this service and the business model followed by this industry focused on 
massive use rather than monopolistic prices to raise its profits. From the users’ 
point of view, the prepayment mechanism is helpful, because expenditure is always 
under their control and when they lack resources to make a call, they can always 
receive them. Many transaction costs are eliminated for the enterprise and its cus-
tomers. In this way, without the need of public subsidies, mobile telecommunica-
tions is making headway towards universal access to voice communication 
services.
Within the net and services convergence framework there is the possibility that 
the strong competition in mobile telephony may be transmitted to the rest of the 
industry. This would provide important benefits for consumers and improve firms’ 
competitiveness. Nevertheless, high entry barriers together with weak competition 
regulation may reinforce the increasing importance of regional duopolies in tele-
communications, such as Telefónica y TELMEX – América Móvil, and offset such 
positive tendency mentioned above.
Tariff regulation has to make sure that competitive market pressures are simu-
lated for the fixed telephony incumbent, if not naturally existent. Price reductions 
to near competitive levels can increase/generate substantive coverage. This is 
particularly important in fixed telecommunications because it provides private 
access to the wide band. This is particularly true since fixed telecommunications 
still offer important advantages over mobile telecommunications for these 
 purposes.58 Independently from the arguments that favour the total liberalization 
of this sector, sectorial agencies need to regulate this sector in the best possible 
way in the medium run.
Regulation, though, is not enough. Competition promotion is increasingly 
important. It is particularly relevant to eliminate barriers to entry permanently 
(deregulation and surveillance of interconnection blocking or overpricing, among 
other anti-competitive behaviour), to control mergers as well as other measures to 
ensure price competition. For these measures to succeed, four elements are crucial: 
a strong competition agency, a strong coordination between the latter and sector 
regulation, improvement of the judiciary system performance in these matters and 
the development of a supranational competition legal system.
In Costa Rica’s case, the future of telecommunications is linked to the more 
global decisions the country takes after the presidential elections of February 2006. 
The fundamental decision is undoubtedly the one relative to ratification of DR-
CAFTA. If approved, Costa Rica should approve a General Telecommunications 
Law, create a regulatory agency for the sector and open up Internet, private net-
works services and wireless telephony to competition.
58 Mobile telephony is a very good option for voice transmission, but in the short run it is not a 
comparable competitive alternative for Internet for the population at large. This will probably 
change in the longer run.
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The free trade agreement does not include the obligation to proceed to the pri-
vatization of ICE. Nevertheless, those in favour of maintaining its public nature fear 
that with the opening up the future of the enterprise may be threatened definitively 
by competition from international operators, particularly Telefónica España and the 
TELMEX – América Móvil group.
It is in this context that large telecommunications firms are readjusting their 
organization structures. As in the rest of the world, there are clear signals that fixed 
telephony has ceased to be the nucleus of the operation, as it has lost importance as 
the main source of income and its traditional monopoly over the last mile has been 
weakened.
Towards the end of the 1990s, Telefónica took two important decisions: first, to 
acquire the shares of the retail owners of its affiliates, and second, to structure their 
operations according to the different telecommunications segments. The initiative 
made it possible to better organize the main lines of business, but somehow it ran 
counter to the trends defined by the process of convergence.
Users’ growing interest in relying on providers that can supply a comprehensive 
package of telecommunications services in some way raises doubts about 
the above-mentioned organizational model. This is translating into the search for 
more efficient forms of organization59 and into a systematic policy of incursion into 
fixed telephony. Thus, in the case of Panama, Telefónica Móvil has requested a 
concession for the provision of fixed telephony, and in Mexico the company has 
established a strategic alliance with Avantel and has also indicated that they are 
seeking the acquisition of a fixed operator.
One aspect that is taking on growing importance is the debate regarding the best 
means of treating the industry. Even though an analysis of the different markets into 
which telecommunications are divided continues to be useful, the way in which the 
business is structured, the multi-purpose nature of the networks as a result of con-
vergence and the companies’ own operation make it necessary to move on from 
isolated treatment of each segment towards comprehensive treatment of the indus-
try. The formerly different networks are becoming integrated so as to build a single 
platform for the provision of fixed and mobile telephony, LD, data transmission and 
television services. Companies use all their assets to compete in the markets for 
each of the end services.
Furthermore, the companies that divided up just over five-years ago according 
to the traditional segments, fixed and mobile telephony and Internet, have begun a 
process of reintegration and are seeking new forms of internal structuring. Though 
this tendency seems essential to make the best use of new technologies, regulation 
and competition institutions must prevent anti-competitive practices.
59 Among them being the introduction of de facto organizational formulas in which the different 
companies converge, with the establishment of directorates of business areas, which are served by 
the network and planning boards of directors, etc.
96 E. Rivera
Bibliography
Ansorena, C. (2007)s, Competencia y regulación en las telecomunicaciones: el caso de Nicaragua 
(LC/MEX/L.785), serie Estudios y Perspectivas No. 73, ECLAC/IDRC, July.
Argumedo, P. (2007), Competencia y regulación en las telecomunicaciones: El caso de El 
Salvador, serie Estudios y Perspectivas N° 73, ECLAC/IDRC, Mexico, February.
Estache, A., M. Manacorda and T. M. Valletti (2002), Telecommunications reform, access regula-
tion, and Internet adoption in Latin America, Economía, vol. 2, N° 2, Spring 2002, pp. 
153–217.
FUSADES (Fundación Salvadoreña para el Desarrollo Económico y Social) (1998), “Las 
Telecomunicaciones en El Salvador: un sector estratégico para el nuevo siglo”, Boletín 
Económico y Social, No 153, August.
González, R. (2007), Competencia y regulación de las telecomunicaciones: el caso de Panamá, 
serie Estudios y Perspectivas N° 74, ECLAC/IDRC, Mexico, February.
International Telecommunication Union (2005). http://www.ine.int/ITU-D/icteye/reports.aspx#.
Mariscal, J. and E. Rivera (2005a), New trends in the Latin American telecommunications market: 
Telefonica & Telmex, Telecommunications Policy, N° 29, pp. 757–777.
Mariscal, J. and E. Rivera (2005b), Organización, industrial y competencia en las telecomunicaciones 
en América Latina: las estrategias empresariales, serie Desarrollo Productivo N° 169 (LC/
L.2423-P), ECLAC, Santiago, Chile.
Mariscal, J. and E. Rivera (2007), Regulación y competencia en las telecomunicaciones mexi-
canas, serie Estudios y Perspectivas N° 83, ECLAC/IDRC, June, Mexico.
OECD (2007), Communications Outlook 2007. http://213.253.134.43/oecd/pdfs/browseit/
9307021E.PDF
Ramírez, F. (2005), Interconexión de redes telefónicas en México: solución de disputas y 
búsqueda de consensos, Mexico, unpublished.
Rivera, E. (2006), Regulación y competencia de las telecomunicaciones en Centroamérica: un 
análisis comparativo, in C. Schatan and M. Avalos (Coords.), Condiciones y políticas de com-
petencia. Economías pequeñas de Centroamérica y el Caribe, FCE y ECLAC, Mexico.
Tábora, M. R. (2007), Regulación y competencia en el sector de las telecomunicaciones en 
Honduras (LC/MEX/L.781), serie Estudios y Perspectivas No. 84, ECLAC/IDRC, México, 
June.
Urízar, C. (2007), Competencia y regulación de las telecomunicaciones: el caso de Guatemala, 
serie Estudios y Perspectivas N° 75, ECLAC/IDRC, Mexico. February.
Vargas, L. and G. Hernández (2007), Competencia y regulación en las telecomunicaciones: el caso 
de Costa Rica, ECLAC/IDRC, Mexico, forthcoming.
Waltsten, S. (2000), “Telecommunications privatization in developing countries: the real effects of 
exclusivity periods”. http/www.isnie.org/ISNIE01/Papers01/waltsten. Pdf.
Chapter 4
Competition and Regulation in the Banking 
Systems of Central America and Mexico: 
A Comparative Study
Eugenio Rivera and Adolfo Rodríguez
Introduction
Competition in the financial sector, especially in the banking sphere, has been a 
very polemic topic. The adverse selection and moral risk that characterize this sector 
explain the high regulation of its economic activities. This feature is geared towards 
solving the important information problems faced by the economic actors, so as to 
protect savers’ interests and ensure the stability of the financial sector as a whole. 
This objective, nevertheless, contradicts to some extent the aims of competition 
policy. On the one hand, excessive competition may create difficulties for the bank 
supervisor: it is easier to control a few large banks than having to do so with a large 
number of small ones. On the other hand, an excessive competitive dynamic may 
force banks to transfer a large part of their surplus to the consumer, limiting the 
banks’ capitalization capacity and may lead some of them to undertake excessive 
risks to face competition. This explains to a certain extent the existence of some 
regulatory arrangements – such as the requirement of relatively high minimum 
capital – that promote bank concentration. But, at the same time, the absence of 
competition can weaken market discipline and allow for inefficient practices, while 
the excessive concentration can reduce the supervisor’s relative power as he faces 
banks that are “too big to fail”.
However, the recent evolution of financial markets tends to solve this contradic-
tion. The development of banking technology has created, more than any other 
economic sector, a competitive worldwide space, so that local banks are facing, 
more than ever, a strong competition. This cannot be avoided by measures that 
promote local bank concentration; on the contrary, concentration can worsen some 
of the negative effects of excessive competition on banks’ behaviour, particularly in 
the negligent handling of risk. Competition promotion in local markets, together 
with measures that improve the local bank competitiveness so as to close the gap 
with the international one, is the best complement to the prudential norms. These 
should be revised so as to remove aspects that promote concentration and lack 
of competition in this sector.
Understanding banks’ competitive strategies and their performance requires 
an analysis of the institutional conditions in which financial institutions operate. 
C. Schatan, E. Rivera (eds.) Competition Policies in Emerging Economies, 97
© United Nations 2008
98 E. Rivera, A. Rodríguez
Such conditions include: (i) the regulatory framework, which includes prudential 
regulations, monetary policy and taxation; (ii) the characteristics of the region’s 
financial infrastructure – especially those concerning liquidity management and 
payment systems; (iii) international connectivity; and (iv) non-bank sources of 
contestability in the banking market, particularly public debt and stock markets. This 
is the context that determines banks’ competitive strategies in the region.
In fact, in this context, the Central American banks have developed a set of 
strategies to ensure their continued existence in the setting of the industry’s growing 
internationalization and to respond to the demands imposed by the application of 
the Basel standards. The following feature among those strategies: (i) a process of 
modernization and efficient organization of activities; (ii) development of offshore 
banks in parallel to local ones; (iii) an active policy of mergers and takeovers which 
has reduced the number of banks and increased concentration indicators of the five 
largest institutions; (iv) regionalization of activities and of the ownership of 
financial groups; and (v) growing involvement in financial activities formerly 
barred to the banks.
With this context in mind, the Section I analyses the background and salient 
features of the history of the banking system in the different countries of the region, 
as well as the main characteristics of the institutional framework governing regula-
tion and promotion of competition. Section II consists of a study of the main deter-
mining factors for the banks’ competitive strategies. Section III analyses the main 
strategies developed by bank operators. Section IV shows certain indicators regard-
ing the banking system’s performance from the point of view of both management 
efficiency and intensity of competition in the system. The study ends with the main 
conclusions drawn and some policy recommendations in Section V.
I.  Organization of the Banking System and Institutional 
Framework for Regulating and Promoting 
Competition in Central America and Mexico
1. Historical Background of the Banking System in the Region
Although the bank’s historic trajectories in the different nations are extremely varied, 
they show at least three similarities: the presence of a strong public bank at some 
point, the generalized tendency to privatization of such bank (with the exception of 
Costa Rica) and the presence of political or economic turmoil which have threat-
ened the industry’s financial solidity.
Recent trends in the banking sector reveal a modernization process and an 
improvement in its regulation, even if at a different pace in each country. There has 
been a considerable progress in the prudential regulation application and different 
steps have been taken in order to achieve a consolidated supervision of the whole 
financial sector. The authorities’ concern for financial stability has limited their 
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effort to promote more competition in these markets. This can be appreciated in the 
fact that regulatory bodies have not included competition as one of their most 
important tasks, as well as in the absence of a competition agency, or else in their 
judicial limitations to undertake these cases.
Over the past 15 years the banking system in Central America and Mexico has 
undergone major transformations. A brief look at the development of the banking 
system in Mexico reveals a traumatic track record. In the context of the international-
debt crisis in the early 1980s, the Mexican government announced the nationalization 
of the banking system. Less than ten years later, in May 1990, the Mexican government, 
then headed by President Carlos Salinas de Gortari, announced the constitutional 
amendment that made privatization possible. The government’s aim was to maximize 
public revenues. The privatization process was structured as a series of successive 
auctions in which the losers could participate in bidding processes for subsequent 
blocks of shares. The process was open not only to groups with banking experience, 
but also to groups linked to the stock exchange. No kind of assessed value of assets 
or minimum prices was made known, so the sale was carried out at an average of 
three and a half times the book value. The high sale prices were subsequently con-
sidered to be one of the reasons behind the collapse of most of the banks in the con-
text of the 1994–1995 “Tequila crisis”. Several causes were adduced to explain the 
above-mentioned crisis, among them the fragility of the Mexican banking system, 
stemming from the low quality of the banks’ credit portfolio and the high level of 
leverage in the corporate sector. These circumstances followed from the rapid 
expansion of credit and the overvalued prices of assets and guarantees which took 
place during the years of economic expansion in Carlos Salinas’ term of office and 
were associated with the weakness of prudential regulation. One particularly seri-
ous situation was the growth of related credits without adequate backing. Although 
less than eight years had elapsed between nationalization and privatization, this 
time it took four years for the privatized banking system to collapse. The tequila 
crisis brought in its wake high delinquency due to high interest rates, contraction of 
the supply of uncommitted funds, reduction in the level of financial intermediation 
and economic slowdown, which made it necessary for the state to intervene in the 
capitalization of banking institutions. In 1999, only 35% of the 20 banks in opera-
tion came from the privatizations; two of these – Bancrecer and Inverlat – were 
controlled by Institute for the Protection of Bank Savings (IPAB), another two had 
been taken over by foreign banks (servicios financieros integrados (SERFIN) by 
Santander Mexicano and Banco de Comercio (BANCOMER) by Banco Bilbao 
Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA) ) and Banco Internacional (BITAL) was being capital-
ized by European banks. Thus, by 1999 only two of these institutions – BANAMEX 
and Banorte – had retained 100% Mexican stock ownership (see Avalos and 
Hernández, this volume).
As in Mexico’s case, the commercial banks and savings and loan associations of 
El Salvador were nationalized in 1980.1 Ten years later, in 1990, the process was 
1 Legislative Decree No. 158: “Law on the Nationalization of Credit Institutions and Savings and 
Loan Associations” dated March 7, 1980.
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reversed and the government set in motion a process to privatize the sector. This 
evolution has taken place together with several legal changes, among which are the 
Organic Law of the Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador, passed in 1991, which 
included a prohibition on directly or indirectly financing the state (Article 74) and 
eliminated the authority of that institution to set the exchange rate and interest rates. 
These have been subject to market forces ever since. Probably the most important 
subsequent event in the development of the financial system took place on January 1, 
2001, when the Law on Monetary Integration went into effect. The law introduced 
the use of the US dollar as legal tender and stipulated that all banks and financial 
operations be denominated in that currency. Naturally, the role of the Central 
Reserve Bank had to be redefined, particularly as regards monetary policy. In 2006, 
there were ten private banks and two state banks (Herrera, 2007).2
Nicaragua has not been free of vicissitudes. The nationalization of the banking 
system after the Sandinista revolution was followed by an initial period during 
which a state banking system was in operation (1980–1990); the next decade was 
characterized by a private banking system which gained a leading role in the country 
but underwent a severe crisis (2000–2002) paving the way for a process of concen-
tration between 2003 and 2005 that had left the country with six banking institu-
tions by 2006. Despite the ups and downs in the history of Nicaragua’s banking 
system, or perhaps because of these, Nicaraguan financial capital has a strong 
presence in the region.
Undoubtedly the characteristic feature of the banking system in Costa Rica is a 
strong state sector with origins in the 1949 bank nationalization, which also provided 
for a monopoly on deposits based on the argument that the public’s savings should 
serve the public interest and not private profit-making. Only one bank was not 
nationalized, Banco Lyon, which specialized in international operations to support 
exports. Nevertheless, protected by a series of reforms, the private financial sector 
started attracting funds even since the end of the 1960s. From 1980 onwards, the 
private banks started having a wider space. Further leeway was afforded to private 
banks by authorizing access to Central Bank credit programmes and it was allowed 
to attract savings from the public at progressively shorter terms.
Panama stands out for being an international financial district. The modern 
Panamanian banking system has its origins in Cabinet Decree 238 of 1970 which 
established the National Banking Commission, the first attempt at state regulation of 
banking operations in the country. The Law formalized the presence of international 
banks in Panama by authorizing both local and offshore operations, depending on the 
interests of each institution. Banks that engaged exclusively in offshore transactions, 
however, could make local interbank placements, thus creating a highly active inter-
bank market that forms the basis of the system to this day. The Bank Law gave every 
2 Public banking in El Salvador has not been devoid of problems, an example being Banco de 
Fomento Agropecuario (BFA), which was the scenario of one of the financial system’s biggest 
frauds, in which BFA lost approximately 24.8 million colones (US$2.84 million). Another nega-
tive aspect affecting public banking has been a poor-quality loan portfolio. At the end of 2002, 
Banco Hipotecario registered a 9.3% default rate and BFA 28.6% (Herrera, 2007).
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bank the freedom to establish its own borrowing and lending rates and the granting 
of credit – with a few minor exceptions – was not restricted by general ceilings or by 
specific portfolio allocation by sectors. This rate-setting freedom for each bank paved 
the way for the integration of the banking system with the rest of the world, and the 
London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) is the base for establishing the cost of credits. 
The number of banks increased steadily between 1970 and 1983. Notwithstanding, 
since the latter year, some important banks such as First Chicago, Libra Bank and 
Bank of America, among other smaller ones, began to shift their operations to other 
financial centres, as their presence in Panama was founded on the accounting records 
of sovereign loans to Latin America; but when those loans became delinquent, it was 
more advantageous to register them in centres where those losses could serve as a tax 
shield. Even so, many foreign banks continued to carry out operations from Panama 
and to cater to the local market (Fernández, 2006).
In Guatemala’s case, a number of problems hindered approval of the new regulatory 
framework for the banking system throughout the 1990s. It was not until 2002 that 
the Monetary Law, the Law on Free Negotiation of Foreign Currency, the Organic 
Law of the Bank of Guatemala, the Law on Banks and Financial Groups, the 
Financial Supervision Law and the Law on the Stock and Commodities Market were 
passed. The delay in implementing the reforms has been associated with the outbreak 
of the 1998 financial crisis,3 which pointed out deficiencies and poor financial and 
administrative management within the framework of legislation that proved obsolete 
in the face of the financial innovations that had taken place (Balsells, 2007).
2.  Institutional Regulatory Framework and Promotion 
of Competition
The modernization of the banking system, its growing internationalization, bank 
disintermediation processes and the importance of competition in ensuring the 
industry’s efficient performance raise a series of institutional problems of prime 
academic and public-policy interest. This evolution, together with the intensifica-
tion of prudential regulation, has demanded the development of greater competence 
from regulatory agencies. Domestic banks have grown in size and in their interna-
tional links, while international banks, because of their large size and its global way 
of operating, pose a challenge for regulators mostly operating on a domestic basis. 
Hence, international cooperation among regulators takes on vital importance.
3 The 1998 crisis was brought on by risky investments in agro-export companies linked to tradi-
tional products such as coffee and cardamom, which suffered marked price drops that year. In 
addition, important banks invested in securities affected by the “Asian crisis”, including Russian 
government bonds that fell into a non-payment situation. International problems, together with the 
coffee crisis and the appearance of natural phenomena such as Hurricane Mitch, provoked a 
liquidity crisis in the banking system which rapidly raised the country-risk situation and led to the 
bankruptcy of a considerable number of financial firms (Balsells, 2007).
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An intensely debated issue is the independence of the institutional regulatory 
framework from the government. At one end, the appointment of regulatory authorities 
by the Congress is seen as a guarantee for these authorities’ autonomy, while at the 
other end this autonomy is seen as a potential source of a lack of coordination on eco-
nomic policy and a kind of “total political irresponsibility”. As we shall see, in most 
of the countries studied Executive Branch authorities intervene in the appointment and 
dismissal of regulatory authorities, and adequate mechanisms for safeguarding the 
independence of regulators are non-existent. The problem is compounded when the 
sector being regulated has a say in the designation of authorities and in approving the 
principal measures, an example being the Monetary Board in Guatemala.
Another institutional issue raised with growing insistence is competition. As we 
will see, recent developments have given rise to a process of mergers and takeovers 
which has produced a concentration of ownership and a regionalization of the 
banks. This process has taken place in parallel with a certain reduction of 
 intermediation margins and commissions which nevertheless remain at relatively 
high levels, indicating a low degree of competition in the sector. This justifies dis-
cussion on the need to promote the role of competition agencies. Until late 2004, 
four countries in the region lacked a competition supervisor, and in the other three 
the effective powers of such agencies in the banking sector were highly limited or 
non-existent. Bank supervision agencies fail to appreciate the importance of com-
petition and the involvement of competition agencies; in point of fact, bank supervisors 
still tend to consider banking as a special industry which on account of its 
importance to the overall performance of the economy should be protected from 
the “excesses” of competition regulation. The competition laws recently passed in 
El Salvador and Honduras acknowledge the importance of competition in the finan-
cial sector and establish that the competition agency should become involved in that 
sector just as in any other economic activity,4 for which purpose the means of coor-
dination with financial supervision authorities should be appraised.
In Mexico the chief supervisor is the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit 
(SHCP), which authorizes the operation of financial groups, banks, insurance compa-
nies, pension fund administrators (Afores) and stockbrokerage firms and follows up 
on these entities through four commissions in charge of regulation and prudential 
supervision: the National Banking and Securities Commission, the National Insurance 
and Sureties Commission, the National Commission on the Retirement Savings 
System and the National Commission for the Protection and Defense of Users of 
Financial Services. Analysts maintain that the Mexican financial system is dominated 
by the major financial groups which own banks, stockbrokerage firms, insurance 
companies and Afores, complicating regulation due to the overlapping of activities 
engaged in by each entity, the existence of cross-subsidies not properly registered in 
accounting ledgers and coordination difficulties among the regulatory agencies. 
4 In Mexico’s case the powers of the Federal Commission on Competition (CFC) apply to the 
financial sector in the same way as to any other sector. Nonetheless, the CFC’s actions have 
focused mainly on reviewing mergers and takeovers (Avalos and Hernández, this volume).
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In contrast to other countries of the region, since 1993, Mexico has had a competition 
agency, the Federal Commission on Competition, which is in charge of supervising 
mergers in the industry. Despite the modernization of the regulatory agencies, one 
problem that has affected regulation is the lack of modernization of the Judiciary.5
The Salvadoran financial system is governed by four institutions: the 
Superintendence for the Financial System (SSF), in charge of supervising and 
regulating the activities of commercial banks, insurance companies, bonded ware-
houses, bureaux de change and other concerns related to financial activities; the 
Securities Superintendence, in charge of supervising securities intermediaries, 
central securities depositories and the stock exchange; the Pensions Superintendence, 
responsible for supervising and regulating Pension Fund Administrators; and the 
Central Reserve Bank, which is in charge of promoting and maintaining monetary 
stability and developing an efficient, competitive financial system. The SSF forms 
part of the Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador and possesses autonomy in admin-
istrative and budgetary matters and in exercising the powers conferred on it by the 
Law. The SSF’s management is headed by a Directive Board and the Superintendent, 
the latter nominated by the council of ministers and approved by the President of 
the Republic. The Bank Law establishes that the SSF is in charge of authorizing 
bank mergers and such mergers must be carried out in accordance with the rules 
established by the Code of Commerce. Throughout the period studied, El Salvador 
has lacked a competition agency. The Law on Competition was passed in December, 
2004, and the agency began operating in January, 2006 (Herrera, 2007).
In Guatemala, the law stipulates that supervision of the entire financial system, 
including banks, is incumbent upon the Superintendence of Banks, a Central Bank 
agency that acts under the general directorate of the Monetary Board. The latter is 
responsible for submitting a list of three candidates from which the President of the 
Republic appoints the Superintendent, whose resolutions in regard to oversight and 
inspection may be appealed before the Monetary Board. The Monetary Board 
grants or denies authorization for the incorporation of banks and foreign bank 
branches, and for bank mergers. The Monetary Board’s powers and composition 
translate into a low level of autonomy for the supervisory body both from the 
government and from the private sector itself (Balsells, 2007).6 Guatemala had neither 
competition law nor agency yet in 2006.
Nicaragua also has a system with a sole regulatory agency. The Superintendence’s 
higher organs are a directive board, a superintendent and a vice-superintendent. 
5 According to a study, 60% of mercantile executory processes do not go beyond the first stage of 
the proceedings, i.e. summons and attachment. Moreover, of the remaining 40% of cases, only half 
reach a final decision, in other words, of every 100 complaints admitted, only 20 reach a verdict 
(Avalos and Hernández, this volume).
6 The board is chaired by an official appointed by the President of the Republic for a four-year term who 
is also chairman of the Bank of Guatemala (BANGUAT), and its members include the Ministers of 
Public Finance, Economy and Agriculture, a member elected by Congress, a member elected by trade, 
industry and agriculture business associations, a member elected by the National Banking Association 
and a member elected by the Higher Council of the University of San Carlos of Guatemala.
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It authorizes, regulates and supervises the operations of the following entities: banks, 
finance companies, insurance companies, the stock exchange, seats on the stock 
exchange, general bonded warehouses, leasing companies and Tourism Investment 
Capital Funds (FONCITURs). Its sphere of duties makes no reference to considera-
tions of concentration, dominant position or abuse of market power and their implica-
tions for competition; the criteria for approval of mergers or takeovers contain only 
aspects that denote concern over the system’s solvency. In accordance with the current 
provisions of the Bank Law, by virtue of bank secrecy in Nicaragua that sector remains 
outside the jurisdiction of any future Competition Agency (Ansorena, 2007).
In Honduras, the Law of the National Banking and Insurance Commission (CNBS) 
was passed, becoming a de-concentrated agency of the Presidency of the Republic, 
assigned to the Central Bank of Honduras (BCH), but with absolute technical, admin-
istrative and budgetary independence. Its mission is to supervise and regulate but the 
law does not assign any competition supervision function to it (Tábora, 2007).
II. Determining Factors in the Banks’ Competitive Strategy
In the struggle to secure market share and an adequate rate of return, the banks try 
out different strategies that are not only determined by their objectives and goals, 
but also to a large extent constitute reactive behaviour in the face of the external con-
ditions in which competition operates. The determining factors of these external 
conditions could be classified into four groups, mainly of institutional origin and 
relatively independent of the banks: (i) the regulatory framework; (ii) the infrastructure 
of the financial sector; (iii) the connectivity of the financial system; and (iv) the 
internal sources of contestability. This section discusses these factors, their effects 
on banks’ competitive strategies and their results.
1. The Regulatory Framework
The banks face a regulatory framework that operates in different fields and has 
consequences on their performance and on the way competition operates in each 
country and in the region as a whole. One could hardly explain the course of the 
banking system’s development in the different countries without taking that frame-
work and its vicissitudes into account.
1.1. Discriminatory Barriers to Entry
The regulatory provisions with the most obvious effects on competition are those 
concerning entry barriers. There are barriers that hinder the entry of new banks due 
to existing banks’ “natural” advantages related, for example, to economies of scale 
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or relationship lending. Other barriers stemming from the regulatory framework 
indistinctly affect all banks seeking to establish themselves in a particular market, 
such as minimum capital requirements, for example. Finally, there are barriers that 
do not equally affect all the banks seeking to establish themselves in the market, but 
that discriminate on two grounds: origin of capital (foreign or domestic) and owner-
ship of capital (public or private). These are known as “discriminatory entry 
barriers”.
At present there are no absolute barriers to the entry of particular banks, although 
they have existed in the past. The most extreme case is Costa Rica which, as we 
saw in the preceding section, nationalized all the existing banks and implemented 
a state monopoly on deposits from the public in 1949; this was followed by a 
lengthy period during which for all intents and purposes only state-owned banks 
existed. This monopoly began to be loosened in the mid-1980s when private banks were 
authorized to take deposits from the public for terms longer than six months and 
was eliminated in 1995.7 The extensive network of branches developed by the 
public banks and the existence of an unlimited state guarantee on their deposits has 
made Costa Rica the only country in the region in which public banking clearly 
predominates.
The opposite extreme is exemplified by Panama, which imposes no restrictions 
on the banks to establish in its territory. The 1970 Bank Law authorized opera-
tions, from offices established in Panama, carried out, completed, and having 
effects in other countries, as well as the establishment of bank agencies in Panama. 
This set of provisions, complemented by a deregulation process that included the 
liberalization of interest rates and later the elimination of reserve requirements, 
gave rise to the development of the “financial district” which became an important 
offshore destination for the region’s banks and for some of the world’s largest 
banks.
Between those two extremes there are various degrees of discriminatory entry 
barriers in the region. With regard to ownership of capital, the barriers that discrimi-
nate private banks as against public ones concern the obligation of private institu-
tions to manage their funds through public banks, income tax exemptions for public 
banks and the existence of a state guarantee on deposits in public banks, which in 
countries such as Costa Rica and Guatemala play an important role for the public. 
By contrast, the law in some countries stipulates a number of specific uses for public 
bank profits and the legislation imposes a series of restrictions on them regarding 
employment and administrative hiring.
As to the origin of capital, no country in the region has restrictions on the estab-
lishment of foreign banks, although in some of them there are certain limitations 
on the establishment of offices or branches: only banks subject to local regulation 
and supervision can operate in the national territory. This restriction eliminates the 
7 In exchange for eliminating the state monopoly on deposits, Costa Rican legislators provided that 
private banks taking sight deposits (current accounts) should place 17% of their acceptances in 
public banks so that the latter funnelled them into development credit.
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pos sibility of banks established abroad to openly offer their services in the  country, 
although they do so surreptitiously, as will be seen on analysing the degree of con-
nectivity in the region and the role of offshore banking.
1.2. Prudential Regulation
Other than El Salvador and Panama, all the countries of the region have undergone 
bank crises (Mexico, Nicaragua) or periods of serious bank stress that have included 
bankruptcies and interventions (Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras). This has paved 
the way for considerable efforts to update prudential regulations and supervisory 
capacity. The countries of the region have gradually been adopting the prudential 
norms issued by the Basel Committee. These norms seek, among other aims: (i) to 
define minimum conditions for the establishment of a bank as regards its capital 
and the honour of its shareholders; (ii) to adjust each bank’s capital base to its risks 
as a guarantee for absorbing unforeseen potential losses; (iii) to establish mecha-
nisms to assess asset quality, risk and coverage by creating reserve funds; (iv) to set 
limits on portfolio concentration and restrictions on extending credit to persons 
linked to the bank; (v) to foster procedures for assessment and comprehensive 
management of other sources of risk, such as country, infrastructure and market 
risks; and (vi) to regulate the use of internal controls and client assessment systems 
to prevent money laundering.
Among the Basel standards that most influence competition in the banking 
sector are those on capital requirements, which have gradually been increasing 
since the 1990s. On the one hand, the minimum capital required to establish a 
bank was around US$8 million on average in 2006. This amount is far below the 
minimum capital required in OECD countries and even in other Latin American 
countries (US$25 million in Chile). And on the other, the compulsory capital 
adequacy ratio (CAR) is generally higher than that recommended by Basel, 
which is explained by the greater opaqueness in information and the greater risk 
associated with these markets. The compulsory ratio fluctuated in 2004 between 
7.5% in Guatemala and 13% in Panama (see Table 4.3). This ease, however, can 
be partly explained by the liberality with which the credit portfolio tends to be 
classified, the quality of which would require provisions that would lower the 
effective CAR. In any event the gradual increase in capital requirements has 
played an active role in furthering mergers and takeovers since the beginning of 
the present decade.
Other Basel standards affecting competition are those concerning credit, particu-
larly limits on portfolio concentration and credit to related persons. The main prob-
lems facing the banks in the region are associated with credit risk, since information 
on portfolio quality – debtors’ capacity to pay and loan security – is frequently 
lacking, until the economic situation deteriorates and a high proportion of the port-
folio becomes delinquent. The excessive concentration of the portfolio in a few 
sectors of the economy, as well as with loans to related persons, is the origin of 
most banking crises and interventions in the region.
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1.3. Monetary and Exchange Policy
Monetary policy in most of the economies of the region has been marked by central 
bank losses and monetary policy. Aside from Panama, officially dollarized since 
1904, all the countries had fixed dollar exchange rates which were abandoned dur-
ing the course of the 1980s as a result of inflationary processes, armed conflicts or 
financial turbulence: Nicaragua abandoned the fixed exchange rate in 1979, Costa 
Rica in 1981, El Salvador in 1983, Guatemala in 1984, Honduras in 1990 and 
Mexico in 1994. Abandonment of the fixed exchange rate often took place after an 
accumulation of imbalances which provoked a free fall, after which various 
exchange systems were adopted: following a relatively short period, Costa Rica, 
Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador adopted a crawling peg, generally adjusted 
in line with expected inflation; later, El Salvador adopted dollarization as of 2001, 
and Guatemala an independently floating system since 2003. Mexico, for its part, 
has allowed its currency to float freely, although there have been episodes when the 
Central Bank has intervened forcefully in the foreign exchange market according 
to pre-established rules. In all cases, leeway in monetary policy is tightly restricted 
by exchange goals.
Moreover, the foreign exchange crises experienced by the Central American coun-
tries during the 1980s obliged the Central Banks to intervene in order to avoid the 
collapse of the commercial banks. This caused excess liquidity which had to be 
siphoned off through the placement of securities issued by the Central Bank itself, the 
service of which entails quasi-fiscal losses of several percentage points of gross 
domestic product (GDP) and creates chronic excess liquidity. The need to continually 
siphon off this excess liquidity and keep to foreign exchange goals has compromised 
the autonomy of monetary policy. This is aggravated by deficiencies in the payments 
infrastructure and in public-debt management, which has hindered the organization 
of interbank markets that enable the monetary authority to intervene through indirect 
instruments. Hence, the main monetary-policy instrument is cash reserves: aside from 
Table 4.1 Central America and Mexico: capital requirements and reserve coefficients, 
2005 (%) (Rodlauer and Schipke, 2005)
  Requirements 
 For Capital Reserve coefficient
  In foreign
 In local currency currency
Costa Rica 10.0 10.0 10.0
El Salvador 11.5 20–25 n/aa
Guatemala 10.0 14.6 1.6
Honduras 10.0 12.0 12.0
Mexico 8.0 – –
Nicaragua 10.0 16.3 16.3
Panama 8.0 – n/aa
a El Salvador and Panama are totally “dollarized”.
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Panama, which lacks bank reserves, reserve coefficients fluctuate between 10% 
(Costa Rica) and 20–25% (El Salvador) (see Table 4.1). This way of implementing 
monetary policy has a high cost for banks, which transfer them to their clients through 
high intermediation margins (as cash reserves are not remunerated). This places local 
banks at a considerable disadvantage compared with their international competitors 
and motivates them to shift their operations elsewhere.
In Mexico the elimination of reserve requirements on new deposits by Banco de 
México coincided with a considerable net inflow of foreign capital just at the time 
of the re-privatization of the banks in 1991. This led to an increase in liquidity in 
the banking system and hence by a marked expansion of credit, also made possible 
by the weakness of the banks’ supervision and risk management during the decade 
when they were nationalized. This expansion contributed to turning the 1994 
exchange crisis into a serious solvency crisis.
Another consequence of the exchange and monetary environment is the growing 
informal dollarization experienced by these economies. The Central American 
Monetary Council (Consejo Monetarios Centroamericano, (CMCA) ) has estimated 
that in 2001, around US$1.401 billion was in circulation in the region, representing 
44% of the monetary emission; in 2004 that dollar availability had risen to 
US$2.297 billion, 72% of monetary emission (CMCA, 2004).8 Between 1996 and 
2003 dollar deposits in commercial banks – excluding Mexico and Panama – increased 
from 20.2% to 31.1% of overall deposits, and dollar credits from 15.7% to 28% of 
overall credit. This trend heightens the banking system’s liquidity risk, insofar as 
there are less mechanisms for protection from the mismatching of maturities 
between dollar deposits and credits, as well as the credit risk, since a large proportion 
of debtors do not have dollar incomes and in the event of a devaluation many of 
them would become insolvent, which would compromise the health of the creditor 
banks’ assets. This outcome of monetary and exchange policy, as well as the preceding 
one, has implications for competition in the region, particularly if not all the coun-
tries have prudential rules that make the price system reflect the risks inherent to 
informal dollarization.
2. Financial Infrastructure
The shortcomings suffered by practically all the countries of the region, except for 
Mexico, in the development of the financial infrastructure, have direct conse-
quences on competition between local banks and their foreign competitors, as well 
as between large and smaller banks.9 In addition, they help to explain some of the 
8 These estimates give an idea of the intensity of the dollarization process, although the amounts 
exclude Mexico and Panama and include the Dominican Republic.
9 In 1994, Banco de México undertook a comprehensive reform of payment systems which 
reduced the character risk and attained a high degree of security and operative reliability in settle-
ment of payments.
4 Competition and Regulation in the Banking Systems 109
competitive strategies that will be analysed in the next section. Two components of 
the infrastructure are especially relevant from the point of view of bank competi-
tion: interbank markets and interregional payment transfer systems.
2.1. Interbank Markets
Commercial banks manage their liquidity mainly in interbank markets by trading 
and borrowing public-debt securities. The existence of efficient interbank markets 
from the point of view of price-setting, but in particular of the timeliness with 
which operations are agreed and settled, is essential to them for optimal liquidity 
management. None of the countries of the region, with the exception of Mexico, 
have such markets. Two circumstances account for this.
First of all, central government-debt management has not provided, among its 
objectives, for the development of the public-debt market: non-standardized gov-
ernments bonds are issued, there is no constant presence on the market, placements 
are made through mechanisms lacking in transparency – such as retail windows or 
unilateral negotiations with public or private institutions – and the organization of 
secondary and bond-execution markets has been left in private hands. The result is 
a practically non-negotiable stock of public debt which cannot be used, as in more 
developed countries, to manage banks’ liquidity and risk and for the execution of 
monetary policy.10
Second, local payment systems stand as an additional hurdle to the organization 
and operation of interbank markets. Aside from Mexico, Guatemala and Costa 
Rica, no country in the region has payment systems that enable transfers between 
banks to be made in real time, which is a basic infrastructure for the development 
of an interbank market. Furthermore, in Guatemala and Costa Rica no measures 
have been taken to allow the use of real-time gross settlement (RTGS) infrastruc-
ture for an interbanking market to work. Therefore, the payment system lacks the 
mechanisms required to handle liquidity and is not used by banks for high value 
payments.11 This means that, except for Mexico, in order to transfer money, banks 
have to resort to two types of channels. On the one hand, clearing houses limit pay-
ment timeliness (because cheques are generally cleared in t + 1) and increase the 
systemic risk, as clearing houses lack risk management mechanisms for large pay-
ments; the funds a bank expects to receive are generally tied up in other operations, 
so that one bank’s default can cause a chain of defaults. On the other hand, the 
channel used by banks to make their payments is through the Central Bank. Here a 
commercial bank can request the Central Bank, by telephone or fax, to debit its 
reserve account in order to credit another bank’s account for the amount in  question. 
10 See World Bank and IMF (2000) and Litan et al. (2003), on the importance of an adequate 
management of the public debt the limitations faced by emerging markets.
11 See IMF (2005 and 2006), on the shortcoming of the regional payments systems, especially for 
its judicial framework.
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This channel is too inefficient to allow the development of an active interbank 
market.
Beyond the consequences that the absence of public-debt interbank markets has 
for the state, since the lack of market liquidity increases the cost of public indebted-
ness and hinders the use of modern monetary-policy instruments, it distorts compe-
tition and limits local and small-bank competitiveness. In fact, the lack of 
mechanisms to handle liquidity forces commercial banks to maintain excessive 
liquidity at great financial cost in order to meet the vicissitudes of their daily needs 
and contract lines of credit with foreign banks to address their diverse contingen-
cies. This increases intermediation costs and creates a dependence on international 
markets with regard to liquidity management and introduces competition distor-
tions in the different banking systems. On the one hand, it gives foreign banks an 
advantage over local banks, since liquidity management is less costly for the former 
than for the latter. On the other, the large banks have an advantage over the smaller 
ones, since many of these cannot obtain adequate lines of credit from foreign banks 
or at any rate can only do so at a much higher cost than their competitors.
2.2. Intraregional Transfers
The other important infrastructure component for bank competition is the one gov-
erning intraregional transfers. Despite the region’s high degree of integration in its 
productive structure, migratory flows and financial system, there are no efficient 
mechanisms for making payments between one country and another. Intraregional 
payments have to be carried out through a costly chain of correspondent banks that 
increase transaction costs and raise portfolio management costs for both local 
clients and the banks themselves.
How does the system work at present? A bank customer in Costa Rica wishes to 
transfer a sum of money to a customer of another bank in El Salvador – a typical case 
involving imports of Salvadoran goods, but which also applies to a remittance from a 
Salvadoran immigrant. The Costa Rican bank holds an account in at least one corre-
spondent bank in Miami or New York, as does the Salvadoran bank. To make a transfer 
from the Costa Rican bank to the Salvadoran bank, the Costa Rican bank requests its 
correspondent bank in New York or Miami, through a swift message, to debit its 
account and transfer the sum in question to the correspondent bank of the Salvadoran 
bank, which, once notified, will credit the amount to the receiving customer’s account. 
Commissions have to be paid which in the chain as a whole can amount to more than 
5% for the client. Obviously the accounts in the correspondent banks have to have 
funds, and those resources are generally managed by the correspondent bank. This 
transfer mechanism makes all regional transfers more costly and imposes time restric-
tions on the operations: although local banks close at 6 p.m., interregional transfers 
must be made before 1 p.m. if they are to be executed on the same day, otherwise the 
funds will not be credited to the receiving account until the following day.
The regionalization of banking groups has made it possible to overcome such 
limitations, for they have developed compensation systems between their various 
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banks which enable a customer of one of the group’s banks in Costa Rica to make 
transfers to a customer of another of the group’s banks in El Salvador, with more 
flexible hours and relatively lower rates – or in any case, rates that are not compa-
rable to the chain of correspondent banks but are left entirely to the regional bank-
ing group. This regional transfer mechanism through compensation between the 
group’s banks places regional groups in a strong position to attract clients engaged 
in intraregional business, which is part of the motivation behind the regionalization 
process that has been taking place in recent years. There are less efficient mecha-
nisms than those available with present technology. If the countries were interested 
in greater regional integration and competitiveness of their banking systems, they 
would have to update such technologies.12
3. Degree of Connectivity
The evolution of communications and banks’ technological development, which 
have paved the way for e-banking, has radically transformed the shape of financial 
markets and the different groups’ strategies. Five years ago, in its report on consoli-
dation in the financial sector, the Group of Ten stated that: “The continued evolu-
tion of electronic finance could expand greatly, or even eliminate, existing 
geographical limits and lower entry barriers, thereby altering the potential effects 
of consolidation” (Group of Ten, 2001, p.10). Traditional concentration indicators 
no longer reflect the degree of competition to which local banks are subjected; after 
having been protected by laws and different barriers to entry, these banks are rather 
suddenly facing an intensive competitive dynamics.
Transaction costs limiting local banks’ exposure to external competition 
continue to exist, particularly in certain market segments, but a growing segment of 
local banks’ activities is subject to strong competition from foreign banks and in 
general from foreign intermediaries.
On the one hand, local investors have the choice of opening accounts abroad and 
having their capital managed there through stockbrokerage firms in Miami or New 
York. But the majority of investors who invest in foreign markets do so through the 
local banks with stock market branches abroad, with which they can share manage-
ment fees. This loyalty to local banks is explained by transaction costs and the 
individualized attention provided by local brokers. In fact, to operate directly 
through a foreign stockbrokerage firm, there are relatively high minimum sums 
required for opening accounts, which small-scale investors have difficulties 
to meet. Furthermore, these agencies usually give individualized attention to 
large investors only and, therefore, the medium-size investors and even some of the 
12 The IMF (2006, p. 3) has repeatedly pointed out that the “efficiency gains that would be reached 
through the adoption of regionally integrated payment frameworks and stock market settlement”.
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large ones prefer to rely on the local banks. Hence, the competition from foreign 
intermediaries is restricted by these barriers and is an obstacle for the direct relationship 
with local investors.
On the other hand, sufficiently large local companies have the option of issuing 
American Depositary Receipt (ADR)s on Euro markets, as has been done by some 
of the region’s breweries and cement industries, among others. But that particular 
segment includes a very small number of companies, although the amount of their 
financing needs is very high. Those companies, as well as a segment of smaller and 
medium-sized companies, receive offers of credit from foreign banks, which visit 
them regularly through their local offices when this is permitted, or through sales-
men who make periodic visits, just as foreign brokers visit investors. The cost of 
dollar credits depends partly on the country’s risk, partly on the company’s sound-
ness and partly on how far its links to the foreign bank date back, but in general it 
tends to be lower than the cost of credits offered by local banks.
Recent research shows the perception on the degree of openness and development 
of the financial systems of various Latin American countries, among them those of 
Central America, Mexico and Panama. Table 4.2 shows this perception for a set of 
indicators on the degree of exposure to competition and international markets.
As we can see, the predominant view is that it is very easy for investors to invest 
in both foreign and local markets, but much more difficult for companies to obtain 
financing in foreign and local markets. This confirms that in order to secure 
the financing they need, local companies continue to be relatively dependent on 
Table 4.2 Selected countries: perception on openness (Arnoldo Camacho, Finance Alternatives 
in Latin America. Recent Developments and Future Outlook, Sumaq Summit, 4 de mayo de 
2004)
 Investment  Access of  Access to  Access to  Entry to local
 Access in  foreigners to financings in financing in banking
 foreign marketsa local marketb foreign marketsc local marketsd industrye
Brazil 4.7 6.3 4.8 5.5 5.3
Colombia 5.3 3.1 3.1 3.6 4.4
Costa Rica 6.5 6.6 2.6 3.8 4.7
El Salvador 6.3 6.0 2.8 3.7 3.8
Guatemala 5.0 5.7 2.3 2.3 4.4
Honduras 6.0 6.2 2.0 2.8 3.8
Mexico 6.1 6.4 4.9 4.8 4.5
Nicaragua 6.1 5.9 2.5 3.2 4.3
Panama 6.0 5.9 3.2 4.1 5.2
a Local citizens who wish to invest on stocks and bonus and open banking accounts in other country 
(1 = forbidden to do it, 7 = free to do it).
b Foreigner investors (1 = forbidden to invest on stocks and bonus in the country, 7 = free to do it).
c Local enterprises may get into debt in bonus foreign markets (1 = practically impossible, 7 possible 
enough for a good company).
d Capture money emitting actions in the local market (1 = practically impossible, 7 = possible 
enough for a good company).
e The entry of new banks in the local banking industry (1 = difficult enough and rarely allowed, 
7 = easy and subject to reasonable regulations).
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domestic banks, a perception reinforced by the view that it is still relatively difficult 
for new banks to enter the market.
4. Internal Sources of Contestability
Apart from the competitive pressure arising from the globalization of the financial 
system and exerted by foreign banks and stockbrokerage firms, banks face various 
local sources of contestability. The most important in the region, which operate 
especially in Mexico and Costa Rica, are public debt and the stock market, the latter 
not so much in the financing of enterprises as in deposit-taking from the public 
through mutual funds, which in turn invest mainly in public debt.
4.1. Public Debt
Public debt is a source of competition for banks in attracting savings from the public. 
The returns on public debt are generally higher than those offered by the banks’ 
term deposits, and the public in all the countries of the region have been able to 
purchase public-debt securities at the Finance Ministry, Central Bank and commer-
cial bank windows. This has been an investment alternative for medium and large 
investors who invest part of their portfolio in local public debt purchased on the 
spot market (auctions and windows) or on the over-the-counter market through 
banks and stockbrokerage firms. This involves a market segment for which the 
banks are unable to compete, for in order to capture it they should expect to see 
their funding costs increase appreciably and in any case they already have the most 
captive market for sight deposits (current accounts) and term deposits from small 
investors who have no access to public debt. Indeed, public debt has not been an 
investment option for the latter due to the lack of a distribution network for such 
bonds, which is explained by the cost for the state of issuing physical certificates. 
The struggle to attract small investors and sight deposits has been opened by the 
development of jointly administered instruments, particularly mutual funds.
4.2. The Stock Market
The stock market offers two sources of contestability for the banks: through attraction 
of savings and through company financing. However, they have been unimportant 
in most of the countries of the region except Mexico and Costa Rica.
With regard to company financing, in no country of the region, not even Mexico, 
has the local stock market seriously competed with bank credit. In Mexico the capi-
talization of the stock market has been falling since 1994, and corporate-debt place-
ments represent a low percentage of GDP. In Costa Rica the relative importance of 
the stock market and corporate acceptance is even lower. In both countries the stock 
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market basically consists of public debt and bank securities. In Panama stock market 
activity is virtually non-existent and the high rate of stock market capitalization is 
accounted for purely tax reasons: the stock issued by companies is a mechanism for 
receiving bank credit and benefiting from more favourable tax treatment.13
As regards deposit-taking, the stock market has played a certain role in the 
development of the banking system in Mexico and Costa Rica, although that role 
has been uneven. As we have mentioned, in 1949, Costa Rica established a state 
monopoly on deposits from the public which for many years prevented financial 
intermediation by private concerns. This situation, coupled with the existence of a 
high level of public sector internal debt, favoured the emergence of a stock market 
which enabled the state to meet its financing needs and allowed private financial 
capital to compete with the public banks in the colón market (the colón is Costa 
Rica’s currency). Costa Rica established a stock market long before the rest of the 
Central American countries and promoted two instruments which were to play a 
key role in the development of the banking system. First, joint investment portfolios 
administered by stock exchange seats, the design of which was copied from 
Mexico. Investment in public debt was done through these portfolios and it yielded 
higher returns than those offered by the public banks. This was a bank instrument, 
for it formed part of the stock market seat’s balance and guaranteed previously 
agreed returns and ready cash. Second, it permitted the borrowing of public-debt 
securities at relatively short terms, thus constituting a means for investors to invest 
at very short terms with relatively high returns. These two instruments and foreign 
exchange activities as well as the support from the Agency of International 
Development (AID) led to the development, during the 1970s and 1980s, of private 
financial capital. Credit institutions and subsequently banks were established, 
which took deposits from the public by issuing negotiable investment certificates 
on the stock market, an instrument developed to replace term deposits, which were 
prohibited to them until the 1990s. Even at present, the banks used both joint port-
folios and the borrowing of securities to manage their liquidity in the absence of an 
interbank market.
Thus, in Costa Rica the stock market constituted a means for the development of 
private financial capital and private banks in the face of the public banks’ monopoly 
on deposits. This made it possible for the market’s infrastructure, regulation and 
supervision to make more headway than in the rest of Central America and, at a 
certain point, to become a source of competition for the banking system, especially 
with the development of mutual funds. This instrument was initially developed by 
non-bank stock market seats, and its rapid development, particularly after the legis-
lation passed in 1998, gradually obliged all the financial groups to create mutual 
funds and propose them to their customers. This instrument replaced the former joint 
portfolios – which were prohibited – and has been a source of competition in the 
13 Tax treatment for companies listed on the stock exchange and their dividends is highly benefi-
cial. Hence a considerable portion of bank credit has taken the form of purchase of share issues 
which the banks themselves structure and which never pass through the secondary market.
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Costa Rican financial system, and its growth over the past five years, as such, 
reached almost 40% of the banks’ liabilities. Some of them, though, in the absence 
of an interbank market use these as an instrument to handle their own liquidity.
In Mexico the importance of the stock market in the financial system increased 
following the 1982 nationalization of the banks. As a result of the latter, a growing 
percentage of bank deposits was earmarked for financing the fiscal deficit, which 
displaced the private sector from bank credit, and restrictions were imposed on 
lending and borrowing rates and other quantitative and qualitative limits on credit. 
Companies’ need for funds encouraged the creation of a parallel banking system. 
In this regard, stockbrokerage firms were the main institutions competing with the 
nationalized banks, both in deposit-taking and in channelling savings. Their devel-
opment at that time has allowed them to position themselves with a series of jointly 
administered instruments which are invested mainly in public debt and to a lesser 
extent in bank instruments. During the second half of the 1990s and in more recent 
years, the legal framework for mutual funds has been improved and that instrument 
has been gaining ground over the banks in deposit-taking.
In the rest of Central America the development of the stock market has been 
incipient, due largely to the fact that the financial system is dominated by the banks. 
In El Salvador there is a type of joint portfolios, similar to Mexican and Costa Rican 
portfolios, which enables stockbrokerage firms to attract sight deposits which they 
invest in public debt, and in Honduras the stockbrokerage firms issued securities 
backed by public debt, in both cases earning from the spread. In Panama and 
Guatemala mutual funds exist, in the latter country with deficient regulation, but in 
neither of the two countries have they succeeded in attracting significant amounts.
III. Competitive Strategies of the Banks in the Region
A series of common actions by the banks could be taken to mean strategies aimed 
at strengthening their competitive situation. The first strategy was the reorganiza-
tion of, and modernization of, the banks to be able to meet the Basel standards and 
the increasing exposure to competition from foreign banks and stockbrokerage 
firms. The second strategy has been an active policy of mergers and takeovers as a 
means to expand operations, attract more clients, enter new fields of operation and 
eliminate competitors. The outcome of this strategy has been a significant reduction 
in the number of operators and an increase in the five main operators’ share of total 
assets in each country. The third strategy has been regionalization which has taken 
place together with the mergers and acquisitions. With few exceptions, the main 
operators in each country are setting up operations in the other countries, thus 
accompanying the regionalization of Central American industry and becoming 
regional operators. The fourth strategy has been the establishment of offshore 
operations which makes it possible to operate at lower costs for clients and bank 
stock holders. The fifth strategy has been the combination of specialization and 
diversification of the products and services offered by the banks.
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1. Efficient Organization and Modernization of the Banks
There has been a generalized improvement in the banks’ operative efficiency. 
However, the intensity of this improvement varies substantially. El Salvador during 
the 1990s is a case in point: as we can see in Table 4.3, in 1997, the administrative 
costs/total assets ratio stood at an average of 3.42%, far below the other countries; 
since then and until 2005 that indicator continued to improve until it reached 
2.81%, which was surpassed only by Panama. This country had an administrative 
costs/total assets ratio of 1.10%, a long way from the other countries being studied, 
in spite of that indicator’s deterioration since 2000, when it reached 0.78%. 
Efficiency levels in Panama are associated with the existence of the financial dis-
trict, where large part of the operations are barely registered and do not involve 
costs as high as local operations.
Nicaragua’s experience contrasts sharply with that of El Salvador. These two 
countries’ banks are the most active as regional operators, and they would therefore 
be expected to share similar efficiency levels. This, however, is not the case: 
Nicaragua features among the countries with the most inefficient banking systems, 
far below El Salvador, and without registering any significant improvement during 
the period from 1997 to 2005.
Mexico’s case is paradoxical. The majority of the country’s largest banks were 
taken over several years ago by some of the main bank operators at international 
level. It was to be expected that the high efficiency levels that characterize those 
operators in their countries of origin and in the other countries where they have 
operations would be transmitted to their activities in Mexico. This, however, has not 
been the case. As we see in Table 4.3, operative efficiency measured by the admin-
istrative costs/total assets ratio reaches 4.7% in Mexico, just below Costa Rica and 
Honduras. This situation can be explained by lax regulations in this matter and the 
existence of a strong trade union movement which has been successful in defending 
its achievements. The high fluctuation shown by the indicator in this case is also 
noteworthy.
Table 4.3 Central America and Mexico: operative efficiency of the banks, 1997–2005 (adminis-
trative costs/total assets average) (Central American Monetary Council at www.secmca.org/
Estadisticas_Indicadores_Ban.htm and Mexico’s National Banking and Securities Commission, at 
www.cnbv.gob.mx)
Country 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Costa Rica 6.08 6.06 6.04 5.85 6.01 5.87 5.76 5.42 4.96
El Salvador 3.42 3.42 3.46 3.53 3.04 3.06 2.98 2.83 2.81
Guatemala 5.84 5.92 5.82 5.71 5.26 5.32 4.67 4.66 4.28
Honduras 6.34 6.22 6.26 6.43 6.23 5.99 5.62 5.30 5.13
Nicaragua 5.03 5.67 5.05 4.20 4.18 4.27 4.26 4.74 4.64
Panama n/a n/a 0.80 0.78 0.82 0.98 1.06 1.00 1.10
Mexico n/a 5.56 6.00 6.35 3.79 5.37 5.01 5.08 4.70
Note: Figures are for December each year from 1997 to 2004. For 2005, the figures are for June, 
except for Panama, which are for April.
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In Costa Rica, the low operative efficiency evidenced by Table 4.3 is associated 
with the public nature of its main banks, which are subject to regulations inherent 
to the public administration with regard to procurement and personnel manage-
ment, not to mention that they often have to produce results reflecting social rather 
than profit-making criteria, such as the extent of the branch network. Finally, the 
case of Honduras, last in the ranking, reflects the country’s general backward state 
and the lower level of development of its banking system. In this context it is inter-
esting to look at Table 4.4, which contrasts various efficiency indicators for 
Honduran-owned banks with foreign banks operating in the country. The table 
clearly shows that these have a better performance than the domestic banks in all 
the indicators.
The table above shows that the average CAR is approximately 4% points higher 
in the foreign banks than in the domestic banks; the bank with the highest CAR 
(38.65) is a foreign-owned bank, whereas the one with the lowest CAR (10.36) is 
a domestic bank. The foreign banks, on their part, generate greater average financial 
returns (FR) and in turn register a lower cost of liabilities (CL), and consequently 
their financial intermediation mark-up (9.69%) is 1.5 times higher than in the 
domestic banks (6.12%). This is related to two facts: higher administrative costs, 
but higher profitability of foreign banks. In fact, the relationship between adminis-
trative costs and average productive assets of foreign banks is 13% higher than the 
domestic banks, probably because of staff expenses associated with the hiring of 
international personnel. The returns on productive assets (RPA) of foreign banks is 
double that of the domestic banks and the returns on assets (RA) is approximately 
14% higher (Tábora, 2007).
2. Mergers and Takeovers
As a result of the implementation of the Basel standards and the increased exposure 
to international competition stemming from the globalization of the financial 
system, the banking industry has experienced a major process of concentration. 
Table 4.4 Honduras: efficiency differences between foreign and domestic banks, September 
2004 (%) (Prepared by Tábora, 2007)
     Administrative costs
Variable CARa FRb CLc IMd /productive assets RPAe RAf
Domestic Banks 14.85 10.63 4.51 6.12 6.58 1.18  9.47
Foreign Banks 18.48 13.90 4.21 9.69 7.45 2.43 10.78
a Capital adequacy ratio.
b Financial returns.
c Cost of liabilities.
d Intermediation margin.
e Returns on productive assets.
f Returns on assets.
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In addition, the deficiencies in regulation and supervision suffered by various countries 
throughout the 1990s created the right conditions for a series of crises which 
stepped up the concentration process. As can be seen in Table 4.6, the five main 
banks’ share of total assets is very high. Nevertheless, the consequence of the rela-
tively similar sizes of the main operators was that the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI), which measures all the individual firms’ share of the industry,14 stood at 
around 2,000 in the majority of cases.
In Mexico, as of 1990 the privatization of the banks led to a period of rapid 
growth in the activity and in the number of banks. In 1991, there were 12 banks, 
rising to 22 in 1992, 27 in 1994 and 33 in 1995. The 1995 crisis reversed the proc-
ess: by 1996 the number of banks was 31, despite government rescue efforts, and 
continued to fall over the following years to only 20 in 1999. During that period a 
mass entry of foreign capital began, and the mergers and takeovers coincided with 
the country’s main banks being taken over by foreign institutions. Thus, the Spanish 
bank, BBVA, which started operating in 1994, absorbed three existing banks 
between 1995 and 1999: Oriente, Probursa and Cremi; Santander, also a Spanish 
bank, began operations in 1995 and in 1997 absorbed Banco Mexicano; whereas 
Citibank, which was already operating in 1991, took over Confia. Meanwhile, in 
1999, another three banks, all of them among the country’s largest financial con-
cerns, were capitalized by foreign banks: BANCOMER, capitalized by the Bank of 
Montreal; SERFIN, capitalized by the Hong Kong & Shanghai Bank; and BITAL, 
capitalized by Banco Central Hispano and Banco Central Portugués. Likewise, both 
BANCOMER and BITAL absorbed other entities: the former, PROMEX and 
Unión, and the later, Atlántico, Interestatal and Sureste.15 During the period 2000–
2003, the total number of banks fell from 20 to 18, which involved large-scale bank 
mergers and changes in control from Mexican owners to foreign ownership: BBVA, 
recently merged in Spain, absorbed BANCOMER, and Citibank acquired Banco 
Nacional de México (BANAMEX), Mexico’s largest bank16; HSBC took over 
BITAL; Scotia acquired Inverlat and Santander absorbed SERFIN. These develop-
ments left all the major Mexican banks in the hands of foreign capital. (see Avalos 
and Hernández, this volume).
Central America also underwent a process of bank consolidation over the same 
period, although the different cases vary among themselves. As we can see in Table 4.5, 
taking all the banks into account, including affiliates of foreign entities, the most 
14 Defined as the sum of the squares of the relative shares of all the firms in the entire industry. The 
result falls between 0 and 10,000. Zero indicating perfect competition and 10,000, absolute 
monopoly. The Department of Justice considers a market with HHI lower than 1,000 as competi-
tive; with a value between 1,000 and 1,800 as moderately concentrated and 1,800 or greater as 
highly concentrated.
15 Throughout the period analysed (1990–2003), foreign banks’ affiliates were not taken into 
account.
16 The operation involved resources in excess of US$12 billion (see Avalos and Hernández, this 
volume).
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intense process of reduction took place in Nicaragua, where the number of banks 
dropped from 12 to 6. As in Mexico’s case, the concentration process in Nicaragua 
took place after a period in which the banking system experienced major growth: 
as of 1990, following the end of the Sandinista regime, ten private banks were cre-
ated while at the same time the importance of the state banks declined. The banking 
sector became consolidated with the entry of Nicaraguan-owned private banks 
which in 1999 concentrated over 90% of the system’s deposits, with a relatively 
well-balanced distribution of assets and liabilities. However, in the year 2000, the 
Nicaraguan financial system was shaken by a series of bankruptcies that threatened 
the country’s financial stability. The crisis broke suddenly with the takeover by the 
Superintendence of the country’s largest bank, Banco Intercontinental (Interbank), 
which at the time held 14% of the system’s total assets.17 The Interbank intervention 
had serious consequences as regards account holders’ confidence in the stability of 
the banking system. Between June and December 2000, an outflow equivalent to 
8.2% of the public’s deposits was registered, reducing the total during the same 
period from US$1.539 billion to US$1.414 billion. Thus, other banks in the system 
which were already facing difficulties were affected by this withdrawal of deposits; 
the loss of credibility combined with portfolio irregularities led to the collapse of 
another four banks18 (Ansorena, 2007).
In view of the size of the institutions affected, the authorities decided to guaran-
tee the totality of deposits and the majority of liabilities. The assets and liabilities 
were transferred to other local banks by auction, whereas the Central Bank of 
Table 4.5 Central America and Mexico: evolution of the number of banks (Central American 
Monetary Council at www.secmca.org/Estadisticas_Indicadores_Ban.htm and Mexico’s National 
Banking and Securities Commission, at www.cnbv.gob.mx/default.asp?com_id = 0)
Country/year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Total 231 214 207 196 193 184 176 174
Costa Rica 23 23 22 21 21 19 19 19
El Salvador 17 15 14 12 12 12 12 11
Guatemala 34 34 32 31 31 26 25 25
Honduras 23 22 21 21 19 16 16 16
Nicaragua 12 12 8 6 6 6 7 6
Panama 85 78 75 74 71 73 67 68
Mexico 37 30 35 31 33 32 30 29
Note: From 1998 to 2004, the figures refer to banks in existence in December each year; for 2005, 
to those in existence in June.
17 What appeared to be a well-managed portfolio turned out to be a situation in which 80% of 
loans, mostly unrecoverable, had been made to individuals or companies linked to an agro-industrial 
economic group (Ansorena, 2007).
18 The four institutions taken over by the Superintendence during that period represented in June, 
2000, approximately 40% of the system’s assets and 39% of its deposits. The liquidity and solvency 
problems arose as a result of the rapid growth of risk assets, their concentration and the proliferation 
of related loans, in addition to external factors.
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Nicaragua (BCN) covered the difference between liabilities and assets by issuing 
medium-term internal-debt securities (CENIS) equivalent to almost 16% of GDP. 
This decision led to increased concentration in the sector: as a result of the auctions, 
Banco de la Producción (BANPRO) absorbed three banks, Pribanco, Banco 
Intercontinental and Banco Nicaragüense (BANIC), while Banco de Finanzas 
(BDF) absorbed Banco del Café and Banco de Credito Centroamericano 
(BANCENTRO) took over Banco Mercantil. As can be seen in Table 4.6, this proc-
ess increased the five largest banks’ share of total assets to 95.71% in 2001, reach-
ing 99.57% in 2005. This situation was reflected in the evolution of the HHI from 
0.09 in 1999 (when there was greater distribution among the nine largest banks) to 
1,900 in 2004, above the critical level of 1,800 (Ansorena, 2007).
After Nicaragua, El Salvador was the country that suffered the greatest reduction 
as a percentage of total national banks during the period 1998–2005. It is also the 
country, after Nicaragua, showing the greatest asset concentration: in 2005, the five 
largest banks held 91% of assets (see Table 4.6). This is expressed by the pro-
nounced growth of the HHI for total assets (see Table 4.7). In this case the mergers 
Table 4.7 Central America: Hirschman-Herfindahl index total assets, 1996–2005 
(Based on official sources from Ávalos and Hernández in this volume, Balsells, 2007, 
Herrera, 2007, Tábora, 2007 and Yong, 2007)
Year Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemalaa Honduras Mexico
1996 2,095 1,136 503   722 n/a
1997 1,743 1,168 490   735 n/a
1998 1,716 1,158 495   743 1,639
1999 1,735 1,294 489   752 1,547
2000 1,680 1,790 559   889 1,485
2001 1,533 1,921 711   901 1,621
2002 1,515 1,876 778   971 1,537
2003 1,598 1,865 855 1,077 1,528
2004 1,842 1,585 861 1,057 1,458
2005 1,875b n/a n/a n/a n/a
a Equivalent to the HHI of total credits.
b Figures correspond to March.
Table 4.6 Central America and Mexico: five largest banks’ share of overall assets, 1997–2005 
(%)a (Central American Monetary Council at www.secmca.org/Estadisticas_Indicadores_Ban.htm 
and Mexico’s National Banking and Securities Commission, at www.cnbv.gob.mx/default.
asp?com_id = 0)
Country/year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Costa Rica 79.65 77.57 76.80 75.24 72.54 73.00 71.54 76.00 76.83
Honduras 51.21 51.97 51.17 59.66 60.98 64.03 66.83 66.12 66.08
Guatemala 38.12 38.84 39.81 43.45 53.86 55.29 59.70 60.62 62.15
El Salvador 68.74 69.71 75.04 85.03 89.46 89.32 88.40 86.93 91.00
Nicaragua 63.32 56.54 60.82 80.00 95.71 95.63 95.96 95.93 99.57
Panama n/a 36.80 37.59 39.33 42.83 41.92 41.51 43.84 45.77
Mexico 71.79 67.26 66.39 69.65 73.62 72.76 75.81 74.67 80.02
a Equivalent to the five main banks’ share of the total banking sector in each country.
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and takeovers process did not stem from a financial crisis, but from strategies aimed 
at strengthening the banks’ positioning in the domestic market and attaining scales 
of activity to enable them to operate at the Central American level. The first merger 
took place in 1997 and involved an international bank from outside the region: in 
October that year The Bank of Nova Scotia (Scotiabank) acquired 53% of the 
shares of Ahorros Metropolitanos, making it the first international bank to hold a 
majority share of a Salvadoran bank. Nova Scotia increased its shareholding in 
Ahorromet to 98.3% in December 2000, when it changed its name to Scotiabank El 
Salvador. In August 1998, two small banks, PROMERICA and Banco Corporativo 
(Bancorp),19 merged. In July 1999, BANCOMER took over Banco Atlacatl. In May 
2000, the merger began between Banco Agrícola Comercial, the country’s largest 
bank (with a 20.27% share of total credits, 24.55% of the deposits market and 
23.04% of the system’s overall assets) and Banco Desarrollo, which in turn was in 
fifth place in the system. In July 2000, the merger between Banco Salvadoreño and 
Banco de Construcción y Ahorro (BANCASA) took place.
In Guatemala’s case, the number of banks dropped from 34 in 1998 to 25 in 
2005. The reduction in the number of banks was associated with the 1998 crisis20 
and with corporate strategies aimed at strengthening the institutions’ positioning in 
the domestic market. In 1999, a period of mergers began which continues to this 
day. That year Banco del Café absorbed Multibanco, thus rising to second place by 
size of assets; in 2000, Banco Reformador took over Banco de la Construcción, 
passing from eighth to fourth place in the same ranking; in September, authoriza-
tion was granted for the merger between Banco del Agro and Banco Agrícola 
Mercantil, forming the new Banco Agromercantil de Guatemala, second place in 
assets that year; in March 2001, Banco Granai & Townson and Banco Continental 
merged, thus creating Banco G & T Continental, which became the country’s prin-
cipal bank; in November, 2002, Banco CHN took over Banco del Ejército, as well 
as another small bank, Banco Del Nor-Oriente (BANORO), the following year; 
finally, in April, 2004, Lloyds TSB Bank, Guatemala Branch, made over the totality 
of its credit assets in favour of Banco Cuscatlán de Guatemala, as a result of which 
Banco Cuscatlán rose from eleventh to eighth place in the market upon increasing 
its assets by 50% (Balsells, 2007).
The mergers process in Guatemala began in a context of low concentration levels. 
In fact, in 1998 the five largest banks’ share of overall assets was 38.84%. Despite 
the major increase in the five largest banks’ share of total assets in 2005 (62.15%), 
Guatemala continues to register the lowest concentration levels, the only exception 
being Panama. Analysed on the basis of the HHI with respect to total credits, the 
19 Banco Promerica established its operating strategy through alliances with important chains of 
supermarkets and shoe stores, Pricesmart and Payless Shoe Source in various Central American 
countries. This bank’s equity is 99.99% in the hands of Salvadoran shareholders according to data 
in the Boletín Estadístico, December 31, 2004 (Herrera, 2007).
20 In 2001, three private entities were intervened due to causes related to the 1998 crisis. Those 
banks were Banco Empresarial (February), and Banco Metropolitano and Banco Promotor, both 
in March that year (Balsells, 2007)
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index has never risen above 881, which denotes low levels of concentration. The 
other characteristic aspect is that apart from the last case involving a foreign bank, 
Cuscatlán, of Salvadoran origin, the leading role in the mergers and takeovers proc-
ess has been played by Guatemalan concerns.
Beginning in 1998, Honduras has also experienced a process of consolidation of 
its banking system, which went from 23 banks to 16 (see Table 4.5). During the 
period 1998–2002, a number of events had an influence on that reduction: the forced 
liquidation of Bancorp in 1999, and Banco de Crédito y Servicios (Bancreser) in 
June 2001. In July 2000, authorization was given for the merger between Bancahsa 
and Banco El Ahorro Hondureño to form Banco BGA, the system’s largest bank 
until December 2001. In 2001, the operation of Banco Promérica, a member of the 
Network of Grupo Corporativo PRO, was authorized. In May 2002, CNBS inter-
vened Banco Capital21 and Banco Sogerín. The latter was taken over, together with 
Banco de las Fuerzas Armadas, by Banco del País in July 2003 (Tábora, 2007).
In Costa Rica the banking system was made up of 16 institutions in 2006, four 
of which were state-owned. Of these four, three were commercial banks and one 
was a second-floor bank. The three commercial public banks, Banco Nacional, 
Banco de Costa Rica and Banco Crédito Agrícola de Cartago, concentrate 65% of 
the entire system’s assets. The private banks, for their part, have undergone a series 
of mergers and takeovers. Prominent among the mergers was the acquisition in 
September 1995, of 80% of the shares of Banco Mercantil by The Bank of Nova 
Scotia, which became Scotiabank Costa Rica; in December that year, Lafise took 
over Banco del Exterior and became known as BANCENTRO; in December 1996, 
Banco Cuscatlán took over Banco BFA, which acquired Cofisa in May 1998; in 
December 1997, Banex took over Banco Continental, and in 2000, Banco del 
Istmo, of Panamanian origin, made a takeover bid for 75% of the capital stock of 
Corporación Banex, whose shares were listed on the stock exchange, and then 
merged with Corporación Metropolitana (which owned Banco Metropolitano); in 
May 2000, Corporación BCT merged with BANCOMER. In September 2001, 
Banco de San José (BAC San José, of Nicaraguan capital but established in Costa 
Rica since a long time ago) acquired Banco Finadesa and UP Bank (an offshore 
operation in the Bahamas); and in 2002, Banco Istmo acquired Bancrecen.
Two aspects of Costa Rica’s experience stand out. First of all, the strong involve-
ment by Central American banks in the mergers and takeovers process is noteworthy. 
Second, despite this process of takeovers, the five largest operators’ share of overall 
assets remains fairly stable, which reflects the important weight of the public banks 
(see Table 4.6). As we can see in Table 4.7, Costa Rica is the country with the high-
est levels of concentration according to the HHI.
For Panama, two features, probably associated with the existence of the interna-
tional financial district, are worth noting: the large number of banks operating in 
the country (Table 4.5) and the relatively low share of total assets of the country’s 
five main banks (Table 4.6). The principal stakeholder in Panama’s merger and 
takeover processes is Primer Banco del Istmo: in September 2001, it took over 
21 Banco Capital went into forced liquidation due to insolvency in late 2002.
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Primer Banco de Ahorros; in September 2002, Banco de Latinoamérica; and in 
October 2003, Banco Mercantil del Istmo. As a result, Primer Banco del Istmo’s 
total assets increased from US$1.97 billion in December 2000 to US$4.186 billion 
in September 2004, hence becoming the country’s main bank. In July 2002, Banco 
Continental acquired Banco Internacional de Panamá and Banco Cuscatlán Panamá, 
of Salvadoran origin. Later, in April 2004, Banco Continental took over Banco 
Panamericano and Banco General acquired Bank of Boston.
3. Regionalization and Internationalization
The banks’ globalization process has been heterogeneous. While Mexican and 
Panamanian banks are highly internationalized – in Mexico because the local banks 
were massively acquired by foreign banks, and in Panama because of the creation 
of a special financial district – foreign banks in the rest of Central America still had 
a limited presence at the end of 2005.22 The internationalization process has taken 
place in three different ways in this area: the regionalization of local banks, the 
services provided to the Central American migrant population in the USA and the 
creation of offshore banks (which will be discussed in the following section).
In fact, the concentration process that has taken place in the different Central 
American countries has been interwoven with a dynamic process of regionalization 
of the banks. Three objectives appear as determining factors in this process. The 
first objective has to do with providing a competitive service to the productive 
enterprises that are increasingly operating on a Central American scale, among 
them companies engaged in telecommunications, beer, energy, air transport, sugar 
cane and foods in general. The private sector is making rapid headway in the 
economic integration process and the likely ratification of Dominican Republic-
Central American Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA) will give renewed impetus 
to this process. The second objective of bank regionalization is attaining a larger 
scale to facilitate modernization processes and the development of infrastructure 
for the circulation of capital and means of payment throughout the region. The third 
objective is associated with the expectation that major international banks will 
arrive in the region in the short term, and that to start operations they will probably 
be prepared to pay considerable charge to access operating infrastructure and a 
significant client portfolio.23 The other component of internationalization is serving a 
22 This situation started changing radically at the end of 2006, when two regional banks were 
bought by extraregional banks.
23 This process has developed even though, as stated by the corporation IDC, “Unfortunately the 
legislation does not yet permit an appropriate regulatory framework for the functioning of a true 
concept of regional banking, since the regulations and supervisory bodies continue to act sepa-
rately in each country and banking legislation is still national in scope. In practice, however, the 
region’s principal financial groups compete with one another, with or without physical presence 
in each country, to cater to the main corporate clients in the Central American region” (Quoted by 
Balsells, 2007, p. 21).
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large contingent of emigrants to the USA. This process has a positive impact on 
competitiveness of regional banks, but at the same time it poses serious challenges 
to bank regulators.24
In the case of El Salvador, Banco Cuscatlán is an example of the first strategy. To 
April 2005, it appeared as El Salvador’s second largest bank according to paid-in 
capital (US$90 million), and as shown in Table 4.8, the bank operates in five of the 
six Central American countries. Its chief operation is naturally in El Salvador, but as 
can be seen in Table 4.10, when comparing 2003 and 2004, its profits grew substan-
tially more rapidly in its operations in Guatemala and Costa Rica. Excluding 
Panamanian banks, Banco Cuscatlán appears as the largest regional group, with 
assets totaling US$3.101 million, as shown in Table 4.9. Its aggressive expansion 
policy also includes Panama, where as a result of the merger with Banco 
Panamericano its assets grew from US$35 million in April 2004, to US$553 million 
in June the same year.25 Another two Salvadorian banks that have operations in other 
Central American countries are Agrícola Comercial (in Honduras and Panama) and 
BANCOMER (in Guatemala). At the same time, El Salvador is also a place where 
regional banks, with another Central American origin operate: BAC, Grupo Financiero 
Uno and PROMERICA have a relatively strong position in that country.26
An alternative internationalization strategy is that of Banco Salvadoreño, the 
country’s fourth largest bank, which has placed emphasis on serving Salvadorans 
abroad by offering services related to attraction and management of remittances. 
A very important item if we take into account is that the flow of remittances 
amounted to US$2.547 million in December 2004 and has maintained an annual 
growth rate of around 10%. By 2006 Banco Salvadoreño was present in Houston, Los 
Angeles, San Francisco, Las Vegas and the entire West Coast of the USA (Herrera, 2007).
Nicaragua’s banks have played a particularly important role in the regionaliza-
tion process, even though it is one of the region’s poorest countries. In fact, the 
expansion of the Nicaraguan banks to other nations of the region, which started in 
1980, with the flow of capital from that country to Miami and other countries of the 
region, enabled them to strengthen, notwithstanding the weakness of Nicaraguan 
economy and the abrupt changes in economic policy over the 1980s. BAC for 
example, as shown in Table 4.10, derived many more profits from abroad than from 
Nicaragua. A similar situation occurs in the case of Grupo Financiero Uno, with the 
peculiarity that profits from its operations were of a similar size in each country. 
The importance of this group’s investments in Nicaragua had dropped from 15.95% 
in 2001 to 8.88% in 2004 (Ansorena, 2007).
24 Among these are the difficulties that arise from regulatory arbitrage, the effects of intra-group 
transactions and the higher risk of this phenomenon transmission. A detailed analysis on these 
issues can be found in IMF (2006).
25 Banco Cuscatlán also purchased the local credit portfolio and private banking operations of 
Lloyds Bank of London (Fernández, 2006).
26 By April 2005, the capital paid for its operations reached 11.5 million, 11 million and 13 million 








Table 4.8 Central America: regionalization of the banks (Ansorena, 2007; Balsells, 2007; Fernández, 2006; Herrera, 2007; Tábora, 2007; Yong, 2007)
Name of the subsidiary bank in each country
Name and origin of the group Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua Panama
Grupo del Istmo (Panama) Banco Bañes Banco BGA Banistmo Primer Banco del 
Istmo.




Banco de la 
Producción




Cuscatlán Cuscatlán Cuscatlán Cuscatlán Cuscatlán de 
Panamá












Banco BICSA Offshore of 
public banks (Costa Rica)
BICSA BICSA BICSA
Grupo Financiero Uno 
(Nicaragua)
Banco Uno Banco Uno Banco Uno Banco de la 
Exportación
Banco Uno (for-
merly Banco de la 
Exportación)
Banco Uno
Red Promerica (Nicaragua) Banco Promerica Banco Promerica Banco 
Promerica





Corporación BCT Banco BCT BCT Bank
Banco Catia Banco Cathay
Citigroup Citibank Citibank Citibank Citibank
Bank of Nova Scotia Scotiabank Scotiabank Scotiabank
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Four Nicaraguan banks were participating in the regionalization process in 2004, 
as can be seen in Table 4.8. Both BAC and Grupo Financiero Uno carried out opera-
tions in all the Central American countries, including Panama. PROMERICA, for 
Table 4.9 Assets – regional groups, December 2004 (millions 













Table 4.10 Regional groups: ranking by profit level, 2003–2004 (Herrera, 2007)
 Profits (millions of dollars)
REGIONAL GROUP December 2004 December 2003 Variation (percentage)
CUSCATLÁN 30,506 23,989 27.17
Banco Cuscatlán El Salvador 24,531 19,522 25.66
Banco Cuscatlán Guatemala 1,732 1,046 65.58
Banco Cuscatlán Costa Rica 4,109 2,895 41.93
Banco Cuscatlán Honduras 134 526 −74.52
BAC 48,670 38,009 28.05
BAC Guatemala 3,902 3,308 17.96
Banco Credomatic El Salvador 7,878 8,652 −8.95
BAC Honduras 2,913 2,644 10.17
BAC Nicaragua 20,230 11,893 70.10
Banco de San José Costa Rica 13,747 11,512 19.41
Grupo Financiero UNO 15,917 15,284 4.14
Banco Uno Guatemala 2,805 2,254 24.45
Banco Uno de El Salvador 3,827 5,483 −30.20
Banco Uno Honduras 1,123 1,050 6.95
Banco Uno Nicaragua 6,955 5,417 28.39
Banco Uno Costa Rica 1,207 1,080 11.76
PROMERICA 18,082 14,293 26.51
BANPRO Nicaragua 13,473 11,574 16.41
Banco Promerica de El Salvador 1,604 1,146 39.97
Banco Promerica de Costa Rica 1,982 776 155.41
Banco Promerica de Honduras 1,023 797 28.36
CITIBANK 6,070 7,001 −13.30
Citibank N. A. Guatemala Branch 2,868 5,715 −49.82
Citibank El Salvador −173 −1,250 −86.16
Banco de Honduras (Citibank) 1,789 777 130.24
Citibank Costa Rica 1,586 1,759 −9.84
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its part, had operations in three countries, Costa Rica, El Salvador and Honduras, 
while LAFISE/BANCENTRO had opened operations in Costa Rica. As can be seen 
in Table 4.9, BAC, Grupo Financiero Uno and PROMERICA were in second, sixth 
and eighth places among the main regional groups. In contrast to El Salvador, 
Nicaragua is not a field of operation for regional financial groups from the other 
Central American countries. In December 2004, the Panamanian Banco del Istmo 
began operations in Nicaragua and the Panamanian financial group, ASSA, 
acquired 20% of the shares of the Nicaraguan BDF (Ansorena, 2007). Finally, it is 
worthwhile noting that Banco Agrícola Comercial took over Banco Caley Dagnall 
in El Salvador (Herrera, 2007).
In contrast to Nicaragua, the Guatemalan banks have had little regional activity. 
Furthermore, regional banks’ operations in Guatemala are considerably smaller. 
The share of the mortgage portfolio of the four banks of non-Guatemalan origin 
operating in that country (BAC, Citibank, Cuscatlán and Grupo Financiero Uno) 
amounted to barely 3.8% in 2004 (Balsells, 2007).
Honduras is the Central American country in which regional banks had the larg-
est market share. As shown in Table 4.11, in 2004, there were seven foreign banks 
with non-Honduran capital whose assets amounted to 32% of total assets, a loan 
portfolio of 30%, deposit-taking of 28%, capital and reserves of 33% and their 
profits 29%. In general, it may be said that over the first half of the present decade 
the entry of regional banks was one of the main features of the banking system’s 
consolidation process in Honduras. Eight of the most important groups in the 
Central American region have penetrated the Honduran market. Panama’s Primer 
Banco del Istmo group took over Banco BGA. BAC Internacional was linked to 
BAC Honduras (formerly Credomatic) and to Banco Ficensa. Until 2002 Banco 
Agrícola de El Salvador was associated with Banco de la Producción, which was 
acquired by Banco Ficohsa in 2003. Grupo Pacific-Banco Uno took over Banco de 
la Exportación (Banexpo), later called Banco Uno. In 2001, Banco Promérica 
began operations, linked to Red PRO. In 2004, Lloyds Bank, always considered a 
foreign bank, was acquired by Grupo Corporación Unión de Bancos Cuscatlán 
Internacional. In 2005, the arrival of the Lafise group meant that 50% of Honduran 
banks had foreign ownership interest. Banco de Honduras Citibank has always been 
considered a foreign-owned bank (Tábora, 2007).
The Costa Rican banks are among the largest in the region, though this does not 
imply an important position outside the country. In terms of net worth, in 2004, 
Table 4.11 Honduras: participation of foreign banks, 2001–2004 (Tábora, 2007)
Item 2001 2002 2003 2004
Foreign-owned banks 7 8 7 7
Foreign banks/totals banks (%) 33.33 42.11 43.75 43.75
Total assets (%) 26.22 30.22 31.18 32.86
Loan portfolio (%) 23.83 25.87 27.99 30.05
Deposits (%) 25.68 28.88 27.46 27.94
Capital and reserves (%) 27.36 29.47 30.20 33.14
Profits (%) 31.21 25.78 28.11 28.91
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Costa Rica’s three public banks featured among Central America’s five main banks 
(excluding Panama). From the point of view of assets, Banco Nacional de Costa 
Rica, with assets amounting to US$3.132 billion, stood as the region’s largest bank 
(excluding Panama) and Banco de Costa Rica was in fourth place with assets total-
ing US$2.128 billion. However, these banks’ regional presence – through their 
subsidiary Banco BICSA in Guatemala and Panama – was minimal. By contrast, 
Costa Rica’s second largest private bank, Banex, was owned by the Panamanian 
group Banistmo. Questions arise as to why Costa Rica’s main banking institutions 
did not appear to be starting up activities in the other countries of the region, and 
this will certainly have an impact on its banking sector and on the productive 
branches of the economy. The country’s more advanced economic development 
may not translate into an equivalent position for its banks in the region.
4. Offshore Operations
One of the strategies followed by banking groups to contend with the local regula-
tions and at the same time compete with both local and foreign banks has been the 
establishment of banks in markets subject to laxer regulations, especially in tax and 
monetary matters. Arbitrage in those fields has turned some financial markets into 
what are known as “offshore financial centers”, which means that most of the financial 
institutions handled by them are from clients resident in other jurisdictions.
Carrying out offshore operations has various advantages, though some of them 
are an obstacle for the financial system to work efficiently. Offshore deposits 
remain free of taxes at the source, and depositors are not obliged to include the 
interests earned in their income tax declaration, since in most of the countries of the 
region income received outside the national territory is not subject to taxation. 
Furthermore, banks do not have to keep part of those deposits in the central bank 
as cash reserves, which enable them to pay higher interest on their deposits or 
charge less interest on loans. Finally, depositors believe that the risk of their assets 
becoming known is lesser in the custody of an offshore bank.
On the other hand, some of the regulations governing credit operations can be 
evaded if carried out by an offshore bank, especially as regards limits on the amount 
of the credit extended to one same interest group or to companies belonging to a 
particular economic sector, as well as limits on persons related to the interest group 
that owns the bank. Also, when a non-domiciled bank is established in a centre with 
deficient regulation, it is common practice for some of them to clean up their credit 
portfolio and evade capital adequacy requirements by transferring their deficient port-
folio to the offshore bank. Finally, offshore centres can be used by banking groups to 
minimize their tax payments by simply transferring a large proportion of the 
group’s income to the offshore bank through accounting operations and leaving 
most of their expenses in onshore banks.
Among the activities carried out by offshore banks, credit operations are the ones that 
most concern the authorities, especially when the banks are in poorly supervised centres. 
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Offshore banks’ depositors are generally the same as those of the onshore bank, so 
if the quality of the credit portfolio compromises the solvency of the offshore bank 
and endangers its depositors’ funds, this would produce a loss of confidence in the 
onshore bank and could place the stability of the financial system as a whole at risk. 
More recently there has been concern that offshore operations could be linked to 
money laundering and the financing of terrorism. Therefore a growing number of 
multilateral institutions, countries and jurisdictions are doing their utmost to raise 
the quality of supervision and regulation of offshore financial centres.
In the second quarter of 2003, total credits from offshore financial centres to 
non-domiciled private and public agents amounted to US$1.8 trillion, one third of 
which were extended in the USA. Since the end of 2000, US banks have been the 
largest users of offshore banking services (BIS, 2005).
Deposit-taking by offshore banks within the national territory is prohibited in all 
the countries of the region except Guatemala: no bank domiciled abroad can take 
savings from the public unless it has an authorized branch in the country. There are, 
however, no restrictions on nationals investing in banks domiciled abroad, or on 
local banks carrying out commercial transactions with such banks; this enables local 
banks to take savings from the public on account of their offshore banks, and this is 
presented to the authorities as fund transfer services provided to their customers.
According to a study carried out by the Central American Monetary Council, in 
2004, the deposits taken by Central America’s offshore banks (excluding Mexico 
and Panama) amounted to just over 50% of the deposits taken by banks domiciled 
in the region, whereas the credits extended by offshore banks that same year repre-
sented 62% of those granted by domiciled banks (see Table 4.12). These figures 
reflect the importance of offshore operations for the region’s banks.
These proportions tend to be confirmed by the information supplied by the 
countries’ regulatory bodies. In Guatemala, for example, all the country’s largest 
financial groups have offshore banks which handle assets equivalent to 35% of those 
of the onshore banks and to 20% of the entire group’s assets; over 54% of offshore 
assets are concentrated in three of the country’s most important banks: Industrial, 
G & T Continental and Bancafé. In Costa Rica, where the situation is more pronounced, 
Table 4.12 Central America: credits and deposits of domi-
ciled banks that report to BIS, 2002–2003 (million dollars) 
(CMCA. Implications of the operations with offshore banks, 
February, 2004)
 Credits Deposits
Country 2002 2003a 2002 2003a
Total 9,967 7,631 11,035 7,317
Costa Rica 4,122 3,029 3,702 2,169
El Salvador 2,030 1,193 1,023 417
Guatemala 2,179 2,070 3,122 3,254
Honduras 850 655 2,614 1,054
Nicaragua 786 684 574 423
a Data up to June, 2003.
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to December 2004 offshore banks held assets, liabilities, credits and deposits 
representing 55%, 56%, 60% and 77%, respectively, of the assets, liabilities, credits 
and deposits of all the private banks (i.e. excluding the public banks, which have no 
offshore operations) and 71%, 72%, 77% and 101% of the assets, liabilities, credits 
and deposits of the private banks whose group possesses an offshore bank.
5. Specialization and Diversification
One of the banks’ competitive strategies is specialization or diversification. This 
strategy can be applied in three main areas: products, services or market niches 
dictated by clients’ income level or economic activity. Decisions on specialization 
or diversification in one of these areas imply decisions in the other areas: priority 
attention on one type of clientele often leads to emphasis on the subset of products 
and services that best meet the needs of that clientele. Although the size of the 
Central American market does not allow highly specialized banks to emerge, and 
even less second-floor banks, certain patterns of specialization or diversification 
can be detected as competitive strategies implemented by different banking groups. 
The general trend, however, has been for financial groups to become involved in all 
types of business, even though the legislation has led them to do so through inde-
pendent concerns belonging to a holding company.
First, banks can specialize by their clientele’s income level. Some banks specialize 
in small-customer deposits, which means they have an extensive network of 
branches and automated teller machine (ATM)s to facilitate deposit-taking from the 
public at large, and also credit programmes specializing in small-scale farm operators 
or micro and small-sized enterprises. By contrast, banks specializing in corporate 
clients, such as BCT of Costa Rica – one of the few remaining locally owned private 
banks – have practically no branches but instead rely on highly specialized account 
executives in charge of providing personalized service and meeting all the client’s 
needs. Both these banks and those specializing in lower-income segments do not 
offer the whole range of financial services, but rather those that respond to their 
clientele’s needs. For example, banks specializing in small savers in general do not 
have offshore banks, investment banking or a significant international operations 
division – except where remittances are concerned – whereas banks specializing in 
corporate banking do not manage pension funds domiciled in their countries 
(although they do trade in international funds).
Foreign banks operating in the region, such as Citigroup or NovaScotia, typically 
specialize in the corporate segment, and prominent among their clients are transna-
tional corporations. Such is the case with Costa Rica and Panama. On the other hand, 
small savers and customers requiring credit have been catered to by medium 
and small banks – which find it harder to compete with larger banks and foreign banks 
in the corporate sector – or by large public banks. Among the public banks that deal 
with small savers and people requiring credit are the Costa Rican ones, which concentrate 
around 65% of the country’s deposits and together possess the largest portion of the 
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branch network. Among the small- and medium-sized banks serving this segment are, 
for example, the Guatemalan banks Banco de Desarrollo Rural, Banco Crédito 
Hipotecario and Banco de Antigua (the latter Chilean-owned, with operations also in 
Costa Rica under the name Financiera Miravalles). These three Guatemalan banks are 
relatively small and have specialized in catering to small-scale farm operators and 
small-credit customers who are practically neglected by the larger banks. In addition 
to direct credit for farmers, the first of these has established alliances with a network 
of operators which it serves with second-floor banking services.
Recently the segment of small savers and credit customers has begun to be 
considered as customers by banks which had so far specialized in higher-income 
sectors. To that end they are relying on technical and financial support from inter-
national agencies such as Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) which are 
interested in promoting the supply of banking services to the rural sector, especially 
in countries where it has a low level of modernization.
Second, banks can specialize in serving specific economic groups. Such is the 
case with banks that have emerged to solve the lack of financial services for a 
particular economic group, especially in agriculture or industry. A typical example 
of this type of banks is the above-mentioned Banco de Desarrollo Rural of 
Guatemala. However, changes in the productive structure of the countries of the 
region have gradually eroded the base of these banks, which little by little have 
been compelled to open up to other sectors and are losing the specificity of their 
clientele. Many non-bank financial entities, particularly savings and loan coopera-
tives, are specializing in clients from a specific type of economic activity.
Third, banks can specialize by type of services. As we have mentioned, this kind 
of specialization is determined by the needs of the segment covered by the bank. For 
example, remittance transfer services are provided by a few Guatemalan, Salvadoran 
and Nicaraguan banks in response to the large-scale emigration experienced by those 
countries. BAC has gone beyond the simple transfer of remittances and has taken 
advantage of its position as one of the first regionalized banks to develop a payments 
network through which it provides cash clearance and settlement services to banks 
and companies in the region. This bank made greater progress than others in the 
integration of regional treasurer’s offices and has developed money market desks 
with a regional strategy to manage the bank’s and its clients’ exchange and trading-
portfolio risks.
Some banks also specialize in investment banking activities which are generally 
carried out through one of the financial group’s companies. This activity is espe-
cially important among the Panamanian banks, which for tax purposes lend to local 
companies through the purchase of bonds issued by the latter and structured by the 
banks themselves. But there are also banks in the region that invest in venture-capital 
enterprises through their financial group’s companies, like Banco Interfin of Costa 
Rica, for instance.
Another activity in which there has been a certain degree of specialization as a 
result of tax legislation and enforcement of guarantees is financial leasing, which 
has a significant volume in practically all the countries of the region. A number of 
factors may underlie the upswing in leasing, either combined or separate, depending 
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on the country’s legislation or institutional framework. First, the routine judicial 
procedures leading to the enforcement of a guarantee can be very trying and involve 
considerable notary costs, all of which can be obviated by a leasing contract. In 
case the debtor does not fulfil the contract, the financed good can be recovered 
quickly and without high costs. Second, leasing costs may have advantageous tax 
treatment in view of the depreciation of assets and therefore leasing may be useful 
as a tax shield. Third, leasing contracts tend not to be recorded in the accounts as 
credits for purposes of banks’ capital adequacy, which enables those that have little 
leeway to channel their credit resources in this manner. It should be mentioned that 
leasing contracts are generally handled by one of the financial group’s companies, 
not directly by the bank.
Finally, there is the whole chapter on the stock market. Here it is worth recalling 
that stock exchanges have had disproportionate weight in the organization of the 
Central American stock market due to the legal provision in the countries of the 
region – except Mexico – that all transactions involving securities, whether shares 
or debt must be carried out on the stock exchange and through its members (stock-
brokerage seats or firms).27 This has not been the case with the neighbouring country, 
Mexico. The conditions just described have hindered the development of interbank 
markets and has compelled the banks to establish stockbrokerage firms in order to 
deal at least with their own bank’s liquidity needs. These stockbrokerage firms provide 
their clients with securities intermediation services and in some cases hold contracts 
with foreign stockbrokerage firms for the management of those clients’ accounts, 
for which they obtain lower service fees.
In addition to stockbrokerage firms, pension funds and more recently mutual 
funds have been organized in the region. Costa Rica pioneered the organization of 
these products. Initially, pension funds were managed by private banks under the 
concept of trust fund or trust commission. The legislation in all the countries has 
gradually obliged financial groups to establish companies for the group’s different 
activities and efforts have been made to clearly differentiate strictly banking prod-
ucts from medium-term investment portfolios (mutual funds) and long-term portfolios 
(pension funds). In general, foreign banks have not entered the business of mutual 
funds, because restrictions such as “Chinese walls” and risk diversification imposed 
by head offices on their branches are practically impossible to comply with on the 
scale of the Central American market; nor have the banks specializing in service to 
corporate clients, whose sales force is small and highly specialized, entered the 
pension fund market.
The development of stock market activities in Costa Rica is interesting from the 
viewpoint of competition. Originally developed by non-bank financial groups, mutual 
funds have gained growing importance and all the financial groups have gradually 
been obliged to establish fund management companies and offer them to bank 
customers before they transferred part of their resources to mutual funds managed by 
27 This obligation is very restrictive and has tended to be abandoned at an international level in 
recent years.
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the competition. Most financial groups allowed fund management companies to compete 
with the bank for deposit-taking, so that much of the competitive pressure on banks 
came from mutual fund management companies, including those belonging to the 
same financial group. The development of mutual funds in Costa Rica paved the way 
for improvements in banking services and for increases in interest rates on deposits. 
It is no coincidence that in the other countries of Central America, where financial 
development has been determined more by the banks, the development of the stock 
market, and particularly mutual funds, has been much more limited.
IV.  Performance of the Banking System and Development 
of Competition in the Financial Sector
The past 15 years have been a period of substantive changes in the region’s regulatory 
frameworks. These changes have paved the way for the consolidation of private 
financial systems, with the exception of Costa Rica, where a private system has also 
become consolidated, but in coexistence with a powerful public sector. Furthermore, 
progress has been made in modernizing the institutional regulatory framework and 
applying the Basel standards. The banks have also undergone a period of intense 
activity and transformations. Many banks have appeared and disappeared. The sector 
has been subject to an active process of mergers and takeovers. The banks have 
begun to operate on a regional scale en masse and have extended their operations to 
all types of financial activities. From the institutional point of view, a notable absentee 
has been the competition agency, and the consequences of this institutional vacuum 
have been aggravated by the scarce or non-existent concern of the regulatory institu-
tions for competition in the industry.
Bank performance will be analysed in three spheres. The first perspective, from 
the point of view of prudential indicators, is: solvency and quality of the portfolio. 
A second perspective focuses on its role in the canalization of savings to the private 
sector. A third one focuses on the point of view of the sector’s profitability.
From the prudential perspective, banks have had to increase their net worth in 
order to respond to the new capital requirements imposed by the Basel standards, 
which has contributed to the expansion of their operations and activities. However, 
as can be seen in Table 4.13, the results are varied. Whereas in some countries the 
system’s average solvency has been substantially strengthened, in others it has 
remained stagnant and even deteriorated. In fact, in several countries the net worth/
total assets ratio has increased substantially, such as in Nicaragua (which has risen 
from 4.85% in 1997 to 8.25% in 2005) and in Mexico (8.03–12.27% in that same 
period). El Salvador and Panama also stand out in that regard.
Guatemala and Honduras contrast with the above. The former has still not recovered 
in 2005 from the 2001–2002 crisis. This explains why the net worth/total assets 
ratio dropped from 9.98% in 1999 to 7.54% in 2005. In Honduras, the ratio has 
remained practically stagnant since 1998, although the levels were not as precarious 
as Guatemala in 2005.
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Table 4.14 shows that the solvency of banking activities was subject to serious 
threats, to a great extent as a result of instability suffered during that period. This 
weakness symptom of the banking system explains why regulators have given pri-
ority to the sector’s stability over competition policy. We should emphasize the 
grave situation of the Mexican banking system, with high rates of payment arrears 
which were not overcome definitely before 2004. This situation has to do with the 
problems caused by the tequila crisis, but it also responds to the mistrust which 
affected the system’s operation.
Throughout the period, the two cases that have shown the poorest performance 
are Honduras and Guatemala. For the latter, 2002 was the worst year, in the midst 
of the financial crisis that affected the country. During the rest of the period the figures 
tend to feature among the region’s poorest, but without reaching Honduras’s 
extremes, which are very serious. During the period between 1997 and 2005, the 
default rate was in double digits. This situation is associated with the ravages of 
Hurricane Mitch and the persistence of its catastrophic effects.28 Since 2004, however, 
Table 4.13 Central America and Mexico: bank capitalization, 1997–2005, net worth/total assets 
(%) (Central American Monetary Council at www.secmca.org/Estadisticas_Indicadores_Ban.htm 
and Mexico’s National Banking and Securities Commission at www.cnbv.gob.mx/default.
asp?com_id = 0)
Country 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Costa Rica 8.71 8.79 10.07 9.94 9.02 9.12 9.49 9.71 9.82
Honduras 8.39 8.53 8.70 8.79 9.00 8.08 7.65 8.40 8.52
Guatemala 7.81 8.11 9.98 9.08 6.70 5.27 7.92 7.58 7.54
El Salvador 7.76 7.50 8.34 8.86 8.47 9.01 10.17 10.72 11.23
Nicaragua 4.85 5.03 6.55 7.46 6.13 7.06 7.48 8.81 8.25
Panama n/a n/a 8.66 9.34 9.43 10.71 12.42 13.43 13.27
Mexico 8.03 8.31 7.97 9.56 9.42 11.14 11.83 11.20 12.27
Table 4.14 Central America and Mexico: payment arrears ratio in the banking system, 1997–
2005, overdue portfolio/total portfolio (%) (Central American Monetary Council at www.secmca.
org/Estadisticas_Indicadores_Ban.htm and National Banking and Securities Commission, Mexico, 
at www.cnbv.gob.mx/default.asp?com_id = 0)
Country 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Costa Rica 5.24 3.20 2.71 3.49 2.44 3.20 1.71 2.04 1.61
El Salvador 2.96 4.10 4.55 4.34 3.47 2.83 2.26 2.09 2.01
Guatemala 6.27 6.30 7.69 7.14 8.82 13.80 4.77 4.46 4.45
Honduras 5.36 10.69 10.94 12.19 12.84 12.01 9.66 6.90 6.33
Nicaragua 2.01 2.43 2.61 3.98 3.37 3.49 2.77 2.26 2.48
Panama n/a n/a 1.73 1.55 2.63 3.48 2.63 1.71 2.02
Mexico 11.34 11.3 8.91 5.81 5.14 4.56 3.15 2.51 2.27
Note: Figures correspond to December each year from 1997 to 2004. For 2005, the figures corre-
spond to June, except for Panama which corresponds to August.
28 It should also be pointed out that the destructive effects of Hurricane Mitch followed a period of 
vigorous growth of credit (Tábora, 2007).
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there has been a substantial improvement, even though the figures for that year and 
for 2005 were still very high and Honduras is in the last place in the region as 
regards past due to indebtedness. Though with significant fluctuations, the other 
four countries show similar improvements in their performance, with clear evi-
dence of more solid solvency.
Table 4.15 confirms the precarious situation of Guatemala and Honduras and the 
degree of solvency of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Panama and Mexico: 
whereas in the former two countries the overdue portfolio surpasses funding, in the 
latter five funding levels are acceptable.
From the point of view of credit access for the private sector, the situation is 
heterogeneous, though, in general the evolution has not been very positive. Figure 
4.1 shows the evolution of private sector credit as a proportion of GDP. First of all, 
Table 4.15 Central America and Mexico: credit portfolio quality: funding/overdue portfolio, 
1997–1998 (Central American Monetary Council at www.secmca.org/Estadisticas_Indicadores_
Ban.htm, Mexico’s National Banking and Securities Commission, at www.cnbv.gob.mx/default.
asp?com_id = 0, and Statistical Reports of Commercial Banks, several years, seen at www.cnbv.
gob.mx/default.asp?com_id = 0)
Country 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Costa Rica 110.48 136.84 131.62 101.96 114.76 103.63 147.75 126.88 167.34
El Salvador 82.90 86.73 93.61 93.80 110.34 127.56 148.12 141.98 135.66
Guatemala 29.25 34.54 47.56 53.28 68.45 60.73 68.45 70.30 70.74
Honduras 36.94 19.25 23.01 26.42 28.71 36.91 36.49 60.33 61.80
Nicaragua 149.66 121.72 137.47 83.60 175.01 161.47 170.00 187.90 187.02
Panama   102.12 128.14 97.24 129.70 136.29 149.85 132.26
Mexico   104.3 115.3 123.8 138.1 167.1 201.78 198.4
Note: Figures correspond to December each year from 1997 to 2004. For 2005, the figures corre-
spond to June, except for Panama which corresponds to March.
Fig. 4.1 Central America and Mexico: bank credit to private sector as a percentage of GDP, 
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we should note the case of Mexico, where this indicator was barely above 15% in 
2004. A number of factors explain this precarious situation, the 1995 crisis being 
one of them. Since that year, the banking system began a process of recovery in 
which foreign capital played a key role. Nevertheless, this has largely been attained 
to the detriment of credit, for the banks concentrate their investments in securities, 
particularly those aimed at financing the salvage operation implemented by the 
state following the generalized collapse of the privatized banks. Whereas securities 
represent more than 50% of the banks’ investments in Mexico, trade and housing 
credit has remained stagnant since 2001 following a decline with respect to 2000 
and only consumer credit has registered vigorous growth in recent times (see 
Avalos and Hernández, this volume). The low level of private sector credit as a 
proportion of GDP is of even greater concern if we consider that in relative terms 
it falls below countries as poor as Honduras and Nicaragua (see Fig. 4.1).
Guatemala places second among the countries of the region in which private 
sector credit is lowest. As shown in Fig. 4.2, private sector credit does not reach 
20% of GDP. This figure comes close to the maximum levels reached in the early 
1980s. The political problems and violence affecting the country during that period 
explain the sharp drop in private sector credit until 1992, when it began to recover. 
The vigorous growth registered between that year and the year 2000 runs parallel 
to a major increase in the number of branches and the expansion of the banks to 
areas which previously had been practically devoid of banking services: during the 
period 1990–2004, the number of bank agencies rose from 259 to 1,315, an increase 
of more than 400% and a percentage that reaches almost 790% if we consider only 

























Fig. 4.2 Domestic credit to private sector in 187 countries as percentage of GDP, 2004 (Authors 
preparation based on official data)
Note: The horizontal axis orders 187 countries and some country groups (“world” and “countries 
with low incomes”) according to their domestic credit/GDP ratio. These ratios vary from near 
0–300%.
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most of the growth in the number of agencies was registered towards the end of the 
last decade and the growth rate has fallen notably over the past five years (Balsells, 
2007). Private sector credit, for its part, has tended towards stagnation. This reflects 
the problems experienced by the sector at the beginning of the decade. As in 
Mexico’s case, a high proportion of deposits is invested in securities: only around 
60% of savings is allocated to credit.
In Nicaragua, as in Mexico, the emergence of private banking was accompanied 
by dynamic growth in private sector credit. Nonetheless, the low quality of the 
credits, associated with deficiencies in regulation, led to a marked decline in private 
sector credit from which the country has not recovered. In fact, Fig. 4.2 shows that 
in 2004 credit fell off steeply to around 25% of GDP (see Fig. 4.2).
El Salvador is an interesting case. Between 1990 and 2001, private sector credit 
rose dynamically from slightly over 15% of GDP to more than 45%, reflecting the 
economy’s fast growth and the effects of liberalization. However, as of 2001, pri-
vate sector credit declined significantly as a result of dollarization and the deteriora-
tion of the economy’s competitiveness.
Panama contrasts with all the other countries of the region. As shown in Fig. 4.1, 
private sector credit went up from around 50% of GDP in 1990 to 100% in 2002. 
These figures have no equal in the region. A drop was recorded between 2002 and 
2004 which can be explained for accounting reasons.29
Table 4.16 shows that in all countries, with the exception of Costa Rica and El 
Salvador, the proportion of deposits from the public that are not used to provide 
credit has been increasing. This indicates that the evolution of the banking system 
in those years has reduced its capacity to play the role it should have in a market 
economy, i.e. that of directing savings to productive activities.
Table 4.16 Central America and Mexico: total deposits as percentage of total credit, 1997–
2005 (Central American Monetary Council at www.secmca.org/Estadisticas_Indicadores_Ban.
htm and Mexico’s National Banking and Securities Commission, at www.cnbv.gob.mx/default.
asp?com_id = 0)
Country 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Costa Rica 196.89 163.40 159.21 146.95 129.50 130.26 128.19 145.29 148.25
El Salvador 111.14 108.67 112.33 115.83 126.16 113.19 107.81 104.71 100.50
Guatemala 153.74 136.29 123.56 147.31 153.44 161.79 157.92 155.38 154.91
Honduras 119.87 111.17 117.96 120.59 120.96 133.00 127.91 131.99 134.71
Nicaragua 166.12 147.06 130.25 163.45 224.11 223.26 195.17 180.23 177.30
Panama n/a n/a 123.16 125.41 120.51 134.77 134.37 123.06 120.72
Mexico 90.48 92.73 102.64 102.42 121.90 115.05 128.67 131.63 123.20
Note: Figures correspond to December each year from 1997 to 2004. For 2005, the figures corre-
spond to June, except for Panama which corresponds to April.
29 As a result of tax treatment on interests received, traditional loans documented with promissory 
notes were replaced by issues of corporate bonds. These bonds have the advantage for the bank 
that the interests received are not taxable, but payment of interests by the issuer are income tax 
deductible. The same banks that extended the credit took charge of structuring and purchasing the 
totality of the issues (Fernández, 2006).
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From the viewpoint of profitability of the banking system, the results have been 
much better. Tables 4.17 and 4.18 provide information in this regard. In general 
terms, there has been a significant growth trend in recent years in the rate of return 
on assets (ROA). Costa Rica is notable for the relative stability of this indicator and 
its growth trend throughout the period (except 1998 and 2002). In 1999 and 2000, 
it registered the best performance in the region and over the next two years it was 
surpassed very slightly only by Nicaragua.
Interestingly, Nicaragua has registered high rates of ROA since 2001 in compari-
son with the other countries. Mexico’s ROA attained the same level only in 2005. 
Good performance, although affected by the crisis in the sector in the year 2000, 
has remained at levels that place it second. Similarly, on comparing the rate of 
return on equity (ROE), the Nicaraguan banking system shows a particularly high 
performance. Table 4.18 shows that from 2001 to the first few months of 2005, 
ROE reached an average level of over 30%, more than 10% higher than the next 
country. The rise in ROE, from 20.66% in 2000 to 30.12% in 2001, coincides with 
the reduction in the number of banks from 12 in 1999 to 8 in 2000 and 6 as of 2001 
(see Table 4.5). The high level of returns also reflects the concentration of private 
credit in the first five banks, which rose from 60% in 1999 to 80% in 2000 and to 
Table 4.17 Central America and Mexico: bank returns, 1997–2005, ROA (Central American 
Monetary Council at www.secmca.org/Estadisticas_Indicadores_Ban.htm and Mexico’s National 
Banking and Securities Commission, at www.cnbv.gob.mx/default.asp?com_id = 0)
Country/year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Costa Rica 1.58 1.21 1.61 1.80 1.89 1.74 1.99 1.93 2.32
El Salvador 1.65 0.49 0.51 0.64 1.14 1.19 1.16 1.12 1.45
Guatemala 1.39 1.11 1.49 1.21 0.47 0.57 1.37 1.65 1.73
Honduras 3.135 2.235 1.546 1.014 0.993 0.921 1.328 1.454 1.722
Nicaragua 0.94 0.88 1.57 1.46 1.91 1.77 2.03 2.73 2.55
Panama n/a n/a 1.35 1.29 1.04 0.63 2.01 2.37 1.96
Mexico 0 2.05 0.89 0.66 0.81 1.1 1.65 1.47 2.55
Note: Figures correspond to December each year from 1997 to 2004. For 2005, the figures corre-
spond to June, except for Panama which corresponds to May.
Table 4.18 Central America and Mexico: bank returns, 1997–2005, ROE (Central American 
Monetary Council at www.secmca.org/Estadisticas_Indicadores_Ban.htm and Mexico’s National 
Banking and Securities Commission, at www.cnbv.gob.mx/default.asp?com_id = 0)
Country 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Costa Rica 17.78 13.46 18.04 17.93 19.70 18.93 20.72 20.20 23.83
El Salvador 21.66  6.16  6.24  7.43 13.15 13.66 11.80 10.88 13.23
Guatemala 17.63 14.26 16.66 12.67  6.10 10.75 15.56 20.24 21.78
Honduras 36.47 26.95 17.90 11.54 11.02 10.90 16.70 18.91 20.13
Nicaragua 18.18 17.84 26.48 20.66 30.12 27.65 28.97 34.56 30.22
Panama n/a n/a 15.62 14.03 10.91  6.39 16.74 18.15 14.01
Mexico n/a 25.56 10.93  6.76  8.58 10.4 14.2 12.98 21.38
Note: Figures correspond to December each year from 1997 to 2004. For 2005, the figures corre-
spond to June, except for Panama which corresponds to May.
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95.71% in 2001 (Table 4.6). These levels may be associated with the sharp rise in 
the HHI, from 900 in 1999 to 1,900 in 2004.
V. Conclusions
Several conclusions can be derived from the analysis done before on the bank 
development in the region.
The banking sector in the region is very heterogeneous and has undergone impor-
tant transformations as a result of political and economic convulsion. Banks in some 
of the countries have reflected the political upheaval of the 1970s and 1980s. Such 
is the case with El Salvador, Nicaragua and Mexico, where the banks went from 
being predominantly private to a public banking system which was then privatized 
once again. The economic crises with serious banking components that affected 
Mexico and Nicaragua have also had a strong influence on the fluctuations between 
public and private predominance in the sector. As in other sectors, Costa Rica has 
shown an almost immutable predominance of the public banking system for nearly 
60 years. Panama, with its financial district, has the advantage of possessing the 
most advanced banking system in the region. Guatemala and Honduras are stable 
cases which nevertheless have an industry that lags behind the other countries.
At the same time, contestability faced by the sector has increased, particularly from 
abroad. The development of telecommunications and the increasing capital movement 
have meant great competition from foreign banks and stockbrokerage firms: from the 
liability side, many large- and medium-size investors handle their portfolios abroad, 
and on the assets side, many corporations receive loans from foreign banks. The econ-
omies of scale in this activity have allowed local banks to keep control on small and 
medium-size customers, but there are indications that this barrier will eventually disap-
pear. In those market niches, the bank may face contestability from domestic sources, 
such as credit cards issued by non-banking operators, the public debt or investment 
funds. The Costa Rican case is especially relevant in this sense.
In a parallel way, because of this greater foreign exposure, the banking system 
has tended to concentrate. All countries have experienced this tendency: the number 
of banks has fallen systematically and various concentration indicators have risen. 
Nevertheless, this phenomenon does not necessarily seem to have reduced competi-
tion. On the one hand, the HHI reflects this greater concentration, but the fact that 
relative symmetry prevails between leading banks, supports the idea that there is 
workable competition; on the other hand, the exposure to foreign contestability has 
forced banks to keep a relatively competitive stand; finally, concentration has 
occurred within a framework of a regionalization process, with positive conse-
quences for competition in the region.
After having traditionally concentrated in domestic activities, local banks are 
increasingly participating in regional markets. A growing number of the countries’ 
large banks are developing activities in other countries and the regional nature of 
these operations becomes, in time, a competitive advantage. Its importance will 
also grow as the needed regional institutional framework for these private sector 
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activities is completed. Furthermore, the regionalization of this industry seems to 
intensify competition: for example, while its impact in Guatemala is negligible due 
to the low penetration of the regional bank, in Honduras there is a very positive 
effect from regional large bank activities, since the performance indicators of 
regional banks are substantially better than that of the domestic banks.
The contribution of extraregional banks does not seem to have been as helpful 
for competition as regional banks have. In fact, and contrary to what has tradition-
ally been thought, the entrance of foreign banks has not meant an improvement in 
the banking sector performance neither in cost of services nor in other costs, such 
as commissions, or intermediation margins nor in service efficiency (coverage and 
proportion of credit going to the private sector, among others). In contrast, what has 
really increased has been profitability of banks. In Mexico – which, together with 
Panama, is the country with the greatest presence of foreign banks in the region – 
bank performance indicators are quite deficient in several areas, especially those 
regarding credit for the private sector.
Public policies have great challenges ahead. There is no guarantee that by taking 
control of local banks, foreign banks will improve competition in the banking 
system or in the services it provides to customers. For the moment, the domestic 
banks have demonstrated great dynamism and adaptation capacity, but competing 
with foreign banks is not easy because of some public policies’ anachronism. 
Particularly unfavourable for the financial sector is the poor public infrastructure 
for payments and public-debt management. The fact that in all countries studied, 
except for Mexico, the emissions policies do not meet with some basic international 
standards30 prevents the development of competitive mechanisms for liquidity and 
risk management. It also makes it difficult to rely on market mechanisms for an 
efficient monetary policy to work without a rise in financial intermediation costs. 
While the state is in the process of meeting these challenges and takes on its respon-
sibility for developing an adequate financial infrastructure and public-debt markets, 
local banks will still be in better shape both to assign savings more efficiently and 
to handle risks and liquidity, hence transferring the fruits of a growing proportion 
of competition and technology development to its customers.
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Chapter 5
Advantages and Limitations of Costa Rica’s 
Experience in Competition Policy: 
A Benchmark for the Rest of the Countries 
of the Central American Region
Pamela Sittenfeld
Introduction
The Law on Promotion of Competition and Effective Consumer Protection (N° 
7472) was enacted on December 19, 1994 (LPCDEC). Its chief objective is to pro-
mote and protect the process of unrestricted competition, as well as consumer rights 
and interests, by preventing and prohibiting monopolies, monopolistic practices 
and other restrictions on efficient market operation and eliminating unnecessary 
regulations governing economic activities.
To implement antimonopoly standards the Law created the Commission to 
Promote Competition (CPC), which began operating in January 1996. The purpose 
of this study is precisely to appraise the work of these ten years of CPC, with 
the aim of assessing the experiences, challenges and certain lessons that could 
serve other countries of the region. In this regard, the context in which Costa Rican 
regulation came about is similar to that of other countries. The latter are characterized 
by being small economies, with scarce resources and with a scant culture of com-
petition. Nevertheless, within this reality significant progress has been made which 
could serve as a reference point for these nations.
Since Costa Rica’s enactment of LPCDEC and creation of CPC, there has been 
dynamic interaction among the different agents involved in the market, and the 
manner in which they do so has varied over time. For example, at least two types of 
reaction on the part of companies have been perceived: some have become aware that 
monopolistic practices are illegal and do not practice them, and others continue to do 
so but much more surreptitiously. Thus, CPC’s work has become more difficult, since 
at first it could base its findings on sound and easily accessible evidence, but over time 
its investigations have become increasingly costly and complex. The accumulation of 
experiences in resolving cases is real capital in improving the manner and the respon-
siveness with which anti-competitive behaviour can be addressed, and the purpose of 
this study is precisely to compile the legacy of CPC’s decade of experience.
In order to meet the proposed goal, a detailed study will be made of the regula-
tion of prohibited practices and concentrations and the most important cases CPC 
has dealt with. This will be in order to analyse the most significant lessons in application 
C. Schatan, E. Rivera (eds.) Competition Policies in Emerging Economies, 145
© United Nations 2008
146 P. Sittenfeld
of the legal and institutional framework and compare them with best international 
practices. The conclusions of this paper will make a general appraisal to provide 
certain recommendations for the countries of the Central American region that have 
recently approved competition legislation or are about to do so.
I. Analysis of Monopolistic Practices and Concentrations
Investigating anti-competitive practices and concentrations is any competition 
agency’s principal task. According to the registers of the Technical Support Unit 
(hereinafter UTA), CPC carried out 55 investigations in 1995. Of these, eight were 
related to absolute practices, 13 to relative practices and one case related to a 
concentration. However, rather than considering the number of cases investigated 
by the Costa Rican authority, the aim of this section is to consider CPC’s experience 
in investigations and their analysis and resolution. To that end, each part of this 
section will briefly describe the applicable legislation on the subject, the most 
representative cases, and best international practices.
Absolute Monopolistic Practices
1. Regulatory Provisions
Absolute or horizontal monopolistic practices are regulated in Article 11 of LPCDEC. 
Specifically, this Article prohibits acts, contracts, agreements, arrangements or com-
binations between competing agents among themselves, the purpose or effect of 
which is to: fix or manipulate prices or exchanges of information for the same end; 
restrict or limit the supply of goods or services; divide markets by means of clientele, 
suppliers, time spans or areas; and coordinating offers in bidding processes.
Such practices are analysed according to the per se rule. Precisely because of the 
harmful effect of these conducts on the process of unrestricted competition, Costa 
Rican legislators attributed them with the concept of ipso facto null and void.1
In accordance with Articles 27 and 67 of LPCDEC, the main tool available to 
CPC in carrying out investigations of these practices is the possibility of requesting 
information, whether public or private, from any economic agent The agency cannot 
carry out in situ inspections, attachment of documents or seizures, which undoubt-
edly hampers investigation of absolute or horizontal practices, since obtaining evi-
dence tends to be the most complex factor in this type of cases.
According to Article 28 of LPCDEC, with regard to sanctions CPC can resort to 
two types of measures. First of all, it can order the discontinuance, correction or 
1 In this regard, see López, 1995.
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elimination of the practice. Second, it can impose fines of up to 680 minimum 
wages. In particularly serious cases, it can charge fines of up to 10% of annual sales 
or 10% of the infringer’s assets.
Finally, sanctions can be imposed on both individuals and corporate persons. In 
order to clearly determine those responsible for the execution of a particular prac-
tice, Article 70 of LPCDEC enables CPC to dispense with any juridical forms 
adopted by economic agents that do not correspond to the facts investigated.
2. Significant Resolutions
This section will study CPC’s jurisprudence in order to analyse its evolution. The 
cases selected seek to illustrate as completely as possible the criteria for analysis 
used to carry out the investigations of these conducts, as well as the different obsta-
cles encountered by the authority. Special reference will be made to the type of 
practices analysed, their investigation and the evidence found, the use of the per se 
rule and the sanctions imposed. Similarly, regulatory limitations will be appraised, 
as well as the intervention of other public administration agencies.
2.1. The Case of the Bean Market (CPC-19–99)
Case Description
The investigation of the bean market clearly exemplifies the type of cases that CPC 
dealt with during its early years. This case began with an article on the bean market 
published in the newspaper Al Día on March 12, 1998. On June 16, 1998, CPC 
approved the institution of administrative proceedings against the members of the 
National Chamber of Bean Processors and Similar, for carrying out three possible 
absolute practices: horizontal price fixing for the 900 g bag of black beans, 
exchange of information to manipulate or agree on the purchase price for beans in 
bulk and finally, for dividing up the territory for the purchase of beans in bulk.
Investigation and Analysis of the Practices
Price cartel
To investigate price fixing, the Commission requested the minutes of the sessions 
of the National Chamber of Bean Processors and Similar, in which the new price 
for the 900 g bag of beans was clearly agreed upon, as well as the names of the 
participants in the said agreement. Furthermore, in order to determine whether 
the cartel had actually been effective in the market, it requested the invoices of the 
different companies investigated. It succeeded in proving that the prices set by 
the agents denounced for the 900 g bag of black beans tended to be standardized.
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The pleadings of the parties were aimed at certain particular aspects of the par-
ticipation or not of the agent in the agreement. Specifically, they argued that the 
agreement was never put into practice and that the latter was not binding either for 
those who took part in the meetings, or for those who did not attend. However, since 
it was a question of a per se practice, none of the arguments were taken into account 
in determining the illegality of the conduct. Moreover, the evidence not only clearly 
demonstrated the existence of the price agreement, but also proved that it had been 
applied in the market. The parties’ arguments were used only to aggravate or 
mitigate the sanction.
The agency sanctioned the companies investigated with fines ranging from 22 to 
37 minimum wages. It did not succeed in sanctioning the National Chamber of 
Bean Processors and Similar, since the description of the prohibited conduct estab-
lished in the regulation only permits sanctioning the competing agents.2
Exchange of information
The second practice investigated was an exchange of information on prices for the 
purchase of beans in bulk. The main evidence of this practice can also be classified 
as direct. Specifically, the Commission succeeded in collecting a copy of the minutes 
of the sessions of the Chamber of Bean Processors and Similar which contained the 
statements or opinions of the different economic agents discussing the problems 
that were arising with the purchase price from farmers, as well as the need to seek 
mechanisms to face the significant increase in prices.
The file contains no evidence that an agreement was actually arrived at or that 
any proposal to pay a particular price was negotiated. Nevertheless, some of the 
aims of the exchange of information did reveal a latent aspect of harming the process 
of free competition.
The parties investigated attempted to justify their conduct. However, since it is 
a per se practice the alleged justification served only to aggravate or mitigate the 
conducts, not to free the companies from responsibility.
Thus, the Commission sanctioned the competing companies in the market for 
purchase of beans in bulk for exchanging information to manipulate prices on the 
market.3 Finally, the agency declared that the illegal act was ipso facto null and 
void and in general ordered both the offending individuals and corporate persons 
to abstain from carrying out similar acts or any other provided for in Article 11 
of the Law.
2 One of the companies was exonerated because it was not a competitor in the relevant market and 
another two because it was not possible to demonstrate whether they knew about the agreement 
reached in the sessions of the Chamber of Bean Processors and Similar.
3 In this agreement also one of the companies was exonerated because it was not a competitor in 
the relevant market and another two because it was not possible to prove whether they knew of the 
agreement reached in the Chamber of Bean Processors and Similar.
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Territorial division
Finally, CPC investigated an alleged division of territories. However, according to 
the resolution, although there was evidence to justify opening proceedings for this 
practice, during the investigation it was determined that there was never any intent 
to carry out a territorial division in terms of Section C of Article 11. The companies 
investigated were therefore exonerated.
Comments on the Investigation
As has been stated, this investigation exemplifies the type of cases CPC dealt with 
during its early years.4 That is to say, the investigations did not pose much difficulty 
in terms of obtaining evidence. This generally becomes the most complex element 
where cartels are concerned. Furthermore, the evidence found in some cases was 
not only of a direct nature, but also public. Obviously this fact simplified investiga-
tion and analysis in such cases.
In addition, it should be pointed out that the fines imposed were relatively low. 
That is, they were symbolic, probably with very little or no dissuasive or exemplify-
ing effects.
Nonetheless, as agents increase their knowledge of competition legislation, they 
will probably learn to act less conspicuously in reaching prohibited agreements. 
Thus, not only will investigations be more complex, but some agreements are 
bound to remain undetected. As a matter of fact, the airlines case begins to display 
this new reality.
2.2. The Case of the Airlines (CPC-37–03)
Case Description
One of the cases marking a difference in CPC’s jurisprudence is the investigation 
of an alleged agreement among the airlines to fix travel agents’ commissions. This 
is because it is one of the few proceedings in which the evidence analysed was of 
an indirect nature, which obliged the agency to go more deeply into an analysis of 
the circumstances surrounding the case and the existing evidence.
The investigation began with an article in a national daily on January 6, 2000. 
The article, entitled “Dispute Between Airlines and Agencies,” announced the deci-
sion by various airlines of reducing the commissions they pay travel agencies for 
the sale of airline tickets. According to the information published, the reductions 
would become effective as of January 1, 2000, and the commission per ticket sold 
would drop from 12% to 6%.
4 In this regard, see CPC-9–95 and CPC-32–00.
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Investigation and Analysis of the Practice
Based on these publications, CPC ordered administrative proceedings to be instituted 
against the airlines that allegedly took part in the price cartel. Specifically, it opened 
the case against the following airlines: American Airlines Inc., Continental Airlines 
Inc., United Airlines Inc., Líneas Aéreas Costarricences, S.A., Taca International 
Airlines, S.A., Grupo Taca, S.A., Compañía Panameña de Aviación, S.A., Aviateca, 
S.A., Delta Airlines Inc. and Compañía Mexicana de Aviación, S.A.
In this context, the competition authority basically had to prove two things: 
(i) that the participating agents were competitors among themselves; and (ii) that 
the agents had taken part in one of the acts prohibited by Article 11 of LPCDEC.
With regard to the first point, CPC defined the relevant market as services pro-
vided by travel agencies to the airlines, specifically services related to the market-
ing of tickets for air transport of persons. In other words, the conduct investigated 
referred specifically to the commercial relationship between airlines and travel 
agencies and not to the provision of air transport service.
This point was crucial during the case, since the parties alleged that CPC was 
incompetent to take cognizance of the acts stemming from concessions to provide 
air transport service. This is because public services are excluded from the applica-
tion of LPCDEC. However, in this case the events investigated did not refer to this 
service, but to a related market such as the commercial relationship between the 
airlines and travel agencies.
In regard to evidence to determine the existence of the practice, during the inves-
tigation CPC failed to find any document directly proving an agreement among the 
airlines to unify the rates at 6%. The facts the competition authority analysed are 
set out below.
First of all, it should be pointed out that before the proceeding was initiated, the 
airlines under investigation paid different commissions to travel agencies (defined 
as percentages of the value of the ticket).5 It was after communications were sent to 
travel agencies by the majority of the airlines in December 1999 that the rates were 
almost simultaneously unified at 6%,6 to be applied in the same geographical region 
(Central America). Likewise, the date on which the reduction went into effect was 
very similar among the airlines.7
On the basis of the above, the Commission demonstrated that similar behaviour 
existed on the part of the economic agents involved. However, it had to explain that 
the only explanation for such behaviour was none other than the existence of a cartel 
among the economic agents.
5 The percentages of commissions to travel agencies were between 6% and 12%.
6 The majority of the airlines communicated their decision between December 27 and 30, 1999. 
Only two airlines communicated it between January 5 and 7, 2000.
7 The majority of the airlines had as the date of entry into effect of the reduction January 1, 2000. 
Two of them set it for January 7 and 16 and one of them for February 1, 2000.
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Throughout the proceeding the airlines pointed out that this similar behaviour 
was the result of a unilateral decision by each one of them to follow the airlines of 
Grupo Taca, S.A. In general, the airlines maintained that they found out about that 
decision through the reservations information systems.8
As a result of these declarations, CPC requested information from the airlines 
investigated and from various travel agencies on the reservations information systems 
they use. It was shown that the commission percentage paid to the travel agencies 
was not included in these systems and that changes in these percentages were 
communicated by some kind of formal means.
Thus, the analysis of all the above-mentioned evidential elements led the com-
petition authority to conclude that the only reasonable explanation for the uniform 
fixing of the commission was that this information was already known previously. 
That is, that there was an exchange of information between the airlines that make 
up Grupo Taca, S.A. and the other airlines which culminated in an agreement 
between the latter to standardize those percentages and thus avoid competing for 
the demand for the service provided by travel agencies.9
Measures and Sanctions Applied
Based on the background information mentioned above, CPC decided to sanction the 
airlines for forming a cartel to lower the commissions they paid travel agencies. 
Despite the foregoing, the Commission decided to exonerate two of the airlines: Delta 
Airlines Inc. and Compañía Mexicana de Aviación, S.A. since these airlines commu-
nicated the reduction in their commissions on January 5 and 7, 2000, respectively. By 
those dates the reduction of the other airlines had already been made public.10
The Commission imposed fines of between 141 and 280 minimum wages. It also 
ordered all the persons participating in the absolute monopolistic practices to 
suspend them and abstain in the future from carrying out any act in violation of 
both Articles 11 and 12 of Law N° 7472.
Appeals for Reconsideration
The fact that the airline resolution basically used circumstantial or indirect evidence 
to prove the existence of the prohibited conducts gave rise to a major discussion 
8 Except for one of the airlines which stated it had known about the information through third 
parties.
9 In its analysis, CPC used the standard set by the Spanish agency to appraise evidence of an indi-
rect nature. In this regard, see rulings by the Spanish Constitutional Court 174/1985, 175/1985, 
169/1986, and 150/1987.
10 It should also be pointed out that the Commission exonerated Grupo Taca S.A., as this company 
was not a competing economic agent.
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within CPC, as well as between the parties in the proceedings. All the arguments 
put forward in the appeals were rejected on the basis of the information contained 
in the file and in the arguments set forth in the final resolution.
During the filing of the appeals, however, new factors unexpectedly came to 
light which made the agency reconsider the position upheld in the final resolution. 
Specifically, that the conduct adopted by the airlines of Grupo Taca, S.A. was 
known and therefore foreseeable several months in advance of the events that gave 
rise to the proceedings, which could have allowed the other airlines to take a uni-
lateral decision to follow the market’s leading company at the time when the latter 
took the anticipated decision.11
Thus, CPC considered that since a further possible rational explanation of the facts 
existed, and therefore doubts as to whether the conducts reflected a prohibited practice, 
it was in order to interpret such doubts in favour of the companies sanctioned and to 
reconsider the challenged resolution. However, the competition agency made it clear 
that it was not a question of whether or not use was made of the circumstantial 
evidence to justify the reconsideration, but rather the existence of new factors that 
admitted another reasonable explanation for the actions investigated.
For all the above reasons, it excluded from all responsibility the companies 
Líneas Aéreas Costarricences, S.A., Taca Internacional Airlines, S.A., Aviateca, 
S.A., United Airlines Inc., Continental Airlines Inc., American Airlines Inc. and 
Compañía Panameña de Aviación, S.A.12
Comments on the Investigation
The airlines investigation undoubtedly set a new course in analysis of evidence in 
absolute practices. Although in the end, the resolution was reconsidered, CPC made it 
quite clear that it is possible to use circumstantial or indirect evidence in this type of 
proceedings, but with certain limitations. The circumstantial evidence should be suffi-
cient and unequivocal. That is, there should be a sole reasonable explanation of the 
evidential elements. Obviously if the Commission had a wider range of investigation 
instruments, it would very probably have to depend less on this type of evidence.
This case is also significant because it somehow shows the need for agree-
ments between competition agencies, whether formal or informal, in order to 
11 In this regard, it was the representative of the association of travel agents who expressed in the 
appeal filed that the issues discussed at a meeting in Montreal and the agreements to lower the 
commissions to travel agencies were disseminated among all International Air Transport 
Association (IATA) airlines as part of the general obligations of this organization with respect to 
its members.
12 Two of the members of CPC differed from the majority opinion. In general terms, they pointed 
out that of the evidence contained in the file, the only reasonable explanation that could be upheld, 
was an agreement among the airlines to fix travel agencies’ commissions. That is, they upheld the 
opinion of the final resolution.
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proscribe anti-competitive practices. In Panama, for example, a similar investiga-
tion was conducted on the case of airlines and travel agencies. Had an agreement 
between the two agencies existed, perhaps the result of the investigation would 
have been different.
However, the competition authority has also faced other types of challenges and 
limitations. These are related to exceptions to the competition legislation provided 
for in other regulations. In this regard, one of the most controversial cases the 
Commission dealt with was the investigation of the shipping companies. The most 
important aspects of this investigation are set out below.
2.3. The Case of the Shipping Companies (CPC-39–01)
Case Description
The National Coffee Exporters Chamber filed a complaint against various shipping 
companies for alleged rate agreements between them, which led CPC to carry out 
a preliminary investigation, as a result of which it found evidence of a possible anti-
competitive practice. Nevertheless, during the course of the preliminary investiga-
tion, it was determined that Costa Rica formed part of the Code of Conduct of the 
United Nations Maritime Conferences, which has the status of an international 
agreement ratified by the Legislative Assembly in 1975, in Law N° 6074.
Articles 2 and 13 of this agreement establish the possibility of economic agents 
who are members of the Conference sharing out the market among themselves, as 
well as setting rates. This means that the economic agents involved in the shipping 
sector are exempted by the law from the application of competition regulations, 
since as the Code of Conduct of Maritime Conferences is an international agree-
ment; it possesses a higher status than ordinary law, as provided for in Article 7 of 
the Political Constitution. Furthermore, the norm is special to the maritime sector, 
so that even if it were a question of legislation with the same status, the former 
would prevail over competition regulations.13
Analysis of the Conduct and Complaint File
On rejecting the complaint, CPC criticized the situation and pointed out that effec-
tive application of competition norms would depend on consistency with the 
current legal system. Also, it stated that it was neither advisable nor fair to apply 
competition regulations to certain sectors only and that this situation was contrary 
to the Principles of Equality and Freedom of Enterprise, embodied at constitutional 
13 This criterion has been upheld by the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic in Opinion 
N° C-008–2001, in which CPC consulted the force of Articles 4 and 5 of the Law of Cooperative 
Associations N° 6756 of May 7, 1982, in relation to the provisions of LPCDEC.
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level (Articles 33 and 46 of the Political Constitution, respectively). The above was 
valid particularly when there was no type of justification for excluding a specific 
sector from the application of competition regulations, as occurred with the 
maritime sector. It also pointed out that the international regulations could even run 
counter to the Political Constitution, particularly to Article 46, which prohibits any 
monopolizing practice or tendency.
Therefore, CPC stated in its resolution that it was necessary to make amend-
ments to the law so that the different norms that comprised it should be consistent 
among themselves. In the end, the agency had to file away the case, since as the 
Code of Conduct of Maritime Conferences had higher legal status than the competi-
tion legislation; it was unable to open the proceeding.14
Comments on the Investigation
This case highlights the typical limitations that new competition agencies face upon 
becoming established in countries with a scarce culture of competition, or with 
legal systems having a protectionist slant. Hence, the activity of competition law is 
vital in the effort to change long-standing patterns.
In this context, we can cite the interventions of other agencies of the public admin-
istration in competition matters. The case of the Chorotega pallets is a good example 
of the type of obstacles CPC has faced in applying competition regulations.
2.4. The Case of the Pallet Market (CPC-39–96)
Case Description
In April 1993, the Ministry of Economy, Industry and Trade (hereinafter MEIC) 
issued Decree N° 22111 by means of which it reduced tariff protection for pallets, 
pallet boxes and other load box platforms from 15% to 1%. At the time, the measure 
was taken to address supply problems, problems with the quality of domestic pallets, 
and to protect the nation’s forests.
On November 27, 1995 several pallet production companies signed a letter 
addressed to MEIC. The letter requested the Minister to increase the pallet tariff 
14 The Coffee Exporters Chamber instituted amparo proceedings against the final resolution of the 
case of the shipping companies CPC-39–01 and against the resolution of the appeal for reconsid-
eration confirmed by this resolution. It also filed an unconstitutionality action against Chapter I 
and Articles 2, 13 and 16 of the Convention on the Code of Conduct of Maritime Conferences. 
The Constitutional Court considered that the powers conferred by the said agreement on the shipping 
companies were not contrary to the Principles of Free Competition contained in Article 46 of the 
Political Constitution and enlarged upon by LPCDEC. It therefore rejected the unconstitutionality 
action and the amparo proceedings instituted by the Coffee Exporters Chamber.
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and if this could be done, the companies pledged to maintain the maximum price 
to plant of pallets at US$9.50 per unit.
On January 26, 1996, by means of Executive Decree 24783-MEIC, the Cost, 
Insurance and Freight (CIF) tariff for pallets, pallet boxes and other load box 
platforms was increased by 10%. This decree stated the following: “The national 
wooden pallet industry has the capacity to meet domestic demand for pallets in the 
country’s banana sector and other productive and commercial branches at com-
petitive prices and has pledged to sell at the same prices as import prices, or lower, 
as a result of which it will use 100% of its installed capacity, since it is currently 
employing an underutilized production scale.”
The company Tarimas Chorotega, S.A., which was importing wooden pallets, 
filed a complaint with CPC (in April, 1996) against eight pallet manufacturing 
companies for the alleged forming of a cartel to fix the price of their products. It 
also requested the competition agency to issue its opinion on the actions of the 
administrative authorities that approved Executive Decree N° 24783, which according 
to the complainant supported the concerted agreement. Following this company’s 
action, in June 1996, the previous decree was annulled by means of Executive 
Decree N° 25275.
Investigation and Analysis of the Practice
The Commission instituted ordinary administrative proceedings against the 
offending companies in June 1996. Once the stages of the proceedings had been 
completed, CPC appraised the existing evidence and pleadings. First of all, it 
considered that the letter of November 27, 1995, signed by the companies 
denounced, constituted clear evidence of a horizontal agreement between com-
petitors to fix the maximum price of their products. The companies claimed that 
the said letter was signed at the request of the Minister of Economy, Industry and 
Trade but this fact could not be proved in the proceedings. In any event, by being 
a per se practice, the circumstances surrounding the agreement were not relevant 
to determining its illegality.
During the investigation, CPC also assessed the effects of the agreement in order 
to determine the sanction to be imposed. It requested the manufacturers to furnish 
the prices actually charged and succeeded in confirming that the majority of the 
manufacturers did not raise the agreed price of US$9.50. Nevertheless, it pointed 
out that even with the tariff increase and the prices charged by the producers, the 
importing companies were able to compete for the sector’s tax incentives.
The competition authority also referred to Executive Decree 24783-MEIC. The 
Commission did not concern itself with assessing the legality of this document, nor 
whether MEIC had acted within its powers when it raised the tariff. However, it 
pointed out that the grounds for the said decree were reprehensible and indicated to 
MEIC that it should not use its procedures to carry out practices prohibited by the 
law. In particular, it recommended to the Minister of Economy, Industry and Trade 
in the future not to endorse such agreements by means of an Executive Decree.
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Measures and Sanctions Applied
The Commission ordered the elimination of the agreement for seven of the offending 
companies. It exempted one of the manufacturing companies from all responsibility 
because it was not a competitor in the market. However, it did not apply any fine, 
since it considered that the effects on the market were minor.
Comments on the Investigation
It is worth highlighting that this was one of the agency’s first cases and its value 
in terms of jurisprudence lies in having clearly marked the competition authority’s 
independence in technical matters and criteria from MEIC, which appoints its 
commissioners and allocates its budget. This is encouraging, for it shows that 
such independence is possible for the competition agencies of small economies 
or developing countries.
Nevertheless, the Commission showed a certain weakness by not having applied 
a fine, as the forming of a cartel was so evident. Furthermore, the study on the effect 
on competition took a poor approach, since it concentrated on analysing particular 
economic agents’ possibilities of competing rather than on the process of competi-
tion as such.
3. Conclusion and Recommendation
Having analysed the competition legislation with regard to cartels, as well as the 
most representative cases in this type of practice, we will now proceed to compare 
the most significant conclusions from the previous sections in the light of best 
international practices. To that end, we will use as references the recommendations 
of the International Competition Network (ICN) and the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), as well as competition agencies with 
acknowledged experience.
3.1. Regulatory Restrictions
An essential requirement for promoting and defending competition is the existence 
of a consistent legal framework that permits cross-sectional application. The degree 
of consistency of the law directly affects the degree of effectiveness in the applica-
tion of competition legislation.15 As a matter of fact, one of the difficulties CPC has 
15 In this regard, see Curiel, 2000.
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encountered in the application of competition legislation is that part of the law 
pursues contradictory objectives. The clearest example is Article 9 of LPCDEC, 
which excludes public services from the norms established in the chapter on com-
petition. In the same way, we can cite many other sectoral regulations that exclude 
certain markets from the application of competition norms.16
This limitation has been reflected in several investigations of absolute practices 
of which the Commission has taken cognizance. Thus, one of the competition 
authority’s most significant challenges is to make sure that the legislation is applied 
to all the agents participating in the market, in whatever capacity. To that end it 
must intensify its efforts to promote competition in the public sector and pay par-
ticular attention to the opening up of regulated sectors.
3.2. Intervention by Other Public Institutions
Public institutions can play a key role in investigations of horizontal practices, but 
they can also favour this type of conduct. The agency should therefore approach 
civil servants by holding seminars, publishing newsletters or simply by making 
informal contacts with them.
In this context, certain officials are particularly strategic to the agency in inves-
tigating cartels, with emphasis on those in charge of procurement or supplies 
departments in public institutions. These civil servants are the ones who are in the 
best position to detect collusive bidding among competitors. If we analyse the cases 
dealt with by CPC in recent years, most of the investigations have been related to 
price cartels or supply restrictions. This is not to say that price cartels alone exist in 
the Costa Rican market, but rather that these are easier to detect than others where 
investigation is more difficult and costly.
In fact, OECD points out that establishing contacts with the procurement depart-
ments of public institutions is one of the best practices. This organization’s experts 
aver that such officials have an excellent knowledge of the sector and can also 
observe certain behaviour patterns in bidding processes that are key indicators in 
detecting collusive bids.17 It would therefore be very useful for CPC to establish a 
programme to systematize best practices in this regard, in order to have a wider 
range of instruments and information to detect collusive bids.
16 An example of the foregoing is the case of the Law on the Sugarcane League N° 7818 of 
September 22, 1998 and the Law on Cooperative Associations and creation of Infocoop, N° 4179 
of August, 1968.
17 As examples of successful training programmes OECD points out the cases of the USA and 
Canada. Among the activities carried out, mention is made of the publication of a list of behav-
iours that could be suspicious to public officials of procurement departments, or the establishment 
of procedures that make the forming of cartels difficult. In Korea, in addition to training officials, 
the agency monitors certain bidding processes directly (OECD, 1998).
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3.3. The Role of the Judiciary
The Judiciary is the public entity that gives CPC’s work greater legitimacy, since 
its resolutions are reviewed by this body. Therefore, one of the best practices rec-
ommended by the agencies of more developed countries is to train judges on the 
subject. In the absence of qualified judges within the country, it is recommended 
that judges from other countries with more experience in the field be brought in to 
train their counterparts.
The task of training should be ongoing, since in countries with limited culture 
of competition judges tend to favour other values over competition law. Major 
efforts have been made in Costa Rica to train the judges of the Judiciary, and 
these efforts have directly or indirectly produced very encouraging results. In this 
regard, the resolution on the real-estate brokers’ cartel is a good example.18 
Nevertheless, not all the experiences have been positive. Here we can cite the case 
of the “Code of Conduct of Maritime Conferences,” which the Constitutional Court 
considered did not run counter to Article 46 of the Political Constitution.19
To overcome this problem, the agency should intensify its efforts in the field of 
competition law in the Judiciary. This entity is part of the regulatory role in matters 
of competition. Both the legitimacy and the effectiveness of the agency’s resolu-
tions depend directly on the Law Courts.
3.4. Business Chambers and Associations
CPC’s jurisprudence has shown that business chambers and associations have 
somehow participated in the execution of anti-competitive practices, whether as 
promoters of cartels or even as those directly responsible for these conducts. In this 
regard, we can cite the case of the bean market, the case of the ice manufacturers20 
and the case of the airlines. However, the agency has been unable to establish measures 
against these economic agents, since the legislation lays down that they cannot be 
sanctioned. Only agents competing among themselves characterize the description 
of the standard on cartels.
In other legislation,21 this type of organization can be sanctioned for participa-
tion in cartels and other anti-competitive practices. It would therefore be important 
to amend the legislation so that business chambers and associations can also be 
sanctioned. It is essential for CPC to discourage this type of agreement in the places 
where competitors typically meet.
18 In this connection, see Court for Matters under Administrative Law. Second Section. Ruling No. 
275–2005.
19 See note 15.
20 In this connection, see CPC-9–95.
21 For example, the European Union’s Treaty of Rome permits sanctions against business associa-
tions or chambers for anti-competitive conducts.
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3.5. The Per Se Rule or the Rule of Reason
One of the most important points of discussion regarding cartels is about the standard 
of analysis that should be used to determine the legality or illegality of these con-
ducts. Specifically, the discussion centres on whether the per se rule or the rule of 
reason should be used. In the former case, the agency is not required to prove the 
anti-competitive effects of the conduct, since these are assumed. This rule provides 
far more legal certainty to economic agents and is less burdensome in terms of the 
resources needed to investigate a monopolistic practice. In the latter case, the anti-
competitive effects of the conduct must be demonstrated, which may sometimes 
allow an analysis of possible efficiencies. This rule has the advantage of being 
much more flexible than the per se rule, since the agency must analyse the circum-
stances surrounding each particular case.
Although each rule has its advantages and disadvantages, for a small agency 
with limited resources and a nascent culture of competition it is much more 
advisable to use the per se rule during its early years. Also, it should be pointed 
out that most experts agree that cartels never or rarely have pro-competitive 
effects.22 For example, if we analyse the jurisprudence of CPC, many of the cases 
involving this issue were sanctioned simply as the result of proof of the existence 
of an agreement. Specifically, in the case of overland container transport,23 it was 
impossible for the Commission to analyse the effects on the market due to the 
diversity of the services provided by the economic agents. If it had done so, it 
would have cost a large amount of resources and possibly the final decision 
would have been very similar.
3.6. Investigation Powers
The fundamental problem for every competition agency with regard to cartels is 
furnishing proof of their existence. Owing to the clandestine nature of this type of 
practice, there is a serious risk of evidence being destroyed or altered. Hence, most 
competition agencies consider that in addition to the power of requesting public or 
confidential information, it is essential to be able to carry out seizures and attach-
ments of documents. Some agencies, moreover, have pointed out that this type of 
tool is their first option when carrying out an investigation for horizontal practices 
(ICN, 2006).
However, if we analyse the Costa Rican experience, we can confirm that a 
considerable number of the cases have been detected through newspaper advertise-
ments or the minutes of business associations or chambers. This information alone 
has been sufficient to launch investigations. Undoubtedly this does not exemplify 
22 In this regard, see ICN, 2005a.
23 In this regard, see CPC-32–00
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the typical experience of competition agencies in investigating cartels. If we analyse 
the jurisprudence, and in particular the pleadings of the parties, it may be seen that 
in several cases the agents investigated were simply unaware of the existence of 
competition legislation. However, as the culture of competition develops, this type 
of case will tend gradually to disappear. Moreover, in recent cases investigated by 
CPC the parties’ arguments are much more sophisticated and the agency is facing 
increasing difficulties in detecting all the cases it could investigate because it does 
not have access to all the necessary tools.
This situation merits an amendment to the legislation so that the Commission 
broadens its powers of investigation. It should be pointed out, however, that the type 
of instruments needed require large amounts of financial and human resources, 
which could be a limitation for a small agency. Such an agency would therefore 
have to be very prudent in the use of the said resources and restrict them to espe-
cially serious or difficult cases.
3.7. Ten Per Cent of Sales or Assets
One of the most effective instruments for dissuading companies from committing 
horizontal practices is fines. These must obviously be sufficiently high to discour-
age economic agents from carrying out this type of practices (i.e. if by forming a 
cartel an economic agent is likely to obtain a higher profit, it prefers to run the risk 
of being fined). If we analyse CPC’s experience, we find that there has been a sig-
nificant increase in the amounts of the fines imposed.24 Nonetheless, according to 
UTA files, up to mid-2006 the agency had not applied any fine of 10% of the annual 
sales or assets of the wrongdoer in relation to cartels.
However, one possible interpretation of this Article is that the Commission can 
only apply a fine of 10% of annual sales or the assets of the infringer, which means 
that it would be difficult for it to apply such a fine in practice, since in the majority 
of cases it could break the company. This would not only exceed the purpose of 
competition legislation, but could even be unconstitutional.
It would thus be advisable to clarify this subparagraph of Article 28, or else 
amend the legislation so as to be able to apply fines ranging from 1% to 10% of the 
sales or assets of the wrongdoer. Otherwise, in practice it will only be able to apply 
the parameter of 680 minimum wages, which in cases of small companies could 
mean a high fine, but for larger companies would probably not succeed in fulfilling 
the objective of discouraging this type of practice.
24 The investigation on the palm-fruit cartel has been one of the cases in which the highest fines 
have been imposed. In this case, three absolute monopolistic practices carried out by competing 
companies in this market were sanctioned. The fines fluctuated between 28 and 569 minimum 
wages, which was directly related to the size of the companies investigated and their ability to pay. 
In addition, the individuals involved in the agreements were sanctioned with fines ranging from 1 
to 21 minimum wages (CPC-32–02).
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3.8. Penalties
Another significant point of discussion with regard to cartels has to do with the 
possibility of applying penalties, which can be highly dissuasive for the possible 
infringer. If a leniency programme is also established, this can be very effective in 
detecting and punishing this type of anti-competitive practice.
Penalties, however, have only been introduced successfully in countries with a 
long experience in the field, such as the USA. The culture of competition needs to 
be relatively well established to apply them. In other words, society must be clearly 
aware that this type of conducts is sufficiently harmful for them to be considered an 
offence. Otherwise, although this type of measure forms part of a particular legislation, 
it may never be applied. Furthermore, such measures require a fairly well-developed 
expertise on the subject in the Judiciary in order to reduce the possibility of 
committing an error to the utmost.
So although this type of instrument can be fairly useful, in a country such as 
Costa Rica and probably in various countries of the region, greater experience has 
yet to be gained in this sphere so that it can be applied.
3.9. The Leniency Programme
Leniency programmes implemented by different competition agencies have been 
one of the most effective weapons in prosecuting agreements among competitors, 
since they make it possible to discover practices that might otherwise be impossible 
to detect (OECD, 2001). These consist of the elimination or reduction of a particular 
sanction in exchange for voluntary cooperation by one of the infringers.25
In order for this programme to be successful, clarity and certainty for the person 
investigated are essential. That is, the persons or companies that cooperate should 
have full certainty as to how the possible advantages will be granted them. Also, 
these should be appropriate and attractive for the first to collaborate. Hence, pro-
grammes offering complete immunity tend to be the most successful. Obviously 
this last point is directly linked to the sanctions imposed by the authority, since if 
these are very weak or are applied infrequently; no one will have the incentive to 
cooperate with the authority (OECD, 2001).
In Costa Rica’s case, this would be a programme that could improve cartel inves-
tigation processes, since it would make it easier to detect not-so-obvious evidence. 
Moreover, it could save financial and human resources that the agency uses in 
25 One of the clearest examples is that of the US legislation, which grants total immunity in criminal 
matters. Since this country modified its leniency programme in order to extend the scope of immu-
nity, the number of requests for immunity has surpassed 20 per year and the number of sentences 
and fines has increased significantly. Likewise, since the European Commission implemented its 
programme to reduce penalties in exchange for cooperation on cases, it has received more than 20 
cases. Also, the European Commission submitted a bill with the aim of maximizing the capability 
to detect these conducts (ICN, 2006).
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investigations. However, the Commission would have to increase the fines currently 
applied so as to really generate an incentive for persons or companies to collabo-
rate. This factor is an essential requirement for the programme to work.
3.10. International Cooperation
Many competition experts believe the existence of cooperation agreements between 
competition agencies to be essential in investigating practices with cross-border 
effects. These types of agreements have been implemented largely by the agencies 
of developed countries. Nevertheless, developing countries or small economies 
should follow this same path. For example, if we analyse CPC’s jurisprudence a 
number of cases registered have originated in Costa Rica with effects in other mar-
kets and conversely, cases originating in other countries with effects in Costa Rica. 
In this regard, the case of the airlines and travel agencies began in Canada and the 
decisions taken by the airlines had effects in Costa Rica, the rest of the Central 
American countries and Panama. In fact, an investigation was opened in Panama on 
these actions that were fairly similar to those of the Costa Rican agencies.26
This means it is indispensable for the Commission to establish agreements with 
Costa Rica’s most important trading partners. Specifically, as regards cartels, it 
would be advisable to sign agreements with the agencies of neighbouring countries, 
especially if we bear in mind that in such small countries there are strong incentives 
to fix prices in the region, as well as to split up markets. The manner in which 
cooperation schemes are established will depend on each case and the resources 
available for that purpose.
Relative Monopolistic Practices
This section, like the preceding one, will analyse the legal framework for relative 
monopolistic practices and the most representative cases, in order to appraise the 
possible advantages and disadvantages of the current model and to contrast the 
analysis with the best practices in this field.
1. Regulatory Provisions
Competition legislation defines relative monopolistic practices as any acts, con-
tracts, covenants, arrangements or combinations of these between economic agents 
whose purpose or effect is or may be the undue displacement of other agents in the 
26 In this regard, see the newspaper “La Prensa,” Panama, June 6, 2001. [online] http://mensual.
prensa.com/mensual/contenido/2001/06/08/hoy/negocios/152364.html
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market, substantial hindrance to their access or the establishment of exclusive 
advantages in favour of one or several persons.
Specifically, Article 12 of the legislation prohibits the following conducts: estab-
lishment or imposition of exclusive distribution of goods or services; imposition of 
resale prices; sale or conditioned transaction to buy or sell other goods or services; 
concerted agreement among various economic agents or inviting them to exert pressure 
on some client or supplier; and production or marketing of goods and services at 
prices below their normal value.
Subparagraph (g) of the above Article also sets forth as a relative monopolistic 
practice any deliberate act that leads to competitors leaving the market or prevents their 
entry. Although this latter prohibition allows for a certain amount of flexibility in order 
to adapt to circumstances that have not been expressly provided for in other hypotheses, 
it has also been criticized for the legal uncertainty it engenders for economic agents. 
Since this matter is governed by the Principles of Penalizing Administrative Law, the 
characterization of a conduct should be as detailed as possible.27
As a requirement to determine the illegality of this type of conducts it must be 
proved that the economic agent that committed the infringement has substantial 
power28 in the relevant market.29
In other words, according to Costa Rican legislation, three factors must be 
proved in order to determine the illegality of a relative monopolistic practice: (i) 
that the economic agent has substantial power in the relevant market; (ii) that one 
of the conducts characterized has been committed; and (iii) that the said conduct 
has anti-competitive effects.
However, it should be pointed out that the legislation does not clearly indicate 
the possibility of analysing the pro-competitive effects or efficiencies that these 
types of conducts normally have. In other words, the legislation does not lay down 
the typical rule of reason in which the anti-competitive versus pro-competitive 
effects of the practice are analysed. Moreover, it could even be interpreted as meaning 
that the legislation establishes a sort of per se rule, but with the requirement that the 
economic agent should have substantial power in the relevant market. Despite this 
limitation of LPCDEC, the Commission has assessed considerations of efficiency 
27 It should be pointed out that the legislation does not characterize some vertical conducts and 
others related to abuse of position of control that are normally prohibited in other countries. 
Specifically, LPCDEC does not include cross-subsidies, discrimination among economic agents 
and denial of business.
28 Article 15 of the legislation establishes a series of criteria for determining the existence of substan-
tial power on the part of the economic agent under investigation. Specifically, there must be evidence 
of the investigated agent’s market share and the possibility of its fixing prices unilaterally, the exist-
ence of barriers to entry, the existence and power of its competitors, and its recent behavior.
29 Article 14 of LPCDEC establishes a series of criteria that serve as a basis for defining the relevant 
market, such as: the possibility of substitution of the good or service, distribution costs, its significant 
inputs, its complements and substitutes, the costs and the possibilities of consumers turning to other 
markets, and finally, national and international regulatory restrictions. Based on an analysis of these 
factors, the Commission must define a product market and a geographical market.
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in this type of cases, i.e. it has been more flexible in interpreting the regulation 
established by the legislation.
Finally, it should be pointed out that the powers of investigation and sanction are 
practically the same as for cases of absolute practices. The only difference is that 
the fines are limited to 410 minimum wages.30
2. Significant Resolutions
Having described the legal framework in the preceding section, we will study 
CPC’s experience in the analysis and investigation of relative monopolistic prac-
tices. However, it is worth noting that its experience in cases of relative practices is 
considerably less than in those involving absolute practices. Basically, there are two 
firm, representative cases in this area: the case of electrical components and the 
case of carbonated beverages and fruit juices.
The first of these investigations – on the electrical components market – was 
undertaken in CPC’s early years. The second investigation – in the carbonated bev-
erages and fruit juices market – was conducted several years later. Clearly, if these 
proceedings are compared there are major differences in the evidence obtained, the 
complexity of the analysis, and the fines imposed. Details of the most important 
features of the investigations are set out below.
2.1. The Case of the Electrical Components Market (CPC-9–95)
Case Description
The General Manager of the company Sigma Dam Accesorios Eléctricos de 
Centroamérica, S.A. (Sigma Dam) filed a complaint against the company Bticino 
Costa Rica, S.A. (Bticino), in 1995, for an alleged infringement of LPCDEC. The 
origin of the complaint was the text of some communications from Bticino to 
its distributors.
CPC opened the proceeding in order to analyse four possible anti-competitive 
conducts by Bticino: (i) a possible price reduction below normal value carried out 
by this company in order to deliberately cause the exit of its competitors from the 
market or prevent their entry; (ii) an alleged price imposition on its distributors, as 
well as the establishment of sanctions in case of failure to comply; (iii) a possible 
exclusive distribution by Bticino in order to introduce its imported products into the 
domestic market and; (iv) an alleged transaction subject to the condition not to 
acquire goods normally offered to third parties.
30 As with cartels, in especially serious cases it can impose fines of up to 10% of annual sales or 
10% of the infringer’s assets.
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Investigation and Analysis of the Practices
In order to analyse the above-mentioned practices, CPC conducted a market study 
in which it requested information from the different participants in the production 
and marketing chain. Also, it arranged for two appearances so that the parties could 
present their pleadings.
The above with the aim of demonstrating the existence of the factors of the type 
provided for in Article 12 of the legislation in order to prove the commission of 
relative monopolistic practices. These were: (i) Bticino’s substantial power in the 
relevant market; (ii) the characterization of the practices denounced; and (iii) the 
anti-competitive effects.
On substantial power in the relevant market
CPC set the limits of the relevant market as the market for low-voltage electrical 
appliances normally used in households. The rationale for this definition was based 
mainly on the fact that the possibilities for substitution of the goods were minimal, 
and that safety reasons almost invariably obliged consumers to use this type of 
appliance in households. The agency did not explicitly delimit the geographical 
market. Nevertheless, from the factors analysed in the resolution it can be inferred 
that the latter was defined as the national territory.31
As regards substantial power, the agency determined that the market share of the 
offending company was around 80%. It stated that although a high market share 
was not synonymous with substantial power, this factor constituted a strong indica-
tion. There is no record in the resolution as to how the existence of that share was 
determined.
The offending company, for its part, contributed a study on cross-elasticity 
which calculated that the latter was high (2.37, 1.32, 1.66) in three important lines 
of products in the range of low-voltage electrical appliances. The Commission, by 
contrast, considered that the said elasticity was not so high as to inhibit significant 
market power for Bticino. CPC, using the Lerner Index, showed that although the 
company did not have dramatic substantial market power, a value of 0.75 was sig-
nificant and revealing.32
Thus, based only on some of the factors the legislation establishes, CPC con-
cluded that Bticino had substantial power in the relevant market.
31 The following were among the entry barriers analysed in the resolution: distortions in the 
exchange rate, transport costs, international prices and tariff protection for inputs. Likewise, CPC 
pointed out that even though there were hundreds of retail distributors (hardware stores), the dis-
tribution channels were significantly concentrated.
32 This index adopts values of between 0 and 1: The value 1 is associated with a strong, aggressive 
market power, and 0 with a widely competitive market.
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Practices investigated33
Having proven the existence of the offending company’s substantial power in the 
 relevant market, the Commission analysed the practices investigated and their effects on 
the market. The practices investigated by CPC were the following: (i) exclusive 
 distribution; (ii) imposition of resale prices; (iii) transaction subject to the condition of 
not purchasing goods normally offered from third parties; and (iv) predatory prices.
Exclusive distribution
The first practice CPC analysed was possible exclusive distribution on the part of 
Btcino to its distributors. To that end, the agency ordered a market study from the 
Trade Directorate of MEIC. The study revealed that Bticino conditioned the sale of 
its products to exclusivity or awarded prizes in exchange for this condition. Despite 
the above, the Commission had to reject the study since the officials who conducted 
it failed to comply with the formalities required by the legislation.
Furthermore, the witnesses called upon to appear in order to determine the mer-
its of the study all denied selling only Bticino products and in any event pointed out 
that if they did so it was by their own volition and due to the greater demand for 
that brand’s products. By virtue of this and of the lack of additional evidence of the 
existence of possible illegal distribution, any sanction for infringement of subpara-
graph (a) of Article 12 was ruled out.
Imposition of resale prices
Second, CPC assessed the possible imposition of resale prices by the offending 
company to its distributors. The main evidence found by the agency in analysing 
this practice was a communication that the sales manager sent to its distributors, 
backed and acknowledged by the company’s general manager, in which distributors 
were asked to calculate consumer prices according to a particular formula. The note 
indicated that if the distributor did not comply, sanctions would be applied, ranging 
from a reprimand to suspending delivery of goods.
The agency was unable to gather suitable evidence of the effects of the conduct 
on the market.34 Despite the foregoing, the Commission considered that the note 
33 CPC also analysed the possible commission of practices that could lead to the departure of 
competitors or to preventing their entry. In this regard, the agency’s interpretation was that in order to 
consider these acts punishable, it had to be a question of express, aggressive and evident acts that 
were not provided for in the other subparagraphs of Article 12 and that exceeded any company’s logical 
and normal interest in achieving a greater market share or defending its current share, with strategies 
that enabled it to face its competitors. The Commission did not find evidence to suggest that Btcino’s 
intent was to push Sigma Dam out of the market, but rather considered that its strategies sought to 
maintain its market position, which had been threatened by the entry of a new competitor.
34 There was evidence in the file to the effect that the resale price was not uniform in the retail market. 
However, CPC discarded the evidence, since it was gathered several months after the complaint had 
been filed. The agency did not succeed in collecting evidence for the months between July and 
September, which were the months when the notes were sent to the distributors.
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was clear, sufficient and direct evidence that the company under investigation had 
the intent of obliging its distributors to charge consumers a particular price, thus 
eliminating intra-brand competition. The agency therefore considered that a viola-
tion of subparagraph (b) of Article 12 of LPCDEC had indeed taken place on the 
part of the offending company.
Transaction subject to the condition of not purchasing goods normally 
offered from third parties
The third practice CPC investigated was the conditioned sale of Bticino products, 
so that distributors should not acquire the competition products. Regarding this 
practice, the agency obtained evidence supporting the fact that the offending com-
pany conditioned the continuance of commercial relations with a hardware store to 
its refraining from acquiring goods offered by Sigma Dam. To demonstrate this, it 
based itself on statements and documentary evidence in which the general manager 
of the company under investigation and the owner of one of the country’s most 
important hardware stores stated that distribution of Bticino products was condi-
tioned to that company’s not acquiring Sigma Dam products.
On the infringement investigated, the Commission established an important 
legal principle. Specifically, it pointed out that it was not necessary for the conduct 
to be generalized in order for the illegality of this type of conduct to be determined; 
rather the existence of one such case was sufficient to establish the pertinent sanc-
tion. It thus stated that the conduct prevented its competitor from gaining access to 
this channel and consumers to a greater variety of products. For this reason, the 
Commission considered that there had been a breach of subparagraph (d) of Article 
12 of LPCDEC.
Marketing of goods at prices below normal price (predatory prices)35
The agency found evidence that Bticino lowered its prices in the product lines just 
when its market position was being threatened by Sigma Dam’s entry. Specifically, 
there was an overall change in price policy in which the price of some products 
went up, essentially imported products, and others went down.
Nonetheless, according to the evidence found by the agency, the reduction did 
not set the prices at below-cost levels. The profit margin, although significantly 
lower, was always higher than the producer’s cost, including administration and 
marketing overheads. Also, no price was ever lower than its competitor’s, Sigma Dam. 
CPC therefore considered that the price reductions did not violate the competition 
35 To analyse this practice, CPC stated that predatory prices could be defined in two ways: by 
measuring the marginal cost (stricter method), or the unit cost (less-strict method). According to 
the first yardstick, the concern is that no agent should sell at a price lower than that which provides 
it with reasonable profits. However, the Commission considered that the difficulty in calculating 
the marginal cost has led to the use of the second concept and to the use rather of rules presump-
tive of that level of profits that is acceptable in a particular economy.
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legislation, since although Btcino could lower its profits, if they were kept above 
the costs, this was legitimate.
Measures and Sanctions Applied
To impose sanctions, CPC took into account various features of the legislation. It 
considered as an aggravating factor the express and careless manner in which the 
circulars to bring the market under control were issued. In this regard, it pointed out 
that the indications of intentionality were particularly strong, since the resolution’s 
chief evidence was documents acknowledged by the head of the company in which 
express reference was made to the practices that should be sanctioned. The infringer’s 
market share was considered another important aggravating circumstance. As 
a mitigating factor, CPC took into account that this was the first investigation on 
relative monopolistic practices conducted in the country.
Moreover, the agency made a distinction between the two practices analysed. On 
the one hand, it considered as an aggravating factor in establishing the sanction the 
fact that the imposition of resale prices had been done in a generalized manner in 
the market. On the other, it considered as a mitigating factor the fact that the only 
evidence found of the practice of imposing conditions was in regard to one distribu-
tor of these products.
CPC therefore ordered Bticino, in accordance with subparagraph (a) of Article 
25 of Law N° 7472, to discontinue measures aimed at establishing resale prices and 
conditioning the sale of its products. Likewise, it proceeded to establish a fine 
equivalent to 60 times the amount of a monthly minimum wage for imposing resale 
prices and 40 for imposing conditions to acquire products normally offered from 
third parties, within the limit of 410 minimum wages.
Comments on the Investigation
The electrical components case was an important step forward for CPC. The agency 
was successful in carrying out its first investigation on relative monopolistic practices. 
It established an important precedent in terms of evidence, which was subsequently 
used in the case of carbonated beverages and fruit juices. That is, suffice it to find one 
case or piece of evidence of some conduct in order to meet the definition of the legal 
concept established in Article 12 of LPCDEC. Nonetheless, the agency did not carry 
out a thorough analysis of the anti-competitive effects of the practices investigated, 
nor of the essential factors to determine substantial power in the relevant market.
Due to the complexity of this type of case, several years elapsed before the 
Commission succeeded in establishing another investigation on relative monopolistic 
practices that had a significant impact on the behaviour of economic agents in the 
market. It was not until the investigation on the carbonated beverages and fruit 
juices market that CPC was once again able to set standards of conduct for agents 
with market power.
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2.2.  The Case of the Carbonated Beverages and Fruit Juices 
Market (CPC-19–04)
Case Description
In May 2001 the companies PepsiCo Inc., Pepsi-Cola Interamericana de Guatemala, 
S.A. and Pepsi-Cola Manufacturing Company of Uruguay S.R.L. filed a complaint 
against The Coca-Cola Company and Embotelladora Panamco Tica, S.A. for con-
sidering that the latter companies carried out relative monopolistic practices. In 
June 2001, the company Embotelladora Centroamericana filed a complaint against 
Embotelladora Panamco Tica, S.A. for the same reasons.36
CPC decided to deal jointly with the above-mentioned complaints, opening an 
ordinary administrative proceeding against the companies Coca Cola Inter-
American Corporation and Embotelladora Panamco Tica, S.A., considering that 
there were sufficient grounds in the administrative file for this purpose. The prac-
tices investigated were the following: imposition of resale prices, imposition of 
minimum purchase volumes, exclusivity in the use of refrigeration equipment, 
exclusivity in vending machines, product exclusivity in stores, tied sales and price 
discrimination.37
Investigation and Analysis of the Practice
CPC carried out an extensive investigation on the market. To that end, it requested 
information from the competitors on the market’s characteristics, products mar-
keted, sales, distribution systems and their relationship with clients and consumers, 
among other factors. Likewise, it requested information from clients in different 
distribution channels on their relations with beverage producing companies as 
regards: price policies and marketing and sales policies, among other topics. It also 
arranged for the parties to appear in order to present their pleadings.
Once the investigation was completed, CPC handed down its final resolution. In 
this context and in accordance with the LPCDEC, proving the existence of the illegal 
conducts involved analysing three elements: (i) substantial power in the relevant 
market on the part of the agent investigated; (ii) execution of the practices characterized 
36 Subsequently, other beverage producing companies joined this proceeding. Thus, Refrescos La 
Mundial, S.A., La Cruz Blanca, S.A. and Fábrica de Refrescos y Sirope La Flor, S.A. requested 
to be considered as additional parties in the complaint filed. These requests were admitted by CPC 
in October 2001 and on October 16, 2001.
37 CPC exonerated Embotelladora Panamco Tica, S.A. from all responsibility for the commission 
of anti-competitive practices of tied sales and price discrimination set forth in subparagraphs (c) 
and (g) of Article 12 of LPCDEC, since no indication was found that they were carrying out such 
acts. The agency simply reiterated the prohibition on conditioning the sale of a product to other 
products from different markets and ratified that price discrimination was prohibited.
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in Article 12 on the part of the offending company; and (iii) anti-competitive effects 
of the conducts.38 A summary of the features analysed is set forth below.
Relevant market
The first aspect the Commission defined was the product market, establishing it as 
that of non-alcoholic carbonated beverages and canned or bottled fruit juices. This 
definition gave rise to a major controversy, since the complainants claimed that the 
market should include carbonated beverages alone. Nevertheless, CPC decided that 
all the products contemplated could be substituted among themselves, since the 
technical studies showed a high cross-elasticity of demand. That is, the increase in 
the price of one product determined a displacement of the demand for same towards 
demand for the other product. Furthermore, the agency based its decision on 
various studies on the characteristics, uses and prices of the beverages, as well as 
their production processes.
The second factor analysed was the geographical market, which was defined as 
the entire national territory, since: (i) the marketing companies had a national dis-
tribution network; (ii) the companies did not differentiate their sales and marketing 
policies according to geographical areas; (iii) there were no restrictions to limit 
supply within the country; and (iv) the conducts denounced were carried out irre-
spective of the geographical area in which their clients operated.39
Substantial market power
To establish the substantial power of the agent investigated, CPC determined as a 
first factor that this company had a 74% share of the relevant market as defined. In 
addition, it analysed possible barriers to entry and in this regard pointed out that 
since beverages were goods acquired on impulse or in a routine manner, intensive 
distribution was required so as to be able to place the product in the largest number 
of sales outlets possible. The Commission considered this fact a barrier to entry.
Similarly, it considered the strength of the established brands and the advertising 
investment required to enter the market as an entry barrier. In this connection, the 
offending company had a wide-ranging portfolio of brands of carbonated and non-
carbonated beverages, with products differentiated into different presentations and 
flavours, some of which were leading products in their categories.
Finally, CPC considered that there were no greater legal barriers, since taxes 
were applied to domestic and foreign beverages alike. Moreover, the customs tariff 
was 15%, which was not considered a significant obstacle to importing products.
38 LPCDEC lays down that it must be demonstrated that the practices have or may have the purpose 
or effect of unduly displacing other agents from the market, substantially hindering access to same 
or establishing exclusive advantages in favour of one or several persons.
39 It should be pointed out that the parties submitted various studies on different aspects of the rel-
evant market, which to a certain extent made the agency’s work easier, since in general it is diffi-
cult to obtain so much quality information on the market. However, it should be noted that the 
agency depended largely on the documents contributed by the parties in taking its decision, and 
not on its own investigation, which would have been too costly.
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Once the agency had concluded that the company investigated had substantial 
power in the relevant market, it proceeded to analyse the practices denounced.40
Imposition of resale prices
The first conduct analysed was the imposition of consumer resale prices on the part 
of the offending company to its distributors. It was proven in the proceeding that 
Embotelladora Panamco Tica, S.A. established clauses in sales agreements with its 
distributors suggesting consumer sale prices, and in some of them, clauses were 
even found referring to the obligation of keeping to the price lists.
In addition, it was proven that the company distributed resale price lists in all the 
businesses with an ambiguous wording, which lent itself to doubting the latter’s 
nature as a suggestion.41
Having analysed the evidence, CPC found the issuance of suggested resale prices 
permissible, as long as it was clear that these were not obligatory in nature. The rule 
laid down in this case was that a company with substantial power should make it 
expressly clear that the client did not have the obligation of following these lists.
Under these circumstances, the agency penalized the company investigated, con-
sidering that the anti-competitive effect of this practice was reducing intra-brand 
competition, i.e. the conduct reduced competition in products of the same brand 
among the different establishments and limited retailers’ freedom to establish their 
sale prices. Thus, a fine of 410 minimum wages was established for violation of sub-
paragraph (b) of LPCDEC. Furthermore, it ordered the company to discontinue the 
practice, eliminate the provisions of the contracts that obliged clients to keep to the 
lists, and change the wording of the same to indicate these were suggested prices and 
retailers were the ones to decide the price at which they should sell the products.
Minimum purchase volume
Second, CPC analysed the possible imposition of purchase volumes to distributors. 
Regarding this conduct, it was proven that the company Embotelladora Panamco 
Tica, S.A. had signed written contracts with different types of businesses, mainly 
schools and colleges, in which a series of benefits were offered in exchange for a 
minimum purchase volume. However, the Commission decided to absolve the com-
pany investigated of this charge, since in the establishments in which the minimum 
volume was demanded there was also an obligation of exclusivity, and it was there-
fore not possible to determine in themselves the anti-competitive effects of fixing 
minimum purchase volumes.
40 On establishing responsibilities for the practices investigated, CPC held Coca Cola Inter-
American Corporation and Embotelladora Panamco Tica, S.A. responsible. However, it imposed 
sanctions and measures on the bottling company, as this company was the one that directly exe-
cuted the illegal conducts.
41 In addition to the contractual clauses obliging distributors to follow the price lists, the 
Commission criticized the fact that the offending company’s route delivery men affixed these lists 
directly in commercial establishments, chambers or cafés within sight of consumers.
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The Costa Rican authority was clear in pointing out that demanding a minimum 
purchase volume was not always a prohibited practice. It was so only in cases in 
which the minimum volume became an exclusivity either in fact or in complicity 
or else when such volumes were fixed in irrational quantities that surpassed the real 
cost of the investment made in the establishment. It also pointed out that fixing a 
minimum volume could constitute an entry barrier if it was established within a 
contract having a very long term or conditioned to new premises that the client 
might establish in the future.
Exclusivity in the use of refrigeration equipment
Another of the conducts investigated was the establishment of exclusive use of 
refrigeration equipment. During the investigation it was determined that the offending 
company granted such equipment to its distributors for exclusive sale of its products. 
CPC considered that although it was understandable, being an investment of the com-
pany’s, that use of the equipment by the competition’s products should be restricted, 
for a company with substantial market power, imposing this condition in small establish-
ments could restrict competition and reduce consumers’ possibilities to choose.
That is to say, the rule the Commission established was that companies could 
request exclusivity in the use of their refrigeration equipment as long as this did not 
become an entry barrier to the market. Determining whether or not the equipment 
was an entry barrier depended on whether or not there was sufficient space on the 
premises to install additional equipment. In case of lack of space, the condition of 
exclusivity in the use of refrigeration equipment did constitute a barrier to entry for 
competitors.42
In keeping with the above reasoning, CPC determined that the practice could 
hinder the access of new participants. Consequently, the company Embotelladora 
Panamco Tica, S.A. was sanctioned by ordering it to abstain from imposing, includ-
ing or negotiating in any manner, exclusivity clauses with its clients with respect to 
refrigeration equipment in locales where there was no space to set up another 
refrigerator for products considered part of the relevant market.43
Product exclusivity in stores
The Commission also investigated the establishment of exclusivity agreements by 
the offending company. It was determined in the proceeding that Embotelladora 
Panamco Tica, S.A. had indeed established sales agreements in some marketing 
42 CPC established a similar principle for the case of vending machines. Basically it pointed out 
that if the machine was owned by the trader, the offending company could not condition the type 
of products he should sell. Furthermore, it stated that if the machine belonged to the bottling 
company (and its use was provided to the client free of charge), exclusivity could be established 
only in cases in which there was a material impossibility of sharing the machine, whether for rea-
sons of space or other duly proven ones. In either case, there could not be a contractual limitation 
to hinder the client’s free decision.
43 The criticism levelled at this parameter established by the Commission was that it could give rise 
to some uncertainty among traders, since in some establishments it could be difficult to determine 
whether or not there was enough space for additional equipment.
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channels, which included an exclusivity or preference44 clause for the business in 
the sale of the said company’s beverages. The Commission considered that this type 
of actions reduced competition and led to the displacement of competitors while 
hindering the entry of new participants. It therefore considered that Embotelladora 
Panamco Tica, S.A. violated subparagraph (a) of Article 12 and the company was 
thus sanctioned with a fine. This fine was 410 minimum wages. Moreover, the 
agency ordered it to eliminate this type of clauses from current contracts, as well as 
to abstain from including them in future ones.
Although CPC had indicated that exclusivity admitted reasons of efficiency on 
some occasions, for this case it considered that in view of the offending company’s 
market power, no product exclusivity contract was acceptable. In its opinion, when 
a company had that degree of power, no possible benefit it could offer justified a 
total block on the competition’s products.
Comments on the Investigation
The jurisprudence established by CPC in the resolution on the carbonated bever-
ages and fruit juices market set the guidelines on the manner in which companies 
having market power should behave. In this regard, the resolution laid down the 
notion for the first time in the country that the conduct’s negative impact is related 
to the level of power of the agent investigated. The greater the market power, the 
worse the effects of a relative monopolistic practice and therefore the more the 
company’s actions should be restricted.
The Commission also established as a principle that among all the possible 
alternatives to attain a commercial end, companies should choose the one that is 
least restrictive to competition. According to the agency, conducts are acceptable as 
long as they are carried out within a framework that allows the participation of dif-
ferent companies in the market, and when the restrictions for the benefit provided 
are reasonable. Finally, it should be pointed out that the agency’s resolution was 
also criticized, specifically, for the time it took CPC to resolve the case45 and 
because the amounts of the sanctions were considered too low.
3. Conclusions and Recommendations
As in the previous section, having analysed competition legislation in the area of 
relative practices, as well as the most representative cases, we now go on to present 
the most significant conclusions of the previous sections in the light of best 
44 In this context, “exclusivity” and “preference” agreements were considered equivalents, given 
that the effects of the contract were the same.
45 This was basically due to the fact that during the proceeding the parties lodged various amparo 
proceedings before the Constitutional Court, which to a certain extent delayed resolution of the 
case. In addition, the file was sizable and contained a large amount of confidential information, 
which required many UTA resources to properly appraise the documents that comprised it.
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 international practices. Specifically, reference will be made to the analysis of 
 prohibited conducts, the investigation instruments used, the imposed remedies and 
sanctions, the participation of state institutions in the market and the judicial back-
ground in the field.
3.1. Analysis of the Legality of Conducts
Costa Rican legislation formulates a sort of rule of reason which by its very nature 
should be as flexible as possible in order to adapt it to each case. However, Costa 
Rica’s legalist tradition, especially important in the area of sanctioning, tends to 
favour legal certainty over other values. For example, relative monopolistic prac-
tices are characterized previously, which provides considerable weight to proving a 
particular conduct or not.
Along these lines, one of the most recent criticisms of the European system is 
that Article 82 of the Treaty of Rome places greater emphasis on characterization 
of the practice than on assessment of its effects. Some experts have pointed out 
that ex ante characterization runs the risk of leaving some conducts without sanc-
tions. In other words, economic agents could carry out a conduct not expressly 
provided for, with the same anti-competitive effects as the practice characterized 
(EAGCP, 2005).
In view of the above, rather than taking confirmation of the existence of a par-
ticular conduct as a point of departure, the competition agency should begin by 
detecting the anti-competitive effects. In point of fact, one same practice, depend-
ing on the environment and circumstances in which it is executed, can have pro-
competitive or anti-competitive effects. If the agency concentrated on detecting the 
effects of the conducts, case analysis would be more consistent, since practices with 
similar effects would be treated in the same manner (EAGPC, 2005).
Great care must be taken in bringing these ideas into the context of the Central 
American countries. This discussion arises in countries with a considerably more 
developed culture of competition than in our own countries. That is, it would be 
premature to change the rules of the game in the Central American region, where 
economic agents are beginning to understand the concept of abuse of dominant 
position and the competition agencies are starting to deal with their first cases. 
Nonetheless, CPC and the other authorities of the area should not loose sight of this 
discussion, so that in analysing a practice of abuse of dominant position, the issue 
that should determine its illegality should be proving the anti-competitive effects.
3.2. Investigation Instruments and International Cooperation
As in the case of absolute monopolistic practices, in carrying out investigations on 
relative practices it is essential to rely on relevant information. However, in these 
cases the problem is of a different nature and is related to the fact that most of the 
information depends on a single economic agent who generally holds a significant 
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market share. The main consequence of this situation lies in the fact that for the 
agency it is extremely difficult to compare the information it gathers in order to 
determine its truthfulness. On the one hand, because normally there is no other 
similar agent, and on the other because it stands to reason that the agent investigated 
has no incentive to submit the information.
Furthermore, the other economic agents normally depend on the agent with 
substantial power. For instance, a distributor of a particular product normally 
wishes to have a good relationship with its supplier, especially if the latter is dominant 
in the market. Hence, with a few exceptions, since it could signal the end of the 
business relations, a distributor is unlikely to file a complaint for relative monopo-
listic practices against its supplier, and nor will it collaborate in an investigation 
against it. Moreover, it should be pointed out that the investigated agents are 
frequently multinational companies whose strategic decisions on sales and marketing 
policies are taken at their head offices in other countries. This means that the information 
may not even be available within the country.
It is therefore essential for CPC to increase its investigation powers so that in 
addition to requesting public or confidential information, it can carry out searches 
and attachment of documents. It is also important for the agency to promote inter-
national cooperation with neighbouring countries, as well as with strategic coun-
tries, so that it can gain access to information outside Costa Rica.
3.3. Remedies and Sanctions
There are various types of remedies or sanctions with regard to practices of abuse 
of dominant position that can be applied to economic agents that commit this type 
of offence. In order to define the most appropriate remedy or sanction in a partic-
ular case, OECD points out that the competition agency must be very clear about 
the goal it wishes to meet and the consequences that the instrument chosen could 
bring about.
For example, one of the agency’s objectives could be to ensure that the market 
in which the offence was committed comes as close as possible to perfect competi-
tion. However, if economies of scale are generated by the industry, fulfilling this 
objective could diminish productive efficiency in the market, which over the long 
term could reduce incentives to innovate. The agency could also promote the elimi-
nation of entry barriers. For example, a sector’s tariffs can be eliminated with the 
aim of diminishing the firm’s dominance through international competition. 
However, this type of remedy implies costs for the government (OECD, 1996).
In addition, some remedies seek to eliminate or alter an abusive conduct in the 
market. But this type of measures gives rise to costs for the agencies, since they 
have to use resources to confirm that the orders issued to economic agents are com-
plied with. Another available remedy is the establishment of measures to change 
the market structure. Some experts believe that this type of instruments should be 
used cautiously, as once the remedy has been executed it is difficult to revert 
(OECD, 1996).
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In any event, the important thing is for the agencies to have the widest possible 
range of options to discourage this kind of conducts, or else to correct their negative 
effects. That is, in cases of practices involving abuse of dominant position, in 
general the application of a simple fine is not sufficient to eliminate or correct a 
particular situation.46
3.4. State Institutions
There are still various state-owned enterprises in Costa Rica that have a dominant 
position assigned by Law. Like any other economic agent, state enterprises are 
exposed to committing relative monopolistic practices. In most cases, however, they 
are partially or fully exempt from the application of competition legislation. For 
example, the Costa Rican Electricity Institute is totally excluded from antimonopoly 
regulation.47 Another case is the National Liquor Factory, which has an absolute 
monopoly on alcohol distilling, but can grant concessions in the preparation of liquors 
and competes freely in marketing a finished product. In practice this means that in the 
relations with its competitors the competition legislation can be applied.48
Although one can argue that all monopolies granted by Law should disappear 
and allow competition in the market, this issue involves political and other kinds of 
considerations that are beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, even if these 
monopolies were kept in place, at least the LPCDEC should be applied to these 
enterprises in order to prevent conducts that may affect the process of unrestricted 
competition.
3.5. The Judiciary
As in the issue of horizontal practices, training the Judiciary in the area of practices 
involving abuse of dominant position is essential. In fact, the analysis of such prac-
tices is generally more complex, since it requires the use of economic instruments 
to determine the legality or illegality of conducts.
At present, no final resolution is known in this matter on the part of the Judiciary, 
and it is therefore not possible to technically assess its work. However, there are various 
cases of which it will take cognizance in the near future. For this reason, it is impor-
tant to emphasize the point that training sources should be placed at its disposal. In 
this regard, it should be borne in mind that the Judiciary is not only an active part of 
the regulatory process of competition, but also the final authority available in resolution 
46 In this context, in the case of carbonated beverages and juices the measures that obliged the 
company to change its commercial practices were much more significant than the fines imposed.
47 In this regard, see Article 9 of LPCDEC.
48 In 2004 and 2005 two investigations were opened against the National Liquor Factory. See CPC 
files D-14–04 and IO-01–06.
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of the cases referred to it. Therefore, the Courts play a vital, long-term role in defining 
the criteria and interpretations of competition legislation.
Concentrations
In addition to absolute and relative monopolistic practices, company concentrations 
are also a usual object of regulation by competition laws and Costa Rica is no 
exception. For the purposes of this study, the issue will be analysed in line with the 
same methodology as the previous sections. Initially, the applicable legislation and 
the Commission’s experience will be reviewed, and subsequently an analysis of 
same will be made in the light of best practices in the matter.
1. Regulatory Provisions
In Costa Rica, concentrations are regulated by Article 16 of LPCDEC. In accord-
ance with these provisions, a concentration is:
the merger, acquisition of control or any other act by virtue of which corporations, associa-
tions, shares, capital stock, trust funds or assets in general, carried out between competi-
tors, suppliers, clients or other economic agents, with the purpose or effect of diminishing, 
harming or hindering unrestricted competition, with respect to the same, similar or sub-
stantially related goods or services.
Thus, if we analyse the above text literally, we could conclude that Costa Rican 
legislation would appear not to distinguish between concentrations that are harmful 
to the process of competition and those that are not. Rather, operations described as 
concentrations are those that have an anti-competitive purpose or effect. Article 39 
of the Regulations of the said Law would seem to be drafted in much the same 
manner, since it states that a sanction will be imposed in cases where the existence 
of a concentration is determined.
Article 28 of the LPCDEC, which addresses the issue of sanctions, sets forth that 
CPC may order total or partial de-concentration “when there has been an undue 
concentration.” Similarly, this Article sets a fine of 410 minimum wages for those 
who incur “in any of the concentrations prohibited in this Law.” This wording 
seems to imply that there are concentrations that are not prohibited by Law. This 
second interpretation, as we shall see, is the one the agency has followed in its 
jurisprudence.
For an analysis of such practices, the aforementioned Article 16 refers to the 
same criteria for measuring market power as those used to assess relative monopolistic 
practices. LPCDEC definitively prohibits only concentrations with an anti-competitive 
purpose or effect. Thus, for a concentration to be liable to a sanction, it must be 
demonstrated that it tends to create or maintain a position of substantial power in 
the relevant market, and that it has an anti-competitive purpose or effect.
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By contrast to much legislation in other countries, LPCDEC does not establish 
a prior notification procedure by companies for concentration operations. CPC’s 
powers are limited to the application of a posteriori measures. The main limitation 
of this path is that it is often practically impossible to de-concentrate a merger that 
has already taken place, except at a high cost, giving rise to even greater inefficiencies 
in the competition process.
By way of exception, the Law on Workers’ Protection N° 7983 of August 20, 
2001, lays down a prior authorization procedure for concentrations between pensions 
operators. Such authorization is granted by the Superintendence of Pensions, which 
has the obligation to request CPC’s opinion. The purpose of this provision, according 
to the text of the Law is to ensure that “the merger process does not harm the interests 
of beneficiaries or levels of competition.”
Finally, regarding the investigation, LPCDEC does not differentiate between the 
proceeding to investigate concentrations and the one to be followed when investigating 
monopolistic practices. This also gives rise to major limitations, since the ordinary 
administrative proceeding is designed as an eminently punitive process whose objec-
tives frequently differ from those pursued by investigations on concentrations.
2. Relevant Resolutions
Few cases of concentrations have been pursued by CPC, probably due to the limita-
tions of the regulatory framework. Below we will comment on two cases that show 
the system’s advantages and weaknesses. First of all we will analyse the merger 
between Kimberly Clark Costa Rica, S.A. and Scott Paper de Costa Rica, S.A., 
which was the first concentration dealt with by the competition agency. Second, we will 
analyse the concentration of the pensions operators Banex and Interfin, which was 
one of the few cases in which prior notification was submitted.
2.1.  Merger Between Kimberly Clark Costa Rica, S.A. and Scott Paper 
De Costa Rica, S.A. (CPC-05–96)
Case Description
The investigation was conducted as a result of a complaint filed in February, 1996, 
by Procter and Gamble Interamericas de Costa Rica, S.A. The complaint accused 
the companies Kimberly Clark Costa Rica, S.A. and Scott Paper de Costa Rica, S.A. 
of entering into a concentration prohibited by LPCDEC, and therefore of infringing 
Article 16 of same.
The complaint was grounded on the possible negative effects on the structure of 
competition in the market for paper products for domestic use in Costa Rica. 
Consequently, the complainant requested CPC to take the necessary action to prevent 
the above-mentioned adverse effects.
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Investigation and Analysis of the Concentration
As a result of the complaint a preliminary investigation was carried out, and by 
means of a decision on record in the Minutes of Regular Session N° 20 of May 
1996, the opening of the ordinary proceeding to investigate the actions denounced 
was ordered.
During the proceeding the following evidential elements were collected: com-
mercial information requested from different companies participating in the mar-
ket; official customs information on imports and exports of paper-associated 
products and on the evolution of tariffs on same; official MEIC information on the 
evolution of paper product prices; and information requested from the companies 
under investigation on prices, sales volumes and other relevant company informa-
tion. Also, two appearances were convened to furnish proof, among which certain 
competitors of the offending companies were summoned, among others.
In the first instance, the agency analysed the concept of concentration according 
to LPCDEC. Here, the Commission was of the opinion that the effects or conse-
quences of the conduct, rather than its intention, should be considered. In this 
regard, it pointed out that the mere effect of diminishing competition, irrespective 
of the spirit of the companies that were concentrating, made the operation subject 
to the suspension, correction or suppression of the concentration.49
The product’s relevant market was defined as including four products derived 
from tissue paper: toilet paper, paper napkins, kitchen towels and facial tissues. All 
these products were being marketed by both companies prior to the merger. Costa 
Rica was defined as the geographical market. This in terms of transport costs, tariffs 
and normal strategies of companies participating in other countries of the area, 
which are usually concentrated in local markets.
The offending companies’ defence is centred mainly on making light of their 
market power. They also argued that the merger was between companies of foreign 
origin and that, judging by their previous behaviour, there should be no fear that in 
the future the market concentration should result in aggressive behaviour with regard 
to prices or marketing conditions. Another argument put forward by these compa-
nies was that the merger did not involve pooling productive assets but only adminis-
trative structures, and that the complainant had no investments in Costa Rica.
These arguments led CPC to assert that in accordance with Article 70 of 
LPCDEC, although there had been no concentration of assets or merger at the statu-
tory and shares levels, the fact that the two firms would respond to a single eco-
nomic interest group made it possible to consider them a single unit with regard to 
business activity. In order to conclude that the companies, even though legally 
being separate entities, operated as a single firm, recourse was taken to various ele-
ments of fact, such as the use of common stationery, single price lists, use of a single 
administrative head office and a single warehouse, among others.
49 In this connection, see CPC-05–96, Preambular Paragraph II.
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Particular circumstances in Costa Rica would likely lead one to suppose negative 
effects in this market, since the merger would have led to a concentration of almost 
100%. To calculate the concentration that would be reached the Hirschman-
Herfindhal index (HHI) was applied. The result of applying this index gave a result 
very close to 1.0 (maximum concentration value). In other words, once the merger 
took place, competition in the market would disappear.
Added to the above was the analysis of different entry barriers identified by the 
Commission, such as the level of investment required, the positioning of brands in 
the market, the tariffs on imported products from extra-regional countries (both 
merging companies had subsidiaries at the Central American level).
The conclusion was therefore reached that the merger would cause harmful 
effects on the market, since the merged company would enjoy a highly dominant 
position in a market with few threats from new competitors, as a result of which it 
would be difficult to restore competition in the market in the near future. The 
agency therefore considered it necessary to take measures to create a level of com-
petition similar to the one that existed prior to the merger.50
Measures Taken
In its resolution, CPC agreed to request the companies in the process of merging to 
present, within 30 working days, an action plan to revert the negative effects of the 
merger on the market for toilet paper, paper napkins, kitchen towels and facial tissues. 
Subsequently, within the following 30 working days, the Commission could coordinate 
the mechanisms it deemed appropriate to reach agreement with the offending compa-
nies on the measures to be applied. Should an agreement not be reached or the plan 
not delivered within the established time frames, CPC would impose the measures 
deemed pertinent to eliminate the effects of the concentration.
The plan submitted by the companies consisted in the sale of certain brands to 
third parties and was accepted by the Commission. However, there is no record in 
the files that the conditions imposed were actually complied with in the end.
Comments on the Investigation
This case was extremely important for CPC, since it clearly highlighted the weak-
nesses of the system of regulation of concentrations, among which the following can 
be cited: lack of a procedure for prior notification, non-existence of appropriate 
conditions and remedies to approve or reject a concentration and lack of clear criteria 
for in-depth analysis of operations. These weaknesses have been reflected in the small 
number of concentrations in which the Costa Rican authority has intervened.
In spite of the weaknesses detected, the second case, on the pensions market, 
pointed up the advantages of making an ex ante analysis of concentrations. It was 
50 In this context, see CPC-05–96. Preambular paragraph XXII.
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also demonstrated that it is possible to establish relations of coordination with the 
regulatory bodies in this field, as will be seen in the next section.
2.2. Merger of Pensions Operators Banex and Interfin (CPC-14–01)
Case Description
This investigation was initiated in April 2001, as a result of steps taken by the 
Superintendent of Pensions, who requested CPC’s opinion on the merger of pen-
sions operators Banex and Interfin. The consultation was made under Article 47 of 
the above-mentioned Law for Workers’ Protection, which, as we saw, establishes a 
hypothesis of exception whereby prior authorization is required for pensions opera-
tors intending to carry out mergers.
Investigation and Analysis of the Concentration
As a result of the consultation, UTA drafted a report which CPC used as the basis 
for its decision. Below we detail the most significant elements analysed by the 
Costa Rican authority.
Proof furnished
The evidence used in this case consisted of the documentation provided by the 
companies that merged. Likewise, information was available on the rest of the com-
panies in this market, provided by the Superintendent of Pensions.
CPC concluded first, that pensions operators Banex and Interfin were competing 
agents in the market for labour capitalization administration funds and for funds for 
the complementary pensions system. Second, that neither of these two companies 
had substantial power in the relevant market and the merger would not lead to an 
acquisition. Third, despite the fact that at the time of resolution the relevant market 
was highly concentrated, where one or two companies (of a total of ten) were con-
siderably larger than the rest, the merger of two small or medium firms could well 
translate into benefits for competition. The foregoing because it would tend to bal-
ance the agents’ market share.
Measures Taken
CPC determined that the merger between pensions operators Banex and Interfin 
would not have an anti-competitive effect in the market for Labour Capitalization 
Administration Funds and funds for the Complementary Pensions System, thus 
positively resolving the consultation.
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Comments on the Investigation
Had the concentration posed problems in terms of competition, the regulatory 
framework would not have been sufficient, especially because appropriate conditions 
and remedies do not exist. Hence, the necessary amendments to the legislation 
should not only include a prior notification procedure, but also the characterization 
of suitable measures to be imposed on concentrations presenting some kind of limi-
tation on competition.
On the other hand, it is important to reiterate the fact that this was one of the few 
cases in which a sectoral body requested CPC’s opinion on matters of concentra-
tion. The proceeding showed that it was possible to establish good coordination in 
which both regulatory organs respected one another’s spheres of competence. As 
in this market, this scheme could repeat itself in other financial markets, or even in 
public sectors.
3. Conclusions and Recommendations
As in the previous sections, having analysed competition legislation in the area of 
concentrations, as well as the most representative cases, we now go on to contrast 
the most significant conclusions of the previous sections with best international 
practices. In particular, reference will be made to the procedure for dealing with 
these formalities, to prior notification as an investigation tool, to the method for 
analysing cases, and to available corrective conditions and measures.
3.1. The Proceeding
The proceeding provided for by the competition legislation does not respond to the 
particular needs of concentration cases. In this regard, the scarce existing jurispru-
dence has clearly shown that the proceeding laid out in the General Law of the 
Public Administration, N° 6227 of May 2, 1978, is inadequate for approving, 
rejecting or conditioning a particular concentration operation.
For this reason, an authorization proceeding and not a sanctioning proceeding 
should be designed. Specifically, this proceeding should take the following into 
account: (i) the role of the parties (this should be different from a typical sanctioning 
proceeding); (ii) treatment of confidential information (above all, information related 
to the strategic elements of the operation); and (iii) resolution time frames (for an 
authorization request, the proceeding should be as expeditious as possible).
3.2. Prior Notification
Costa Rican regulations place serious limitations on instruments available for the 
investigation of concentrations. LPCDEC’s principal shortcoming is the absence of 
a mechanism for prior notification by the companies involved in the operation, 
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a mechanism considered the main tool available to competition agencies at interna-
tional level (ICN, 2005b). Its absence therefore highlights the inadequacy of Costa 
Rican Law in dealing with this type of operations. This has been reflected in the 
absence of cases processed by the agency, a similar shortcoming as the one that 
formerly existed in the European Union prior to the passing of specific regulations 
on the matter (Goyder, 2000/2001).
One basic principle that should be followed by an appropriate prior notification 
procedure is flexibility in the definition of notification thresholds and requirements. 
Here, the aim should be to ensure that only relevant operations are submitted to the 
verification procedure. That is, CPC should invest its (usually scarce) resources in 
concentrations likely to cause an appreciable effect on the market so as to avoid 
incurring unnecessary transaction costs on economic agents and superfluous use of 
resources by the Commission. Such thresholds and requirements should also comply 
with the following criteria: (i) clear and understandable; (ii) based on objectively 
quantifiable criteria; (iii) established on the basis of readily available information; 
and (iv) laying down a reasonable period of time for the notification (ICN, 2002, 
2005a, b).
3.3. The “Two-Stage” Method
Proper control of concentrations uses up the majority of competition agencies’ 
resources. For this reason it is important to establish a proceeding that makes it as 
easy as possible to review these operations. This is especially important for small 
agencies with very limited resources, as in CPC’s case.
In this regard, the European Union and other agencies in the world have estab-
lished a proceeding commonly known as the “two-stage method” which makes 
possible a relatively expeditious analysis of concentrations. This method or pro-
ceeding is grounded on the fact that most concentrations do not pose any problems 
for competition. Thus, the concentrations notified are submitted to a preliminary 
examination carried out for a short period of time, submitting only concentration 
operations that do pose problems for competition to longer review periods.
Under this system, however, the operation notified may not be carried out until the 
applicable waiting or suspension period has elapsed. Therefore, suspension periods 
should be subject to definitive and easily calculable time frames so as to allow opera-
tions that pose no problems for competition to be analysed as expeditiously as possi-
ble. Likewise, if the operation goes on to a second stage, the time frames and dates 
should be well defined (ICN, 2005b). In short, the proceeding should not only be 
expeditious, but also create the greatest certainty for the interested party.
3.4. Criteria for Analysis of Concentrations and Corrective Measures
Generally speaking, mechanisms for the control of concentrations seek to prevent 
economic agents from securing or strengthening a dominant position in the market 
by acquiring control of competing companies (current or potential). To that end, the 
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premise should be that the market’s structure will affect the conduct of the eco-
nomic agents that form part of it (Conrath, 1995).
Thus, it is normal for investigations related to concentrations to use tools that 
differ from investigations of monopolistic practices. This difference is absent in 
LPCDEC, which treats regulation of concentrations on a par with relative monopo-
listic practices. This is reflected not only in the absence of criteria to analyse this 
type of operations, but also in the lack of measures or remedies for solving the 
problems to which these give rise in the markets.
In this regard, the Costa Rican Law does not clearly lay down the criteria and 
specific technical instruments to be used at the time of approving a concentration 
or not. For example, it makes no reference of any kind to the possibility of using 
indexes to measure the degree of concentration of a particular operation. Nor does 
the legislation provide for the measures or remedies that the competition authority 
can impose in order to condition concentrations. Such remedies can include the sale 
or licensing of brands, the sale of assets, prohibition on participating in certain 
markets for a set time, the horizontal or vertical division of the company, among 
others. In any event, these mechanisms should not only be as wide-ranging as 
possible in order to be able to adapt to the circumstances of each particular case, 
but should be duly characterized in the legislation to ensure legal certainty for the 
economic agents.
3.5. Coordination with the Regulated Sectors
Coordination between the competition agency and regulatory bodies is a key aspect 
where concentrations are concerned. In this context, the pensions case reflected 
good teamwork between the two authorities. However, this was an exceptional case 
in Costa Rica. The rest of the regulated markets do not have this type of coordination. 
For example, under current legislation if a concentration takes place in the banking 
market, both the Superintendence of Financial Entities and CPC could take cogni-
zance of the concentration, but the bank authority would do so ex ante, whereas the 
agency would exercise ex post control.
It is therefore essential to amend all the regulations that cause such conflicts with 
regard to competition. Furthermore, CPC should intensify its competition law 
activities in the regulated sectors in order to facilitate coordination between authorities. 
In this connection, a practice recommended by ICN is to establish such coordina-
tion with the aim of effectively applying the legislation on concentrations and 
obtaining consistent or at least non-contradictory results in the jurisdictions 
involved, as well as reducing overlapping and unnecessary burdens for both the 
parties and the authorities (ICN, 2002) – this regardless of which authority hands 
down the final decision. On this issue there is no uniform yardstick on whether it 
should be the competition agency or the sectoral body that determines whether or 
not a particular concentration is approved. This will depend on the type of regulated 
sector. In any case, the important thing is that one of the determining factors should 
be the criteria with regard to competition.
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II. Conclusions
The fundamental purpose of this paper was to appraise the Costa Rican competition 
legislation and its application by CPC. To that end, we presented a detailed analysis 
of the agency’s work in the investigation of horizontal and vertical practices and 
anti-competitive concentrations. For purposes of the study, the legislation applicable 
to the field was described, as well as the most representative cases, possible limita-
tions faced by the agency, and some recommendations were suggested, in line with 
best international practices.
However, the experience with regard to cartels can be divided into two stages that 
may well be repeated in other countries beginning to apply competition legislation. 
During the first phase, CPC’s investigations were relatively simple. This was on 
account of the fact that in most of the investigations the agency succeeded in obtain-
ing direct evidence of the conducts being carried out, and in some cases the evidence 
was even of a public nature. To a large extent this was due to the investigated per-
sons’ ignorance of competition legislation. This undoubtedly facilitated the agency’s 
work, since in general the main difficulty in this type of cases is finding the evidence 
to prove that a cartel has been formed, as these can be set up without a trace.
However, as economic agents gradually broaden their knowledge of competition 
legislation and CPC applies stiffer sanctions, this reality is likely to change. Economic 
agents will tend to act in a less conspicuous manner to carry out prohibited 
agreements. This means that investigations will become more complex and some agree-
ments will probably remain undetected. In this context, the airlines case somehow 
shows that the agency has entered a second phase regarding investigation of cartels. 
In this case the evidence obtained was of an indirect nature and the investigation went 
much deeper in order to determine whether or not the practice had been committed.
This implies that the competition legislation should be amended so as to reinforce 
investigation tools and establish a leniency programme that facilitates detection of 
this type of cases. In parallel, CPC should apply a policy of severer sanctions with the 
aim of discouraging economic agents from forming cartels. Otherwise, as time goes 
by the current tools will be inadequate for investigating this type of conduct.
In regard to relative practices, the competition agency’s experience has been 
considerably less than in the sphere of cartels. This has largely been due to the 
difficulty in setting up this kind of investigations. Nonetheless, the cases dealt with 
have highlighted CPC’s good technical capability to analyse the economic and legal 
factors involved in such investigations.
The difficulties have to do more with the rigidity of the legal framework in the 
analysis of these types of practices. First of all, LPCDEC characterizes all the pos-
sible practices beforehand; second, the rule of reason fails to clearly lay down the 
possibility of weighing up anti-competitive versus pro-competitive effects. However, 
the authority solved this last point in analysing cases by accepting justification of 
efficiencies.
The above notwithstanding, it continues to be a legalist system that needs to 
characterize beforehand the anti-competitive conducts and effects, which runs 
counter to the very nature of the rule of reason. In this context there has been an 
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important discussion in the European Union on the need to focus on analysis of the 
effects rather than on the commission of a particular conduct. Thus, instead of tak-
ing as the point of departure confirming the relative practice, the competition 
authority should begin by assessing the anti-competitive effects.
This discussion, however, arises in countries with a more developed culture of 
competition than our own countries. That is, it would be premature to change the 
rules of the game when economic agents are beginning to understand the rules of 
competition and the authorities are starting to investigate their first cases. 
Nonetheless, agencies should not lose sight of this discussion, so that in analysing 
a relative practice, the issue that should determine its illegality should be confirm-
ing the anti-competitive effects.
Finally, in the area of concentrations the fundamental problem is that the legisla-
tion fails to adequately regulate this type of operations. Here, regulation of concen-
trations is practically the same as for relative practices. This could be inadvisable 
in view of the differences between measures which by their very nature concentrate 
on market structure and not on the conduct of the economic agents themselves.
Specifically, the lack of an authorization procedure, non-existence of the mecha-
nism for prior notification, and absence of appropriate remedies and sanctions have 
limited the authority’s investigation of anti-competitive concentrations. There can 
be no doubt that these factors are essential for regulation in this field to work prop-
erly. Hence, amending these aspects in the legislation is a pressing need.
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Chapter 6
Banking Competition in Mexico
Marcos Avalos and Fausto Hernández Trillo
Introduction
One of the most widely debated sectors in terms of economic competition is the 
financial system – particularly banks. Although worldwide trends in this sector 
have been moving towards concentration, the available studies conclude that this is 
not impairing competition.
Such trends can be seen in Mexico, where the banking sector has tended towards 
apparent concentration resulting from mergers between financial intermediaries, 
with emphasis on national institutions being absorbed by foreigners. The country, 
however, has failed to enjoy the normal benefits of efficient financial intermedia-
tion. On the one hand, although the interest rate spread (main price in the sector) 
has diminished in recent years, it remains high by international standards; on the 
other, overall sector penetration as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) – 
30% in 2002 – is still the lowest among the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) countries.
The literature seeking to explain these circumstances abounds,1 including studies 
by multilateral agencies.2 Among oft-cited arguments is low sectoral competition 
levels, and it is this aspect our study aims to review.
Competition in the financial sector is not an easy subject to tackle, as a number 
of approaches can be taken from the theoretical point of view. Traditionally, the 
study of banking competition has focused on market-structure theory and concen-
tration indexes. Recently, however, the evidence has shifted, suggesting that some 
markets may be suffering from low industrial-concentration indexes along with low 
levels of competition, as evinced by far higher prices for financial products than 
international norms. The situation looks paradoxical.
An alternative approach that appeared recently was based on the theory of con-
testability in multi-product industries, the main argument here being that certain 
industries offering a wide range of products may in fact not be incurring entry costs 
1 These studies will be referred to throughout this chapter.
2 OECD’s 2002 edition on Mexico (OECD, 2002) was devoted exclusively to the financial sector 
and the challenges facing it.
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in supplying one or more such products. Once profit has been obtained, they can 
exit that particular relevant market cost-free. In other words, companies involved in 
certain markets do have to face some form of contestability on the part of one or 
more entities.
This theory can be applied when identifying whether such entities have to con-
front contestability on the part of other financial or non-financial enterprises within 
the bank market. If no contestability exists, the situation could perhaps be due to 
the presence of some barrier to entry which should not be in place on principle, 
since this could limit competition.
Therefore, this paper maintains that competition should be analysed from the 
standpoint of the entire financial system – or, indeed, examining it in a setting that 
includes other non-financial entities offering financial-type products and services. 
Again, a study on competition in the financial sector should essentially take all agents 
into account; further, it should include the full range of financial products and serv-
ices. Here the well-known saying that “protecting a company from competition gives 
rise to inefficiencies that are paid for by the rest of the economy” (Rajan and Zingales, 
1998) should perhaps be rephrased to read “protecting one industry from competition 
from other industries – whether inside or outside the sector – gives rise to inefficien-
cies paid for by the rest of the economy – more specifically, by consumers.”
This study will include the two approaches to identify bank competition prob-
lems. First of all, we look at the type of market structure and concentration indexes, 
followed by a sectoral analysis based on the contestability theory.
The results suggest that from the market-structure point of view, the Mexican 
system’s bank sector shows no sign of concentration, except for two relevant mar-
kets: the first is note issuance and second, earnings from credit card interests. 
However, our analysis of other market indicators such as sector price levels (finan-
cial margins, coupled with fees and commissions and rates) reveals that competi-
tion is lacking in certain relevant markets within the financial system, prompting a 
review of possible barriers to entry – some legal – in a number of financial prod-
ucts. To put it another way, competition from other financial and non-financial 
intermediaries in some of the sector’s overall services appears to be inadequate in 
the banking system, compelling us to examine one such product – credit cards – 
using contestability as the yardstick.
Contestability theory indicates that barriers to entry – legal ones – actually exist 
in the all-purpose credit card market, since banks are the only institutions permitted 
to issue them. Although cards issued by chain stores also exist, their share vis-à-vis 
bank credit cards differ, the issue here being different relevant markets.3 This helps 
explain why financial intermediation margins for that particular service have 
ranged far above international standards. One product whose price has dropped 
nonetheless is mortgage loans, following market entry by other non-financial inter-
mediaries. In other words, a contestable market open to non-bank competitors has 
led to the ensuing drop in interest rates in this area.
3 Chain store’s credit cards cannot be used outside this business.
6 Banking Competition in Mexico 191
Commission levels in the credit card market have also remained high as a result 
of lack of contestability. The difference compared to more advanced countries 
where fees and commissions have risen in response to the drop in interest levels in 
other products is that these are constantly challenged by other entities, both finan-
cial and non-financial. But high commissions in Mexico – although comparable to 
other countries – are not offset by lower intermediation margins as they are in the 
developed nations.
A policymaking feature on which Mexico should perhaps focus more closely is 
the possibility of reducing certain legal barriers to entry in some niches in order to 
promote more competitive markets. Among the most important are those that could 
make it possible to relax restrictions on the issuance of all-purpose credit cards 
(i.e. those not restricted to particular commercial endeavours) by non-bank agents. 
Similarly, the Mexican financial authority should study the possibility of placing 
bonds directly without financial intermediation, which could be helpful in promot-
ing competition throughout the sector.
This study is structured as follows: The second section presents a review of 
certain theoretical concepts on competition, the third section analyses the status of 
competition in the banking sector, bearing two approaches in mind: the traditional 
view of concentration and the alternative one of contestability. The fourth section 
shows some of our conclusions.
I. Theoretical Concepts of Banking Sector Competition
Not long ago it became more generally accepted that financial intermediation actu-
ally generates economic growth. Many articles have even studied the causal rela-
tionship, both theoretical and empirical, in which a sound, competitive financial 
system contributes to sparking economic growth through different channels.4 In the 
first place, the financial system channels savings by offering a diverse range of 
alternatives for surplus units5 and savings instruments. At the same time, interme-
diaries are better at using financial analysis tools to identify worthwhile credit 
recipients. Likewise, such institutions are more efficient in collecting and process-
ing client/borrower information.
Second, the financial system covers credit risks in an isolated manner, since by 
accumulating amounts from individual savings, financial agents can diversify their 
portfolios by channelling the proceeds into a wide range of investment opportunities.
Third, the presence of financial agents offers the possibility of a greater liquidity, 
thereby allowing savers quick access to their funds while at the same time financing 
long-term projects. Finally, risk management is made easier through intermediaries who 
can follow up on debtors and monitor managers to whom credit has been extended.
4 For an account of this aspect, see Hernández (2003).
5 A surplus unit is a synonym of a saver.
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Financial intermediation can be useful as long as an appropriate operating 
framework exists in which on the one hand, the financial system is competitive and 
on the other, adequate regulation and prudential supervision prevail.
This section aims to review and comment on the current literature and empirical 
evidence that suggests that economic competition in a banking system is difficult 
to appraise and also because no information on costs and cross-subsidies is availa-
ble in this type of industry, which is by nature multi-product. Paradoxically, the 
argument that excessive competition has been one of many factors that exacerbate 
financial crises throughout the world has also been put forward.
One feature that could indicate or suggest the level of competition in a given 
banking sector is access to the industry, or to put it another way, the existence of 
barriers to entry, a factor which has not been the object of much study in Mexico’s 
case. Claessens and Laeven (2003) argue that this alternative approach to the study 
of competition in the financial industry has been possible because traditional analy-
ses have placed too much focus on market structure and market concentration 
indexes rather than on ‘contestability’ in the relevant markets.
For contestability to exist, markets should be fully open to competition, even in 
cases where they are dominated by oligopolistic or monopolistic forces. That is, the 
presence of an inefficient incumbent could result in excessive market price levels 
and absorption of the entire consumer surplus, but when market entry is open to 
potential agents whenever possible and profitable, then contestability will force the 
incumbent to become competitive. Formally, the theoretical conditions for “perfect 
contestability” to exist are: (i) the entrant does not incur sunken costs; (ii) the 
entrant can begin to market its product before the dominant agent is able to imple-
ment a price change; and (iii) the entrant faces post-entry costs.6
On account of its having very clear policy implications, the contestability theory 
can be most useful in promoting an increase in competition in the financial sector, 
in contrast to other theories on competition and economic regulation. Bailey 
(1981), for example, has documented how the theory has been beneficial to the 
design of regulatory measures and economic competition policy in the USA.
To illustrate the above, Table 6.1 shows some indicators for the structure of bank 
markets in the world which suggest that high concentration levels in markets domi-
nated by three large banks do not necessarily imply low – or inefficient – competition. 
As we can see, no clear relationship exists between concentration and greater 
competition: Finland is a case in point, where the three main banks concentrate 
more than 97% of bank assets, while intermediation margins are among the world’s 
lowest. This indicates that the competition faced by these few banks probably 
comes from other, different financial intermediaries (Allen and Santomero, 2001).
Moreover, the changes the financial sector has undergone over the past decade 
in terms of technological innovation and deregulation processes have given rise 
6 The concept of contestable markets is owed to Baumol et al. (1982), who argue that certain types 
of industries are subject to constant contestability resulting from lack of entry barriers and also 




































Countries with high income levels
Australia 146.27 19 0 39 17.1 27 62.95 15 2.41 24
Belgium 315.12  6 0 40 24.1 23 57.39 21 1.15  7
Canada 153.84 14 0 42  6.1 41 55.32 23 1.76 15
Cyprus  76.27 33  3.3 35 10.9 34 78  7 1.6 12
Denmark 121.41 22 0 43  3.7 51 73.56  8 1.86 16
Finland  75.25 34 21.9 18  7.8 38 97.17  1 1.56 11
France 146.8 17  8.7 28 11.6 32 42.43 37 1.08  6
Germany 313.29  7 42  9  4.2 49 17.66 52 1.19  8
Greece 100.21 25 13 24  5 44 59.2 16 2.48 27
Israel 146.67 18 45.6  5 10.7 35 72.1 10 2.18 19
Italy 150.46 16 17 22  5 45 37.1 42 1.93 17
Japan 164.13 12  1.15 38  5.9 42 22.66 49 1.32 10
Korea  97.7 26 29.7 15 0 54 39.2 41 2.1 18
Luxembourg 3,423.18  1  5.03 33 94.97  3 17.06 54 0.36  3
The Netherlands 357.6  5  5.9 32  3.8 50 79  6 1.6 13
New Zealand 153.82 15 0 48 99  1 58.99 17 2.42 25
Portugal 238.29  9 20.8 19 11.7 31 34.2 45 1.6 14
Singapore 801.86  2 0 50 50  8 17.2 53
Slovenia  66.13 37 39.6 10  4.6 48 51.41 27 4.04 40
Spain 155.75 13 0 52 11 33 43.99 35 2.23 22
Sweden 128.91 20 0 53  1.8 52 68.99 12 1.3  9
Switzerland 538.9  3 15 23  8.5 36 67.06 13 0.85  5
UK 311.08  8 0 54 52.6  7 16.2 55 2.2 21
USA  65.85 38 0 55  4.7 47 21.48 50 3.35 36





































Countries with middle to high income levels
Argentina  54.24 45 30 14 49  9 29.8 46 4.9 43
Botswana  28.92 50  2.39 37 97.61  2 91.8  3 5.2 44
Brazil  55.17 43 51.5  4 16.7 28 44.7 33 5.3 45
Chile  96.58 27 11.7 26 32 18 41.24 39 3.82 37
Czech Republic  124.9 21 19 21 26 21 46.26 32 2.65 28
Estonia  59.33 41  0 44 85  4 92.4  2 3.9 38
Lithuania  26.88 52 44  7 48 10 72.9  9 0.13  2
Malaysia 166.07 11  0 46 18 26 41.26 38 2.2 20
Mauritius  96.15 28  0 47 25.8 22 80.7  5 3.17 34
Mexico  30.48 49 25 16 77.1  5 66.6 14 5.55 46
Panama 385.68  4 11.56 27 38.33 14 28.3 47 2.3 23
Poland  54.45 44 43.7  8 26.4 20 39.7 40 4.04 39
Saudi Arabia  92.81 29  0 49  0 55 58 19 2.9 31
Venezuela  6.03 55  4.87 34 33.72 16 44.27 34 13.2 53
Average  91.26 17.41 36.89 54.35 4.23
Countries with middle to low income levels
Bolivia  65.61 39  0 41 42.3 12 49 30 5.6 47
El Salvador  62.39 40  7 31 12.5 30 58.2 18 4.89 42
Guatemala  27.65 51  7.61 29 4.93 46 25.67 48 6.12 48
Jamaica  74.34 35 56  3 44 11 89.9  4 6.9 51
Jordan 213.92 10  0 45 68  6 52.7 26 2.9 30
Morocco  88.74 32 23.9 17 18.78 25 48.12 31 3.33 35
Peru  36.35 47  2.5 36 40.4 13 59.9 15 4.8 41







Rumania 25.49 53 70 2 8 37 57.58 20 3.71 50
South Africa 89.78 31 0 51 5.2 43 57.34 22 2.43 32
Thailand 116.85 23 30.67 12 7.16 39 53.56 24 0.54 4
Turkey 67.35 36 35 11 66.3 6 35.06 43 6.51 49
Average 79.94 20.4 27.53 50.53 4.53
Countries with low income levels
India 47.55 46 80 1 0 53 34.6 44 2.78 29
Indonesia 100.79 24 44 6 7 40 52.8 25 −3.84 1
Kenya 56.06 42 30.6 13 29.4 19 43.4 36 7.5 52
Moldova 25.29 54 7.05 30 33.37 17 49.3 29 17.91 54
Nepal 32.02 46 20 20 35 15 69.21 11 2.44 26
Average 52.34 36.33 20.95 49.86 5.36
Note: Income groups according to 2003 World Bank Classifications are as follows: low income: US$745 per capita or less; middle to low income: US$746–
2,085; middle to high income: US$2,976–9,025; high income: more than US$9,026.
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to a series of circumstances that make competition analysis in the banking sector 
highly complex. Of special note here are disintermediation, removal of barriers 
in certain products (in advanced countries), an increase in international capital 
flows, greater financial integration and a new set of risks to be covered and 
minimized (see Allen and Santomero, 1998).7 Several studies have shown that 
financial systems are more efficient and competitive in countries with low sector 
entry barriers; making lower active equilibrium lending rates possible (see 
Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993).
1. Bank Competition: A Brief Review of the Literature
Focus has been placed on banking from the point of view of individual countries 
and of comparisons among many countries. As mentioned, the traditional approach 
in this regard has been market structure and level of market concentration.
However, recent studies – an important example being Claessens and Laeven 
(2003) – have shown that in the banking industry this does not necessarily mean a 
lack of economic competition. Barth et al. (2004) document that in some countries 
(Australia, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, among others), the assets are 
concentrated in three major banks; their quotient is higher than 60%, as can be seen 
in Table 6.1, and the industry’s operation and financial margins are at competitive 
levels which in some cases are even below international standards. Here, concentra-
tion can play a much more complex role in interpreting the banking industry and 
the financial sector in general, than in other industries.
This may be due to the existence of scale and scope economies in many of the 
products provided by these institutions. For example, one of the major functions 
assigned to the banking system is more effective compilation and processing of 
information on possible credit recipients’ current financial standing. This is because 
economies of scale and scope in this service do exist and these increase in keeping 
with the size of the bank in question (Thakor, 1992).8 Thus, an increase in competition 
as a result of a larger number of smaller-sized banks with less market power entering 
the market discourages investment in the compilation and processing of information9 
on companies considered opaque, which can be very costly for small banks. We 
maintain that this argument should be used with caution as it excludes the possibility 
of related loans in bank conglomerates with large-scale horizontal and vertical 
7 Hence the need for a new set of prudential rules, established in the 2003 – Basel Accords II.
8 In Mexico’s case the authorization and creation of the concept of All-Purpose Banks at the end 
of the 1970s was an advantage in terms of economic efficiency, as shown by Chávez-Presa (1990) 
on finding economies of both scale and scope.
9 Although credit bureaus solve some of the problems of small borrowers, this is not so when large-
scale investments are involved, especially with companies that might be more opaque in the sense 
used by Morgan (2002).
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integration, as was the case in Mexico prior to the 1994–1995 crisis, documented 
by Laporta et al. (2003).
Ideally, a competition analysis should include a detailed study of the price-
setting process to verify whether or not a competitive balance would be likely to 
be obtained. But the literature acknowledges that this industry has special char-
acteristics due to inherent information problems regarding the products and 
 services it markets. Even so, comparing intermediation margins is a generally 
accepted practice in checking that such margins fall within a range in line with 
the standards, although, again, caution should prevail in this type of analysis due 
to cost-structure differences in each country, such as legal frameworks, tax 
 structures, risk factors (political) and other more idiosyncratic factors such as 
income distribution itself.
Equally important would be a competition analysis to look at substitute financial 
products and services in domestic markets; this, however, lies beyond the scope of 
this study. An important point worth considering is whether competition between 
different types of financial intermediaries actually exists, as it does in most of the 
developed countries. Claessen and Laeven (2003) and Beck et al. (2003) have found 
evidence in panel studies that banking concentration is neither negative nor 
 statistically correlated to competition levels, although the authors acknowledge that 
further research is necessary to ensure better grounded findings. The remainder of 
this particular chapter is devoted to a case study of Mexico.
In any case, a review of the traditional approach to concentration,10  complemented 
by some other form of analysis such as barriers to entry or contestability, would 
undoubtedly be of benefit. This is the path we will take over the course of this study. 
It should be pointed out that in order to better appreciate the status of banking 
competition in Mexico, a review of recent developments should be made. At the 
outset, banking competition concentrated on setting the stage for the sale of the 
banks and subsequently, as a consequence of the crisis, on mergers and  acquisitions. 
Therefore, although this study does review such aspects, it actually focuses on more 
recent scrutiny (2000–2004) of competition policy. Furthermore, the necessary 
information has been made available relatively recently, among other reasons 
because an accounting change took place in this sector towards the end of the 1990s 
and also because by 1997 the Federal Commission on Competition (CFC) had only 
just begun to publish detailed information on certain aspects of competition.
2. Banking in Mexico
Over the years, banking in Mexico has been one of the economic sectors most seriously 
affected by the recurrent crises that shook the Mexican economy. Thus, the debt 
crisis in the early 1980s marked the beginning of a new stage for the banking sector 
10 Such as the one presented by García Rocha (2004).
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upon its nationalization.11 Further ahead, the banks were re-privatized and a few 
years later became once again the object of a financial crisis (1994–1995) which 
ended in a rescue operation.12
Since then, the banking system has taken around 10 years to recover, with the 
aid of foreign bank inflows and improvements in the sector’s legal system. Today 
we can say that Mexico’s banking indicators point to a healthier situation from 
the point of view of financial strength. Nevertheless, the evidence points to the 
existence of low competition levels in the banking system, as shown by high 
intermediation margins and the commission levels charged for different services. 
Based on an empirical analysis of foreign bank entry, between 1997 and 2004, 
Shulz (2006) shows that: “FDI had a positive, but limited impact on banking sec-
tor development. The key contribution of foreign banks was the recapitalization 
of the banking sector following the financial crisis. But there is only limited evi-
dence that banking sector efficiency increased as result of a transfer of skills, 
technology, or management know-how. The main reason for the limited impact of 
FDI was the low level of competitive intensity in the Mexican banking sector”. 
It is this aspect we are about to look at.
II. Banking Competition in Mexico 2000–2004
For the purposes of our study, we should point out that in Mexico, as in most coun-
tries, the Federal Law on Economic Competition (LFCE in Spanish) monitors the 
financial sector with the same provisions as those that apply to any other economic 
sector, whether in a preventive manner (mergers, for example), or in its role as 
investigator of any absolute or relative practices that could arise as a consequence 
of a financial agent’s market power.
The law has two underlying principles. The first seeks economic efficiency and 
the second is that the law itself be enforced so as to include all economic agents in 
the relevant markets. From this standpoint, LFCE should formally apply to the 
financial sector to guarantee effective competition and lower the cost of goods and 
services, much in the same way as in any other sector of the economy.13 With this 
in mind, we take a look at the bank mergers that have taken place in the country 
within the context of the worldwide situation.
11 For a fine analysis of the banking situation during the bank nationalization, as well as the events 
that preceded it, see Del Angel et al. (2005).
12 A vast number of interpretations of the causes and consequences of the “tequila crisis” are in 
print. This is not an object of study here, but an interested reader could look at Kaminsky et al. 
(1997) for a review of several crises. For Mexico, an earlier study warning the macro problems 
that lay ahead is Arellano et al. (1993), and among those seeking to explain it are Hernández and 
Villagómez (2000), Calvo and Mendoza (1996), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996), McKinnon and 
Pill (1995), and Sachs et al. (1996).
13 For a wide-ranging discussion of the LFCE’s principles and implementation, as well as its regu-
lation of mergers and monopolistic practices, see Ávalos (2006).
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1. Mergers and Relevant Markets: A Brief Economic Analysis
It would seem pertinent to begin this analysis with a brief review of the mergers that 
have taken place in Mexico, describing behaviour patterns within the financial 
sector as well as the competition authority’s reaction to such mergers. This is 
important, since much of competition policy in this sector has been aimed at ensuring 
that the mergers have not unfavourably increased concentration.
The database for this section on mergers was built mainly from official CFC (in 
Spanish henceforth) resolutions published in the Gaceta de Competencia Económica 
(Economic Competition Gazette), from its annual reports and also from indirect 
sources. The period covered by the study runs from April, 1997, to December, 
2001.14 Most of the cases were reviewed, but in spite of the efforts made, the infor-
mation contained in resolutions was incomplete in certain situations in the sense of 
not including all cases, so we chose only those whose information was complete – 
or practically so; thus, the final sample included 96 cases representing most of the 
mergers that took place during the period covered by the study.
Article 12 of the LFCE establishes the following yardsticks by which to 
 measure the impact of mergers on competition: the degree of substitution of 
goods or services, and barriers to entry such as distribution costs, new  technology, 
regulatory restrictions of a federal, local or even international nature that hinder 
access to the good or service. Thus, establishing the relevant market varies from 
case to case. As regards financial activities, there is a wide range of products and 
services in which there may be a high level of diversification or combination of 
the same. Table 6.2 shows certain relevant markets within the financial sector on 
which CFC bases its decisions.
On different occasions we find that both bank and non-bank institutions offer 
financial products that could be savings- or credit-like substitutes operating in the 
same relevant market. For example, in the specific case of housing loans, different 
financial agents (banks, savings-and-loan associations, credit unions, Sofoles,15 car 
financing, etc.) compete in the market, so an analysis of mergers should include all 
the participating financial agents. Another example is the money market, which 
includes all brokerage operations (Cetes, 28-day Bondes, UDI-bonds, notes, TIIE 
futures and bank bonds) in which around 51 financial intermediaries participate, 
including banks and stockbrokerage firms; likewise for the foreign exchange market 
in which both domestic and international financial agents take part. Finally, diverse 
financial agents such as independent companies, banks and stockbrokerage firms 
compete in the mutual fund market.
14 CFC began publishing its resolutions in April, 1997. It should be mentioned that 2001 was the 
last year an important merger was registered. The database has therefore not been updated to 2004, 
since it would not be relevant to our analysis.
15 SOFOLES: Sociedades Financieras de Objeto Limitado (Limited-Purpose Financial Companies) 
linked particularly to the mortgage-loan market.
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At sectoral level, mergers under the financial heading proved to be one of the 
most dynamic items.16As can be seen in Table 6.2, the relevant market17 for savings 
and credit intermediation by financial institutions in Mexico (all-purpose banking) 
was the one that registered the largest number of mergers (codified under number 
303 in Table 6.2). Another relevant market worth noting in which merger activities 
stand out is that of Afores and Siefores with 16 cases (codified under number 348). 
16 See Avalos (2006), Table 7.
17 The level of disintegration implied by the notion of relevant market is at the product(s) level. The 
base for the Classification System for Economic Competition in Mexico (SICMACEM, in 
Spanish) includes the codifying of over 1,000 relevant markets covering economic activities. See 
Avalos (2006, p. 49–52) for a broader description of the building of the SICMACEM base.
Table 6.2 Mexico: financial sector. main relevant markets regarding mergers, 1997–2001 




303 Intermediation services provided by financial institutions 
to savers and credit recipients in the national territory 
(all-purpose banks)
20 25.6
304 Insurance services covering life, accidents 
and sickness, and damages (insurance policies)
12 15.4
317 Leasing services for car purchases in the national 
territory (NT) (Leasing company, car financing)
 1 1.3
348 Afores and Siefores. Administration of savings for 
retirement of IMSS-beneficiaries (workers) which 
are deposited in individual accounts.
16 20.5
356 Services provided through stockbrokers in the national 
territory
 4 5.1
371 Factoring services in the national territory  1 1.3
398 Corporate banking  4 5.1
443 Mutual funds and exposure investment  1 1.3
452 Provision of reinsurance services in the national territory  1 1.3
472 Services for audits, analysis of financial statements, 
consultancy, tax assessment
 1 1.3
534 Foreign exchange firms in the national territory  1 1.3
677 Provision of financial leasing services in the national 
territory
 3 3.8
722 Insurance and insurance companies specializing 
in pensions
 2 2.6
834 Mortgage credit services in the national territory  5 6.4
888 Mortgage financing service for the construction 
of low-cost housing in the national territory
 1 1.3
928 Lending of transfer services from the viewpoint of 
 acquiring bank to issuing bank; of transfer from 
ATMs to banks belonging to the RED (network) system
 1 1.3
958 Factoring services in the national territory  1 1.3
Others  3 3.8
TOTAL 78 100.0
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To a lesser extent, the relevant markets for insurance policies (304), services offered 
through stockbrokerage firms (356), corporate banking (398), leasing services 
(667), and mortgage credit services (834) were also relatively dynamic.
Furthermore, mergers were classified as pure horizontal and administrative 
horizontal mergers,18 pure vertical and administrative vertical mergers,19 and diver-
sified mergers (or conglomerates), of which there are three types: diversified by 
product extension, diversified by market extension and pure diversified.20
From this point of view, Table 6.3 shows that of the total of mergers, slightly 
over half fall under the heading of “pure” horizontal mergers (54 cases), and 
 second, diversified mergers of various types with 36% of the total (34 cases). 
Among this type, the most dynamic were those known as diversified  administrative 
 product extension and pure diversified mergers with 50% and 17.6% of the total, 
respectively.21
By contrast, administrative horizontal mergers and administrative vertical merg-
ers were not as important in terms of cases. The former represented only 5.3% of 
the total (5 cases). It should be pointed out that this type of merger does not have a 
major impact on the implementation of competition policy as they do not have a 
direct effect on the relevant market and only involve an internal restructuring of the 
firm or corporation to which the merged company belongs. During that period not 
a single pure vertical-type merger was registered within the financial system. For 
the same type of mergers, but administrative, only one case appeared.
It should be noticed that the behaviour patterns in horizontal versus vertical 
mergers are not a distinctive feature of the Mexican banking system. The annual 
reports of certain competition agencies in the world – the USA and the European 
Union, for instance – confirm this trend. It should therefore come as no surprise that 
18 Horizontal mergers are those in which companies compete for one same market. The potential 
danger to competition derived from these type of mergers comes from the reduction of the number 
of competitors in a given market. Nonetheless, horizontal mergers can, under certain conditions, 
actually increase economic efficiency. By contrast, an administrative horizontal merger has no 
effect on the market whatsoever since it involves a company’s internal restructuring. For a wider-
ranging discussion see Avalos and Melgoza (2002).
19 Vertical mergers take place between economic agents carrying out different stages of the produc-
tive process in one same industry. Such operations have no effect on market concentration, although 
they can favour relative monopolistic practices. As in the case of horizontal mergers, an administra-
tive vertical merger has no effect on market concentration (Avalos and Melgoza, 2002).
20 Conglomerate mergers include three types: those known as product extension between companies 
producing different goods but using distribution and marketing channels or applying similar productive 
processes. The second type is that of market-extension operations between companies producing 
one same product but in different geographical markets. Finally, there are ‘pure’ conglomerate merg-
ers between totally unrelated companies, i.e. not participating in related markets, or that do not share 
production technology or distribution systems (Avalos and Melgoza, 2002). In the same way as the 
above types, administrative conglomerates have no effect on the relative market. It should be men-
tioned that CFC does not establish any classifications in case resolutions. Nor does the paper by 
García Rocha (2004) present such a level of breakdown in merger analysis.
21 Murillo (2005) also presents a merger analysis, although not from the Industrial Organization 
viewpoint.
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most of the formal literature focuses on topics related to horizontal-type mergers. 
Nevertheless, this inclination in economic theory has not been altogether well 
received by specialists in this area – particularly by competition agencies. Many of 
the most complex cases addressed by the different authorities have to do with vertical 
mergers or restrictions. Consequently, research in this area still has a long way to 
go if the gap between theory and professional practice with regard to the 
implementation of competition policy is to be reduced.
As for resolutions, virtually all financial sector cases reviewed by CFC were 
authorized, 1% was conditioned and only one case was objected to during the 
period 1997–2001. The latter figure, an extremely small one when compared to the 
decisions adopted by other authorities in the world, is particularly noteworthy. 
Competition authorities such as the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and those of 
the European Union are backed by much stricter laws than in Mexico, and these 
have made merger processes more difficult, and consequently the process of industrial 
concentration, too. In the USA, for example, the evidence shows that since 1940, 
active implementation of US antimonopoly legislation has made it more difficult 
for mergers to acquire market power (see Andrade et al., 2001). In Mexico’s case, 
it cannot be said that the LFCE has played a leading role in comparison to the leg-
islation in that country.
In short, from 2000 to 2004, bank mergers have continued, as shown in Table 6.4. 
Whether or not such mergers have harmed competition is difficult to determine 
owing to the lack of information at the level of each relevant financial service. From 
the point of view of concentration indexes, this has apparently not harmed the com-
petition process, as will be noted further ahead. However, we can point out that no 
pro-competitive effects resulting from the mergers can be perceived either, and fur-
thermore, the effects of scarce competition are reflected by certain phenomena such 
as high financial margins and fees and commissions on bank services. These 
aspects are an underlying feature of the subsection that follows.
Table 6.3 Mexico: resolutions of the federal commission on competition by type of merger 
financial sector,. 1997–2001 (Prepared by the authors based on SICMACEM data)
 Authorized  Conditioned  Objected
Resolution of the CFC Cases (%) Cases (%) Cases (%)
Pure horizontal 54  57.4 1 100.0 1 100.0
Administrative horizontal  5  5.3 0  0.0 0  0.0
Administrative vertical  1  1.1 0  0.0 0  0.0
Pure diversification  6  6.4 0  0.0 0  0.0
Diversification as 
product extension
 5  5.3 0  0.0 0  0.0
Administrative 
diversification as product 
extension
17  18.1 0  0.0 0  0.0
Diversification as market extension  5  5.3 0  0.0 0  0.0
Administrative diversification 
as market extension
 1  1.1 0  0.0 0  0.0
Total affairs 94 100.0 1 100.0 9 100.0
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2. Concentration and Banking Indexes in Mexico
The purpose of this section is to analyse the impact of the above mergers on con-
centration indexes in the industry.
First of all, we should mention the assessment criteria established by CFC. 
Concentration analysis based on the Hirschman-Herfindhal Index (HHI) and 
Dominance (DI) indexes22 is probably CFC’s best-known merger-assessment yard-
stick, having set the following index classification23:
● When the HHI, following the merger, increases by less than 75 points or is lower 
than 2,000 points, the merger is unlikely to be objected to.
● When the DI, following the merger, either drops or stands at less than 2,500 
points, the merger is unlikely to be objected to.
Table 6.4 MERGERS 2000–2003 (Instituto de Protección al Ahorro Bancario (IPAB ) )
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Afirme Afirme Afirme Afirme Afirme












Banregio Banregio Banregio Banregio Banregio
Bital Bital Bital HSBC HSBC
Del Bajío Del Bajío Del Bajío Del Bajío Del Bajío
Inbursa Inbursa Inbursa Inbursa Inbursa
Industrial Industrial Industrial Industrial Industrial
Interacciones Interacciones Interacciones Interacciones Interacciones
Inverlat Inverlat Scotia-Inverlat Scotia-Inverlat Scotia-Inverlat
Invex Invex Invex Invex Invex
Ixe Ixe Ixe Ixe Ixe
Mifel Mifel Mifel Mifel Mifel
Quadrum Quadrum Quadrum Quadrum Quadrum
Santander-Serfín Santander-Serfín Santander-Serfín Santander-Serfín Santander-
Serfín
Ve por más Ve por más Ve por más
Azteca Azteca Azteca
20 18 18 18 18
22 For wide-ranging discussion and application of alternative concentration indexes, see Tirole 
(1997) and Church and Ware (2000).
23 CFC published these criteria in the Official Gazette of the Federation (DOF) on July 24, 1998. 
HHI has values ranging from 0 to 10,000 points (also measurable from 0 to 1) and is equal to the sum 
of the squares of market participations. HHI is widely recognized in the literature and used exten-
sively by many competition authorities throughout the world. DI sizes a company in relative terms 
in comparison with others in the relevant market. Under this index, a merger does not necessarily 
increase the index as in the case of HHI. For instance, when two small companies merge the index 
may even diminish. For further details of this index and its properties see García (1990).
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The indexes for the period 1998–2004 in Mexico were drawn up on that basis. 
Table 6.5 shows the DI and HHI for a series of variables that constitute the 
relevant markets for the years 1998–2004: interest income in favour from 
 securities, fees and commissions and rates charged; and interest income in 
favour for availabilities, assets, term deposits, investment in securities, demand 
deposits, bank bonds in circulation, current loan portfolio, and income from 
financial intermediation. As can be seen, in virtually all these variables both 
indicators – DI and HHI – suggest that a considerable bank concentration does 
not exist, except for bank bonds in circulation from balance sheets, where the 
market shows considerable concentration.24 This factor should be closely 
Table 6.5 Dominance (DI) and Hirschman Herfindhal Index (HHI) headings for the Mexican 
banking system, 1998–2004 (Authors’ calculations based on CNBV)
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Interest income in favour from securities
DI 0.2640 0.3576 0.2306 0.2328 0.1880 0.3260 0.2762
HHI 0.1520 0.1761 0.1310 0.1294 0.1225 0.1444 0.1383
Commissions and rate
DI   0.3532 0.3695 0.3630 0.3360 0.3361
HHI   0.1987 0.1924 0.1853 0.1788 0.1769
Interest income from availabilities
DI 0.8883 0.3917 0.2599 0.2798 0.2304 0.3050 0.3178
HHI 0.3849 0.1912 0.1341 0.1411 0.1371 0.1603 0.1660
Assets       
DI 0.2941 0.2740 0.3003 0.3581 0.3138 0.3206 0.3110
HHI 0.1639 0.1547 0.1485 0.1621 0.1537 0.1528 0.1458
Term deposits       
DI 0.3090 0.2662 0.3180 0.4244 0.3590 0.3421 0.2998
HHI 0.1691 0.1488 0.1526 0.1703 0.1632 0.1638 0.1501
Invest in securities       
DI 0.3700 0.3329 0.2442 0.3214 0.3876 0.4269 0.3624
HHI 0.1769 0.1660 0.1410 0.1653 0.1948 0.2143 0.1713
Demand deposits       
DI 0.2805 0.3064 0.3135 0.3483 0.3180 0.3154 0.3246
HHI 0.1855 0.1891 0.1891 0.2088 0.1906 0.1844 0.1808
Bank bonds in circulation
DI 0.6462 0.7772 0.7172 0.2916 0.4569 0.3185 0.8853
HHI 0.2783 0.3831 0.3294 0.1948 0.2843 0.2408 0.5870
Current loan portfolio       
DI 0.3017 0.2745 0.3063 0.3607 0.2947 0.2747 0.2972
HHI 0.1644 0.1592 0.1591 0.1804 0.1600 0.1515 0.1479
Income from financial intermediation
DI 0,2636 0,2588 0,3197 0,3606 0,3028 0,2718 0,2670
HHI 0,1553 0,1534 0,1638 0,1865 0,1686 0,1496 0,1394
24 Although in most of the relevant markets the DI exceeds the criteria established by the CFC 
itself (higher than 2,500 points), this is not indicative of a high level of concentration in the said 
markets as they do not exceed a symmetrical duopoly, i.e. above 0.5 (or 5,000 points).
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 followed up by Banco de México, since it may affect interest rates and thus 
monetary policy as well.
As we can see, for earnings in favour from availabilities, in 1998 the DI regis-
tered 0.88, an extremely high figure, which would apparently suggest a concentra-
tion level far higher than the criteria established by the Mexican authority itself 
(higher than symmetrical duopolistic case). It should nonetheless be made clear that 
the figures register zero for the two largest banks (Banamex and Bancomer) under 
said heading for that year, which the DI could have contaminated. It should also be 
appreciated that for 1999, when these two large banks published information, the 
DI dropped abruptly into acceptable limits.
Table 6.6, moreover, displays the market share of the system’s three largest 
banks in each of the previously calculated variables for concentration indexes plus 
net profit, which in themselves do not make up a relevant market. As shown, the 
three largest banks generally take a high percentage of market share. This sounds 
contradictory against the concentration indexes.
Beck et al. (2002) and Claessens and Laeven (2003), on the other hand, find 
no evidence of a negative relationship between concentration and level of com-
petition. Let us recall that Table 6.1 shows that countries with such market 
share indicators for the three largest banks did not suggest scarce economic 
competition, either. We reiterate that these indicators do not make it possible to 
determine competition levels. So far, the results for Mexico have been 
Table 6.6 Ccontribution of three largest banks to various incomes of the financial system, 1998-











1998 59.89 74.69 64.33 65.18 64.24
1999 65.82 69.56 61.90 60.22 64.42
2000 52.54 71.79 55.05 57.90 58.08 56.71
2001 51.38 69.87 55.85 59.97 60.21 63.41
2002 49.23 67.68 54.78 57.55 61.46 68.52
2003 59.92 67.70 61.58 59.97 62.40 71.01




















1998 68.37  75.75 64.68 63.02 97.67 85.79
1999 69.66  85.78 64.50 62.57 NA NA
2000 70.06  81.07 62.07 62.93 74.60 72.30
2001 73.03  69.39 63.79 65.50 68.19 67.38
2002 68.33  85.57 62.71 64.87 83.01 69.73
2003 67.72  79.42 59.79 60.12 65.26 63.48
2004 67.37 100.00 57.98 57.20 40.50 48.99
206 M. Avalos, F.H. Trillo
 ambiguous. Therefore, it is advisable to consider alternative paths.25 The next 
section aims towards that objective.
3. An Alternative Attempt: The Contestability Approach
This section introduces the contestability approach applied to Mexico’s case. We must 
emphasize that this type of methodology is in its early days from the empirical 
point of view, although from a theoretical stance it is generally accepted in the 
literature (see Tirole, 1997). In Mexico’s case the attempt is necessary, as it is 
important to explain why, from the point of view of concentration, no structural 
evidence of lack of competition exists; paradoxically, however, prices remain above 
international standards.
Most of the empirical studies aimed at measuring competition through price fix-
ing have been based on some measure of profitability to try to find the relationship 
between concentration and the aforementioned variable. If the relationship were 
positive, it would indicate that price fixing would be less favourable to the con-
sumer, thus harming competition. Berger and Hannan (1989) argue that rather than 
some measure of profitability, it is better to use the different interest rates paid to 
depositors rather than average deposit-taking rates. In a study for the USA, the 
authors found a negative relationship between different instruments’ deposit-taking 
rate and concentration in the bank market. The difficulty they came across, but 
managed to overcome, was registering (colloquially: getting) information on the 
rates for different types of deposits and for different regions of the USA, without 
taking price discrimination into account. The virtue of their study lies in having 
obtained and processed the said rates, which were not available for most of the 
countries in a systematized manner.
In Mexico’s case it is difficult to reproduce such an exercise, precisely because 
detailed information on every financial product is not available on a sufficiently 
long-term basis. Even so, it is worth looking at Pearson’s simple correlation coeffi-
cient to determine, worldwide, the type of relationship (although statistically insig-
nificant) between average cost of deposit-taking (CPC in Spanish), average 
term-deposit rates (DP, in Spanish) and average demand rates (DEI, in Spanish). 
These are shown in Fig. 6.1 below.
The figure suggests an apparently negative correlation, and this is corroborated 
by correlation coefficients which actually are negative: CPC against DP stands at 
−0.41, whereas CPC against DEI is at −0.36. Although we cannot conclude from 
this that there is a statistical relation, nor does it reflect a relation at sectoral level, 
it does suggest that there is evidence – weak – that the latter is determined unfavourably 
for the consumer even though, we insist, these rates represent an average and do not 
reveal the characteristics of each of the products – differentiated.
25 A study on competition for Mexico was made by Rojas (1997), who appraises whether banks 
“steal” clients from one another. This original article uses Markov’s transition chains. 
Unfortunately, it is the only part of banking competition it takes into account.
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3.1. Financial Margins and Competition
Another more heuristic way normally used to try to infer whether price fixing 
in the banking system is competitive is by comparing the intermediation 
margins of a series of countries in such a way as to verify whether the financial 
margin falls within international ranges, mainly regarding countries with 
 developed financial systems.
Table 6.7 shows the percentage intermediation margin measured as the active 
bank rate minus the free risk rate. This margin is an average of active bank rate. As 
may be seen in Fig. 6.2, this margin has been gradually falling off for Mexico, sug-



























Fig. 6.1 Deposit-taking costs and deposit rates (CNBV, Banking System Financial Statements, 
several years, and CONDUSEF)
Table 6.7 Operative costs as a percentage of the balance sheet, 2000 (CNBV and Financial 
Statistics of OECD (2002). For Mexico, the active bank rate is the investment credit and the mort-
gage credit average)
Country Operating cost Active bank risk – Free risk rate
Czech Republic 16.5 NA
Mexico  5.8 7.5
Turkey  6.0 NA
Hungary  4.1 NA
USA  2.9 3.4
Great Britain  2.0 1.8
Germany  1.8 2.2
France  1.0 2.3
Japan  0.8 1.8
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1996 to 7.5% in 2000. In 2003, the percentage was similar, which suggests that it 
remains high with respect to international standards. In short, although the decline 
in the spread may be attributed to increased competition, this may also be due to 
the system’s greater administrative efficiency. This particular aspect follows.
One way to explain Mexico’s high intermediation costs is the high level of its 
operational costs, which include staffing, property, and other costs. If we look at 
Table 6.7, Mexico’s performance is only a slight improvement over the Czech 
Republic and Turkey in this regard for OECD sample countries. This means the 
Mexican banking system could do a little more in terms of efficiency, which would 
in turn result in lower intermediation margins, thereby benefiting consumers of 
these financial services in Mexico. At any rate, comparisons between intermedia-
tion margins are not simple, since these fail to take into account different legal frame-
works, cost structures, as well as the economic conditions and uncertainty prevalent 
in the different countries. We now move on to Fig. 6.3, which makes it easier to see 
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Fig. 6.3 Financial margin banking active rate – free of risk rate (2001) (OECD, 2005)
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Financial product prices vary considerably, and interest rates represent just one 
such factor. In general, the prices of other products that do not represent credit or 
intermediation as such fall within the framework of what are known as commis-
sions and rates for different services. This issue has given rise to much worldwide 
debate in recent years, as it has in Mexico. As we can see, this heading is an impor-
tant one, inasmuch as it provides us with guidelines regarding the existing de facto 
contestability in the sector, an alternative approach to analysis in the sector.
3.2. Fees and Commissions and Contestability in the System
The fact that banking in Mexico has increased the fees and commissions charged for 
the different products and services it provides has been extensively argued.26 Mexico’s 
Banking Association (ABM, in Spanish) has countered with the argument that the rise 
in commission levels is a worldwide phenomenon (www.abm.org.mx). For example, 
this has occurred in the USA, Great Britain, France, Brazil and Chile, among others.27 
But ABM rightly argues that international comparisons require caution, as different 
important aspects have to be taken into account, many of which have been ignored in 
many studies. Such aspects include: (i) characteristics of the product: for example, not 
all cards or accounts are the same, they do not have the same lines of credit for equal 
amounts, and they have different services, among other considerations; (ii) customers’ 
habits in using them: balances, check issuance or window withdrawals, ATMs, 
etc.; (iii) regulation: diverse regulations can artificially raise the cost of certain 
services, whereas others do not do so; and (iv) costs, taxes and market size.
Although such difficulties exist, a study on competition should, heuristically, be 
made on the basis of international comparisons, in view of the lack of detailed 
market information at the domestic level, especially in the developing countries. As 
we have mentioned, it is difficult to obtain information on cross-subsidies among 
the different products and services provided by a multi-product industry such as 
banking (a product with market power in one relevant market can finance another 
product within the same industry).
An international study on competition between different financial intermediaries 
indicates the following:
First of all, in recent years banking units’ earnings in connection with commis-
sion-taking in industrialized countries such as the USA, Great Britain, France, 
Germany and Japan, have actually risen. To keep it simple, we refer to the case of 
the USA alone; although the results obtained for that country have also been vali-
dated for France, Great Britain, and Japan (see Schmidt et al., 1999 for the case of 
Europe, and Miles, 1996, in Japan’s case).
26 This has been stated by the current Governor of Banco de México, Mr. Guillermo Ortiz Martínez 
(in a speech given on the 30th anniversary of CIDE on October 3, 2004).
27 In September, 2004, CONDUSEF prepared a study (CONDUSEF, 2004) on bank commissions 
which also concluded that commissions had risen throughout the world.
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The USA illustrates the point since it is one of the countries, together with 
Britain, which has developed its financial system the most. In the former country, 
following the 1929 economic crisis, the banking system confronted the severest 
crisis in its history, and extremely cautious action was taken in that sector. This 
helps explain the well-known “Q regulation,” which prevented the banking rules 
from being extended nationwide and which placed restrictions on interest rates. For 
this reason the banks, in order to compete for customers, used cross-subsidies inten-
sively within their own enterprises; in other words, they competed by means of 
commission-payment exemptions and further, compensated for this with earnings 
from intermediation. Among other factors, and having relaxed the Q regulation28 in 
1982–1984, this favoured the entry of a series of competitors into the banking 
system, an aspect shown in Fig. 6.4.
This figure shows that banking lost a portion of its share of total assets in the US 
financial system. As stated earlier, this was the result of increased competition 
between different types of financial intermediaries, with emphasis on Pension Fund 
Management Companies and Mutual Funds, as well as stockbrokerage.
Moreover, for some products in certain market segments, banking has con-
fronted competition from other financial and non-financial institutions offering a 
variety of services. One significant aspect is the credit card market, in which airlines, 
department stores and automotive corporations, among others, have issued credit 
cards managed by Master Card or Visa without the need for involvement by any 
28 For an analysis of these regulations and their removal, as well as the consequences of these 


























Banks Insurance companies Pension funds Investment funds Other
Fig. 6.4 Distribution of the financial system total assets by intermediary in the USA (%) (Barth 
et al., 2000)
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bank. Figure 6.5 demonstrates this phenomenon; market share in this US market 
fell from 95% in 1986 to 23.8% in 2000. Clearly, competition from non-bank and 
non-financial companies has increased considerably in that market.
To sum up, banking in the USA has had to face not only interbank competition 
but also competition from other financial and non-financial institutions providing 
substitute products at better prices (see Allen and Santomero, 2001). That is, banks 
have been “contested” by other entities in this relevant market.
Therefore, the banks’ response has been to eliminate part of the cross-subsidies 
in force under the Q regulations, which has increased fees and commissions and rates 
on products that still hold a significant market niche with few substitutes (Allen and 
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Fig. 6.5 Bank share in the credit card market in the USA (Allen and Santomero (2001) based on 














Fig. 6.6 Income from fees and commissions (percentage of GDP) (Barth et al., 2000)
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earnings from fees and commissions and interests in the USA. A negative correla-
tion between these two variables can clearly be seen, which supports the above 
hypothesis. Much the same has happened in the case of mortgage loans, where the 
mortgage market has displaced the banking system in this segment. It should be 
stressed that the banking system’s drop in earnings from interests took place over 
one decade (the 1990s), during which the US economy was experiencing an eco-
nomic boom. This also occurred in at least France, Japan, Germany and Great 
Britain and other countries; this was documented by Schmidt et al. (1999).
To recapitulate, the loss of consumer surplus caused by a rise in commission 
levels is offset to a certain extent by an increase in the above-mentioned surplus 
derived from a reduction in intermediation margins.
Recently, in fact, competition agencies have begun to regulate the credit card relevant 
market in regard to fees and commissions, compelling the issuing companies to reduce 
the latter. This has happened in Great Britain, Australia and the European Union.29
In Mexico’s case, developments as regards increasing fees and commissions have 
evolved differently (Fig. 6.10a). Although in this country the banking system has 
been the protagonist in the financial system, in the rest of the developed world banking 
has recently lost ground. Figure 6.8 again reveals the US financial  system’s distribu-
tion of total assets by financial intermediary, but adding the structure of the Mexican 
financial system in 2004 in the last column better illustrates the point.30 Here lies the 
difference between the US system and Mexico’s. Whereas in the US banking market 
the banks’ share has declined, in Mexico this intermediary continues to predominate 
(with virtually an 80% share of the  financial system). In the USA, the evolution of the 
banking system has translated into lower intermediation margins, thus causing an 
increase in commission levels to compensate for the reduction.
29 The Economist (2005).
30 The structure in 2004 in the USA has remained essentially unchanged in comparison to 2002, 
according to Barth et al. (2004). This author does in fact suggest that a stable situation in the 











Fig. 6.7 Earnings from interests (percentage of GDP) (Barth et al., 2000)
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In Mexico, on the other hand, whereas commission payments have increased 
much in the same way as in the USA, intermediation margins have remained constant 
in recent years; i.e. at high levels when compared to international standards. That is, 
even without competition from other financial and non-financial intermediaries in 
Mexico earnings from commissions have risen considerably, especially in the last five 
years. This particular aspect sets Mexico apart from the rest of the OECD countries.
Figure 6.9 shows the share of earnings on fees and commissions in Mexico. As 
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Fig. 6.8 USA (1950–2000) and Mexico (2004) structure of the financial system (Barth et al. 




















Fig. 6.9 Development of charges for fees and commissions (Prepared by the authors with CNBV data)


















2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Securities interest/total interests earnings Housing loans int/total interests earnings
Consumer credit int/total interests earnings Commercial credit int/total interests earnings
b
Fig. 6.10 a Earnings from interests/total portfolio (CNBV, the banks’ financial statements) 
b Earnings from interests (CNBV, the banks’ financial statements)
are extremely high, fluctuating at around 50% in both cases, which is higher than 
international standards.
This analysis suggests that the Mexican banking system is facing practically no 
competition from other financial intermediaries. In contrast to banking in the USA, 
where fees and commissions have risen but earnings from interests as a proportion 
of current portfolio have dropped as a result of competition, in Mexico, as seen in 
Fig. 6.10a, earnings from interests as a proportion of current portfolio have not 
diminished, but have remained stable over the past four years. It should be noted 
that this happened despite the adverse macro setting in which the country was 
mired, especially between 2001 and 2003. Figure 6.10b shows earnings from overall 
6 Banking Competition in Mexico 215
interests as well as their breakdown. Emphasis should be placed on the fact that the 
former have increased in recent years.
Regarding the composition of earnings from interests, those from securities and 
housing loans have remained stable for the past five years, whereas those from 
commercial credit have even dropped, the most notable being the growth of con-
sumer credit, which to a large extent represents the interests charged for credit card 
use, a market which is practically exclusive to Mexican banks and not open to other 
intermediaries (see Fig. 6.10b).
Another way of highlighting the problem is by reviewing the interest rates 
charged on the use of credit cards. Table 6.8 shows average rates for a series of 
banks. As may be seen, the average level has remained constant for the period 
2001–2004.
This “suggests” that market power under the item credit cards is high. Certainly 
the financial margins (average active credit card rate less passive deposit-taking rate 
– CPC) under this item stand at around 30 percentage points, although it has 
declined slightly over time. Here we should make it clear that this type of credit has 
increased considerably in the last five years, partly due to better economic perform-
ance and partly to the fact that the banks became consolidated during that period. 
However, in comparison to other types of credit, it has increased unusually, so here 
it is pertinent to ask whether this relevant market is concentrated. We would like to 
emphasize that in the preceding section it was not possible to obtain the respective 
concentration index, since CFC does not consider the credit card market a relevant 
one. In our view, as the line of argument that follows will show, it is.
Mexico clearly has a market for credit cards issued by commercial chain 
stores. Although the consumer credit extended by these chain stores has gained 
ground over the past five years, they cannot actually be considered a perfect sub-
stitute for credit cards. This stems from the fact that the credit cards issued by 
banks are generally accepted in a very wide range of business establishments, 
whereas those of the latter restrict the wide range of consumption opportunities 
to a single business. Hence competition among these two types of cards concerns 
different relevant markets, since banking is funded, on average, at a 5% rate and 
lends to its clients at an annual 35%, whereas chain stores obtain resources at 
12% on average, and charge a rate that may vary over a span of 40% to up to 80%, 
depending on the establishment, according to the figures put out by both banks 
and the businesses in question
In fact, according to the General Law on Credit Titles and Operations, the major 
stores are permitted to issue credit, for they comply with the requirement of being 
registered in the Public Registry of Commerce. So the major chain stores would 
have to be permitted to issue generally accepted cards. Thus, the financial margin 
would be reduced, since there would be greater competition in the credit card sector, 
as has already been the case in advanced countries.
We must stress that the financial services provided by commercial establishments 
are carried out through the banks themselves, and therefore such chains do not 
require authorization and their role is limited to extending their own services and 







Table 6.8 Loan rates evolutiona (%) (INFOSEL Financiero)
   2000    2001    2002    2003    2004    2005
Monthly Annual Monthly Annual Monthly Annual Monthly Annual Monthly Annual Monthly Annual
American Express 3.33 39.96 3.115 37.38 3.167 38 2.826 33.917 3.225 38.695 3.284 39.412
Banax 3.957 47.49 3.263 39.16 3.023 36.275 2.818 33.815 3.041 36.490 3.098 37.179
Bancomer 4.013 48.15 3.242 38.9 3.208 38.5 2.947 35.362 3.224 38.679 3.296 39.555
Bancreser 3.6 43.2 3.3 36.3 2.89 34.68 2.912 34.940 2.989 34.96 2.913 34.960
Banjercito 3.75 45 3.083 37 2.819 33.83 2.667 32.000 2.917 35 2.917 35
Banorte 3.729 44.75 2.083 25 2.083 25 2.083 25.000 2.523 25.98 2.115 34.900
Bilbao Vizcaya 2.9526 35.432 3.242 38.9 3.208 38.5 2.947 35.362
Bital 3.75 45 2.917 35 2.992 35.9 2.908 34.900 3.045 25.114 2.968 25.037
Citibank 4.1 49.2 3.3 39.6 3.3 39.6 3.300 39.600 3.512 40.132 3.311 39.600
Dinners Club 3.3 39.6 3.96 47.52 3.75 45 3.75 45
Industrial 3.729 44.75 2.417 29
Scotia Inverlat 3.27 39.24 2.961 35.538 2.798 33.573 2.591 31.091 3.074 36.893 3.075 36.894
Ixe 2.9665 35.6 2.455 29.46 2.798 33.573 1.997 23.96 2.111 25.33 2.283 27.39
Santander 3.27 39.24 2.719 32.63 2.563 30.76 2.727 32.718 2.994 35.456 2.887 34.646
Serfin 3.98 47.76 3.271 35.4375 3.222 35.328 2.959 32.718 3.197 32.971 3.045 33.258
a Rates without VAT
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which, furthermore, raises the cost of the same. For instance, Liverpool’s housing 
and automotive credit is backed by BBVA Bancomer, its Famsa life insurance is 
operated by Afirme and Viajes; Wall-Mart handles the Barceló agency.
Although concentration as such is not a sign of lack of competition, it is a phe-
nomenon that merits investigation by the competition agency in order to determine 
whether concentration exists in that credit card relevant market. A series of indexes 
(HHI and DI) were obtained for earnings from consumer interests, as shown in the 
last series of bars in Fig. 6.11. This market, in comparison to other relevant markets, 
is one of the most concentrated, as it reaches levels of over 0.5 points, which suggest 
a sign of alert for CFC.
This also applies to other financial products in which intermediaries enjoy some 
kind of legal protection, i.e. barriers to entry. For example, in addition to the above-
mentioned issuance of credit cards, the issuance of window cheques, payment 
orders, etc., in other countries is also more competitive by permitting access to 
other non-financial entities. These are areas in which it would be advisable to delve 
into further analysis in the future.
Much the same applies to minimum amounts for gaining access to the purchase 
of stock certificates. In Mexico, most financial institutions require minimum purchase 
amounts for these instruments, which range between 300,000 to 500,000 pesos. 
Small savers with lower amounts are compelled to purchase mutual funds with high 
fees and commissions charged. What also contrasts with Mexico’s case is that in 
the USA one can buy US stock certificates directly without the need for a financial 
intermediary’s charging a commission, on web page (www.savingsbonds.gov) with 
amounts upwards of US$1,000 (even for people from third countries as long as they 
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Fig. 6.11 Dominance indexes credit cards (Authors’ calculations based on information from 
CNBV, Banks’ financial statements)
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study the rationale behind Mexico’s current provisions, for they may be operating 
as barriers to entry into this relevant market.
The above may be exemplified by what happens in the automotive and mortgage 
credit market. Until recently, these sectors fell within the realm of the business of 
banking in Mexico. As of 1996, when the entry of Sofoles became generalized in 
this industry, bank interest rates have dropped considerably under these items, in 
other words, competition with other financial intermediaries compelled the banking 
system to reduce its profit margins. Figure 6.12 shows average rates for mortgage 
loans for the period 2000–2005. Clearly, the rates have dropped over time, due 
mainly to increased competition among the banks and also between various finan-
cial intermediaries, Sofoles being a case in point.31
A similar situation could be experienced in other products, especially those related 
to the payments system, which is where the banks are overprotected. Thus, the credit 
card, payment orders, window cheque segments, etc. could find themselves open to 
other participants, whether bank or non-bank. This would definitely reduce those 
products’ margins in benefit of consumers and financial intermediation itself.
This could occur where other products are concerned, particularly those 
related to the payments system, which is where the banks enjoy excessive protec-
tion. Thus, credit cards, payment orders, window cheques, etc., could be opened 
up to non-bank and even non-financial intermediaries. This would definitely 
reduce the margins for these products for the benefit of consumers and financial 
intermediation itself.
To sum up, if we add earnings from fees and commissions and from interests 
in the USA, we find that the consumer surplus dropped slightly or did not change 
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Fig. 6.12 Average mortgage credit rates (%) (INFOSEL financiero)
31 It is true that this is partly the result of the country’s greater economic stability, but the same 
conditions are valid in the case of credit cards, and the latter have not experienced the sale rate 
reduction.
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By contrast, if we add these two items for Mexico, the consumer excess dimin-
ishes without any ambiguity. It is important to understand that if the fees and 
commissions are excessive; this could be negatively affecting financial interme-
diation and in fact, might be a factor that explains the financial sector’s limited 
depth in the country.
Either way, a study of vertical – not merely horizontal– integration could also 
shed light on competition in the sector, and not only the portion of the sector cov-
ered by banking, but that lies beyond the scope of this study.
4. Epilogue
After this study was concluded, Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público (SHCP) 
and Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores (CNBV) approved the establishment 
of 13 new banks. Most of these included banks belonging to the popular commer-
cial sector, although some are patrimonial banks of considerable international 
standing (see Table 6.9); on principle, this would make the market more competi-
tive. One aspect that the country’s financial authorities should heed is the fact that 
increasing the number of banks would not necessarily promote competition among 
the financial intermediaries. Thus far, it would be difficult to infer any results from 
such a phenomenon, but it may be that by constituting themselves as banks in order 
to compete, the transaction costs would be too high, and therefore any new banking 
entities would perhaps “adapt themselves” to the high current margins, without 
really entering into real competition with the existing banks.
Table 6.9 New banks, 2007 (CNBV)
New banks Type of business Niche/slot
Banco Autofin Automobile distribution Intermediate level
Barclays Bank, Mexico Foreign bank and stock exchange Corporate and high levels
Banco Ahorro Famsa 322 furniture stores in Mexico and 
15 in the USA
Intermediate
Banco Monex Stock exchange and Afores Intermediate level and high 
levels
Banco Multiva Stock exchange and Afores Intermediate level and high 
levels
Banco Wall-Mart of Mexico Supermarkets Popular level
Bancofacil Chedraui and Sherman Financial 
Group
Popular level
Bancoppel Furnitures Popular level
Banco Comercial del Noreste Banco Amigo Intermediate level
Prudential Bank Stock exchange and Afores Corporate and high levels
Banco Compartamos Savings and micro-loans Micro-loans
Banco Regional Banregio Intermediate level and high 
levels
UBS Bank Mexico Foreign bank UBS Corporate and high levels
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III. Conclusions
This study analyses the status of bank competition in Mexico. As we have discussed 
throughout the paper, this is a difficult task as the very process of intermediation is 
a complex one. Morgan (2002), for example, argues that a country’s most opaque 
sector is in fact banking. This is reflected by the work put forward here.
We can conclude that the traditional approach to analysis of structure and concen-
tration, although useful in putting out valuable information, does not necessarily 
involve an analysis of competition. As an alternative, then, we have made use of the 
theory of contestable markets in different relevant markets throughout this study and 
reached the conclusion that Mexico needs increased competition in some of these 
markets to enable more companies to enter the market. The study includes an analysis 
of bank fees and commissions from the viewpoint of contestable markets. Furthermore, 
we argue that there is a future need to expand on the subject by means of studies 
embracing all non-bank and even non-financial competitors in the financial market, 
within the sphere of a multi-product industry covering different relevant markets.
Looked at in this way, the chapter suggests that the theory of market contestability 
may be a very useful tool in ordering, classifying and implementing competition 
policy and economic regulation in the Mexican banking sector. In particular, as 
regards competition-policy recommendations, the study proposes it should focus on 
dismantling entry barriers in the relevant markets where the banking system faces 
scarce competition – or none at all – from other financial and non-financial agents. 
One case in point is credit cards, the analysis clearly showing that there is evidence 
of market power in the said relevant market. Although a credit card market in which 
chain stores participate does exist, the latter does not constitute a perfect substitute 
for the credit cards issued by banks. Therefore, CFC should examine the impact on 
consumer well-being this could have in the credit card market.
The above aspect may easily be extrapolated to other financial products in which 
the banks enjoy full protection (legal barriers to entry). This occurs with issuance 
of window cheques, payment orders, or the acquisition of some types of stock 
certificates. There is no doubt that the entry of new non-bank and even non-financial 
agents in the above-mentioned market segments would reduce financial margins 
and thereby benefit consumers.
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Chapter 7
Findings in an International Perspective
Simon J. Evenett and Claudia Schatan
Introduction
The purpose of this concluding chapter is to summarize and interpret the main findings 
for Central America and for Mexico of the research conducted for this volume and, 
more importantly, to relate those findings to the experiences of nascent and 
relatively newer competition agencies in other parts of the world. In principle, the 
following discussion may serve a number of useful purposes. First, it may help 
relate the Central American and Mexican experience to the broader dynamics that 
are affecting the intensity of competition in developing country markets more 
generally. For example, some of the important policy measures analysed in prior 
chapters, such as privatization of state-owned enterprises, have been implemented 
elsewhere in the developing world, notably in Central and Eastern Europe, Central 
Asia, and some parts of Africa.
A second potential contribution of this approach is to establish just how distinctive 
the Central American and Mexican experience is. The former are generally character-
ized as small economies and, given the belief of some experts that competition law 
and its enforcement should be different in these economies, it will be interesting to 
see just how distinctive the Central American enforcement experience is.
Comparisons with third countries may serve another purpose: the identification 
of alternative policy prescriptions that might be fruitfully considered by policymakers 
in the Central American region and in Mexico. Of course the policy lessons may 
flow in the opposite direction. Care is required here, not least because arguably it 
was the inappropriate transfer of certain policy reforms to the Central American 
region and to the Mexican economy that created many of these nations’ current 
competition-related challenges in the first place.
The remainder of this chapter is organized into three parts. The first part 
summarizes the findings from this research project concerning the enactment and 
implementation of competition law in recent years in Central American and 
Mexican markets. The second part considers the findings from the analyses 
presented earlier of two sectors of development significance, namely, telecommu-
nications and banking. In the third part, some concluding remarks are made and 
new outstanding matters highlighted.
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1. The Enactment and Enforcement of Competition Laws
In recent years, there have been a number of potentially significant developments 
concerning competition laws and their enforcement in the Central American region 
and in Mexico. Between 2004 and 2006, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua 
enacted competition laws for the first time and successfully set up enforcement 
agencies. What is particularly promising is that the laws and agencies in these two 
countries appear on paper at least to be stronger than others in the region (i.e. fewer 
exceptions from competition law were made; the maximum levels of fines that can 
be imposed are higher, etc.). This may reflect learning on the part of certain policy-
makers in the region and, if so, represents a positive development.
Three other jurisdictions (Costa Rica, Mexico, and Panama) have taken steps to 
revise or strengthen their competition law frameworks. Mexico, for example, 
enacted a new competition law in 2006. By and large, these initiatives have seen the 
ambit and tools available to the competition agencies clarified and improved.
Of all the countries studied in this volume, Guatemala has yet to enact and 
enforce a competition law. This reflects pronounced opposition to such legislation 
in that country and is a reminder of the importance of political economy factors in 
determining both the likelihood and terms of the enactment of competition law; a 
point we return to soon below. Overall, though, in the Central American region and 
in Mexico many political economy constraints appear to have been overcome and 
independent enforcement agencies, staffed by professional lawyers, economists and 
investigators and with clearly defined responsibilities, are now the norms.
The experience of other developing countries highlights the relatively supportive 
political environment confronting competition agencies in Central America. There 
are, for example, no cases like Thailand where the competition agency created 
remains both under direct ministerial control and where the overseeing commission 
is comprised of influential businessmen. This combination of outcomes was delib-
erately designed to ensure that the competition law is not enforced – in fact, the 
Thai competition agency has yet to issue certain fundamental guidelines or regula-
tions that will enable it to enforce selected aspects of the competition law in the first 
place. Closer to Central America, in recent years, Peru’s competition agency 
INDECOPI appears to have responded to political pressures and focused on con-
sumer protection matters, effectively demoting the priority given to competition 
law enforcement. This latter example highlights the importance of national political 
support for sustained and effective competition law enforcement.
The studies in earlier chapters also reported that competition agencies in the Central 
American region and in Mexico were not independent of their respective national 
governments in every possible respect. Specific mention was made of the manner 
in which the competition budget is set and any interference concerning the use of 
the associated funds. Matters related to independence have been a significant concern 
in some other parts of the world too. At the least there is a potential tension between 
the effectiveness of enforcement (which is thought to be bolstered by various 
aspects of agency independence) and accountability (which requires political 
oversight of government officials). This tension exists in most democracies for 
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good reasons and in many areas of regulation, and its existence suggests the (political) 
implausibility of advocating full independence for competition agencies. Yet is full 
independence necessary? Some competition law enforcement agencies, such as the 
Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice, have tough enforcement 
records despite being part of a central government ministry.1 Other agencies are 
much “more” independent in a formal institutional sense, yet their enforcement 
records are much weaker. The relevant question ought to be what types of inde-
pendence really matter? In recent years, some experts have come to believe that an 
independent agency is one with the power to open and close the file on a potential 
violation of the competition law (which could involve an investigation that may or 
may not result in an enforcement action) on its own terms, i.e. without political 
interference. On this view the ability to successfully enforce the law unhindered by 
political considerations is what generates private sector expectations about the pre-
dictability of enforcement and the deterrent effects of such enforcement. If this is 
the right perspective, then many of the competition agencies in Central America 
may already have the requisite form of independence.
Another important finding of earlier chapters, which recurs in other regions of 
the developing world, is that the anti-competitive acts facing a competition agency 
are diverse in nature.2 Horizontal and vertical agreements, abuse of market power, 
and trans-national anti-competitive practices have been found to be important in 
Central America and Mexico. This finding does not suggest that each competition 
agency faces exactly the same caseload. Nevertheless, other implications do follow. 
First, advice to focus on one type of competition enforcement action (notably cartels) 
is hard to reconcile immediately with the multiple perceived threats to competitive 
market outcomes in a national economy. Second, advice to nascent agencies to 
focus on competition advocacy seems particularly perverse in the face of significant 
number of alleged anti-competitive practices.
Third, the very fact that a number of anti-competitive acts will have to be inves-
tigated and potentially prosecuted implies that competition agencies face no alter-
native in the longer term but to build systematically expertise and capacity across 
the board. Internal training programmes and technical assistance received should be 
directed towards this goal. This recommendation does not sit well with one finding 
of the studies presented earlier in this volume.3 Those studies pointed out how 
1 Even so the question does arise as to whether this agency’s enforcement record would have been even 
better had it been established with comparable powers and budget outside a government ministry.
2 Evenett et al. (2006) presented similar evidence of a broad range of anti-competitive practices 
alleged to have taken place in sub-Saharan African countries. Clarke et al. (2005) report similar 
findings for Latin America and the Caribbean. Clarke et al. (2006) undertook a similar analysis 
for a broader sample of developing countries and confirmed the findings of the earlier two studies 
mentioned directly above.
3 A distinction ought to be made between the capacity of a competition agency to tackle a wide 
range of potential anti-competitive practices and the actual caseload of a competition agency over 
a given period of time. It may be that the latter is markedly affected by factors other than the 
former. For example, during a merger wave a competition agency may feel it has little choice but 
to allocate plenty of internal resources to merger reviews.
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resource constraints were hampering enforcement activity (as in Central America) 
and that the better resourced Mexican agency specialized in one or two enforce-
ment activities, notably merger review. Taken together, these findings raise the 
question as to what, if any, should be the appropriate enforcement priorities for dif-
ferent classes of developing countries. We do not presume that evidence on the 
prevalence of different anti-competitive acts alone settles this important question, 
even so competition agencies may wish from time to time to revisit the assumptions 
underlying their chosen enforcement priorities.
Many discussions of the impact of competition legislation on economic per-
formance identify a nation’s so-called competition culture as an important condi-
tioning variable. Typically it is argued that a strong competition culture, adhered to 
by a large proportion of the population, can be the result of competition advocacy 
and may well reduce the need for certain enforcement actions. The experience of 
Costa Rica, however, identified a quite distinct relationship between national com-
petition culture and enforcement outcomes. The absence of the former, it was 
argued, has led cartels to operate relatively openly in a fashion that has, perversely 
from the point of view of the firms involved, made competition law enforcement 
easier! How long it will be before those engaged in anti-competitive practices 
revisit the manner in which any agreements are concluded and maintained is 
another matter. Surely effective enforcement activity, including the imposition of 
substantial fines, will encourage those firms that engage in anti-competitive acts to 
take steps which will make the detection and prosecution of their illicit acts more 
difficult for the competition agencies. Greater efforts to hide evidence and resort in 
order to not formalized or implicit agreements between firms are likely to follow. 
Even so, the Costa Rican experience suggests that there may be some “low hanging” 
fruit for a nascent competition agency to pick and, in so doing, to help to build its 
reputation for seriousness as well as strengthening the deterrent value of the 
competition law.
A challenge faced by many competition agencies examined in this study was the 
obstacles deliberately or inadvertently erected by the local judiciary. Laws on 
economic matters are, of course, not new. However, judges may not be particularly 
well versed in competition law and the appropriate role that economics can play in 
enforcement cases and in helping to resolve matters in court. This challenge is argu-
ably universal, i.e. not confined to developing countries. Competition agencies in 
many industrialized countries devote time and resources for meeting with and 
informing judges. Similar seminars are held in developing countries too. Judges, 
often being inherently conservative in nature, may well put some weight on the 
credibility of the competition agency and its track record. Reputation building 
could be very important in this regard.
One reaction to the difficulties experienced with judges is to consider adopting 
an administrative system of competition law enforcement, as is the case for example 
in the European Union. However, this option is not without its drawbacks. First of 
all, unless carefully designed an administrative law system may essentially result in 
the competition agency appearing to be both “judge and jury”, which goes against 
what many view as a basic principle of justice. Second, most administrative law 
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systems have some judicial oversight and so the need to inform judges about 
competition law still arises. Moreover, as European Union’s experience at the 
beginning of this decade has shown, judicial oversight can be particularly tough 
even in an administrative law system. In sum, judges are an important constituency 
whose cooperation and understanding are essential for the smooth functioning of 
national competition law and competition agencies should recognize this fact and 
act accordingly.
Experience in Central America and Mexico also highlights the low level of fines 
generally imposed on violators of competition law. While this is discouraging, it is 
certainly not a feature unique to this region. For example, the total fines imposed on 
the corporate members of the international vitamins cartel, which distorted 12 vitamins 
markets worldwide for nearly 10 years, totaled approximately US$2 billion. Yet the 
estimated total overcharges made by the cartel in a group of 90 jurisdictions (which 
excluded the world’s largest economy, the USA) exceed US$2.7 billion,4 suggesting 
that in aggregate the firms associated with this cartel probably benefited from their 
illegal acts. More generally from time to time, the OECD secretariat collects 
evidence on the magnitude of fines imposed on cartels and compares these fines 
with estimates of the gains to the cartel members. Depressingly, in many enforce-
ment actions the level of imposed fines remains low, in particular when contrasted 
with the estimated gains and this finding calls into question whether current fining 
practice constitutes an effective deterrent to cartelization in many jurisdictions. 
Competition agencies and national policymakers should give further consideration 
to the adequacy of existing fines and to whether fines ought to be supplemented by 
other sanctions for anti-competitive acts, including incarceration.
Recent Central American and Mexican experience replicates another challenge 
facing many competition agencies worldwide, namely, the relationship between 
competition legislation and its enforcement and sectoral regulation. As is well 
known, competition agencies have typically come later to the field of economic 
regulation and it should not be surprising that some existing government agencies 
and ministries have, or claim to have, powers whose execution impinges one way 
or the other on the effectiveness of competition law. Aware of the potential future 
encroachment on “their turf”, many established government bodies were often able 
to get whole economic sectors or activities exempted from the ambit of competition 
law. Others have found that they can ignore the recommendations of the competi-
tion agency at little or no cost.
In principle, in many cases there need not be any tension between a competition 
agency (with a pro-efficiency mandate) and a sectoral regulator (whose statutory 
goals are often non-economic in nature). Indeed, a competition agency may have 
some suggestions as to how the sectoral regulator might be able to meet its legal 
mandate with less distortion to competitive processes and ultimately to market out-
comes. This beneficial relationship, alas, rarely comes to pass, not least because of 
factors which rose at the end of the last paragraph. What can be done to improve 
4 For details see Clarke and Evenett (2003).
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matters? One option is to legally mandate an institutional mechanism which effectively 
gives voice and clout to the competition agency in the regulatory process. For 
example, a competition agency may be given the right to comment on proposed 
regulation and legislation before the latter is implemented and, going further, an 
obligation on the regulator to explain publicly why it rejected any advice from a 
competition agency could be created.
At present very few nations, with Korea being perhaps the only serious example, 
give their competition agencies the voice and clout to effectively advance proposals 
for pro-competitive regulations. Without such clout the question arises (to para-
phrase Stalin’s inquiry about the Pope in World War II) “How many divisions does 
the competition agency have?” In short, even if the competition agency’s arguments 
are correct, why should another government agency (or indeed politician for that 
matter) privilege those ideas over others that have the backing of more influential 
interests? Still, one should not get too depressed here as there have been some 
examples where competition agencies have claimed to have influenced the design 
and implementation of state-imposed regulation. What policymakers and researchers 
need to discern is whether these examples are extraordinary exceptions or whether 
any replicable lessons can be distilled from them.
In this section we have attempted to relate where possible many of the charac-
teristics, challenges, and outcomes associated with competition agencies in Central 
America and Mexico to comparable features in the experiences of other jurisdic-
tions, in particular those in developing countries. In this section we have attempted 
to relate where possible many of the characteristics, challenges, and outcomes 
associated with competition agencies in Central America and Mexico to comparable 
features in the experiences of other jurisdictions, in particular those in developing 
countries. Notwithstanding that Central American countries and Mexico have some 
features of their own regarding competition law-related experiences; arguing that 
they are particularly distinctive would be a little overstretched. The challenges they 
face are in many ways similar to those of many other countries and, therefore, fur-
ther opportunities for cross-country learning and the exchange of experiences 
should be tapped.
2.  Promoting Competition in the Telecommunications 
and Banking Sectors
If mines and ports represented the foundations of many developing countries’ 
engagement with the world trading system in the early post-war era, then banks and 
telecommunications are two of their modern day counterparts. Both of the latter 
sectors influence, sometimes significantly, the cost of, and the time in, which local 
businesses can respond to the opportunities created by national reforms and globali-
zation. Unreliable and expensive fixed telephone lines, cell phones, or Internet 
connections can seriously disrupt supply chains, preventing companies from devel-
oping countries from reaching even the first step on the ladder of their sector’s 
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cutting-edge international production networks. Inefficient and unresponsive banks 
can add substantial transaction costs to domestic and international commerce. 
Moreover, very poorly regulated banks can trigger financial panics and crises of 
confidence – all of which undermines support for markets and market reforms. The 
studies in this volume take these two sectors potential contributions to development 
as given and consider a slightly narrow matter: what role can competition principles 
and competition law play in the overall regulation of these sectors? Again specific 
reference was made to the experiences of nations and firms in the Central American 
region and in Mexico.
Interestingly the reason why competition principles have gained some promi-
nence in discussions about policies towards these two sectors was the latter’s prior 
unsatisfactory performance. In the telecommunications sector privatization and 
other sectoral reforms were supposed to result in a substantial increase in the quality 
of services, along with a reduction in the prices charged to all end users (and not just 
to large commercial buyers of telephony services). In banking the combination of a 
number of financial crises as well as a gap between national banking performance 
and internationally agreed standards triggered a rethink by some policymakers about 
the optimal mix of different types of regulation and competition. Digging deeper, 
failures in sectoral regulation appear to underlie the unsatisfactory outcomes in both 
sectors and a challenge facing policymakers and competition agencies is to identify 
which, if any, elements of current sectoral regulation should be retained.
The experiences of other regions, notably in East Asia, suggest that resort to 
competition principles in a second (or a third) round of regulatory reform should 
not be taken for granted. The question should arise as to why those principles were 
ignored in the initial round of reform. Strong commercial and often bureaucratic 
interests were often able to persuade policymakers to undertake liberalization 
(whether in the form of privatization or the removal of restrictions on bank activities) 
while arguing against taking additional measures to promote competition in the 
relevant markets that could, in certain circumstances, call for state intervention. 
Non-intervention was the mantra of the day. (Indeed one can imagine an impatient 
policymaker asking a proponent of a pro-competitive regulatory framework: “Well, 
do markets work or not? If so, then why bother with back-up regulations to cope 
with XXX problems?” Pithy answers to this line of questioning may not have been 
easy to come by.)
The supplementary question to ask is whether the unsatisfactory performance 
after the first round of reforms has sufficiently weakened those forces that initially 
opposed the potential introduction of competition-promoting state measures? If 
those forces still remain strong then there must surely be some doubt as to what a 
second round of potentially pro-competitive regulation will accomplish. These 
observations highlight the enduring importance of the relative strength of different 
political economy actors in the design of economic reforms and not just in their 
implementation.
With respect to telecommunications, a current and likely recurring problem in 
Central America and Mexico concerns the behaviour of privatized incumbent firms. 
In the landline market, for example, the incumbents in Mexico, Nicaragua, and 
230 S.J. Evenett, C. Schatan
Panama have been given a certain period of time to enjoy the exclusive (i.e. monopoly) 
right to supply their respective national markets. It was said by policymakers that 
this interval would be used to enable the incumbents to raise their competitiveness 
so that they could eventually be able to withstand and take on new competitors. 
These measures are tantamount to the infant industry protection measures, whose 
track record in Latin America and elsewhere has been disappointing. Worse, once 
competition is allowed, incumbent firms may be able to discourage new rivals by 
charging large fees to the latter for the use of the former’s network infrastructure. 
The associated investigations into such interconnection charges tend to be very 
detailed (placing considerable demands on the competition agency) and controversial. 
Moreover, a strengthened private sector incumbent may also develop the political 
clout to delay, and ultimately to frustrate, the introduction of new competition. 
Competition agencies seeking to advance competition principles in the telecommu-
nications sectors need to be cognizant of the incumbent firms’ strategies towards 
lobbying and rivals.
Since the design of privatization schemes appears to critically define post-
implementation incumbent performance, it should not be surprising that many have 
argued that competition advocacy could play a helpful role at this stage. Advocating 
for measures to simultaneously privatize and liberalize entry conditions in telecom-
munications is one recommended option. (Indeed, according to some of the studies 
presented in this volume such an option has delivered good results in El Salvador 
and in Guatemala.) A second option is to ensure that there is a clear, predictable 
post-privatization pro-competition enforcement regime with sufficient investigative 
powers and capacity to sanction. In its competition advocacy on such matters competi-
tion agencies may want to identify allies inside and outside government that are 
committed to seeking more pro-competitive post-privatization outcomes.
The promotion of entry by new suppliers has yielded substantial benefits in 
telecommunications. Nowhere is this clearer than in mobile telephony. The ability 
of new entrants to provide related services without having to use or invest in the 
incumbent’s existing infrastructure has effectively reduced an important barrier to 
entry. The impact on prices, access (especially to the poor), and innovation has been 
impressive. The lessons for policymakers are not just to oppose barriers to entry but 
also to be vigilant about any rearguard anti-competitive actions that the incumbent 
firms may take.
Turning now to the banking system in Central America and Mexico it is impor-
tant to appreciate the diversity of experience among these countries in terms of 
regulatory structures and outcomes. Costa Rica, for example, exempted its banking 
sector from the application of its national competition law, whereas Panama long 
ago stripped away barriers to entry into banking and has developed an internationally 
competitive banking sector with appropriate regulatory oversight. Some countries 
in this region have suffered from financial crises, but not all.
An interesting difference between the Central American and Mexico banking 
system concerns the manner in which international factors are altering the industrial 
organization of respective national banking sectors. In Mexico, for example, many 
foreign banks have taken over domestic banks but the degree of inter-firm rivalry 
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appears little unchanged. (Earlier in this volume it was argued that Mexico’s com-
petition agency has done little to effectively alter these outcomes.) In contrast, 
Central American banks have expanded into their neighbours’ economies and com-
petition has risen accordingly, though recently large international banks have begun 
to enter the region too. Available choices have grown and downward pressure on 
commissions has intensified. It will be interesting to see, as happened in Mexico 
(and examined in this book) and in Europe, whether the greater expansion of banks 
eventually leads to cross-border consolidation, a reduction in inter-firm rivalry, and 
an increase in spreads between deposit and loan interest rates.5 Should such con-
solidation start to occur also in Central America, competition agencies in the region 
should be particularly vigilant and take a more active role in the financial sector 
than they have had up to now.
3. Concluding Remarks
In this sector we discuss two recurring and important themes that have been discussed 
in many places throughout this book. The first is that competition agencies should not 
take as given either both market outcomes and industrial organizations they face or 
the policy environment confronting current and potential suppliers. Many authors 
have stressed the importance of so-called competition advocacy, the support for state 
measures (including, in some cases, decisions to liberalize and decisions not to inter-
vene) that promote competition between firms and more efficient market outcomes. 
While it is important to recognize that advocacy can complement the enforcement 
activities of a competition agency, this volume’s studies do not support the notion that 
advocacy can entirely substitute for the later.
Yet, arguing that there is a role for advocacy is not to suggest that it is necessarily 
easy or effective. Indeed, one of the outstanding questions at the end of this study is 
to better understand the circumstances under which advocacy by competition agencies 
makes a long-term contribution to promoting markets. Making progress on this 
question requires thinking through the potential role and consequences of the com-
petition agency as an actor in national political processes, and it is not just the tech-
nocratic matter of getting the policy recommendations and analysis correct. Part of 
this discussion could also include an evaluation of the relative merits of introducing 
government mechanisms to give competition agency’s the right to comment, possi-
bly to redraft, and perhaps even to veto, suggestions for new societal regulations.
A second theme in this book is the growing importance of regional factors in 
shaping international deliberations and outcomes on competition-related matters. 
On a number of occasions it was argued that Mexican experience provided useful 
pointers to countries in the Central American region. For Mexico, having a cooperation 
agreement with the USA on competition matters has probably helped. A similar 
5 For evidence on the later in Europe see Evenett (2003a).
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cooperation between all Central American countries and the USA might be very 
useful too. Better understanding of the mechanisms by which policymakers and 
competition experts learn from other countries’ experiences and which, if any, 
international fora actually facilitate such learning would be useful. This is in addi-
tion to the processes developing between competition agencies that promote the 
exchange of information about investigations and associated anti-competitive acts 
and strong technical knowledge and best practices. Much more work needs to be 
done here by competition agencies and researchers alike, to understand how best to 
strengthen the appropriate enforcement of competition law by relatively smaller 
nations operating in an increasingly globalized economy.
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